`
`No. 19-631
`
`IN THE
`Supreme Court of the United States
`
`________________________________________________________________________
`
`WILLIAM P. BARR, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL.,
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS,
`INC., ET AL.,
`Respondents.
`________________________________________________________________________
`
`On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
`Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
`________________________________________________________________________
`
`BRIEF OF INDIANA, NORTH CAROLINA,
`AND 31 OTHER STATES
`IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
`________________________________________________________________________
`
`
`
`JOSHUA H. STEIN
` Attorney General
`MATTHEW W. SAWCHAK
` Solicitor General
`RYAN Y. PARK
` Deputy Solicitor General
`NICHOLAS S. BROD
` Assistant Solicitor
` General
`
`NORTH CAROLINA
` DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
`Post Office Box 629
`Raleigh, NC 27602
`(919) 716-6400
`msawchak@ncdoj.gov
`
`CURTIS T. HILL, JR.
` Indiana Attorney General
`*THOMAS M. FISHER
` Solicitor General
`KIAN J. HUDSON
` Deputy Solicitor General
`JULIA C. PAYNE
` Deputy Attorney General
`
`
`OFFICE OF THE INDIANA
` ATTORNEY GENERAL
`302 W. Washington St.
`Indianapolis, IN 46204
`(317) 232-6255
`Tom.Fisher@atg.in.gov
`*Counsel of Record
`
`
`
`i
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................... iii
`
`INTEREST OF AMICI STATES ............................. 1
`
`SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ......................... 5
`
`ARGUMENT ............................................................ 7
`
`I. The Robocall Ban Safeguards Personal and
`Residential Privacy in Conformity with the
`First Amendment ............................................. 7
`
`
`
`A. The ban prohibits highly intrusive
`robocalls regardless of content and
`therefore passes First Amendment
`scrutiny ..................................................... 7
`
`B. The federal-government-debt exemption
`applies regardless of call content and
`complies with the First Amendment ..... 12
`
`1.
`
`The federal-government-debt
`exemption does not depend on
`a call’s content .............................. 13
`
`The federal-government-debt
`exemption survives intermediate
`scrutiny ......................................... 13
`
`2.
`
`
`II. If Invalid, the Federal-Government-Debt
`Exemption Is Severable from the Remainder
`of the Robocall Ban ......................................... 16
`
`
`
`ii
`
`
`
`CONCLUSION ....................................................... 26
`
`ADDITIONAL COUNSEL ..................................... 27
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`CASES
`
`Alaska Airlines v. Brock,
`480 U.S. 678 (1987) .................................. 20, 21, 23
`
`Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New
`Eng.,
`546 U.S. 320 (2006) ............................ 17, 20, 22, 24
`
`Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox,
`492 U.S. 469 (1989) .............................................. 14
`
`Bland v. Fessler,
`88 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 1996) ....................................7
`
`Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.,
`472 U.S. 491 (1985) ........................................ 17, 23
`
`Buckley v. Valeo,
`424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) ............................ 20
`
`Cahaly v. Larosa,
`796 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2015) ..................................4
`
`Carpenter v. United States,
`138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) .......................................... 11
`
`Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
`298 U.S. 238 (1936) .............................................. 21
`
`Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation
`Comm’n of Okla.,
`286 U.S. 210 (1932) .............................................. 16
`
`
`
`CASES [CONT’D]
`
`iv
`
`
`City of Ladue v. Gilleo,
`512 U.S. 43 (1994) ................................................ 12
`
`Duguid v. Facebook, Inc.,
`926 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2019), petition
`for cert. pending, No. 19-511 (filed Oct.
`17, 2019) ............................................................... 14
`
`Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found.,
`438 U.S. 726 (1978) .............................................. 10
`
`Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co.
`Accounting Oversight Bd.,
`561 U.S. 477 (2010) ............................ 16, 17, 20, 24
`
`Gomez v. Campbell–Ewald Co.,
`768 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2014), aff’d on
`other grounds, 136 S.Ct. 663 (2016) ......................7
`
`Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v.
`United States,
`527 U.S. 173 (1999) .............................................. 19
`
`Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v.
