`(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2019
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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`
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
`SEILA LAW LLC v. CONSUMER FINANCIAL
`
`PROTECTION BUREAU
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`No. 19–7. Argued March 3, 2020—Decided June 29, 2020
`In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Congress established the Con-
`sumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an independent regula-
`
`tory agency tasked with ensuring that consumer debt products are safe
`
`and transparent. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
`Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 124 Stat. 1376. Congress transferred the
`administration of 18 existing federal statutes to the CFPB, including
`
`the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
`
`and the Truth in Lending Act; and Congress enacted a new prohibition
`
`on unfair and deceptive practices in the consumer-finance sector. 12
`
`
`
`U. S. C. §5536(a)(1)(B). In doing so, Congress gave the CFPB extensive
`rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory powers, including the au-
`thority to conduct investigations, issue subpoenas and civil investiga-
`tive demands, initiate administrative adjudications, prosecute civil ac-
`
`
`tions in federal court, and issue binding decisions in administrative
`proceedings. The CFPB may seek restitution, disgorgement, injunc-
`
`tive relief, and significant civil penalties for violations of the 19 federal
`
`statutes under its purview. So far, the agency has obtained over $11
`billion in relief for more than 25 million consumers.
`
`
`Unlike traditional independent agencies headed by multimember
`boards or commissions, the CFPB is led by a single Director,
`§5491(b)(1), who is appointed by the President with the advice and
`consent of the Senate, §5491(b)(2), for a five-year term, during which
`
`the President may remove the Director only for “inefficiency, neglect
`of duty, or malfeasance in office,” §§5491(c)(1), (3). The CFPB receives
`its funding outside the annual appropriations process from the Federal
`Reserve, which is itself funded outside the appropriations process
`
`through bank assessments.
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`2
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`SEILA LAW LLC v. CONSUMER FINANCIAL
`
`PROTECTION BUREAU
`
`Syllabus
`
`
`In 2017, the CFPB issued a civil investigative demand to Seila Law
`LLC, a California-based law firm that provides debt-related legal ser-
`vices to clients. The civil investigative demand (essentially a sub-
`poena) sought information and documents related to the firm’s busi-
`ness practices. Seila Law asked the CFPB to set aside the demand on
`
`
`the ground that the agency’s leadership by a single Director removable
`only for cause violated the separation of powers. When the CFPB de-
`clined, Seila Law refused to comply with the demand, and the CFPB
`
`filed a petition to enforce the demand in District Court. Seila Law
`renewed its claim that the CFPB’s structure violated the separation of
`
`powers, but the District Court disagreed and ordered Seila Law to com-
`
`ply with the demand. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that
`
`Seila Law’s challenge was foreclosed by Humphrey’s Executor v. United
`
`States, 295 U. S. 602, and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654.
`Held: The judgment is vacated and remanded.
`923 F. 3d 680, vacated and remanded.
`THE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court with respect
`
`to Parts I, II, and III, concluding:
`1. Appointed amicus raises three threshold arguments for why this
`
`
`Court may not or should not reach the merits of petitioner’s constitu-
`
`
`tional challenge, but they are unavailing. Pp. 8–11.
`
`
`2. The CFPB’s leadership by a single individual removable only for
`
`inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violates the separation of powers.
`
`Pp. 11–30.
`(a) Article II vests the entire “executive Power” in the President
`
`
`
`alone, but the Constitution presumes that lesser executive officers will
`assist the President in discharging his duties. The President’s execu-
`
`tive power generally includes the power to supervise—and, if neces-
`sary, remove—those who exercise the President’s authority on his be-
`half. The President’s removal power has long been confirmed by
`history and precedent. It was recognized by the First Congress in
`
`1789, confirmed by this Court in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52,
`
`
`
`and reiterated in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting
`
`Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477. In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court rec-
`
`ognized that it had previously upheld certain congressional limits on
`the President’s removal power. But the Court declined to extend those
`
`limits to “a new situation not yet encountered by the Court.” 561 U. S.,
`
`at 483. Free Enterprise Fund left in place only two exceptions to the
`
`
`President’s unrestricted removal power. First, Humphrey’s Executor
`
`permitted Congress to give for-cause removal protection to a multi-
`member body of experts who were balanced along partisan lines, ap-
`pointed to staggered terms, performed only “quasi-legislative” and
`
`“quasi-judicial functions,” and were said not to exercise any executive
`power. Second, Morrison approved for-cause removal protection for an
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`

