No. 19-
`
`IN THE
`Supreme Court of the United States
`_________
`
`MALWAREBYTES, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`ENIGMA SOFTWARE GROUP USA, LLC,
`Respondent.
`
`_________
`On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
` United States Court of Appeals
`for the Ninth Circuit
`_________
`PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`_________
`
`TYLER GRIFFIN NEWBY
`FENWICK & WEST LLP
`555 California Street
`12th Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94104
`
`NEAL KUMAR KATYAL
`Counsel of Record
`BENJAMIN A. FIELD
`REEDY C. SWANSON
`HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
`555 Thirteenth St., N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20004
`(202) 637-5600
`neal.katyal@hoganlovells.com
`
`Counsel for Petitioner
`
`
`
`IN THE
`Supreme Court of the United States
`_________
`
`MALWAREBYTES, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`ENIGMA SOFTWARE GROUP USA, LLC,
`Respondent.
`
`_________
`On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
` United States Court of Appeals
`for the Ninth Circuit
`_________
`PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`_________
`
`TYLER GRIFFIN NEWBY
`FENWICK & WEST LLP
`555 California Street
`12th Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94104
`
`NEAL KUMAR KATYAL
`Counsel of Record
`BENJAMIN A. FIELD
`REEDY C. SWANSON
`HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
`555 Thirteenth St., N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20004
`(202) 637-5600
`neal.katyal@hoganlovells.com
`
`Counsel for Petitioner
`
`
`
`QUESTION PRESENTED
`Section 230(c)(2)(B) of the Communications Decen-
`cy Act provides immunity from most civil liability to
`computer-service providers for “any action taken to
`enable or make available to * * * others the technical
`means to restrict access to material” that “the pro-
`vider or user considers to be * * * objectionable.” 47
`U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). The court below agreed that none
`of the narrow, express exceptions to that immunity
`in Section 230(e) apply here. The question presented
`is:
`Whether federal courts can derive an implied ex-
`ception to Section 230(c)(2)(B) immunity for blocking
`or filtering decisions when they are alleged to be
`“driven by anticompetitive animus.”
`
`(i)
`
`
`
`ii
`PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
`Malwarebytes, Inc., petitioner on review, was the
`defendant-appellee below.
`Enigma Software Group USA, LLC, respondent on
`review, was the plaintiff-appellant below.
`
`
`
`iii
`RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
`Malwarebytes, Inc. has no parent corporation, and
`no publicly held company owns 10% or more of its
`stock.
`
`
`
`iv
`RELATED PROCEEDINGS
`U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:
`Enigma Software Group USA, LLC v. Mal-
`warebytes, Inc., No. 17-17351 (9th Cir. Dec. 31,
`2019) (reported at 946 F.3d 1040)
`Enigma Software Group USA, LLC v. Mal-
`warebytes, Inc., No. 17-17351 (9th Cir. Sep. 12,
`2019) (reported at 938 F.3d 1026) (opinion
`withdrawn and superseded on denial of re-
`hearing)
`U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
`California:
`Enigma Software Group USA LLC v. Mal-
`warebytes Inc., No. 5:17-cv-02915-EJD (N.D.
