No. 19-46
`In the Supreme Court of the United States
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE;
`ANDREI IANCU, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR
`INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR, UNITED
`STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PETITIONERS
`
`v.
`
`BOOKING.COM B.V.
`
`
`
`ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`
`PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`
`
`
` NOEL J. FRANCISCO
`Solicitor General
`Counsel of Record
`JOSEPH H. HUNT
`Assistant Attorney General
`MALCOLM L. STEWART
`Deputy Solicitor General
`ERICA L. ROSS
`Assistant to the Solicitor
`General
`MARK R. FREEMAN
`DANIEL TENNY
`Attorneys
`Department of Justice
`Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
`SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
`(202) 514-2217
`
`SARAH T. HARRIS
`General Counsel
`THOMAS W. KRAUSE
`Solicitor
`CHRISTINA J. HIEBER
`Senior Counsel
`MOLLY R. SILFEN
`Associate Solicitor
`United States Patent and
`Trademark Office
`Alexandria, Va. 22314
`
`
`
`
`

`

`QUESTION PRESENTED
`
`Under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq., ge-
`neric terms may not be registered as trademarks. The
`question presented is as follows:
`Whether the addition by an online business of a generic
`top-level domain (“.com”) to an otherwise generic term
`can create a protectable trademark.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`(I)
`
`

`

`RELATED PROCEEDINGS
`
`United States District Court (E.D. Va.):
`
`Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, No. 16-cv-425 (Aug. 9,
`2017) (order on summary judgment)
`
`Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, No. 16-cv-425 (Oct. 26,
`2017) (order on defendants’ motion to amend judg-
`ment and motion for expenses)
`
`United States Court of Appeals (4th Cir.):
`
`Booking.com B.V. v. United States Patent & Trade-
`mark Office, No. 17-2458 (Feb. 4, 2019, amended
`Feb. 27, 2019), petition for reh’g denied, Apr. 5, 2019
`(defendants’ appeal of partial grant of summary
`judgment)
`
`Booking.com B.V. v. United States Patent & Trade-
`mark Office, No. 17-2459 (Feb. 4, 2019, amended
`Feb. 27, 2019), petition for reh’g denied, Apr. 5, 2019
`(plaintiff ’s cross-appeal on expenses)
`
`Supreme Court of the United States:
`
`Booking.com B.V. v. United States Patent & Trade-
`mark Office, petition for cert. pending, No. 18-1309
`(filed Apr. 10, 2019)
`
`
`
`(II)
`
`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`Opinions below .............................................................................. 1
`Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 2
`Statutory provisions involved ...................................................... 2
`Statement ...................................................................................... 2
`Reasons for granting the petition ............................................. 12
`A. The court of appeals’ decision is wrong ..................... 13
`B. The question presented warrants review .................. 23
`Conclusion ................................................................................... 27
`Appendix A — Court of appeals opinion (Feb. 4, 2019,
`amended Feb. 27, 2019) ............................. 1a
`Appendix B — District court memorandum opinion on
`summary judgment (Aug. 9, 2017) ......... 46a
`Appendix C — District court memorandum opinion on
`motion to amend the judgment and
`motion for expenses (Oct. 26, 2017) ...... 108a
`Appendix D — Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
`opinion (Feb. 18, 2016) ........................... 136a
`Appendix E — Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
`opinion (Feb. 18, 2016) ........................... 182a
`Appendix F — Court of appeals order denying
`rehearing (Apr. 5, 2019) ......................... 225a
`Appendix G — Statutory provisions .................................... 227a
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases:
`
`
`
`Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.,
`537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976) .................................... 3, 11, 13, 20
`Advertise.com, Inc. v. AOL Adver., Inc., 616 F.3d 974
`(9th Cir. 2010) .................................................... 16, 17, 23, 24
`America Online, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 243 F.3d 812
`(4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 534 U.S. 946 (2001) ................ 22
`
`
`
`(III)
`
`