`

`3
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`Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)
`
`
`Syllabus
`inferior officer—the independent counsel—who had limited duties and
`
`
`no policymaking or administrative authority. Pp. 11–16.
`
`(b) Neither Humphrey’s Executor nor Morrison resolves whether
`
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`the CFPB Director’s insulation from removal is constitutional. The
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`New Deal-era FTC upheld in Humphrey’s Executor bears little resem-
`blance to the CFPB. Unlike the multiple Commissioners of the FTC,
`
`who were balanced along partisan lines and served staggered terms to
`
`ensure the accumulation of institutional knowledge, the CFPB Direc-
`
`tor serves a five-year term that guarantees abrupt shifts in leadership
`
`and the loss of agency expertise. In addition, the Director cannot be
`dismissed as a mere legislative or judicial aid. Rather, the Director
`possesses significant administrative and enforcement authority, in-
`cluding the power to seek daunting monetary penalties against private
`parties in federal court—a quintessentially executive power not con-
`sidered in Humphrey’s Executor.
`
`The logic of Morrison also does not apply. The independent counsel
`
`approved in Morrison was an inferior officer who lacked policymaking
`
`or administrative authority and exercised narrow authority to initiate
`criminal investigations and prosecutions of Governmental actors iden-
`
`tified by others. By contrast, the CFPB Director is a principal officer
`
`whose duties are far from limited. The Director promulgates binding
`rules fleshing out 19 consumer-protection statutes that cover every-
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`
`
`thing from credit cards and car payments to mortgages and student
`
`loans. And the Director brings the coercive power of the state to bear
`on millions of private citizens and businesses, imposing potentially bil-
`lion-dollar penalties through administrative adjudications and civil ac-
`tions.
`
`The question here is therefore whether to extend the Humphrey’s
`
`Executor and Morrison exceptions to a “new situation.” Free Enterprise
`
`Fund, 561 U. S., at 433. Pp. 16–18.
`
`
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`(c) The Court declines to extend these precedents to an independ-
`ent agency led by a single Director and vested with significant execu-
`
`tive power. Pp. 18–30.
`
`
`
`
`(1) The CFPB’s structure has no foothold in history or tradition.
`
`Congress has provided removal protection to principal officers who
`alone wield power in only four isolated instances: the Comptroller of
`the Currency (for a one-year period during the Civil War); the Office of
`Special Counsel; the Administrator of the Social Security Administra-
`
`
`tion; and the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Aside
`from the one-year blip for the Comptroller of the Currency, these ex-
`amples are modern and contested; and they do not involve regulatory
`
`or enforcement authority comparable to that exercised by the CFPB.
`Pp. 18–21.
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`