`Cal. Nov. 7, 2017) (unreported)
`
`
`
`v
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`QUESTION PRESENTED ........................................... i
`PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ............................ ii
`RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ............... iii
`RELATED PROCEEDINGS ...................................... iv
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... vii
`OPINIONS BELOW .................................................... 1
`JURISDICTION .......................................................... 1
`STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ................. 2
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 2
`STATEMENT .............................................................. 5
`A. Statutory Background .............................. 5
`B. Procedural Background ............................ 7
`REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ....... 10
`I. THE DECISION BELOW DEFIES
`THIS COURT’S BASIC RULES OF
`STATUTORY
`INTERPRETATION
`AND DEVIATES FROM COURTS’
`SETTLED UNDERSTANDINGS OF
`SECTION 230 ................................................. 10
`A. The Decision Below Erroneously
`Relied On Policy Rather Than
`Text To Interpret Section 230 ................ 11
`B. The Decision Below Splits From
`The Approach Of Numerous Oth-
`er Courts ................................................. 17
`II. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS OF
`SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE .................... 20
`
`
`
`vi
`TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
`
`Page
`
`A. The Decision Below Threatens
`The User Choice And Internet
`Security Goals That Motivated
`Section 230(c)(2)(B) ................................ 21
`B. The Decision Below Will Under-
`mine Other Tools That Help In-
`ternet Users Curate Their Own
`Online Experience .................................. 29
`C. The Decision Below Endangers
`All Of Section 230’s Important
`Immunities ............................................. 31
`III. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE
`TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION
`PRESENTED,
`AND
`OTHER
`OPPORTUNITIES MAY NOT SOON
`PRESENT THEMSELVES ............................ 35
`CONCLUSION .......................................................... 37
`APPENDIX
`APPENDIX A—Ninth Circuit’s Amend-
`ed Opinion (Dec. 31, 2019) ................................ 1a
`APPENDIX B—Ninth Circuit’s Opinion
`(Sept. 12, 2019) ................................................ 30a
`APPENDIX C—District Court’s Order
`Granting Defendant’s Motion to
`Dismiss (Nov. 7, 2017) .................................... 57a
`APPENDIX D—Statutory Provisions
`Involved ........................................................... 66a
`
`
`
`vii
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`CASES:
`Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006) ............................ 18
`Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.,
`534 U.S. 438 (2002) ........................................ 11, 12
`Barrett v. Rosenthal,
`146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006) ...................................... 20
`BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton,
`549 U.S. 84 (2006) ................................................ 11
`Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A., v. First Inter-
`state Bank of Denver, N.A.,
`511 U.S. 164 (1994) .............................................. 12
`Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights
`Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,
`519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) ................................ 17
`Comcast Corp. v. Federal Communications
`Commission,
`600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) .............................. 19
`Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
`447 U.S. 303 (1980) .............................................. 12
`Doe v. GTE Corp.,
`347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003) .......................... 31, 32
`Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc.,
`824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016) ................................ 18
`Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,
`528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) ................................ 18
`
`
`
`viii
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
`Page(s)
`
`Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading
`Comm’n,
`519 U.S. 465 (1997) .............................................. 12
`Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs.,
`Inc.,
`504 U.S. 451 (1992) .............................................. 28
`Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Val-
`ley v. Roommates.com, LLC,
`521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) .............................. 25
`Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports
`Auth.,
`535 U.S. 743 (2002) .............................................. 24
`Fehrenbach v. Zeldin,
`No. 17-CV-5282 (JFB) (ARL), 2018 WL
`4242452 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2018), report
`and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL
`4242453 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2018) ........................ 29
`Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media,
`139 S. Ct. 2356 (2019) ................................ 5, 10, 12
`Force v. Facebook,
`934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019), petition for
`cert. filed, No. 19-859 (U.S. Jan. 2, 2020) ............ 17
`Hassell v. Bird,
`420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018) ...................................... 17
`Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC,
`817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016) ............................ 17, 23
`
`
`
`ix
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
`Page(s)
`
`Johnson v. Arden,
`614 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2010) ................................ 18
`Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google,
`LLC,
`925 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ............................ 18
`Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty.,
`572 U.S. 782 (2014) .............................................. 14
`Mitchell v. Forsyth,
`472 U.S. 511 (1985) .............................................. 25
`Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,
`510 U.S. 249 (1994) .............................................. 14
`Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraf-
`fairs.com, Inc.,
`591 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2009) ................................ 24
`N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross &
`Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
`514 U.S. 645 (1995) .............................................. 12
`Pallorium, Inc. v. Jared,
`No. G036124, 2007 WL 80955 (Cal. Ct.
`App. Jan. 11, 2007) .............................................. 20
`Perry v. Perez,
`565 U.S. 388 (2012) .............................................. 15
`Prager Univ. v. Google LLC,
`No. 19CV340667, 2019 WL 8640569
`(Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2019), appeal
`docketed, No. H047714 (Cal. Ct. App.
`Dec. 19, 2019) ................................................. 19, 20
`
`
`
`x
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
`Page(s)
`
`Reno v. ACLU,
`521 U.S. 844 (1997) .............................................. 23
`Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Grp., Inc.,
`__ S. Ct. __ (2020) ................................................. 14
`Russello v. United States,
`464 U.S. 16 (1983) ................................................ 13
`Sebelius v. Cloer,
`569 U.S. 369 (2013) .............................................. 11
`Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc.,
`952 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 2011) ......................... 17, 18
`Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs.
