(Slip Opinion)
`
`OCTOBER TERM, 2020
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
`NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`Syllabus
`
`BRNOVICH, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARIZONA,
`ET AL. v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE ET AL.
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`No. 19–1257. Argued March 2, 2021—Decided July 1, 2021*
`Arizona law generally makes it very easy to vote. Voters may cast their
`ballots on election day in person at a traditional precinct or a “voting
`center” in their county of residence. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §16–411(B)(4).
`Arizonans also may cast an “early ballot” by mail up to 27 days before
`an election, §§16–541, 16–542(C), and they also may vote in person at
`an early voting location in each county, §§16–542(A), (E). These cases
`involve challenges under §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) to
`aspects of the State’s regulations governing precinct-based election-
`day voting and early mail-in voting. First, Arizonans who vote in per-
`son on election day in a county that uses the precinct system must vote
`in the precinct to which they are assigned based on their address. See
`§16–122; see also §16–135. If a voter votes in the wrong precinct, the
`vote is not counted. Second, for Arizonans who vote early by mail, Ar-
`izona House Bill 2023 (HB 2023) makes it a crime for any person other
`than a postal worker, an elections official, or a voter’s caregiver, family
`member, or household member to knowingly collect an early ballot—
`either before or after it has been completed. §§16–1005(H)–(I).
` The Democratic National Committee and certain affiliates filed suit,
`alleging that both the State’s refusal to count ballots cast in the wrong
`precinct and its ballot-collection restriction had an adverse and dispar-
`ate effect on the State’s American Indian, Hispanic, and African-Amer-
`ican citizens in violation of §2 of the VRA. Additionally, they alleged
`that the ballot-collection restriction was “enacted with discriminatory
`
`
`
`——————
`* Together with No. 19–1258, Arizona Republican Party et al. v. Dem-
`ocratic National Committee et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
`
`

`

`2
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`
`BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
`
`Syllabus
`intent” and thus violated both §2 of the VRA and the Fifteenth Amend-
`ment. The District Court rejected all of the plaintiffs’ claims. The
`court found that the out-of-precinct policy had no “meaningfully dis-
`parate impact” on minority voters’ opportunities to elect representa-
`tives of their choice. Turning to the ballot-collection restriction, the
`court found that it was unlikely to cause “a meaningful inequality” in
`minority voters’ electoral opportunities and that it had not been en-
`acted with discriminatory intent. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit
`affirmed, but the en banc court reversed. It first concluded that both
`the out-of-precinct policy and the ballot-collection restriction imposed
`a disparate burden on minority voters because they were more likely
`to be adversely affected by those rules. The en banc court also held
`that the District Court had committed clear error in finding that the
`ballot-collection law was not enacted with discriminatory intent.
`Held: Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy and HB 2023 do not violate §2 of
`the VRA, and HB 2023 was not enacted with a racially discriminatory
`purpose. Pp. 12–37.
`
`(a) Two threshold matters require the Court’s attention. First, the
`Court rejects the contention that no petitioner has Article III standing
`to appeal the decision below as to the out-of-precinct policy. All that
`is needed to entertain an appeal of that issue is one party with stand-
`ing. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsyl-
`vania, 591 U. S. ___, ___, n. 6. Attorney General Brnovich, as an au-
`thorized representative of the State (which intervened below) in any
`action in federal court, fits the bill. See Virginia House of Delegates v.
`Bethune-Hill, 587 U. S. ___, ___. Second, the Court declines in these
`cases to announce a test to govern all VRA §2 challenges to rules that
`specify the time, place, or manner for casting ballots. It is sufficient
`for present purposes to identify certain guideposts that lead to the
`Court’s decision in these cases. Pp. 12–13.
`
`(b) The Court’s statutory interpretation starts with a careful consid-
`eration of the text. Pp. 13–25.
`
`
`(1) The Court first construed the current version of §2 in Thorn-
`burg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, which was a vote-dilution case where the
`Court took its cue from §2’s legislative history. The Court’s many sub-
`sequent vote-dilution cases have followed the path Gingles charted.
`Because the Court here considers for the first time how §2 applies to
`generally applicable time, place, or manner voting rules, it is appro-
`priate to take a fresh look at the statutory text. Pp. 13–14.
`
`
`(2) In 1982, Congress amended the language in §2 that had been
`interpreted to require proof of discriminatory intent by a plurality of
`the Court in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55. In place of that language,
`§2(a) now uses the phrase “in a manner which results in a denial or
`
`