`United States,
`1999 WL 642904 (E.D. La. Aug. 23,
`1999) ..................................................................... 19
`
`Hershey v. City of Clearwater,
`834 F.2d 937 (11th Cir. 1987) .............................. 23
`
`Hill v. Wallace,
`259 U.S. 44 (1922) ................................................ 21
`
`
`
`CASES [CONT’D]
`
`v
`
`
`I.N.S. v. Chadha,
`462 U.S. 919 (1983) .......................................... 7, 23
`
`McCullen v. Coakley,
`573 U.S. 464 (2014) .......................................... 9, 13
`
`Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC,
`565 U.S. 368 (2012) ............................................ 2, 3
`
`Moser v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n,
`46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995) .............................. 8, 11
`
`Nat. Fed. of Indep. Businesses v. Sebelius,
`567 U.S. 519 (2012) .............................................. 20
`
`Nat’l Coal. of Prayer, Inc. v. Carter,
`455 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2006) ................................ 16
`
`New York v. United States,
`505 U.S. 144 (1992) .............................................. 20
`
`Olson v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference &
`Bond Ass’n,
`313 U.S. 236 (1941) .............................................. 21
`
`Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Zoeller,
`845 F.3d 303 (7th Cir. 2017) ............................ 7, 13
`
`Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
`135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) ............................................8
`
`Regan v. Time, Inc.,
`468 U.S. 641 (1984) .............................................. 17
`
`
`
`CASES [CONT’D]
`
`vi
`
`
`Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union,
`521 U.S. 844 (1997) .............................................. 21
`
`Riley v. California,
`573 U.S. 373 (2014) .............................................. 11
`
`Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.
`564 U.S. 552 (2011) .............................................. 18
`
`United States v. Booker,
`543 U.S. 220 (2005) ........................................ 24, 25
`
`Van Bergen v. Minnesota,
`59 F.3d 1541 (8th Cir. 1995) ............................ 7, 13
`
`Victory Processing, LLC v. Michael,
`333 F. Supp. 3d 1263 (D. Wyo. 2018),
`appeal filed, No. 18-8063 (10th Cir.) .....................4
`
`Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
`491 U.S. 781 (1989) ................................ 8, 9, 10, 14
`
`Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of La.,
`278 U.S. 235 (1929) .............................................. 21
`
`Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,
`575 U.S. 433 (2015) .............................................. 12
`
`Wisconsin v. Mitchell,
`508 U.S. 476 (1993) .............................................. 13
`
`STATUTES
`
`47 U.S.C. § 227 .......................................................... 22
`
`
`
`STATUTES [CONT’D]
`
`vii
`
`
`47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) ........................................ 2, 18
`
`47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)............................... passim
`
`47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) ............................................ 23
`
`47 U.S.C. § 227(f)(1) ....................................................3
`
`47 U.S.C. § 227(g)(1)....................................................3
`
`47 U.S.C. § 608 ........................................ 21, 22, 23, 25
`
`Ala. Code § 8-19A-3(3)(a) ............................................3
`
`Alaska Stat. § 45.50.475 .............................................4
`
`Alaska Stat. § 45.50.475(a)(4).....................................3
`
`Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1282 ..................................4
`
`Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2919 ..................................3
`
`Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1278 ..................................3
`
`Ark. Code § 5-63-204 ...................................................3
`
`Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No.