`Co.,
`No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.
`Sup. Ct. 1995) ................................................... 6, 23
`Wisconsin Cent. Ltd. v. United States,
`138 S. Ct. 2067 (2018) .................................... 13, 16
`Yates v. United States,
`574 U.S. 528 (2015) .............................................. 16
`Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc.,
`568 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009) .................... 7, 10, 25
`Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.,
`129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) ........................ passim
`STATUTES:
`28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ................................................... 2
`Communications Decency Act ........................ passim
`47 U.S.C. § 230 ............................................. passim
`
`
`
`xi
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
`Page(s)
`47 U.S.C. § 230(a) ................................................ 34
`47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1) ............................................ 34
`47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(2) ............................................ 22
`47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) ............................................ 34
`47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4) ............................................ 22
`47 U.S.C. § 230(b) .......................................... 18, 34
`47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) ............................................ 34
`47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2)-(4) ....................................... 22
`47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) ...................................... 24, 28
`47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3) .................................. 5, 19, 30
`47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) ........................................ 5, 19
`47 U.S.C. § 230(c) ......................................... passim
`47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) .................................... passim
`47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) .................................... passim
`47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) ................................ passim
`47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B) ................................ passim
`47 U.S.C. § 230(c)-(e) ........................................... 18
`47 U.S.C. § 230(e) ................................................... 7
`47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) .............................................. 7
`47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(4) .............................................. 7
`RULE:
`Sup. Ct. R. 10(c) ...................................................... 16
`LEGISLATIVE MATERIAL:
`141 Cong. Rec. 22,045 (1995) (statement of
`Rep. Cox) .......................................................... 5, 22
`H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996), as
`reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10 ...................... 23
`
`
`
`xii
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
`Page(s)
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES:
`About Direct Messages, Twitter,
`https://bit.ly/3bldCQ2 (last visited May
`11, 2020) ............................................................... 30
`About the Notifications timeline, Twitter,
`https://bit.ly/3eu7VRv (last visited May
`11, 2020) ............................................................... 30
`The American Heritage College Dictionary
`(3d ed. 1993) ......................................................... 16
`Community Standards: Part III. Objec-
`tionable Content, Facebook,
`https://bit.ly/2KgiUAq (last visited May
`11, 2020) ............................................................... 33
`Eric Goldman, The Ten Most Important
`Section 230 Rulings, 20 Tulane J. Tech.
`& Intell. Prop. 1 (2017) ........................................ 36
`Eric Griffith, How to Rid a New PC of
`Crapware, PCMag (Apr. 1, 2020),
`https://bit.ly/3ch9BMM ........................................ 26
`Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The
`People, Rules, and Processes Governing
`Online Speech, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1598
`(2018) .................................................................... 32
`Jeff Kosseff, The Twenty-Six Words That
`Created the Internet (2019) ................................. 33
`
`
`
`xiii
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
`Page(s)
`
`Mike Masnick, Masnick’s Impossibility
`Theorem: Content Moderation At Scale
`Is Impossible To Do Well, TechDirt (Nov.
`20, 2019), https://bit.ly/2z1XpRh ......................... 32
`Press Release, FTC, FTC Case Results in
`$163 Million Judgment Against “Scare-
`ware” Marketer (Oct. 2, 2012),
`https://bit.ly/3bjkJIx ............................................. 26
`Press Release, FTC, Office Depot and Tech
`Support Firm Will Pay $35 Million to
`Settle FTC Allegations That They
`Tricked Consumers into Buying Costly
`Computer Repair Services (Mar. 27,
`2019), https://bit.ly/3afWpWH ............................. 26
`Press Release, Senator Ted Cruz, Sen.