`

`
`
`Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Syllabus
`
`3
`
`abridgement of the right . . . to vote on account of race or color.” Sec-
`tion 2(b) in turn explains what must be shown to establish a §2 viola-
`tion. Section 2(b) states that §2 is violated only where “the political
`processes leading to nomination or election” are not “equally open to
`participation” by members of the relevant protected group “in that its
`members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate
`to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
`their choice.” (Emphasis added.) In §2(b), the phrase “in that” is “used
`to specify the respect in which a statement is true.” New Oxford Amer-
`ican Dictionary 851. Thus, equal openness and equal opportunity are
`not separate requirements. Instead, it appears that the core of §2(b)
`is the requirement that voting be “equally open.” The statute’s refer-
`ence to equal “opportunity” may stretch that concept to some degree to
`include consideration of a person’s ability to use the means that are
`equally open. But equal openness remains the touchstone. Pp. 14–15.
`
`
`(3) Another important feature of §2(b) is its “totality of circum-
`stances” requirement. Any circumstance that has a logical bearing on
`whether voting is “equally open” and affords equal “opportunity” may
`be considered. Pp. 15–21.
`
`
`
`(i) The Court mentions several important circumstances but
`does not attempt to compile an exhaustive list. Pp. 15–19.
`
`
`
`
`(A) The size of the burden imposed by a challenged voting
`rule is highly relevant. Voting necessarily requires some effort and
`compliance with some rules; thus, the concept of a voting system that
`is “equally open” and that furnishes equal “opportunity” to cast a ballot
`must tolerate the “usual burdens of voting.” Crawford v. Marion
`County Election Bd., 553 U. S. 181, 198. Mere inconvenience is insuf-
`ficient. P. 16.
`
`
`
`
`(B) The degree to which a voting rule departs from what was
`standard practice when §2 was amended in 1982 is a relevant consid-
`eration. The burdens associated with the rules in effect at that time
`are useful in gauging whether the burdens imposed by a challenged
`rule are sufficient to prevent voting from being equally “open” or fur-
`nishing an equal “opportunity” to vote in the sense meant by §2. Wide-
`spread current use is also relevant. Pp. 17–18.
`
`
`
`
`(C) The size of any disparities in a rule’s impact on members
`of different racial or ethnic groups is an important factor to consider.
`Even neutral regulations may well result in disparities in rates of vot-
`ing and noncompliance with voting rules. The mere fact that there is
`some disparity in impact does not necessarily mean that a system is
`not equally open or that it does not give everyone an equal opportunity
`to vote. And small disparities should not be artificially magnified. P.
`18.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`(D) Consistent with §2(b)’s reference to a States’ “political
`
`