`

`Cases—Continued:
`
`Page
`
`IV
`
`B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc.,
`135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015) ........................................................... 7
`Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t
`Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).................................... 8
`CES Publ’g Corp. v. St. Regis Publ’ns, Inc.,
`531 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1975) .................................................... 4
`Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) ............................... 6
`Goodyear’s India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v.
`Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598 (1888) ............. passim
`Hotels.com, L.P., In re, 573 F.3d 1300
`(Fed. Cir. 2009) ................................................... 8, 15, 23, 26
`Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict,
`198 U.S. 118 (1905).............................................................. 15
`Hunt Masters, Inc. v. Landry’s Seafood Rest., Inc.,
`240 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 2001) ........................................... 4, 21
`Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844
`(1982) .................................................................................... 18
`Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366
`(1st Cir. 1980) ...................................................................... 20
`Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111
`(1938) .............................................................................. 20, 21
`Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017)..................................... 3
`Mil-Mar Shoe Co. v. Shonac Corp., 75 F.3d 1153
`(7th Cir. 1996) ........................................................................ 4
`Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,
`655 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1981) ................................................... 20
`Miller Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.,
`605 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1979) ......................................... 20, 21
`1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, In re, 586 F.3d 1359
`(Fed. Cir. 2009) ............................................................. 23, 24
`Oppedahl & Larson LLP, In re, 373 F.3d 1171
`(Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................................. 17, 24
`Pacer Tech., In re, 338 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003)............... 6
`
`

`

`Cases—Continued:
`
`Page
`
`V
`
`Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.,
`469 U.S. 189 (1985)........................................................ 3, 4, 5
`Peter v. NantKwest, Inc., cert. granted, No. 18-801
`(Mar. 4, 2019) ....................................................................... 12
`Reed Elsevier Props. Inc., In re, 482 F.3d 1376
`(Fed. Cir. 2007) ............................................................... 8, 23
`Retail Servs., Inc. v. Freebies Publ’g, 364 F.3d 535
`(4th Cir. 2004) ........................................................................ 4
`Royal Crown Co. v. The Coca-Cola Co., 892 F.3d 1358
`(Fed. Cir. 2018) ................................................................... 20
`Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455
`(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 976 (1996) ............... 3, 4, 5
`Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc.,
`202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1262
`(2000) ...................................................................................... 8
`Steelbuilding.com, In re, 415 F.3d 1293
`(Fed. Cir. 2005) ................................................................... 17
`Trade-Mark Cases, In re, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) ....................... 3
`Traf Fix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,
`532 U.S. 23 (2001) ............................................................... 22
`Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763
`(1992) .................................................................................. 3, 5
`Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc.,
`529 U.S. 205 (2000) ....................................................................... 16
`Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509 F.3d 1351
`(11th Cir. 2007) .................................................................... 18
`Wm. B. Coleman Co., In re, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 2019
`(T.T.A.B. 2010) .................................................................... 18
`
`Statutes and regulations:
`
`Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 210-212 ......... 3
`Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 ............................. 3
`Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. ............. 6
`
`

`

`Statutes and regulations—Continued:
`
`Page
`
`VI
`
`Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427
`(15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.) ......................................................... 3
`15 U.S.C. 1051(a)(1) ................................................. 3, 227a
`15 U.S.C. 1052(a)-(e) ............................................... 3, 233a
`15 U.S.C. 1052(e) ................................................... 22, 235a
`15 U.S.C. 1052(f ) (1982) .................................................... 5
`15 U.S.C. 1062(a) ........................................................... 6, 9
`15 U.S.C. 1063(a) ............................................................... 6
`15 U.S.C. 1064(c) (1982) .................................................... 4
`15 U.S.C. 1067 .................................................................... 6
`15 U.S.C. 1070 .................................................................... 6
`15 U.S.C. 1071(a) ............................................... 6, 25, 236a
`15 U.S.C. 1071(a)(4) ................................................. 6, 237a
`15 U.S.C. 1071(b) ............................................... 8, 25, 238a
`15 U.S.C. 1071(b)(1) ................................................ 6, 238a
`15 U.S.C. 1071(b)(3) .......................................... 7, 11, 238a
`15 U.S.C. 1127 ...................................................... 2, 3, 241a
`Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. 145 ........................................ 12
`Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988,
`Pub. L. No. 100-667, Tit. I, 102 Stat. 3935.......................... 4
`§ 115, 102 Stat. 3940 (15 U.S.C. 1064(3) (1988)) ............. 4
`§ 136, 102 Stat. 3948 .......................................................... 4
`28 U.S.C. 1291 .......................................................................... 7
`37 C.F.R.:
`Section 2.101(b) .................................................................. 6
`Section 2.111 ...................................................................... 6
`Section 2.145(a) .................................................................. 6
`Section 2.145(c) .................................................................. 6
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`VII
`
`Miscellaneous:
`
`Page
`
`4 Louis Altman & Malla Pollack, Callmann on
`Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies
`(4th ed. 2019) ......................................................................... 4
`J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks
`and Unfair Competition:
`Vol. 1 (3d ed. 1996) ............................................................ 5
`Vol. 2 (5th ed. 2019) ..................................................... 4, 18
`U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Trademark Trial
`and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure
`(June 2018) ...................................................................... 6, 25
`
`
`
`
`