`Cruz: The Pattern of Political Censorship
`Seen Across Technology Companies is
`Highly Concerning (Jan. 17, 2018),
`https://bit.ly/2zdfuMB .......................................... 34
`Senator Josh Hawley (@HawleyMO),
`Twitter (Nov. 27, 2018, 1:22 PM),
`https://bit.ly/2VB3CLQ ........................................ 34
`Transparency Report 2019, Reddit,
`https://bit.ly/2ysFhj9 (last visited May
`11, 2020) ............................................................... 30
`Webster’s II New College Dictionary (1995
`ed.) ........................................................................ 16
`
`
`
`xiv
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
`Page(s)
`
`YouTube Help, Disable or enable Restrict-
`ed Mode, Google, https://bit.ly/2KftqaQ
`(last visited May 11, 2020) .................................. 29
`
`
`
`IN THE
`Supreme Court of the United States
`_________
`No. 19-
`_________
`
`MALWAREBYTES, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`ENIGMA SOFTWARE GROUP USA, LLC,
`Respondent.
`
`_________
`On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
` United States Court of Appeals
`for the Ninth Circuit
`_________
`PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`_________
`Malwarebytes, Inc., respectfully petitions for a writ
`of certiorari to review the judgment of the Ninth
`Circuit in this case.
`OPINIONS BELOW
`The Ninth Circuit’s amended opinion, issued on
`denial of rehearing, is reported at 946 F.3d 1040.
`Pet. App. 1a-29a. Its original, superseded opinion is
`reported at 938 F.3d 1026. Pet. App. 30a-56a. The
`district court’s order granting Malwarebytes’s motion
`to dismiss is unreported. Id. at 57a-65a.
`JURISDICTION
`The Ninth Circuit entered judgment on September
`12, 2019. Pet. App. 1a, 30a. Malwarebytes timely
`
`(1)
`
`
`
`2
`petitioned for panel rehearing and rehearing en
`banc, which were denied on December 31, 2019. Id.
`at 1a, 4a-5a. Justice Kagan extended the time to file
`a petition for certiorari to May 11, 2020. This
`Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
`STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
`Section 230(c)(2) of the Communications Decency
`Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), provides that:
` No provider or user of an interactive computer
`service shall be held liable on account of—
`(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith
`to restrict access to or availability of material
`that the provider or user considers to be ob-
`scene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively vio-
`lent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,
`whether or not such material is constitutionally
`protected; or
`(B) any action taken to enable or make availa-
`ble to information content providers or others
`the technical means to restrict access to materi-
`al described in paragraph (1).
`The entirety of Section 230 is reproduced in the
`appendix to this petition, Pet. App. 66a-71a, as is the
`text of Section 230 as it appeared before its 2018
`amendments, id. at 72a-76a.
`INTRODUCTION
`The Communications Decency Act (CDA) is founda-
`tional to the Internet as we know it. Faced with a
`revolutionary new technology, Congress chose a
`system of self-regulation—one that would leave
`users, rather than governments or courts, in control
`
`
`
`3
`of their own experience. The cornerstone of that
`system is the immunity from civil liability provided
`in Section 230(c). Through that provision, Congress
`ensured that Internet providers and users would be
`free from the constant threat of litigation for moder-
`ating threatening or objectionable content.
` Of
`course, that would be impossible without adequate
`tools for screening and filtering content. Thus, in
`Section 230(c)(2)(B), Congress extended that immun-
`ity—without qualification—to providers for “any
`action taken to enable or make available” the “tech-
`nical means to restrict access to” content the provider
`“considers to be” objectionable. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
`Petitioner Malwarebytes, Inc., is a leading software
`security firm that provides filtering tools to consum-
`ers. Its software flags security threats and other
`unwanted programs, and asks users whether they
`wish to retain those programs. After an update to
`Malwarebytes’s software began flagging Respond-
`ent’s products as potentially unwanted programs and
`providing its users the choice to use or to quarantine
`the products, Respondent sued Malwarebytes. The
`plain text of the Act forbids exactly this kind of
`retaliatory suit.
`In the decision below, however, a divided panel of
`the Ninth Circuit read the Act to contain an implied
`exception for actions allegedly motivated by “anti-
`competitive animus.” To its credit, the court did not
`even try to justify that reading based on the text of
`the statute. Instead, the court relied exclusively on
`its own mistaken understanding of the policy inter-
`ests at stake.
`
`
`
`4
`This Court’s precedents flatly forbid that approach.