`

`4
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`
`BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
`
`Syllabus
`processes,” courts must consider the opportunities provided by a
`State’s entire system of voting when assessing the burden imposed by
`a challenged provision. Thus, where a State provides multiple ways to
`vote, any burden associated with one option cannot be evaluated with-
`out also taking into account the other available means. P. 18.
`
`
`
`
`(E) The strength of the state interests—such as the strong
`and entirely legitimate state interest in preventing election fraud—
`served by a challenged voting rule is an important factor. Ensuring
`that every vote is cast freely, without intimidation or undue influence,
`is also a valid and important state interest. In determining whether a
`rule goes too far “based on the totality of circumstances,” rules that are
`supported by strong state interests are less likely to violate §2. Pp.
`18–19.
`
`
`
`(ii) Some factors identified in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S.
`30, were designed for use in vote-dilution cases and are plainly inap-
`plicable in a case that involves a challenge to a facially neutral time,
`place, or manner voting rule. While §2(b)’s “totality of circumstances”
`language permits consideration of certain other Gingles factors, their
`only relevance in cases involving neutral time, place, and manner rules
`is to show that minority group members suffered discrimination in the
`past and that effects of that discrimination persist. The disparate-im-
`pact model employed in Title VII and Fair Housing Act cases is not
`useful here. Pp. 19–21.
`
`
`(4) Section 2(b) directs courts to consider “the totality of circum-
`stances,” but the dissent would make §2 turn almost entirely on one
`circumstance: disparate impact. The dissent also would adopt a least-
`restrictive means requirement that would force a State to prove that
`the interest served by its voting rule could not be accomplished in any
`other less burdensome way. Such a requirement has no footing in the
`text of §2 or the Court’s precedent construing it and would have the
`potential to invalidate just about any voting rule a State adopts. Sec-
`tion 2 of the VRA provides vital protection against discriminatory vot-
`ing rules, and no one suggests that discrimination in voting has been
`extirpated or that the threat has been eliminated. Even so, §2 does
`not transfer the States’ authority to set non-discriminatory voting
`rules to the federal courts. Pp. 21–25.
`
`(c) Neither Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy nor its ballot-collection
`law violates §2 of the VRA. Pp. 25–34.
`
`
`(1) Having to identify one’s polling place and then travel there to
`vote does not exceed the “usual burdens of voting.” Crawford, 553
`U. S., at 198. In addition, the State made extensive efforts to reduce
`the impact of the out-of-precinct policy on the number of valid votes
`ultimately cast, e.g., by sending a sample ballot to each household that
`includes a voter’s proper polling location. The burdens of identifying
`
`

`

`
`
`Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Syllabus
`
`5
`
`and traveling to one’s assigned precinct are also modest when consid-
`ering Arizona’s “political processes” as a whole. The State offers other
`easy ways to vote, which likely explains why out-of-precinct votes on
`election day make up such a small and apparently diminishing portion
`of overall ballots cast.
` Next, the racial disparity in burdens allegedly caused by the out-of-
`precinct policy is small in absolute terms. Of the Arizona counties that
`reported out-of-precinct ballots in the 2016 general election, a little
`over 1% of Hispanic voters, 1% of African-American voters, and 1% of
`Native American voters who voted on election day cast an out-of-pre-
`cinct ballot. For non-minority voters, the rate was around 0.5%. A
`procedure that appears to work for 98% or more of voters to whom it
`applies—minority and non-minority alike—is unlikely to render a sys-
`tem unequally open.
` Appropriate weight must be given to the important state interests
`furthered by precinct-based voting. It helps to distribute voters more
`evenly among polling places; it can put polling places closer to voter
`residences; and it helps to ensure that each voter receives a ballot that
`lists only the candidates and public questions on which he or she can
`vote. Precinct-based voting has a long pedigree in the United States,
`and the policy of not counting out-of-precinct ballots is widespread.
` The Court of Appeals discounted the State’s interests because it
`found no evidence that a less restrictive alternative would threaten the
`integrity of precinct-based voting. But §2 does not require a State to
`show that its chosen policy is absolutely necessary or that a less re-
`strictive means would not adequately serve the State’s objectives.
`Considering the modest burdens allegedly imposed by Arizona’s out-
`of-precinct policy, the small size of its disparate impact, and the State’s
`justifications, the rule does not violate §2. Pp. 25–30.
`
`
`(2) Arizona’s HB 2023 also passes muster under §2. Arizonans
`can submit early ballots by going to a mailbox, a post office, an early
`ballot drop box, or an authorized election official’s office. These options
`entail the “usual burdens of voting,” and assistance from a statutorily
`authorized proxy is also available. The State also makes special pro-
`vision for certain groups of voters who are unable to use the early vot-
`ing system. See §16–549(C). And here, the plaintiffs were unable to
`show the extent to which HB 2023 disproportionately burdens minor-
`ity voters.
` Even if the plaintiffs were able to demonstrate a disparate burden
`caused by HB 2023, the State’s “compelling interest in preserving the
`integrity of its election procedures” would suffice to avoid §2 liability.
`Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1, 4. The Court of Appeals viewed the
`State’s justifications for HB 2023 as tenuous largely because there was
`no evidence of early ballot fraud in Arizona. But prevention of fraud
`
`