`114-74, § 301(a), 129 Stat. 584 ............................ 12
`
`Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17591 ...................................4
`
`Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(22)(A) ..................................3
`
`Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 2871 .........................................3
`
`
`
`STATUTES [CONT’D]
`
`viii
`
`
`Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-904 ............................................4
`
`Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-311 ..........................................3
`
`Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-302(2)(a) ...................................3
`
`Conn. Stat. § 16-256e ..................................................3
`
`Conn. Stat. § 52-570c ..................................................3
`
`Fla. Stat. § 501.059(8)(a) ............................................3
`
`Ga. Code Ann. § 46-5-27 .............................................4
`
`Ga. Code § 46-5-23 ......................................................3
`
`Haw. Rev. Stat. § 481P-2 ............................................4
`
`Idaho Code Ann. § 48-1003A ......................................4
`
`815 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 305/1 ........................................3
`
`Ind. Code § 24-4.7-4-1 .................................................4
`
`Ind. Code § 24-5-14-5 ..................................................3
`
`Kan. Stat. § 50-670 .................................................. 3, 4
`
`Ky. Stat. § 367.461 ......................................................3
`
`La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45:844.16 ..................................4
`
`La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45:810 .......................................3
`
`Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 159C, § 1 ...................................4
`
`
`
`STATUTES [CONT’D]
`
`ix
`
`
`Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 159C § 3 ....................................3
`
`Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 159 § 19B ..................................3
`
`Md. Pub. Util. Code § 8-204 ........................................3
`
`Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 10, § 1498 ......................................3
`
`Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 10, § 1499-B ...................................4
`
`Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.111a ....................................4
`
`Mich. Stat. § 484.125 ..................................................3
`
`Minn. Stat. § 325E.26 .................................................3
`
`Minn. Stat. § 332.37(13) .............................................3
`
`Miss. Code §§ 77-3-451–59 ..........................................3
`
`Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-1602....................................4
`
`Mont. Code § 45-8-216(1)(a)–(d) .................................3
`
`N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-102 .............................................4
`
`N.C. Stat. § 75-104 ......................................................3
`
`N.D. Cent. Code § 51-28-04..................................... 3, 4
`
`N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 359-E:11 .................................4
`
`N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 359-E:1 to E:6 ........................3
`
`N.J. Stat. Ann. 56:8-130 .............................................4
`
`
`
`STATUTES [CONT’D]
`
`x
`
`
`N.J. Stat. Ann. § 48:17-28 ...........................................3
`
`N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-12-22 ..................................... 3, 4
`
`N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 399-p ........................................3
`
`Neb. Stat. §§ 86-236 to 86-258 ....................................3
`
`Nev. Rev. Stat. § 228.550 ............................................4
`
`Nev. Stat. § 597.812 ....................................................3
`
`Nev. Stat. § 597.814 ....................................................3
`
`Nev. Stat. § 597.816 ....................................................3
`
`Nev. Stat. § 597.818 ....................................................3
`
`15 Okla. Stat. § 755.1 ..................................................3
`
`21 Okla. Stat. § 1847a ............................................. 3, 4
`
`Or. Rev. Stat. § 646A.370 ...........................................4
`
`73 Pa. Stat. § 2245.2 ...................................................4
`
`73 Pa. Stat. § 2245.2(j) ................................................4
`
`Pub. L. 114-74, Title III, § 301(a), 129 Stat.
`588 ........................................................................ 17
`
`R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-61-3.5 ............................................4
`
`R.I. Stat. § 5-61-3.4 .....................................................4
`
`
`
`STATUTES [CONT’D]
`
`xi
`
`
`R.I. Stat. § 11-35-26 ....................................................4
`
`S.C. Code Ann. § 37-21-70 ..........................................4
`
`S.C. Stat. § 16-17-446..................................................4
`
`S.D. Codified Laws § 49-31-99 ....................................4
`
`S.D. Stat. § 37-30-23 ...................................................4
`
`Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
`1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat.
`2394 ........................................................ 2, 9, 10, 17
`
`Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-1502 ....................................4
`
`Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-4-410 ........................................4
`
`Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 304.051 ......................4
`
`Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 305.001 ...............................4
`
`Utah Code Ann. § 13-25a-109 .....................................4
`
`Utah Code § 13-25a-103 ..............................................4
`
`Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-514 ............................................4
`
`Va. Code § 59.1-518.2 ..................................................4
`
`Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2464a .......................................4
`
`Vt. Stat. tit. 18, § 4631 .............................................. 18
`
`Wash. Code § 80.36.400 ..............................................4
`
`
`
`STATUTES [CONT’D]
`
`xii
`
`
`Wis. Stat. § 100.52 ......................................................4
`
`Wis. Stat. § 100.52(4) ..................................................4
`
`Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-2-132 .........................................4
`
`Wyo. Stat. § 6-6-104 ....................................................4
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`Comment from the State Attorneys General
`Supporting Enactment of the Telephone
`Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement
`and Deterrence (“TRACED”) Act 1 (Mar.
`5, 2019), available at
`http://bit.ly/390krVu ..............................................1
`
`Eric S. Fish, Severability as Conditionality,
`64 Emory L.J. 1293 (2015) .................................. 23
`
`Fed. Trade Comm’n, Call It Quits: Robocall
`Crackdown 2019: Federal, State, and
`Local Actions (June 25, 2019) available
`at http://bit.ly/2wxX0F9 .........................................3
`
`Kenneth A. Klukowski, Severability
`Doctrine: How Much of a Statute Should
`Federal Courts Invalidate, 16 Tex. Rev.
