throbber

`
`
`
`No. 19-
`IN THE
`Supreme Court of the United States
`________________
`APPLE INC.,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`
`
`
`
`v.
`VIRNETX INC., LEIDOS, INC.,
`
`
`Respondents.
`________________
`ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
`THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`________________
`PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`________________
`E. Joshua Rosenkranz
`Counsel of Record
`Jennifer Keighley
`ORRICK, HERRINGTON &
`SUTCLIFFE LLP
`51 West 52nd Street
`New York, NY 10019
`(212) 506-5000
`jrosenkranz@orrick.com
`
`
`
`Mark S. Davies
`ORRICK, HERRINGTON &
`SUTCLIFFE LLP
`1152 15th Street, NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`
`William F. Lee
`Mark C. Fleming
`Lauren B. Fletcher
`WILMER CUTLER
`PICKERING HALE AND
`DORR LLP
`60 State Street
`Boston, MA 02109
`Counsel for Petitioner
`
`

`

`i
`
`QUESTIONS PRESENTED
`1. A patented invention often makes but a small
`contribution to a complex end-product’s value. Thus,
`for well over a century, this Court has enforced the
`rule that a patentee must apportion damages for in-
`fringement so that any recovery is limited only to the
`value of its patented invention, not the value created
`by the numerous other features of an end-product in
`which the patented invention is included. The Federal
`Circuit, however, now permits patentees to recover
`damages that extend far beyond the value of the pa-
`tented invention whenever the patentee proves dam-
`ages based on prior licenses, as they commonly do.
`The question presented is whether the Federal
`Circuit’s reliance on prior licenses to ascertain in-
`fringement damages, without satisfying apportion-
`ment rules, conflicts with this Court’s precedent
`requiring apportionment “in every case.” Garretson v.
`Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884).
`2. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) may
`invalidate patent claims after issuing them. This
`Court has held that when patent claims are invali-
`dated, the invalidation applies in pending litigation.
`The question presented is whether intervening
`PTO invalidations apply in all pending cases, includ-
`ing appeals that remain pending at the rehearing or
`certiorari stage.
`
`

`

`ii
`
`PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW
`The parties to the proceedings below were peti-
`tioner Apple Inc., respondents VirnetX Inc. and Lei-
`dos, Inc., and Cisco Systems, Inc.
`
`

`

`iii
`
`CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
`Petitioner Apple Inc. has no parent corporation.
`No publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of Ap-
`ple’s stock.
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`iv
`
`RELATED PROCEEDINGS
`VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., No. 18-1197
`(Fed. Cir.) (judgment issued Jan. 15, 2019)
`VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., No. 13-1489
`(Fed. Cir.) (opinion and judgment issued Sept. 16,
`2014)
`VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 6:10-cv-417 (E.D.
`Tex.) (final judgment issued Sept. 29, 2017)
`
`

`

`v
`
`TABLE OF CONENTS
`
`Page
`QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...................................... i 
`PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW ........... ii 
`CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ......... iii 
`RELATED PROCEEDINGS .................................... iv 
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................... vii 
`INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 1 
`OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW ........................ 4 
`JURISDICTION ........................................................ 4 
`STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ............... 5 
`STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................. 6 
`Apple’s Feature-Rich Mobile Devices
`Revolutionize The Industry ............................... 6 
`VirnetX Sues Apple For Patent
`Infringement But The PTO Invalidates All
`Asserted Claims .................................................. 8 
`Meanwhile, VirnetX Proceeds To Trial
`And Wins A $439 Million Judgment ............... 10 
`The Federal Circuit Affirms The Massive
`Damages Judgment And Denies
`Rehearing, Despite Affirming PTO
`Invalidations ..................................................... 15 
`REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.............. 18 
`
`