`In recent decades, this Court has instructed lower
`courts that statutory interpretation must be guided,
`first and foremost, by the text, and that even compel-
`ling policy considerations cannot justify an interpre-
`tation that runs counter to the text. The decision
`below defies that cardinal rule. It is therefore no
`surprise that—in both its reasoning and holding—
`the decision breaks from decisions of numerous other
`courts. And the conflict has only gotten worse in the
`short time since the court issued its decision, as a
`California state court has already issued a decision
`expressly disagreeing with it—opening a rift between
`state and federal fora in the technology center of the
`Nation.
`It is critically important for the Court to correct the
`Ninth Circuit’s erroneous interpretation now. By
`exposing developers of filtering tools to a flood of
`retaliatory litigation, the decision will have the
`opposite effect from Congress’s goal of promoting
`development of such tools. Making matters worse,
`because the Ninth Circuit relied solely on policy
`considerations that apply to all of Section 230, its
`decision threatens all of Section 230(c)’s immunities.
`It is an open invitation for lower courts to allow a
`lawsuit anytime judges have their own policy con-
`cerns about a particular filtering decision or tool.
`The decision below thus risks exposing cybersecurity
`firms, as well as the most popular Internet services,
`to a raft of burdensome litigation for providing the
`filtering tools and exercising the content-moderation
`and editorial discretion that Congress sought to
`encourage. The result will be an Internet with less
`
`
`
`5
`consumer choice and less protection for users from
`offensive and objectionable content.
`The decision below is a throwback to “a bygone era
`of statutory construction,” when judges looked pri-
`marily to ill-defined indicia of congressional intent
`rather than statutory text. Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus
`Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019) (internal
`quotation marks omitted). The Court should grant
`certiorari to correct the Ninth Circuit’s “casual
`disregard of the rules of statutory interpretation”
`and bring it back in line with the prevailing interpre-
`tations of Section 230. Id.
`The petition should be granted.
`STATEMENT
`A. Statutory Background
`The CDA emerged in 1996 as a response to the
`proliferation of offensive content on the nascent
`Internet. Congress sought an innovative approach
`for this new technology, one that would let “Govern-
`ment * * * get out of the way and let parents and
`individuals” “tailor what [they] see to [their] own
`tastes.” 141 Cong. Rec. 22,045 (1995) (statement of
`Rep. Cox). The resulting Act therefore aimed “to
`encourage the development of technologies which
`maximize user control over what information is
`received by individuals, families, and schools who
`use the Internet” and “to remove disincentives for
`the development and utilization of blocking and
`filtering technologies.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3), (4).
`Congress identified the threat of litigation as a
`particular obstacle to the development of “blocking
`and filtering technologies.” See Pet. App. 8a-10a.
`
`
`
`6
`Early state-court decisions had made it challenging
`for Internet-based firms to take action against offen-
`sive or dangerous content by exposing those who did
`to liability. See id. (discussing Stratton Oakmont,
`Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
`323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995)).
`The operative text of the CDA took a three-pronged
`approach to eliminating the threat of such litigation.
`First, in subsection (c)(1), Congress addressed im-
`munity for hosting third-party content. It ensured
`that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
`service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
`any information provided by another information
`content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). That provi-
`sion bars suits seeking to hold providers liable for
`exercising “a publisher’s traditional editorial func-
`tions—such as deciding whether to publish, with-
`draw, postpone or alter content.” Zeran v. Am.
`Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
`Second, in subsection (c)(2)(A), Congress provided
`immunity for those who block or filter content.
`Specifically, it barred civil liability against “provid-
`er[s]” and “user[s] of an interactive computer service”
`who take action “to restrict access to or availability of
`material that the provider or user considers to be
`obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
`harassing, or otherwise objectionable.” 47 U.S.C.
`§ 230(c)(2)(A). That immunity is available for “any
`action,” so long as it is “voluntarily taken in good
`faith.” Id.
`Third—and most relevant here—in subsection
`(c)(2)(B), Congress extended immunity to entities
`that develop and provide the technology necessary
`
`
`
`7
`for filtering and blocking content. That immunity
`covers “any action taken to enable or make availa-
`ble * * * the technical means to restrict access to” the
`material described
`in subsection
`(c)(2)(A), 1
`id.
`§ 230(c)(2)(B)—that is, “material that the provider or
`user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
`excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objec-
`tionable,” id. § 230(c)(2)(A). Unlike the immunity for
`those who themselves “restrict access to or availabil-
`ity of” such material, the immunity for developers of
`filtering technology is not conditioned on “good
`faith.” Compare id. (emphasis added), with id.