`L. & Pol. 1 (2011) ................................................. 23
`
`
`
`xiii
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES [CONT’D]
`
`Marguerite M. Sweeney, Do Not Call: The
`History of Do Not Call and How
`Telemarketing Has Evolved, Nat’l
`Attorneys Gen. Training & Research
`Inst. (Aug. 2016), available at
`http://bit.ly/2SbCCkn ........................................... 10
`
`S. Rep. No. 102-178, reprinted in 1991
`U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968 ........................................... 2, 10
`
`Stephen J. Blumberg & Julian V. Luke,
`Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Wireless
`Substitution: Early Release of Estimates
`from the National Health Interview
`Survey, July–December 2017, available
`at
`https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/early
`release/wireless201806.pdf .................................. 11
`
`Truecaller, Phone Scams Cause Americans
`To Lose $10.5 Billion In Last 12 Months
`(Apr. 17, 2019), available at
`http://bit.ly/2HCT08r .............................................2
`
`YouMail Robocall Index, January 2020
`Nationwide Robocall Data (last visited
`Feb. 19, 2020), available at
`https://robocallindex.com/2020/january ................2
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`INTEREST OF AMICI STATES1
`
`The States of Indiana, North Carolina, Alabama,
`Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
`Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Mar-
`yland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
`souri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Da-
`kota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Da-
`kota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West
`Virginia, and Wisconsin respectfully submit this brief
`as amici curiae in support of the United States Attor-
`ney General.
`
`For decades, the States and the federal govern-
`ment have sought to protect consumers from un-
`wanted robocalls—automated telephone calls that de-
`liver a prerecorded message. These calls invade con-
`sumer privacy with harassing messages that come at
`all hours, day and night. Indeed, robocalls are the
`most common source of consumer complaints at many
`State Attorney General offices. Comment from the
`State Attorneys General Supporting Enactment of the
`Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and
`Deterrence (“TRACED”) Act 1 (Mar. 5, 2019), available
`at http://bit.ly/390krVu. By seeking to eliminate the
`robocall ban in its entirety, respondents threaten the
`ability of States to fight one of the most pressing con-
`sumer-protection issues that their residents face.
`
`
`1 No counsel for any party authored this brief, in whole or in part,
`and no person or entity other than Amici contributed monetarily
`to its preparation.
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`The robocall problem shows no signs of abating. In
`January 2020 alone, Americans received more than
`4.7 billion robocalls. YouMail Robocall Index, January
`2020 Nationwide Robocall Data (last visited Feb. 19,
`2020), available at https://robocallindex.com/2020/
`january. And technological advances have helped ro-
`bocalls proliferate. Robocalls inflict “more of a nui-
`sance and a greater invasion of privacy than calls
`placed by ‘live’ persons.” S. Rep. No. 102-178, at 4
`(1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1972.
`They are notoriously cheap, which allows telemarket-
`ers to use them to bombard consumers with vast num-
`bers of unwanted sales pitches and survey demands.
`Id. at 2. And because robocalls cannot engage with call
`recipients except in preprogrammed ways, they “do
`not allow the caller to feel the frustration of the called
`party.” Id. at 4. Moreover, these calls have become far
`more than just a nuisance. Last year alone, robocalls
`defrauded Americans of more than $10 billion. True-
`caller, Phone Scams Cause Americans To Lose $10.5
`Billion In Last 12 Months (Apr. 17, 2019), available at
`http://bit.ly/2HCT08r.
`
`The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
`(TCPA), Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394, is a crit-
`ical piece of federal consumer-protection legislation
`that generally prohibits the use of any “automatic tel-
`ephone dialing system or an artificial or pre-recorded
`voice” to make a call to numbers assigned to a cellular
`telephone service. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). The TCPA
`also grants both state and federal courts concurrent
`jurisdiction over TCPA claims, Mims v. Arrow Fin.