`

`4
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`
`SEILA LAW LLC v. CONSUMER FINANCIAL
`
`PROTECTION BUREAU
`
`Syllabus
`
`
`
`(2) The CFPB’s single-Director configuration is also incompati-
`
`ble with the structure of the Constitution, which—with the sole excep-
`
`tion of the Presidency—scrupulously avoids concentrating power in the
`
`hands of any single individual. The Framers’ constitutional strategy
`is straightforward: divide power everywhere except for the Presidency,
`and render the President directly accountable to the people through
`
`regular elections. In that scheme, individual executive officials may
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`
`
`wield significant authority, but that authority remains subject to the
`ongoing supervision and control of the elected President. The CFPB’s
`single-Director structure contravenes this carefully calibrated system
`
`
`by vesting significant governmental power in the hands of a single in-
`dividual who is neither elected by the people nor meaningfully con-
`trolled (through the threat of removal) by someone who is. The Direc-
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`tor may unilaterally, without meaningful supervision, issue final
`
`regulations, oversee adjudications, set enforcement priorities, initiate
`prosecutions, and determine what penalties to impose on private par-
`
`
`ties. And the Director may do so without even having to rely on Con-
`gress for appropriations. While the CFPB’s independent, single-Direc-
`
`tor structure is sufficient to render the agency unconstitutional, the
`Director’s five-year term and receipt of funds outside the appropria-
`tions process heighten the concern that the agency will “slip from the
`
`
`Executive’s control, and thus from that of the people.” Free Enterprise
`
`Fund, 561 U. S., at 499. Pp. 21–25.
`
`
`
`(3) Amicus raises three principal arguments in the agency’s de-
`
`fense. First, amicus challenges the textual basis for the President’s
`removal power and highlights statements from individual Framers ex-
`pressing divergent views on the subject. This Court’s precedents, how-
`ever, make clear that the President’s removal power derives from the
`
`
`“executive Power” vested exclusively in the President by Article II.
`
`And this Court has already discounted the founding-era statements
`
`
`cited by amicus in light of their context. Second, amicus claims that
`
`Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison establish a general rule that Con-
`gress may freely constrain the President’s removal power, with only
`two limited exceptions not applicable here. But text, first principles,
`
`
`
`the First Congress’s decision in 1789, Myers, and Free Enterprise Fund
`all establish that the President’s removal power is the rule, not the
`
`
`exception. Finally, amicus submits that this Court can cure any con-
`
`
`stitutional defect in the CFPB’s structure by interpreting the language
`
`“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,” 12 U. S. C.
`§5491(c)(3), to reserve substantial discretion to the President. But
`
`Humphrey’s Executor implicitly rejected this position, and the CFPB’s
`defenders have not advanced any workable standard derived from the
`statutory text. Nor have they explained how a lenient removal stand-
`
`ard can be squared with the Dodd-Frank Act as a whole, which makes
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`

`

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` Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)
`
` Syllabus
`
`plain that the CFPB is an “independent bureau.” §5491(a).
`
`
`
` The dissent advances several additional arguments in the agency’s
`defense, but they have already been expressly considered and rejected
`
` by the Court in Free Enterprise Fund. Pp. 25–30.
`
`THE CHIEF JUSTICE, joined by JUSTICE ALITO and JUSTICE KAV-
`
`ANAUGH, concluded in Part IV that the Director’s removal protection is
`severable from the other provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that estab-
`lish the CFPB and define its authority. Pp. 30–37.
`
`
` ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts
`
`
` I, II, and III, in which THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ.,
`
`
`joined, and an opinion with respect to Part IV, in which ALITO and KAV-
`ANAUGH, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
`dissenting in part, in which GORSUCH, J., joined. KAGAN, J., filed an opin-
`
`ion concurring in the judgment with respect to severability and dissent-
` ing in part, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.
`
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`5
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` Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
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` corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 19–7
`_________________
`SEILA LAW LLC, PETITIONER v. CONSUMER
`FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`[June 29, 2020]
`CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
`
`Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III.
`
`In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Congress estab-
`
`lished the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB),
`
`an independent regulatory agency tasked with ensuring
`
`that consumer debt products are safe and transparent. In
`organizing the CFPB, Congress deviated from the structure
`of nearly every other independent administrative agency in
`our history. Instead of placing the agency under the lead-
`ership of a board with multiple members, Congress pro-
`
`vided that the CFPB would be led by a single Director, who
`serves for a longer term than the President and cannot be
`removed by the President except for inefficiency, neglect, or
`malfeasance. The CFPB Director has no boss, peers, or vot-
`
`ers to report to. Yet the Director wields vast rulemaking,
`enforcement, and adjudicatory authority over a significant
`
`portion of the U. S. economy. The question before us is
`whether this arrangement violates the Constitution’s sepa-
`ration of powers.
`
`
`Under our Constitution, the “executive Power”—all of
`
`it—is “vested in a President,” who must “take Care that the
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`2
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`
`SEILA LAW LLC v. CONSUMER FINANCIAL
`PROTECTION BUREAU
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
`
`
` Laws be faithfully executed.” Art. II, §1, cl. 1; id., §3. Be-
`
`cause no single person could fulfill that responsibility alone,
`the Framers expected that the President would rely on sub-
`ordinate officers for assistance. Ten years ago, in Free En-
`terprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd.,
`561 U. S. 477 (2010), we reiterated that, “as a general mat-
`
`ter,” the Constitution gives the President “the authority to
`remove those who assist him in carrying out his duties,” id.,
`at 513–514. “Without such power, the President could not
`be held fully accountable for discharging his own responsi-
`
`bilities; the buck would stop somewhere else.” Id., at 514.
`
`The President’s power to remove—and thus supervise—
`
`those who wield executive power on his behalf follows from
`the text of Article II, was settled by the First Congress, and
`was confirmed in the landmark decision Myers v. United
`
`States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926). Our precedents have recognized
`only two exceptions to the President’s unrestricted removal
`
`
`power. In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S.
`602 (1935), we held that Congress could create expert agen-
`cies led by a group of principal officers removable by the
`President only for good cause. And in United States v. Per-
`kins, 116 U. S. 483 (1886), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S.
`654 (1988), we held that Congress could provide tenure pro-
`tections to certain inferior officers with narrowly defined
`duties.
`
`We are now asked to extend these precedents to a new
`
`configuration: an independent agency that wields signifi-
`cant executive power and is run by a single individual who
`
`cannot be removed by the President unless certain statu-
`tory criteria are met. We decline to take that step. While
`
`we need not and do not revisit our prior decisions allowing
`certain limitations on the President’s removal power, there
`are compelling reasons not to extend those precedents to
`
`the novel context of an independent agency led by a single
`Director. Such an agency lacks a foundation in historical
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`