`

`In the Supreme Court of the United States
`
`
`
`No. 19-46
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE;
`ANDREI IANCU, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR
`INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR, UNITED
`STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PETITIONERS
`
`v.
`BOOKING.COM B.V.
`
`
`
`ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`
`PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`
`
`
`The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States
`Patent and Trademark Office and its Director, respect-
`fully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judg-
`ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
`Fourth Circuit in this case.
`
`OPINIONS BELOW
`The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra,
`1a-45a) is reported at 915 F.3d 171. The opinion of the
`district court on summary judgment (App., infra, 46a-
`107a) is reported at 278 F. Supp. 3d 891. The opinion of
`the district court on petitioners’ motion to amend the
`judgment and motion for expenses (App., infra, 108a-
`135a) is not published in the Federal Supplement but is
`available at 2017 WL 4853755. The opinions of the
`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (App., infra, 136a-
`
`(1)
`
`

`

`2
`
`181a, 182a-224a) are not published in the United States
`Patents Quarterly but are available at 2016 WL 1045671
`and 2016 WL 1045674, respectively.
`
`JURISDICTION
`The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
`February 4, 2019. A petition for rehearing was denied
`on April 5, 2019 (App., infra, 225a-226a). The jurisdic-
`tion of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
`
`STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
`Section 1127 of Title 15 of the United States Code
`defines a “ ‘trademark’ ” in relevant part as “any word,
`name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof ”
`that is “used by a person * * * to identify and distin-
`guish his or her goods, including a unique product, from
`those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the
`source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.”
`15 U.S.C. 1127. Other pertinent statutory provisions
`are reproduced in the appendix to this petition. App.,
`infra, 227a-247a.
`
`STATEMENT
`This case involves respondent’s applications to reg-
`ister trademarks containing the term BOOKING.COM
`for online hotel reservation services. The United States
`Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) refused regis-
`tration. The agency concluded that the term “booking”
`is generic for the services as to which respondent
`sought registration, and that the addition of the generic
`top-level domain “.com” did not create a protectable
`mark. App., infra, 136a-181a, 182a-224a. Respondent
`sought review of that decision in the United States Dis-
`trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which
`held that the term BOOKING.COM was non-generic
`
`

`

`3
`
`and potentially protectable as a trademark. Id. at 46a-
`107a. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1a-45a.
`1. a. A trademark is a “word, name, symbol, or de-
`vice” used by a person “to identify and distinguish his
`or her goods” in commerce and “to indicate the source
`of the goods.” 15 U.S.C. 1127. Federal law does not cre-
`ate trademark rights. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744,
`1751 (2017); In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92
`(1879). Rather, trademarks have been protected by the
`common law and in equity since the founding, and the
`common law and statutes of many States continue to pro-
`vide such protection today. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751. Fed-
`eral law, however, has long provided additional ad-
`vantages. See Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724;
`Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 210-212.
`Since 1946, those advantages have been provided
`through the Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (15 U.S.C.
`1051 et seq.). As relevant here, the Lanham Act defines
`the term “trademark” and authorizes federal registra-
`tion of trademarks if certain requirements are met.
`15 U.S.C. 1051(a)(1), 1052(a)-(e), 1127.
`For purposes of determining whether particular
`words or phrases can serve as trademarks, this Court
`has identified five categories of terms, listed in increas-
`ing order of distinctiveness and protectability: “(1) ge-
`neric; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; [and]
`(5) fanciful.” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
`505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co.
`v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)
`(Friendly, J.)). “A generic term is one that refers to the
`genus of which the particular product is a species.”
`Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S.
`189, 194 (1985). It is “the common name of a product or
`service itself,” and “ ‘identifies the general nature of an
`article.’ ” Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d
`
`