`

`vi
`
`I. Certiorari Should Be Granted To Correct
`The Federal Circuit’s Rejection Of This
`Court’s Century-Old Rule Requiring
`Apportionment Of Damages. ........................... 18 
`A. The Federal Circuit has incorrectly
`rejected the requirement to apportion in
`“prior license” cases. ......................................... 19 
`B. This case is a compelling vehicle to
`consider the Federal Circuit’s departure
`from basic apportionment principles. .............. 27 
`C. The Federal Circuit’s failure to
`require apportionment will stifle
`innovation. ........................................................ 31 
`II. Certiorari Should Also Be Granted To
`Confirm That An Infringement Judgment
`Pending On Appeal Cannot Be Upheld
`Once The PTO Has Invalidated The
`Patents. ............................................................. 34 
`CONCLUSION ........................................................ 40 
`APPENDIX A: Court of Appeals Judgment
`(Jan. 15, 2019) .................................................. 1a
`APPENDIX B: District Court Opinion
`(Oct. 13, 2017) ................................................... 3a
`APPENDIX C: Court of Appeals Opinion
`(Sept. 16, 2014) ............................................... 77a
`APPENDIX D: Court of Appeals Order
`(Oct. 1, 2019) ................................................. 126a
`APPENDIX E: Court of Appeals Order
`Denying Rehearing (Aug. 1, 2019) ............... 129a
`APPENDIX F: 35 U.S.C. § 316 (2006) ................ 130a
`
`

`

`
`
`vii
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Allen v. Culp,
`166 U.S. 501 (1897) .............................................. 35
`Apple Inc. v. Pepper,
`139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) ............................................ 6
`Blake v. Robertson,
`94 U.S. 728 (1877) ................................................ 21
`Brulotte v. Thys Co.,
`379 U.S. 29 (1964) ................................................ 38
`Carafas v. LaVallee,
`391 U.S. 234 (1968) .............................................. 37
`
`City of Chicago v. U.S. Dep’t of
`Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol,
`Tobacco & Firearms,
`423 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 2005) ................................ 37
`
`Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research
`Organisation v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`809 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ...................... 23, 29
`Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis,
`523 U.S. 833 (1998) .............................................. 38
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
`136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) .......................................... 38
`
`

`

`viii
`
`Elbit Sys. Land & C4I Ltd. v. Hughes
`Network Sys., LLC,
`927 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .......... 19, 24, 25, 26
`Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Systems, Inc.,
`773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................ 22
`Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.,
`721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ...................... 17, 36
`Garretson v. Clark,
`111 U.S. 120 (1884) ..................... i, 1, 11, 20, 21, 27
`
`Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark
`Int’l, Inc.,
`137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017) .......................................... 31
`Intel Corp. v. Future Link Sys., LLC,
`No. CV 14-377-LPS, 2017 WL
`2482881 (D. Del. June 1, 2017) ........................... 34
`
`Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. Sprint
`Spectrum, L.P.,
`No. 2:17-CV-0661-JRG-RSP, 2019
`WL 1877309 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 26,
`2019) ..................................................................... 34
`Joshua v. United States,
`17 F.3d 378 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ................................ 30
`Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
`511 U.S. 244 (1994) .............................................. 35
`Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,
`395 U.S. 653 (1969) .......................................... 3, 38
`
`

`

`ix
`
`In re Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc.,
`No. 12-244, 2015 WL 5311264 (W.D.
`Pa. Sept. 11, 2015) ............................................... 34
`
`Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA,
`Inc.,
`851 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................ 33
`
`Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA,
`Inc.,
`870 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................ 33
`Moffitt v. Garr,
`66 U.S. (1 Black) 273 (1862) ............................ 3, 35
`Nestle USA, Inc. v. Steuben Foods, Inc.,
`884 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................ 36
`NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC Am., Inc.,
`No. 2:13-cv-1058-WCB, 2015 WL
`1069111 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2015) ..................... 10
`Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC,
`735 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ............................ 37
`
`Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v.
`Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC,
`138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) .......................................... 29
`
`Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG v.
`Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc.,
`924 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ............................ 36
`Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,
`514 U.S. 211 (1995) .............................................. 35
`
`