`

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`3
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` Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`practice and clashes with constitutional structure by con-
`centrating power in a unilateral actor insulated from Pres-
`idential control.
`We therefore hold that the structure of the CFPB violates
`
`the separation of powers. We go on to hold that the CFPB
`
`Director’s removal protection is severable from the other
`statutory provisions bearing on the CFPB’s authority. The
`
`
`agency may therefore continue to operate, but its Director,
`
`in light of our decision, must be removable by the President
`at will.
`
`I
`A
`
`
`In the summer of 2007, then-Professor Elizabeth Warren
`
`called for the creation of a new, independent federal agency
`focused on regulating consumer financial products. War-
`ren, Unsafe at Any Rate, Democracy (Summer 2007). Pro-
`
`fessor Warren believed the financial products marketed to
`ordinary American households—credit cards, student
`loans, mortgages, and the like—had grown increasingly un-
`safe due to a “regulatory jumble” that paid too much atten-
`tion to banks and too little to consumers. Ibid. To remedy
`the lack of “coherent, consumer-oriented” financial regula-
`tion, she proposed “concentrat[ing] the review of financial
`
`products in a single location”—an independent agency mod-
`eled after the multimember Consumer Product Safety Com-
`mission. Ibid.
`
`That proposal soon met its moment. Within months of
`
`Professor Warren’s writing, the subprime mortgage market
`collapsed, precipitating a financial crisis that wiped out
`over $10 trillion in American household wealth and cost
`millions of Americans their jobs, their retirements, and
`their homes. In the aftermath, the Obama administration
`embraced Professor Warren’s recommendation. Through
`
`the Treasury Department, the administration encouraged
`Congress to establish an agency with a mandate to ensure
`
`