`

`4
`
`455, 464 & n.10 (4th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied,
`519 U.S. 976 (1996). By declining to recognize generic
`names as trademarks, trademark law “protect[s] the
`linguistic commons by preventing exclusive use of terms
`that represent their common meaning.” App., infra, 2a.
`The courts of appeals have recognized as generic such
`terms as “Convenient Store” retail stores, “Crab House”
`seafood restaurants, “Consumer Electronics Monthly”
`magazine, and “Warehouse Shoes” retail stores. See
`Hunt Masters, Inc. v. Landry’s Seafood Rest., Inc.,
`240 F.3d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 2001); Sara Lee Corp., 81 F.3d
`at 464; Mil-Mar Shoe Co. v. Shonac Corp., 75 F.3d 1153,
`1161 (7th Cir. 1996); CES Publ’g Corp. v. St. Regis
`Publ’ns, Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 12-15 (2d Cir. 1975).1
`In contrast to a generic term, a descriptive term “de-
`scribes the qualities or characteristics of a good or ser-
`vice,” Park ’N Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. at 194, such as its “func-
`tion, use, characteristic, size, or intended purpose,” Re-
`tail Servs., Inc. v. Freebies Publ’g, 364 F.3d 535, 539
`(4th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). See 4 Louis Altman &
`Malla Pollack, Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trade-
`marks and Monopolies § 18:14, at 18-160 (4th ed. 2019)
`(“A generic term categorizes; it conveys information
`
`
`1 The Lanham Act originally referred to generic terms as those
`that constitute “the common descriptive name of an article or sub-
`stance.” Park ’N Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. at 193-194 (quoting 15 U.S.C.
`1064(c) (1982)). In the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988
`(TLRA), Pub. L. No. 100-667, Tit. I, 102 Stat. 3935 (effective Nov.
`16, 1989, see TLRA § 136, 102 Stat. 3948), Congress amended the
`statute to replace the phrase “common descriptive name” with the
`phrase “generic name,” e.g., TLRA § 115, 102 Stat. 3940 (15 U.S.C.
`1064(3) (1988)). See generally 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on
`Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 12:21, at 12-106 to 12-107
`(5th ed. 2019).
`
`

`

`5
`
`with respect to the nature or class of an article. A de-
`scriptive term, on the other hand, characterizes; it iden-
`tifies the characteristics and qualities of the article,
`such as its color, odor, functions, dimensions or ingredi-
`ents.”) (emphases omitted). Examples of descriptive
`terms include “After Tan post-tanning lotion, 5 Minute
`glue, King Size men’s clothing, and the Yellow Pages
`telephone directory.” Sara Lee Corp., 81 F.3d at 464
`(citing 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trade-
`marks and Unfair Competition § 11.08, at 11-31 to 11-40
`(3d ed. 1996)). Unlike generic terms, descriptive terms
`may be protected, but only if “the registrant shows that
`[the term] has acquired secondary meaning, i.e., it ‘has
`become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce.’ ”
`Park ’N Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. at 194 (quoting 15 U.S.C.
`1052(f ) (1982)). A descriptive term has acquired second-
`ary meaning, and may be registrable, “if in the minds of
`the public, the primary significance of a product feature
`or term is to identify the source of the product rather
`than the product itself.” Sara Lee Corp., 81 F.3d at 464
`(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
`Suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks “are deemed
`inherently distinctive and are entitled to protection.”
`Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768. “Suggestive marks
`connote, without describing, some quality, ingredient,
`or characteristic of the product.” Sara Lee Corp., 81 F.3d
`at 464 (providing examples of Coppertone ® and Orange
`Crush®). “Arbitrary marks are comprised of words in
`common usage, but, because they do not suggest or de-
`scribe any quality, ingredient, or characteristic of the
`goods they serve, are said to have been arbitrarily as-
`signed.” Ibid. (providing examples of Camel® cigarettes
`and Apple® computers). “Fanciful marks are, in essence,
`made-up words.” Ibid. (providing examples of Clorox®
`and Kodak®).
`
`