`

`6
`
`
`BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
`
`Syllabus
`is not the only legitimate interest served by restrictions on ballot col-
`lection. Third-party ballot collection can lead to pressure and intimi-
`dation. Further, a State may take action to prevent election fraud
`without waiting for it to occur within its own borders. Pp. 30–34.
`
`(d) HB 2023 was not enacted with a discriminatory purpose, as the
`District Court found. Appellate review of that conclusion is for clear
`error. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 287–288. The Dis-
`trict Court’s finding on the question of discriminatory intent had am-
`ple support in the record. The court considered the historical back-
`ground and the highly politicized sequence of events leading to HB
`2023’s enactment; it looked for any departures from the normal legis-
`lative process; it considered relevant legislative history; and it weighed
`the law’s impact on different racial groups. See Arlington Heights v.
`Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266–268. The
`court found HB 2023 to be the product of sincere legislative debate over
`the wisdom of early mail-in voting and the potential for fraud. And it
`took care to distinguish between racial motives and partisan motives.
`The District Court’s interpretation of the evidence was plausible based
`on the record, so its permissible view is not clearly erroneous. See An-
`derson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 573–574. The Court of Appeals
`concluded that the District Court committed clear error by failing to
`apply a “cat’s paw” theory—which analyzes whether an actor was a
`“dupe” who was “used by another to accomplish his purposes.” That
`theory has its origin in employment discrimination cases and has no
`application to legislative bodies. Pp. 34–37.
`948 F. 3d 989, reversed and remanded.
` ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
`and THOMAS, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. GOR-
`SUCH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. KAGAN,
`J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER and SOTOMAYOR, JJ.,
`joined.
`
`

`

`
`
`Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
`ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
`corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`Nos. 19–1257 and 19–1258
`_________________
`MARK BRNOVICH, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
`ARIZONA, ET AL., PETITIONERS
`v.
`19–1257
`DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ET AL.
`
`
`
`ARIZONA REPUBLICAN PARTY, ET AL.,
`PETITIONERS
`v.
`19–1258
`DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ET AL.
`ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`[July 1, 2021]
` JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
` In these cases, we are called upon for the first time to ap-
`ply §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to regulations that
`govern how ballots are collected and counted. Arizona law
`generally makes it very easy to vote. All voters may vote by
`mail or in person for nearly a month before election day, but
`Arizona imposes two restrictions that are claimed to be un-
`lawful. First, in some counties, voters who choose to cast a
`ballot in person on election day must vote in their own pre-
`cincts or else their ballots will not be counted. Second, mail-
`in ballots cannot be collected by anyone other than an elec-
`tion official, a mail carrier, or a voter’s family member,
`household member, or caregiver. After a trial, a District
`Court upheld these rules, as did a panel of the United
`
`