`

`4
`
`
`SEILA LAW LLC v. CONSUMER FINANCIAL
`PROTECTION BUREAU
`
`Opinion of the Court
`that “consumer protection regulations” in the financial sec-
`tor “are written fairly and enforced vigorously.” Dept. of
`Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation
`55 (2009). Like Professor Warren, the administration envi-
`sioned a traditional independent agency, run by a multi-
`member board with a “diverse set of viewpoints and experi-
`ences.” Id., at 58.
`
`
`In 2010, Congress acted on these proposals and created
`
`the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) as an
`
`independent financial regulator within the Federal Reserve
`System. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
`
`Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 124 Stat. 1376. Congress
`tasked the CFPB with “implement[ing]” and “enforc[ing]” a
`large body of financial consumer protection laws to “en-
`sur[e] that all consumers have access to markets for con-
`sumer financial products and services and that markets for
`consumer financial products and services are fair, transpar-
`
`ent, and competitive.” 12 U. S. C. §5511(a). Congress
`transferred the administration of 18 existing federal stat-
`utes to the CFPB, including the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
`the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and the Truth in
`Lending Act. See §§5512(a), 5481(12), (14). In addition,
`Congress enacted a new prohibition on “any unfair, decep-
`
`
`tive, or abusive act or practice” by certain participants in
`
`
`the consumer-finance sector. §5536(a)(1)(B). Congress au-
`thorized the CFPB to implement that broad standard (and
`the 18 pre-existing statutes placed under the agency’s pur-
`view)
`through binding regulations.
`§§5531(a)–(b),
`5581(a)(1)(A), (b).
`
`Congress also vested the CFPB with potent enforcement
`powers. The agency has the authority to conduct investiga-
`tions, issue subpoenas and civil investigative demands, in-
`itiate administrative adjudications, and prosecute civil ac-
`
`tions in federal court. §§5562, 5564(a), (f ). To remedy
`
`violations of federal consumer financial law, the CFPB may
`
`seek restitution, disgorgement, and injunctive relief, as
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`

`

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`5
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` Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` well as civil penalties of up to $1,000,000 (inflation ad-
`justed) for each day that a violation occurs. §§5565(a),
`(c)(2); 12 CFR §1083.1(a), Table (2019). Since its inception,
`
`the CFPB has obtained over $11 billion in relief for over 25
`
`million consumers, including a $1 billion penalty against a
`single bank in 2018. See CFPB, Financial Report of the
`
`Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2015,
`p. 3; CFPB, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection An-
`nounces Settlement With Wells Fargo for Auto-Loan Ad-
`ministration and Mortgage Practices (Apr. 20, 2018).
`The CFPB’s rulemaking and enforcement powers are cou-
`
`pled with extensive adjudicatory authority. The agency
`may conduct administrative proceedings to “ensure or en-
`force compliance with” the statutes and regulations it ad-
`ministers. 12 U. S. C. §5563(a). When the CFPB acts as an
`adjudicator, it has “jurisdiction to grant any appropriate le-
`gal or equitable relief.” §5565(a)(1). The “hearing officer”
`who presides over the proceedings may issue subpoenas, or-
`der depositions, and resolve any motions filed by the par-
`
`ties. 12 CFR §1081.104(b). At the close of the proceedings,
`the hearing officer issues a “recommended decision,” and
`the CFPB Director considers that recommendation and “is-
`sue[s] a final decision and order.”
`§§1081.400(d),
`1081.402(b); see also §1081.405.
`
`
`Congress’s design for the CFPB differed from the pro-
`posals of Professor Warren and the Obama administration
`in one critical respect. Rather than create a traditional in-
`dependent agency headed by a multimember board or com-
`mission, Congress elected to place the CFPB under the
`leadership of a single Director. 12 U. S. C. §5491(b)(1). The
`CFPB Director is appointed by the President with the ad-
`vice and consent of the Senate. §5491(b)(2). The Director
`
`serves for a term of five years, during which the President
`
`may remove the Director from office only for “inefficiency,
`neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” §§5491(c)(1), (3).
`
`Unlike most other agencies, the CFPB does not rely on
`
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`