`

`6
`
`b. When an applicant seeks to register a trademark,
`a USPTO examining attorney determines whether “the
`applicant is entitled to registration.” 15 U.S.C. 1062(a).
`An applicant who is dissatisfied with the examining at-
`torney’s decision may appeal to the Trademark Trial
`and Appeal Board (TTAB), which renders a final deci-
`sion on behalf of the USPTO. See 15 U.S.C. 1067, 1070.
`If the examining attorney finds that registration is
`proper, “[a]ny person who believes that he would be
`damaged by the registration” may file an opposition ad-
`dressed to the TTAB. 15 U.S.C. 1063(a); see 37 C.F.R.
`2.101(b); see also 37 C.F.R. 2.111 (permitting third par-
`ties to initiate cancellation proceedings). Both the ex-
`amining attorney and the TTAB apply Federal Circuit
`precedents in deciding whether particular marks qual-
`ify for registration. See USPTO, Trademark Trial and
`Appeal Board Manual of Procedure § 101.03 (June
`2018) (TTAB Manual).
`Any party who is dissatisfied with the TTAB’s deci-
`sion may file a direct appeal in the Federal Circuit.
`15 U.S.C. 1071(a); see 37 C.F.R. 2.145(a). That court
`reviews “the decision from which the appeal is taken on
`the record before the [USPTO],” 15 U.S.C. 1071(a)(4),
`and reviews the USPTO’s factual findings for “substan-
`tial evidence,” In re Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d 1348, 1349
`(Fed. Cir. 2003). Cf. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150,
`152, 165 (1999) (holding that courts of appeals must ap-
`ply the deferential standards of review prescribed by
`the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.,
`to the USPTO’s findings of fact under the materially
`similar patent scheme).
`Alternatively, any party that is dissatisfied with the
`TTAB’s decision may file a civil action in federal district
`court. 15 U.S.C. 1071(b)(1); see 37 C.F.R. 2.145(c). Unlike
`in a direct appeal, the applicant and the USPTO may
`
`

`

`7
`
`conduct discovery, and the applicant may introduce ev-
`idence that the agency had no prior opportunity to con-
`sider. Where new evidence is introduced on an issue,
`“the judge resolves registration de novo.” B & B Hard-
`ware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1301
`(2015); see 15 U.S.C. 1071(b)(3). Any appeal from the
`district court’s decision in such a proceeding is heard by
`the appropriate regional court of appeals. 28 U.S.C. 1291.
`2. a. Respondent operates a website on which cus-
`tomers can book hotel accommodations. App., infra,
`4a. In 2011 and 2012, respondent filed four federal
`trademark-registration applications for marks that in-
`cluded or consisted of the term “BOOKING.COM.”
`Ibid. As relevant here, the applications sought regis-
`tration for use of the marks in connection with “online
`hotel reservation services.” Ibid.; see id. at 4a n.2.
`The examining attorney refused registration on the
`ground that BOOKING.COM is generic as applied to
`the relevant services. See App., infra, 5a. The TTAB
`affirmed in three substantially similar opinions. Ibid.;
`see id. at 136a-181a, 182a-224a (TTAB decisions on two
`applications). The TTAB concluded that “relevant cus-
`tomers would understand the term BOOKING.COM to
`refer to an online reservation service for transportation
`and lodgings.” Id. at 218a; see id. at 176a. In reaching
`that conclusion, the TTAB relied on dictionary defini-
`tions of the terms “ ‘booking,’ ” and “.com”; the use of the
`term “ ‘booking’ ” by “numerous websites” and by re-
`spondent to refer to the relevant class of services; and
`“third-party domain names and trade names that include
`the designation ‘booking.com,’ ” such as “hotelbooking.
`com” and “ebooking.com.” Id. at 141a-169a, 187a-211a.2
`
`2 A domain name is a string of text that is used to look up a par-
`ticular site or resource on the Internet. A top-level domain is the
`
`