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 372 (2012), and State At-
`torneys General have partnered with federal agencies
`to enforce the robocall ban, see, e.g., Fed. Trade
`Comm’n, Call It Quits: Robocall Crackdown 2019:
`Federal, State, and Local Actions (June 25, 2019) (de-
`scribing recent enforcement actions), available at
`http://bit.ly/2wxX0F9; Comment from the State Attor-
`neys General, at 2–3 (same); accord 47 U.S.C.
`§ 227(g)(1) (permitting parens patriae actions by
`states to sue for any “pattern or practice” of violating
`the TCPA).
`
`In addition, as the TCPA expressly forecloses fed-
`eral preemption of state telephone privacy laws, 47
`U.S.C. § 227(f)(1), forty States have enforceable prohi-
`bitions or restrictions on the use of robocalls.2 Many of
`
`
`2 Ala. Code § 8-19A-3(3)(a); Alaska Stat. § 45.50.475(a)(4);
`Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-2919, 44-1278; Ark. Code § 5-
`63-204; Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(22)(A); Cal. Pub. Util.
`Code § 2871; Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-9-311, 6-1-302(2)(a);
`Conn. Stat. §§ 16-256e, 52-570c; Fla. Stat. § 501.059(8)(a);
`Ga. Code § 46-5-23; 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 305/1; Ind. Code
`§ 24-5-14-5; Kan. Stat. § 50-670; Ky. Stat. § 367.461; La.
`Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45:810; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 10, § 1498; Md.
`Pub. Util. Code § 8-204; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 159C § 3, ch.
`159 § 19B; Mich. Stat. § 484.125; Minn. Stat. §§ 325E.26,
`332.37(13); Miss. Code §§ 77-3-451–59; Mont. Code § 45-8-
`216(1)(a)–(d); Neb. Stat. §§ 86-236 to 86-258; Nev. Stat. §§
`597.812, 597.814, 597.816, 597.818; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
`359-E:1 to E:6; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 48:17-28; N.M. Stat. Ann.
`§ 57-12-22; N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 399-p; N.C. Stat. § 75-
`104; N.D. Cent. Code § 51-28-04; 15 Okla. Stat. § 755.1; 21
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`these state laws were patterned on the federal ro-
`bocall ban at issue here. In addition, many States also
`have separate restrictions on placing telemarketing
`calls of any type (even by a live operator) to consumers
`who register for no-call lists.3
`
`
`Okla. Stat. § 1847a; Or. Rev. Stat. § 646A.370; 73 Pa. Stat.
`§ 2245.2(j); R.I. Stat. §§ 5-61-3.4, 11-35-26; S.D. Stat. § 37-
`30-23; Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-1502; Tex. Bus. & Com.
`Code § 305.001; Utah Code Ann. § 13-25a-103; Va. Code §
`59.1-518.2; Wash. Code § 80.36.400; Wis. Stat. § 100.52(4).
`
`Two more States have enacted robocall prohibitions that
`have been enjoined. See S.C. Stat. § 16-17-446 (enjoined by
`Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2015)); Wyo. Stat.
`§ 6-6-104 (enjoined by Victory Processing, LLC v. Michael,
`333 F. Supp. 3d 1263 (D. Wyo. 2018), appeal filed, No. 18-
`8063 (10th Cir.)).
`
`3 See Ind. Code § 24-4.7-4-1; Alaska Stat. § 45.50.475; Ariz.
`Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1282; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17591;
`Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-904; Ga. Code Ann. § 46-5-27; Haw.
`Rev. Stat. § 481P-2; Idaho Code Ann. § 48-1003A; Kan.
`Stat. Ann. § 50-670; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45:844.16; Me.
`Rev. Stat. tit. 10, § 1499-B; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 159C, § 1;
`Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.111a; Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-
`1602; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 228.550; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
`§ 359-E:11; N.J. Stat. Ann. 56:8-130; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-
`12-22; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-102; N.D. Cent. Code § 51-28-
`04; 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2245.2; R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-61-3.5;
`S.C. Code Ann. § 37-21-70; S.D. Codified Laws § 49-31-99;
`Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-4-410; Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann.
`§ 304.051; Utah Code Ann. § 13-25a-109; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
`9, § 2464a; Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-514; Wis. Stat. § 100.52;
`Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-2-132.
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`Notwithstanding the compelling government in-
`terests at stake, the Fourth Circuit deemed a narrow
`TCPA exemption for calls to collect debt backed by the
`federal government to be impermissible content-based
`discrimination. But that ruling overlooks that the ex-
`ception applies based on a call’s purpose and the rela-
`tionship between the parties—not based on the call’s
`content.