`6
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`
`SEILA LAW LLC v. CONSUMER FINANCIAL
`PROTECTION BUREAU
`
`Opinion of the Court
`the annual appropriations process for funding. Instead, the
`
`CFPB receives funding directly from the Federal Reserve,
`which is itself funded outside the appropriations process
`through bank assessments. Each year, the CFPB requests
`an amount that the Director deems “reasonably necessary
`to carry out” the agency’s duties, and the Federal Reserve
`
`grants that request so long as it does not exceed 12% of the
`
`total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve (inflation
`adjusted). §§5497(a)(1), (2)(A)(iii), 2(B). In recent years,
`the CFPB’s annual budget has exceeded half a billion dol-
`
`lars. See CFPB, Fiscal Year 2019: Ann. Performance Plan
`and Rep., p. 7.
`
`
`
`B
`Seila Law LLC is a California-based law firm that pro-
`
`vides debt-related legal services to clients. In 2017, the
`CFPB issued a civil investigative demand to Seila Law to
`
`determine whether the firm had “engag[ed] in unlawful acts
`
`or practices in the advertising, marketing, or sale of debt
`relief services.” 2017 WL 6536586, *1 (CD Cal., Aug. 25,
`
`
`2017). See also 12 U. S. C. §5562(c)(1) (authorizing the
`
`agency to issue such demands to persons who “may have
`any information[] relevant to a violation” of one of the laws
`enforced by the CFPB). The demand (essentially a sub-
`poena) directed Seila Law to produce information and doc-
`uments related to its business practices.
`
`Seila Law asked the CFPB to set aside the demand, ob-
`jecting that the agency’s leadership by a single Director re-
`movable only for cause violated the separation of powers.
`The CFPB declined to address that claim and directed Seila
`Law to comply with the demand.
`
`When Seila Law refused, the CFPB filed a petition to en-
`force the demand in the District Court. See §5562(e)(1) (cre-
`ating cause of action for that purpose). In response, Seila
`Law renewed its defense that the demand was invalid and
`
`must be set aside because the CFPB’s structure violated the
`
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`

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`7
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` Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)
`
`Opinion of the Court
` Constitution. The District Court disagreed and ordered
`
`Seila Law to comply with the demand (with one modifica-
`tion not relevant here).
`The Court of Appeals affirmed. 923 F. 3d 680 (CA9 2019).
`
`
`The Court observed that the “arguments for and against”
`
`the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure had already
`
`been “thoroughly canvassed” in majority, concurring, and
`
`dissenting opinions by the en banc Court of Appeals for the
`
`District of Columbia Circuit in PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881
`
`F. 3d 75 (2018), which had rejected a challenge similar to
`
`the one presented here. 923 F. 3d, at 682. The Court saw
`“no need to re-plow the same ground.” Ibid. Instead, it pro-
`vided a brief explanation for why it agreed with the PHH
`
`Court’s core holding. The Court took as its starting point
`
`Humphrey’s Executor, which had approved for-cause re-
`
`
`moval protection for the Commissioners of the Federal
`
`
`Trade Commission (FTC). In applying that precedent, the
`Court recognized that the CFPB wields “substantially more
`executive power than the FTC did back in 1935” and that
`the CFPB’s leadership by a single Director (as opposed to a
`multimember commission) presented a “structural differ-
`ence” that some jurists had found “dispositive.” 923 F. 3d,
`at 683–684. But the Court felt bound to disregard those
`differences in light of our decision in Morrison, which per-
`mitted a single individual (an independent counsel) to exer-
`cise a core executive power (prosecuting criminal offenses)
`despite being insulated from removal except for cause. Be-
`
`cause the Court found Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison
`
`“controlling,” it affirmed the District Court’s order requir-
`ing compliance with the demand. 923 F. 3d, at 684.
`
`We granted certiorari to address the constitutionality of
`the CFPB’s structure. 589 U. S. ___ (2019). We also re-
`quested argument on an additional question: whether, if
`
`the CFPB’s structure violates the separation of powers, the
`
`CFPB Director’s removal protection can be severed from the
`
`rest of the Dodd-Frank Act.
`
`