`

`2
`
`
`BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. But an en
`banc court, by a divided vote, found them to be unlawful. It
`relied on the rules’ small disparate impacts on members of
`minority groups, as well as past discrimination dating back
`to the State’s territorial days. And it overturned the Dis-
`trict Court’s finding that the Arizona Legislature did not
`adopt the ballot-collection restriction for a discriminatory
`purpose. We now hold that the en banc court misunder-
`stood and misapplied §2 and that it exceeded its authority
`in rejecting the District Court’s factual finding on the issue
`of legislative intent.
`
`I
`A
` Congress enacted the landmark Voting Rights Act of
`1965, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 52 U. S. C. §10301 et seq.,
`in an effort to achieve at long last what the Fifteenth
`Amendment had sought to bring about 95 years earlier: an
`end to the denial of the right to vote based on race. Ratified
`in 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment provides in §1 that “[t]he
`right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
`denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
`account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”
`Section 2 of the Amendment then grants Congress the
`“power to enforce [the Amendment] by appropriate legisla-
`tion.”
` Despite the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, the
`right of African-Americans to vote was heavily suppressed
`for nearly a century. States employed a variety of notorious
`methods, including poll taxes, literacy tests, property
`qualifications, “ ‘white primar[ies],’ ” and “ ‘grandfather
`clause[s].’ ”1 Challenges to some blatant efforts reached this
`Court and were held to violate the Fifteenth Amendment.
`——————
`1 H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 8, 11–13 (1965); S. Rep. No.
`162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, pp. 4–5 (1965); see South Carolina v.
`Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 309–315 (1966).
`
`

`

`
`
`3
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`Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`See, e.g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, 360–365
`(1915) (grandfather clause); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U. S.
`368, 379–380 (1915) (same); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268,
`275–277 (1939) (registration scheme predicated on grand-
`father clause); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 659–666
`(1944) (white primaries); Schnell v. Davis, 336 U. S. 933
`(1949) (per curiam), affirming 81 F. Supp. 872 (SD Ala.
`1949) (test of constitutional knowledge); Gomillion v. Light-
`foot, 364 U. S. 339, 347 (1960) (racial gerrymander). But as
`late as the mid-1960s, black registration and voting rates
`in some States were appallingly low. See South Carolina v.
`Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 313 (1966).
` Invoking the power conferred by §2 of the Fifteenth
`Amendment, see 383 U. S., at 308; City of Rome v. United
`States, 446 U. S. 156, 173 (1980), Congress enacted the Vot-
`ing Rights Act (VRA) to address this entrenched problem.
`The Act and its amendments in the 1970s specifically for-
`bade some of the practices that had been used to suppress
`black voting. See §§4(a), (c), 79 Stat. 438–439; §6, 84 Stat.
`315; §102, 89 Stat. 400, as amended, 52 U. S. C. §§10303(a),
`(c), 10501 (prohibiting the denial of the right to vote in any
`election for failure to pass a test demonstrating literacy, ed-
`ucational achievement or knowledge of any particular sub-
`ject, or good moral character); see also §10, 79 Stat. 442, as
`amended, 52 U. S. C. §10306 (declaring poll taxes unlaw-
`ful); §11, 79 Stat. 443, as amended, 52 U. S. C. §10307 (pro-
`hibiting intimidation and the refusal to allow or count
`votes). Sections 4 and 5 of the VRA imposed special require-
`ments for States and subdivisions where violations of the
`right to vote had been severe. And §2 addressed the denial
`or abridgment of the right to vote in any part of the country.
` As originally enacted, §2 closely tracked the language of
`the Amendment it was adopted to enforce. Section 2 stated
`simply that “[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to vot-
`ing, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or
`applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or
`
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`