`

`x
`
`Realtime Data LLC v. NetApp, Inc.,
`No. 6:16-CV-00961-RWS, 2017 WL
`5756863 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2017) ...................... 34
`Reedy v. Scott,
`90 U.S. 352 (1875) ................................................ 35
`Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc.,
`137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) .............................................. 6
`Seymour v. McCormick,
`57 U.S. (16 How.) 480 (1854) ............................... 20
`
`Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Time Warner
`Cable, Inc.,
`760 F. App’x 977 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ............ 24, 26, 29
`Stutson v. United States,
`516 U.S. 163 (1996) .............................................. 37
`United States v. Byers,
`740 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ............................ 37
`United States v. Davidson,
`551 F.3d 807 (8th Cir. 2008) ................................ 37
`United States v. Schooner Peggy,
`5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801) ........................... 3, 35
`Vectura Ltd. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC,
`397 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D. Del. 2019) ..................... 34
`VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`931 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ................ 10, 16, 36
`
`

`

`xi
`
`VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`776 F. App’x 698 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ............ 10, 16, 36
`
`Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v.
`Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co.,
`225 U.S. 604 (1912) .............................................. 21
`XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics,
`890 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................ 36
`Constitutional Provisions
`U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ........................................ 18
`Statutes & Rules
`28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ...................................................... 4
`35 U.S.C. § 284 ...................................................... 5, 19
`35 U.S.C. § 316(a) (2006) .......................................... 10
`35 U.S.C. § 316(b) (2006) .......................................... 35
`35 U.S.C. § 318(c) ...................................................... 35
`Fed. Cir. R. 36 ............................................... 16, 29, 30
`Other Authorities
`Eric E. Bensen & Danielle M. White,
`Using Apportionment to Rein in the
`Georgia-Pacific Factors, 9 Colum.
`Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 1 (2008) ............................... 20
`
`

`

`xii
`
`Black Swamp IP, LLC v. VirnetX Inc.,
`IPR2016-00693, -00957, Paper No.
`14 (P.T.A.B. June 12, 2017) ................................... 9
`Bernard Chao, Implementing
`Apportionment, 2019 Patently-O
`Pat. L.J. 20 (2019) ................................................ 32
`Decision on Appeal, Cisco Systems, Inc.
`v. VirnetX Inc., 2018 WL 798782,
`Reexamination No. 95/001,679
`(P.T.A.B. Feb. 6, 2018) ........................................... 9
`Application for Extension of Time to
`File a Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
`Elbit Sys. Land & C4I Ltd. No.
`19A564 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2019) ............................... 19
`Joint Motion for Entry of Stipulated
`Dismissal, Elbit Systems Land &
`C41 Ltd. v. Hughes Network Sys.,
`No. 15-00037 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18,
`2019), Doc. 591 ..................................................... 19
`
`EVE-USA, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics
`Corp., No. 17-804 (U.S. Apr. 23,
`2018) ............................................................... 19, 33
`David Franklyn & Adam Kuhn, The
`Problem of Mop Heads in the Era of
`Apps: Toward More Rigorous
`Standards of Value Apportionment
`in Contemporary Patent Law, 98 J.
`Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 182
`(2016) .................................................................... 32
`
`

`

`xiii
`
`Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin:
`Incentives to Innovation in the New
`Economy of Intellectual Property
`Law, 46 Santa Clara L. Rev. 307
`(2006) .................................................................... 32
`Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent
`Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85
`Tex. L. Rev. 1991 (2007) ...................................... 32
`Brian J. Love et al., Determinants of
`Patent Quality: Evidence from Inter
`Partes Review Proceedings, 90 U.
`Colo. L. Rev. 67 (2019) ......................................... 38
`Brian J. Love, Patentee
`Overcompensation and the Entire
`Market Value Rule, 60 Stan. L. Rev.
`263 (2007) ............................................................. 33
`4 Matthews, Annotated Patent Digest
`§ 30:84, Westlaw (database updated
`Dec. 2019) ....................................................... 21, 33
`PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2018 Patent
`Litigation Study, May 2018,
`https://tinyurl.com/y5gd8blr ................................ 21
`Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Time
`Warner Cable, Inc. v. Sprint
`Commc’ns Co., No. 19-211 (Aug. 15,
`2019) ......................................................... 18, 26, 32
`
`

`

`xiv
`
`Brief Amicus Curiae Intel Corp., Time
`Warner Cable, Inc. v. Sprint
`Commc’ns Co., No. 19-211 (Sept. 18,
`2019) ..................................................................... 32
`
`