`§ 230(c)(2)(B).
`Congress also provided a handful of exceptions to
`the CDA’s immunity, including with respect to
`intellectual property
`laws and communications
`privacy laws. See, e.g., id. § 230(e)(2), (4). None of
`those exceptions refers to antitrust law or “anticom-
`petitive” behavior. See id. § 230(e).
`B. Procedural Background
`1. Malwarebytes is an Internet security firm with
`an international customer base. Pet. App. 12a.
`Users download its software to protect themselves
`from a wide array of threats on the Internet. These
`include “malware,” which can damage operating
`systems or steal user information, and “Potentially
`Unwanted Programs” (or “PUPs”) that falsely de-
`
`1 As enacted, the text cross-references subsection (c)(1), see 47
`U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B), but that is uniformly regarded as a
`scrivener’s error, see Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568
`F.3d 1169, 1173 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009).
`
`
`
`8
`ceive users into thinking something is wrong with
`their computer so that they will download paid
`products to combat the supposed threats. See id.
`When Malwarebytes’s “software detects an unwanted
`program, it displays a notification and asks the user
`if she wants to remove the program from her com-
`puter.” Id. at 58a. In other words, users make the
`final decision about what gets filtered.
`In October 2016, Malwarebytes adopted new crite-
`ria for identifying a PUP. Id. at 12a-13a. Using
`those criteria, Malwarebytes’s software began classi-
`fying certain products of Respondent Enigma Soft-
`ware Group as a PUP. Id. As with any PUP, Mal-
`warebytes’ software gave users the option to retain,
`quarantine, or remove Enigma’s products. Id. at
`12a-13a, 58a.
`2. Enigma sued Malwarebytes, alleging state-law
`business torts and unfair advertising in violation of
`the Lanham Act. Id. at 58a-59a. Malwarebytes
`moved to dismiss, invoking Section 230(c)(2)(B)’s
`immunity for providers of filtering software. Id. at
`14a. Enigma opposed the motion, claiming “that
`Malwarebytes blocked Enigma’s programs for anti-
`competitive reasons” and that the CDA’s immunity is
`unavailable under such circumstances. Id. at 19a.
`The District Court granted Malwarebytes’s motion.
`Id. at 65a. It held that “the plain language of the
`statute” requires only that “the provider or user
`consider[ ]” the filtered material “objectionable.” Id.
`at 62a (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)). Thus, it was
`irrelevant why Malwarebytes considered Enigma’s
`products “objectionable.” See id. The court noted
`that the neighboring provision addressing immunity
`
`
`
`9
`for those who actually “restrict access” to content
`“include[s] a good-faith requirement.” See id. at 63a
`(discussing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)). Because Con-
`gress “chose not to” “include[ ] a similar reference” to
`good faith in subsection (c)(2)(B), the court declined
`to find a similar exception implied there. Id.
`3. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed.
`Id. at 27a. Looking to the “history and purpose” of
`the CDA, id. at 19a, the majority held that Section
`230(c)(2)’s immunity provisions contain an unstated
`exception for “decisions that are driven by anticom-
`petitive animus,” id. at 11a. Although the court
`acknowledged that its reading was in tension with
`“the unwillingness of Congress to spell out the mean-
`ing of ‘otherwise objectionable,’ ” it felt obliged to
`update the statute for “today” by reading it not “to
`give providers unbridled discretion to block online
`content.” Id. at 20a. Although the court did not
`explain how its reading was compatible with the
`operative text of the statute or the ordinary meaning
`of the word “objectionable,” it found support for its
`reading in “the statute’s express policies.” Id. at 20a-
`21a.2
`Judge Rawlinson dissented. The majority’s read-
`ing, she explained, “cannot be squared with the
`broad language of the Act.” Id. at 29a. “Under the
`language of the statute, if the blocked content is
`
`2 Separately, the court rejected Enigma’s argument that its
`Lanham Act false-advertising claim falls within the CDA’s
`exception for “intellectual property” law. Pet. App. 23a-27a.
`Malwarebytes does not seek review of this issue.