`

`8
`
`The TTAB observed that its conclusion comported with
`prior decisions of the Federal Circuit, which had “held to
`be generic marks that were similar” to BOOKING.COM
`—such as “HOTELS.COM” and “LAWYERS.COM”—
`“on the basis of ” “highly similar” evidence. Id. at 162a-
`163a, 170a, 205a-206a, 213a (citing In re Hotels.com,
`L.P., 573 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009) and In re Reed Else-
`vier Props. Inc., 482 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
`b. Respondent sought review in the United States
`District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, see
`15 U.S.C. 1071(b), which reversed in relevant part,
`App., infra, 46a-107a. The court recognized that “the
`term ‘booking’ is generic” for the relevant class of ser-
`vices. Id. at 67a. It also observed that the Federal and
`Ninth Circuits had found the combination of similar ge-
`neric terms and top-level domains like “.com” to be ge-
`neric. Id. at 69a-72a, 77a-78a.
`The district court nonetheless concluded that top-
`level domains like “.com” “are generally source identi-
`fying and that a mark composed of a generic [second-
`level domain] and a [top-level domain] is a descriptive
`mark eligible for protection upon a showing of acquired
`distinctiveness.” App., infra, 84a-85a. The court found
`that its “general[]” rule applied in this case because re-
`spondent’s “Teflon survey”—which respondent had in-
`troduced for the first time in the district court—showed
`
`
`right-most portion of a domain name, such as “.com,” “.net,” “.org,”
`or “.gov.” Domain names also include second-level domains
`(e.g., “uscourts.gov”) and may include third-level domains (e.g.,
`“ca4.uscourts.gov”). See, e.g., Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s
`Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 492-493 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S.
`1262 (2000); Brookfield Comm’ncs, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp.,
`174 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999). In the case of “booking.com,”
`“.com” is the top-level domain and “booking” is the second-level
`domain.
`
`

`

`9
`
`that “74.8 percent” of surveyed consumers “identified
`BOOKING.COM as a brand name.” Id. at 84a, 88a.
`Having concluded that respondent’s proposed marks
`were descriptive, the district court held that, as applied
`to hotel reservation services, the marks had acquired
`secondary meaning. App., infra, 97a-104a. The court
`ordered the USPTO to register the marks as to two ap-
`plications, and it remanded the other two applications
`for further agency fact-finding regarding design and
`color elements of the proposed marks. Id. at 106a-107a
`& n.23. The court subsequently amended its judgment
`to direct that the marks it had found distinctive be pub-
`lished for opposition in the USPTO’s Official Gazette, a
`necessary precondition for registration. Id. at 110a-116a;
`see 15 U.S.C. 1062(a).
`3. The court of appeals affirmed. App., infra, 1a-27a.
`a. The court of appeals concluded that BOOKING.
`COM, taken as a whole, is not generic because the rele-
`vant public would primarily understand the term to in-
`dicate respondent’s brand. App., infra, 9a-10a; see id.
`at 12a-13a. The court relied in significant part on re-
`spondent’s Teflon survey, rejecting the USPTO’s argu-
`ment that such survey evidence is irrelevant to the
`question whether BOOKING.COM is generic. Id. at
`16a-18a. The court acknowledged that, “[i]f a term is
`deemed generic, subsequent consumer recognition of
`the term as brand-specific cannot change that determi-
`nation.” Id. at 11a. The court held, however, that this
`rule applies only where a term was “already deemed ge-
`neric” by “a prior court” or was “previously commonly
`used” by the public. Id. at 21a & n.11.
`In arguing that BOOKING.COM is generic, the gov-
`ernment relied in part on this Court’s holding in Good-
`year’s India Rubber Glove Manufacturing Co. v. Good-
`year Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598 (1888), that the addition
`
`