`

`8
`
`
`SEILA LAW LLC v. CONSUMER FINANCIAL
`
`PROTECTION BUREAU
`Opinion of the Court
`Because the Government agrees with petitioner on the
`
`merits of the constitutional question, we appointed Paul
`Clement to defend the judgment below as amicus curiae.
`He has ably discharged his responsibilities.
`
`II
`
`We first consider three threshold arguments raised by
`
`
`the appointed amicus for why we may not or should not
`reach the merits. Each is unavailing.
`First, amicus argues that the demand issued to petitioner
`is not “traceable” to the alleged constitutional defect be-
`cause two of the three Directors who have in turn played a
`role in enforcing the demand were (or now consider them-
`selves to be) removable by the President at will. Brief for
`
`
`Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 21–24. Amicus highlights
`the Government’s argument below that the demand, origi-
`nally issued by former Director Richard Cordray, had been
`
`ratified by an acting CFPB Director who, according to the
`Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), was removable by the Pres-
`ident at will. See Brief for Appellee in No. 17–56324 (CA9),
`pp. 1, 10, 13–19 (citing Designating an Acting Director of
`the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 41 Op. OLC
`
`___, ___ (Nov. 25, 2017)). Amicus further observes that cur-
`rent CFPB Director Kathleen Kraninger, now responsible
`for enforcing the demand, agrees with the Solicitor Gen-
`eral’s position in this case that her for-cause removal pro-
`
`tection is unconstitutional. See Brief for Respondent on
`
`Pet. for Cert. 20; Letter from K. Kraninger, CFPB Director,
`
`to M. McConnell, Majority Leader, U. S. Senate, p. 2 (Sept.
`
`17, 2019); Letter from K. Kraninger, CFPB Director, to N.
`Pelosi, Speaker, U. S. House of Representatives, p. 2 (Sept.
`
`17, 2019).1 In amicus’ view, these developments reveal that
`the demand would have been issued—and would continue
`——————
`1Director Kraninger did not indicate whether she would disregard her
`
`statutory removal protection if the President attempted to remove her
`without cause.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`9
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)
`
`Opinion of the Court
` to be enforced—even in the absence of the CFPB Director’s
`
`removal protection, making the asserted separation of pow-
`ers dispute “artificial.” Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus
`Curiae 22.
`
`Even if that were true, it would not deprive us of jurisdic-
`
`tion. Amicus’ traceability argument appears to challenge
`petitioner’s Article III standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of
`
`Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992) (explaining that the
`
`plaintiff ’s injury must be “fairly traceable to the challenged
`
`action of the defendant” (internal quotation marks and al-
`terations omitted)). But amicus’ argument does not cast
`
`any doubt on the jurisdiction of the District Court because
`
`petitioner is the defendant and did not invoke the Court’s
`
`jurisdiction. See Bond v. United States, 564 U. S. 211, 217
`
`(2011) (When the plaintiff has standing, “Article III does
`not restrict the opposing party’s ability to object to relief be-
`ing sought at its expense.”).
`
`It is true that “standing must be met by persons seeking
`appellate review, just as it must be met by persons appear-
`
`ing in courts of first instance.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570
`
`U. S. 693, 705 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
`But petitioner’s appellate standing is beyond dispute. Peti-
`tioner is compelled to comply with the civil investigative de-
`
`mand and to provide documents it would prefer to withhold,
`a concrete injury. That injury is traceable to the decision
`below and would be fully redressed if we were to reverse the
`judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand with instruc-
`tions to deny the Government’s petition to enforce the
`demand.
`
`
`Without engaging with these principles, amicus contends
`that a litigant wishing to challenge an executive act on the
`basis of the President’s removal power must show that the
`challenged act would not have been taken if the responsible
`official had been subject to the President’s control. See
`Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 21–24. Our prec-
`
`

`

`
` 10
`
`
`SEILA LAW LLC v. CONSUMER FINANCIAL
`
` PROTECTION BUREAU
`Opinion of the Court
`edents say otherwise. We have held that a litigant chal-
`lenging governmental action as void on the basis of the sep-
`aration of powers is not required to prove that the Govern-
`ment’s course of conduct would have been different in a
`“counterfactual world” in which the Government had acted
`
`with constitutional authority. Free Enterprise Fund, 561
`U. S., at 512, n. 12. In the specific context of the President’s
`removal power, we have found it sufficient that the chal-
`lenger “sustain[s] injury” from an executive act that alleg-
`edly exceeds the official’s authority. Bowsher v. Synar, 478
`U. S. 714, 721 (1986).
`Second, amicus contends that the proper context for as-
`sessing the constitutionality of an officer’s removal re-
`striction is a contested removal. See Brief for Court-Ap-
`pointed Amicus Curiae 24–27. While that is certainly one
`
`way to review a removal restriction, it is not the only way.
`Our precedents have long permitted private parties ag-
`
`grieved by an official’s exercise of executive power to chal-
`
`lenge the official’s authority to wield that power while insu-
`lated from removal by the President. See Bowsher, 478
`
`U