`
`
`
`10
`‘otherwise objectionable’ to the provider, the Act
`bestows immunity.” Id. (quoting Zango, 568 F.3d at
`1173). “The majority’s real complaint,” the dissent
`pointed out, “is not that the district court construed
`the statute too broadly, but that the statute is writ-
`ten too broadly.” Id. at 28a. Such an issue “is one
`beyond [judicial] authority to correct.” Id.
`Over Judge Rawlinson’s dissent, the Ninth Circuit
`denied Malwarebytes’s petition for rehearing and
`rehearing en banc. Id. at 4a-5a.3 This timely peti-
`tion followed.
`REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
`I. THE DECISION BELOW DEFIES THIS
`COURT’S BASIC RULES OF STATUTORY
`INTERPRETATION AND DEVIATES FROM
`COURTS’ SETTLED UNDERSTANDINGS OF
`SECTION 230.
`One of this Court’s most fundamental precepts is
`that statutory interpretation must begin with the
`text—and end there when the text is clear. This
`Court has repeatedly granted certiorari to clarify
`that principle. See, e.g., Food Mktg. Inst., 139 S. Ct.
`at 2364 (“We cannot approve such a casual disregard
`of the rules of statutory interpretation.”).
`
`3 The panel issued an amended opinion that modified a sen-
`tence suggesting that immunity would be unavailable anytime a
`decision was motivated by “the identity of the entity that
`produced” the filtered content. Compare Pet. App. 39a, with id.
`at 11a-12a. It made no other changes.
`
`
`
`11
`The Ninth Circuit flouted that rule in this case.
`The court never explained how its reading bears any
`relationship to the operative text of the statute.
`Instead, it relied exclusively on its own policy con-
`cerns (which were themselves questionable). Unsur-
`prisingly, that fundamentally flawed approach led
`the court to the wrong outcome in this case.
`Not only did the Ninth Circuit’s approach defy this
`Court’s precedent, it upended the widely-shared
`consensus among lower courts that Section 230’s
`immunity provisions should be read broadly. The
`court also broke from the D.C. Circuit by using the
`CDA’s prefatory statutory goals to override its opera-
`tive text, and the resulting interpretation of subsec-
`tion (c)(2)(B) has been flatly rejected by state courts
`in the very same State where this litigation arose,
`California. These conflicts on an issue of critical
`importance further counsel this Court’s intervention.
`A. The Decision Below Erroneously Relied On
`Policy Rather Than Text To Interpret Sec-
`tion 230.
`1. “[I]n any statutory construction case,” a court
`must “start, of course, with the statutory text.”
`Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013) (quoting
`BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006)).
`This Court’s cases insisting on that approach are
`legion. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534
`U.S. 438, 461-462 (2002) (“We have stated time and
`again that courts must presume that a legislature
`says in a statute what it means and means in a
`statute what it says there.”).
`
`
`
`12
`“When the words of a statute are unambiguous,
`then, this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry
`is complete.” Id. at 462 (internal quotation marks
`omitted). A statute’s text is not “ambiguous” merely
`because it uses “[b]road general language.” Diamond
`v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980). Only after
`examining “the text of the provision in question” and
`discerning a genuine ambiguity may a court “move
`on, as need be, to the structure and purpose of the
`Act in which it occurs.” N.Y. State Conference of Blue
`Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
`U.S. 645, 655 (1995); accord Food Mktg. Inst., 139 S.
`Ct. at 2364 (finding it “inappropriate[ ]” to “resort to
`legislative history before consulting [a] statute’s text
`and structure”). Courts “[l]ack[ ] the expertise or
`authority to assess the[ ]
`important competing
`claims” involved in policy disputes, which are “best
`addressed to the Congress.” Dunn v. Commodity
`Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465, 480 (1997).
`And, critically, “[p]olicy considerations cannot over-
`ride [an] interpretation of the text and structure of
`[an] Act.” Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A., v. First Inter-
`state Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 188 (1994).
`2. The Ninth Circuit broke sharply from this meth-
`od of statutory interpretation. It started with its
`view of the statute’s “history and purpose,” not text.
`Pet. App. 19a. Indeed, the court apparently recog-
`nized that its approach was incompatible with Sec-
`tion 230’s text: It took note of Congress’s “unwilling-
`ness * * * to
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