`
`The Fourth Circuit correctly held, however, that
`the proper remedy for any First Amendment problem
`with the federal-government-debt exemption was to
`sever the exemption and leave in place the robocall
`ban. Similar to the TCPA, state telephone privacy
`laws frequently include minor, incidental exemptions
`justified on content-neutral grounds. Because such
`laws protect the privacy of consumers, Amici States
`have a compelling interest in defending the TCPA’s
`robocall ban as written—and in preserving the under-
`lying restriction even if the challenged exemption is
`unlawful. The Amici States also have a strong interest
`in ensuring this Court reaches a ruling that will pre-
`serve their ability, under state law, to protect their
`citizens from the harms caused by robocalls.
`
`SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
`
`No court has ever questioned the constitutionality
`of the TCPA’s robocall restriction. Not even respond-
`ents argue that the robocall ban, standing alone, vio-
`lates the First Amendment. Nor could they: the ro-
`bocall restriction is a classic content-neutral speech
`
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`regulation. It applies to anyone who makes a robocall
`to speak on any topic—or no topic at all—and is nar-
`rowly tailored to serve the government’s compelling
`interests to protect individual and residential privacy.
`
`Respondents instead claim that a single, narrow
`exemption from the robocall ban—the federal-govern-
`ment-debt exemption, which exempts calls made
`“solely” to collect a debt owed to or backed by the fed-
`eral government, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)—vio-
`lates the First Amendment. That exemption, however,
`is content-neutral—it applies depending on a call’s
`purpose (to collect a debt) and depending on the
`debtor-creditor relationship between the call recipient
`and the federal government. Its applicability does not
`depend on the content of the call. And as a content-
`neutral speech regulation, the federal-government-
`debt exemption easily survives intermediate scrutiny
`by directly—and narrowly—advancing a substantial
`government interest in protecting the public fisc.
`
`Even if the Court holds that the federal-govern-
`ment-debt exemption does violate the First Amend-
`ment, it should abide by the TCPA’s severability
`clause and sever the exemption from the remaining
`robocall ban rather than invalidate the ban entirely.
`The robocall ban is fully functional even without the
`exemption; it was enforced for twenty-four years be-
`fore Congress added the exemption to the TCPA in
`2015, which proves Congress did not intend the ban to
`be conditioned on the exemption. Indeed, the case for
`severability is sufficiently straightforward that the
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`Court may wish to consider it first. See I.N.S. v.
`Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 931 n.7 (1983) (“In this case we
`deem it appropriate to address questions of severabil-
`ity first.”).
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`
`I. The Robocall Ban Safeguards Personal and
`Residential Privacy in Conformity with the
`First Amendment
`
`A. The ban prohibits highly intrusive ro-
`bocalls regardless of content and there-
`fore passes First Amendment scrutiny
`
`The TCPA permissibly prohibits the use of any
`“automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or
`prerecorded voice” to make “any call” to a cell phone.
`47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). No court has ever held
`that such a blanket ban on robocalls violates the First
`Amendment. Indeed, every court to consider the mat-
`ter has held that such laws are valid, content-neutral
`regulations on the manner by which speech is deliv-
`ered. See Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Zoeller, 845 F.3d
`303 (7th Cir. 2017) (upholding Indiana’s robocall ban);
`Gomez v. Campbell–Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871 (9th Cir.
`2014) (upholding the TCPA before it was amended to
`add the federal-government-debt exemption), aff’d on
`other grounds, 136 S.Ct. 663 (2016); Bland v. Fessler,
`88 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding California’s ro-
`bocall ban); Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541,
`1549–56 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding the TCPA and
`
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`Minnesota’s robocall ban); Moser v. Fed. Commc’ns
`Comm’n, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding the
`TCPA).
`
`These decisions are well-justified. Under the First
`Amendment, laws that “serve[ ] purposes unrelated to
`the content of expression” are constitutional so long as
`they “promote[ ] a substantial government interest
`that would be achieved less effectively absent the reg-
`ulation.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
`791, 799 (1989) (internal quotation marks and cita-
`tions omitted). The robocall ban concerns the manner,
`not the content, of speech, and is narrowly tailored to
`serve the government’s interests in protecting con-
`sumers’ personal and residential privacy.