`

`10
`
`of a corporate identifier such as “Company” to a generic
`term cannot create a protectable trademark. App., infra,
`18a. The government contended that the Goodyear
`Court’s rationales for that conclusion apply equally to
`the addition of the top-level domain “.com” to a generic
`term. Id. at 18a-19a. The court of appeals rejected that
`argument, stating that “Goodyear was decided almost
`sixty years before the Lanham Act and, crucially, did
`not apply the primary significance test” that the court
`in this case applied. Id. at 19a.
`The court of appeals stated that it was “not unsym-
`pathetic to the USPTO’s concerns that granting trade-
`mark protection over BOOKING.COM may prevent
`other companies from using the mark.” App., infra,
`24a. But the court found “these concerns * * * as-
`suaged by two considerations.” Ibid. The court first
`posited that, because trademark protection applies only
`to particular services—here, hotel reservation services
`—other businesses likely could continue to use domain
`names like “carbooking.com” or “flightbooking.com.”
`Ibid. Second, the court observed that a plaintiff in a fu-
`ture infringement suit would be required to show a like-
`lihood of consumer confusion, which might be “more dif-
`ficult” in the context of “unique” domain names. Id. at
`24a-25a.
`b. Judge Wynn dissented in relevant part. App.,
`infra, 28a-45a (Wynn, J., concurring in part and dis-
`senting in part). He explained that, because “trade-
`mark law does not protect generic terms,” a business
`can choose a non-generic domain name like Amazon.com,
`and exclude competitors from using close variants of
`that name; or it can choose a generic domain name that
`identifies the goods or services it provides, thereby eas-
`ily attracting customers on the Internet but forgoing
`the benefits of trademark protection. Id. at 28a. Judge
`
`

`

`11
`
`Wynn would have held that BOOKING.COM falls into
`the latter category. Id. at 28a-29a.
`Judge Wynn would have reversed the district court’s
`judgment on the ground that the court’s factual findings
`were premised on “legal error”—the court’s conclusion
`that the combination of “ ‘.com’ ” and a generic term “ ‘is
`usually a descriptive mark eligible for protection upon
`a showing of secondary meaning.’ ” App., infra, 30a n.2
`(Wynn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (ci-
`tation omitted); see id. at 30a-32a. Judge Wynn stated
`that the majority’s “ultimate determination—that the
`proposed mark BOOKING.COM is descriptive—conflicts
`with the determination that every other court has
`reached” in similar cases. Id. at 32a; see generally id.
`at 32a-37a.
`Judge Wynn further explained that the court of ap-
`peals’ decision undermined the rule that, no matter how
`much success the user of a generic term “has achieved
`in securing public identification, it cannot deprive com-
`peting manufacturers of the product of the right to call
`an article by its name.” App., infra, 38a-39a (Wynn, J.,
`concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
`Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9) (emphasis omit-
`ted). Finally, Judge Wynn stated that the court’s deci-
`sion “unjustifiably empowers [respondent] to monopo-
`lize language” and “freeze out potential competitors,”
`who cannot “use the term ‘booking’ in their own website
`domain names” without “fac[ing] the risk of a costly,
`protracted, and uncertain infringement lawsuit.” Id. at
`41a-42a; see id. at 42a-45a.3
`
`
`3 The court of appeals unanimously affirmed the district court’s
`determination that, under 15 U.S.C. 1071(b)(3), the USPTO was en-
`titled to “all the expenses of the proceeding,” including the salary
`expenses of USPTO personnel who defended the action. App., infra,
`
`

`

`12
`
`4. The court of appeals denied the government’s pe-
`tition for rehearing en banc. App., infra, 225a-226a.
`
`REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
`The court of appeals held that an applicant may ob-
`tain federal trademark protection for a generic term by
`adding “.com” to that term, so long as the relevant pub-
`lic would understand the combination to refer to a spe-
`cific business. That holding contravenes established
`principles of trademark law, and it conflicts with deci-
`sions of the Federal and Ninth Circuits, the only other
`courts of appeals that have considered the protectabil-
`ity of “generic.com” terms.
`More than 130 years ago, this Court held that the
`addition of an entity designation like “Company” to an
`otherwise-generic term like “wine,” “cotton,” or “grain”
`does not create a protectable mark, because “the word
`‘Company’ only indicates that parties have formed an
`association or p