`4
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`BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
`on account of race or color.” 79 Stat. 437.
` Unlike other provisions of the VRA, §2 attracted rela-
`tively little attention during the congressional debates2 and
`was “little-used” for more than a decade after its passage.3
`But during the same period, this Court considered several
`cases involving “vote-dilution” claims asserted under the
`Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
`See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971); Burns v.
`Richardson, 384 U. S. 73 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379
`U. S. 433 (1965). In these and later vote-dilution cases,
`plaintiffs claimed that features of legislative districting
`plans, including the configuration of legislative districts
`and the use of multi-member districts, diluted the ability of
`particular voters to affect the outcome of elections.
` One Fourteenth Amendment vote-dilution case, White v.
`Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), came to have outsized im-
`portance in the development of our VRA case law. In White,
`the Court affirmed a District Court’s judgment that two
`multi-member electoral districts were “being used invidi-
`ously to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of racial
`groups.” Id., at 765. The Court explained what a vote-
`dilution plaintiff must prove, and the words the Court chose
`would later assume great importance in VRA §2 matters.
`According to White, a vote-dilution plaintiff had to show
`that “the political processes leading to nomination and elec-
`tion were not equally open to participation by the group in
`question—that its members had less opportunity than did
`other residents in the district to participate in the political
`processes and to elect legislators of their choice.” Id., at 766
`(emphasis added). The decision then recited many pieces of
`evidence the District Court had taken into account, and it
`——————
`2 See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 60–61 (1980) (plurality opinion)
`(describing §2’s “sparse” legislative history).
`3 Boyd & Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act:
`A Legislative History, 40 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1347, 1352–1353 (1983).
`
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`

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`5
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`Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`found that this evidence sufficed to prove the plaintiffs’
`claim. See id., at 766–769. The decision in White predated
`Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), where the Court
`held that an equal-protection challenge to a facially neutral
`rule requires proof of discriminatory purpose or intent, id.,
`at 238–245, and the White opinion said nothing one way or
`the other about purpose or intent.
` A few years later, the question whether a VRA §2 claim
`required discriminatory purpose or intent came before this
`Court in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980). The plural-
`ity opinion for four Justices concluded first that §2 of the
`VRA added nothing to the protections afforded by the Fif-
`teenth Amendment. Id., at 60–61. The plurality then ob-
`served that prior decisions “ha[d] made clear that action by
`a State that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fif-
`teenth Amendment only if motivated by a discriminatory
`purpose.” Id., at 62. The obvious result of those premises
`was that facially neutral voting practices violate §2 only if
`motivated by a discriminatory purpose. The plurality read
`White as consistent with this requirement. Bolden, 446
`U. S., at 68–70.
` Shortly after Bolden was handed down, Congress
`amended §2 of the VRA. The oft-cited Report of the Senate
`Judiciary Committee accompanying the 1982 Amendment
`stated that the amendment’s purpose was to repudiate Bol-
`den and establish a new vote-dilution test based on what
`the Court had said in White. See S. Rep. No. 97–417, pp. 2,
`15–16, 27. The bill that was initially passed by the House
`of Representatives included what is now §2(a). In place of
`the phrase “to deny or abridge the right . . . to vote on ac-
`count of race or color,” the amendment substituted “in a
`manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the
`right . . . to vote on account of race or color.” H. R. Rep. No.
`97–227, p. 48 (1981) (emphasis added); H. R. 3112, 97th
`Cong., 1st Sess., §2, p. 8 (introduced Oct. 7, 1981).
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`6
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`BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
`
`Opinion of the Court
` The House bill “originally passed . . . under a loose under-
`standing that §2 would prohibit all discriminatory ‘effects’
`of voting practices, and that intent would be ‘irrelevant,’ ”
`but “[t]his version met stiff resistance in the Senate.” Mis-
`sissippi Republican Executive Committee v. Brooks, 469
`U. S. 1002, 1010 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting
`H. R. Rep. No. 97–227, at 29). The House and Senate com-
`promised, and the final product included language proposed
`by Senator Dole. 469 U. S., at 1010–1011; S. Rep. No. 97–
`417, at 3–4; 128 Cong. Rec. 14131–14133 (1982) (Sen. Dole
`describing his amendment).
` What is now §2(b) was added, and that provision sets out
`what must be shown to prove a §2 violation. It requires
`consideration of “the totality of circumstances” in each case
`and demands proof that “the political processes leading to
`nomination or election in the State or political subdivision
`are not equally open to participation” by members of a pro-
`tected class “in that its members have less opportunity than
`other members of the electorate to participate in the politi-
`cal process and to elect representatives of their choice.” 52
`U. S. C. §10301(b) (emphasis added). Reflecting the Senate
`Judiciary Committee’s stated focus on the issue of vote di-
`lution, this language was taken almost verbatim from
`White.
` This concentration on the contentious issue of vote dilu-
`tion reflected the results of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
`tee’s extensive survey of what it regarded as Fifteenth
`Amendment violations that called out for legislative re-
`dress. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 97–417, at 6, 8, 23–24, 27, 29.
`That survey listed many examples of what the Committee
`took to be unconstitutional vote dilution, but the survey
`identified only three isolated episodes involving the out-
`right denial of the right to vote, and none of these concerned
`the equal application of a facially neutral rule specifying
`the time, place, or manner of voting. See id., at 30, and
`
`