`
`1. To decide whether a statute is content-based,
`the Court first looks to the statute’s text and asks
`whether the statute draws content distinctions “on its
`face.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228
`(2015). If the statute is facially neutral, the Court then
`looks to the statute’s purpose, subjecting it to strict
`scrutiny only if it “cannot be justified without refer-
`ence to the content of the regulated speech” or was
`adopted because of the government’s disagreement
`with the message the speech conveys. Id. at 2227.
`Here, neither the text nor the purpose of the robocall
`ban pertain to the content of a telephone call’s speech.
`
`First, the text of the robocall ban does not draw
`content-based distinctions. By its terms, the robocall
`ban applies to “any call,” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii),
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`so content is irrelevant. Instead, the prohibition ap-
`plies based on the technology used to make and re-
`ceive calls: It prohibits calling a cell phone with an
`“automatic telephone dialing system” or an “artificial
`or prerecorded voice.” Id. The statute therefore bans
`robocalls selling products, promoting candidates,
`pranking friends, or addressing any other topic. In-
`deed, a caller could violate the statute without saying
`a word. See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 480
`(2014) (explaining that the challenged law was con-
`tent-neutral because one could violate it “without . . .
`uttering a word”).
`
`Second, the purpose of the robocall ban does not
`reflect impermissible content-based discrimination.
`Congress enacted the restriction because “telephone
`subscribers consider automated or prerecorded calls,
`regardless of the content or the initiator of the mes-
`sage, to be a nuisance and an invasion of privacy”—
`not because the calls discussed any specific subject.
`Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L.
`No. 102-243, § 2(10), 105 Stat. 2394. Nothing in the
`legislative record shows that Congress adopted the re-
`striction because of disagreement with the messages
`that robocalls convey.
`
`2. Because the robocall ban is content-neutral, it
`is reviewed under intermediate scrutiny. Ward, 491
`U.S. at 791. Under that standard, restrictions on
`speech are constitutional so long as they are narrowly
`tailored to further an important government interest.
`
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`See id. The robocall ban principally serves the im-
`portant government interest in protecting personal
`and residential privacy.
`
`The Court has recognized that “in the privacy of
`the home . . . the individual’s right to be left alone
`plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an
`intruder.” Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found.,
`438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). When Congress enacted the
`TCPA, it found robocalls to be “pervasive” and an “in-
`trusive invasion of privacy” that “outraged” consum-
`ers. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub.
`L. No. 102-243, § 2(1), (5), (6), 105 Stat. 2394. Con-
`gress observed that consumers found robocalls to be a
`particularly severe invasion of privacy because “auto-
`mated calls cannot interact with the customer except
`in preprogrammed ways,” and “do not allow the caller
`to feel the frustration of the called party.” S. Rep. No.
`102-178, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1972.
`
`Advances in technology have enabled even more
`widespread privacy invasions. Robocall software is in-
`expensive and easy to access online. Marguerite M.
`Sweeney, Do Not Call: The History of Do Not Call and
`How Telemarketing Has Evolved, Nat’l Attorneys
`Gen. Training & Research Inst. (Aug. 2016), available
`at http://bit.ly/2SbCCkn. Robocalls have proliferated
`as a result. See id.
`
`Although the specific provision challenged here ap-
`plies to calls made to cellphones—calls that may or
`may not take place in the home—the privacy interests
`
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`less compelling. 47 U.S.C.
`at stake are no
`§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). After all, residential
`landline
`phones are increasingly rare. See Stephen J. Blum-
`berg & Julian V. Luke, Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics,
`Wireless Substitution: Early Release of Estimates from
`the National Health Interview Survey, July–December
`2017 2, available at https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/
`nhis/earlyrelease/wireless201806.pdf
`(finding that
`more than half all households in the United States no
`longer have landline phones). As a result, in the mod-
`ern era, protecting residential telephone privacy
`means protecting against harassing calls to cell
`phones. In any event, individuals have constitution-
`ally protected expectations of privacy in their cell-
`phones. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206,
`2218 (2018); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393–94
`(2014). The proliferation of robocalls undermines that
`compelling privacy interest.
`
`The robocall ban is narrowly t
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