`

`
`
`7
`
`Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`n. 119.4 These sparse results were presumably good news.
`They likely showed that the VRA and other efforts had
`achieved a large measure of success in combating the pre-
`viously widespread practice of using such rules to hinder
`minority groups from voting.
` This Court first construed the amended §2 in Thornburg
`v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986)—another vote-dilution case.
`Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court set out three
`threshold requirements for proving a §2 vote-dilution claim,
`and, taking its cue from the Senate Report, provided a non-
`exhaustive list of factors to be considered in determining
`whether §2 had been violated. Id., at 44–45, 48–51, 80.
`“The essence of a §2 claim,” the Court said, “is that a certain
`electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social
`and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the op-
`portunities” of minority and non-minority voters to elect
`their preferred representatives. Id., at 47.
` In the years since Gingles, we have heard a steady stream
`of §2 vote-dilution cases,5 but until today, we have not con-
`sidered how §2 applies to generally applicable time, place,
`or manner voting rules. In recent years, however, such
`claims have proliferated in the lower courts.6
`——————
`4 See Brown v. Post, 279 F. Supp. 60, 63 (WD La. 1968) (parish clerks
`discriminated with respect to absentee voting); United States v. Post, 297
`F. Supp. 46, 51 (WD La. 1969) (election official induced blacks to vote in
`accordance with outdated procedures and made votes ineffective); Toney
`v. White, 488 F. 2d 310, 312 (CA5 1973) (registrar discriminated in purg-
`ing voting rolls).
`5 See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U. S. 380 (1991) (multi-member district);
`Houston Lawyers’ Assn. v. Attorney General of Tex., 501 U. S. 419 (1991)
`(at-large elections); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S. 146 (1993) (district-
`ing); Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S. 25 (1993) (same); Holder v. Hall, 512
`U. S. 874 (1994) (single-member commission); Johnson v. De Grandy,
`512 U. S. 997 (1994) (districting); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U. S. 74 (1997)
`(same); League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U. S. 399
`(2006) (same); Abbott v. Perez, 585 U. S. ___ (2018) (same).
`6 See Brief for Sen. Ted Cruz et al. as Amici Curiae 22–24 (describing
`§2 challenges to laws regulating absentee voting, precinct voting, early
`
`

`

`8
`
`
`BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`B
` The present dispute concerns two features of Arizona vot-
`ing law, which generally makes it quite easy for residents
`to vote. All Arizonans may vote by mail for 27 days before
`an election using an “early ballot.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
`§§16–541 (2015), 16–542(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020). No special
`excuse is needed, §§16–541(A), 16–542(A), and any voter
`may ask to be sent an early ballot automatically in future
`elections, §16–544(A) (2015). In addition, during the 27
`days before an election, Arizonans may vote in person at an
`early voting location in each county. See §§16–542(A), (E).
`And they may also vote in person on election day.
` Each county is free to conduct election-day voting either
`by using the traditional precinct model or by setting up
`“voting centers.” §16–411(B)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2020). Voting
`centers are equipped to provide all voters in a county with
`the appropriate ballot for the precinct in which they are reg-
`istered, and this allows voters in the county to use which-
`ever vote center they prefer. See ibid.
` The regulations at issue in this suit govern precinct-
`based election-day voting and ear