`

`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Defying this Court’s commands, the Federal Cir-
`cuit committed two fundamental legal errors to sus-
`tain a whopping $439 million judgment. It applied a
`rule that is fueling grossly excessive damages awards.
`And it sustained the inflated award even though the
`PTO has invalidated the underlying patent claims.
`I. The first error was to flout more than a century
`of doctrine
`from this Court requiring “appor-
`tion[ment]” of patent damages “in every case.” Garret-
`son v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884). The rule is
`simple: A patentee cannot exploit the success of a
`multicomponent end-product—whether an improved
`mop, as in Garretson, or revolutionary Apple products
`like iPhones, here—to generate a huge damages sum
`far exceeding the limited contribution its patented in-
`vention makes to the end-product. Instead, the pa-
`tentee must “give evidence tending to separate or
`apportion … the patentee’s damages between the pa-
`tented feature and the unpatented features.” Id.
`In a series of cases over the past five years, the
`Federal Circuit has adopted a gaping loophole that al-
`lows patentees to recover inflated damages far beyond
`the value of the patented invention. Patentees may
`now skip apportionment entirely when they prove
`damages using one of the most common damages
`methodologies—pointing to prior
`licenses. This
`method entails introducing a license (or several li-
`censes) for the same or a different patent in a different
`end-product and uncritically assuming that the pa-
`tentee and accused infringer in this case would have
`
`

`

`2
`
`negotiated the same rate. Here, for example, the pa-
`tentee introduced a handful of licenses with third par-
`ties
`for
`infringement claims asserted against
`conventional desktop phones, and assumed that the
`per-unit average rate across these agreements re-
`flects the value of the technology in Apple’s much
`more complex devices.
`The Federal Circuit now regularly permits pa-
`tentees to prove damages through this simplistic ap-
`proach even though it includes zero apportionment.
`In this and multiple other cases, there was no reason
`to think the rate applied to one end-product would re-
`flect the same value of the patented invention in an-
`other. In each, the patentee introduced no evidence to
`prove the equivalence. And the Federal Circuit has
`now made clear that it requires no such evidence
`whenever the patentee invokes prior licenses to prove
`damages.
`Under the Federal Circuit’s settled approach, ap-
`portionment is effectively a dead letter. Patentees are
`increasingly resorting to this method of proving dam-
`ages, carefully selecting prior licenses that lead juries
`to award massive sums entirely untethered from the
`value the patented feature contributes to the end-
`product. Only this Court can end this innovation-
`busting deviation from settled law.
` II. There is another foundational problem with
`this massive verdict that also demands this Court’s
`attention. The Federal Circuit has sustained the judg-
`ment even though it is based on patent claims that
`the PTO has invalidated.
`
`

`

`3
`
`In cases stretching back as early as 1861, this
`Court has held that when patent claims are invali-
`dated, their invalidation applies in “pending suits.”
`Moffitt v. Garr, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 273, 282-83 (1862).
`That is a straightforward application of the broader,
`and even more time-honored, principle that interven-
`ing legal developments apply in pending cases. See
`United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
`103, 110 (1801) (Marshall, C.J.).
`Here, however, the Federal Circuit denied effect
`to intervening PTO invalidations, leaving Apple on
`the hook for hundreds of millions of dollars based on
`invalid claims. In doing so, the court departed from
`yet another established principle: For purposes of the
`rule recognized in Moffit, Schooner Peggy, and legions
`of similar cases, a case remains pending until this
`Court has denied certiorari. At the relevant time here,
`however, the appellate mandate had not yet issued.
`Nor had a petition for certiorari even been filed, much
`less denied by this Court. (Indeed, this is that very
`petition.)
`It is important for this Court to correct the Fed-
`eral Circuit’s fundamental mistake of law. This Court
`has repeatedly declared that it is anathema to force
`an innovator to “pay tribute to would-be monopolists
`without need or justification” when their patents are
`invalid. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
`There is no need or justification to require a defend-
`ant to pay massive damages for infringing patent
`claims that the PTO has decided should never have
`issued in the first place.
`
`

`

`4
`
`Without this Court’s intervention, the Federal
`Circuit will continue allowing patentees to recover
`awards having nothing to do with the value of the as-
`serted technology, even where the underlying patent
`claims are no longer valid. This Court should grant
`certiorari to reinstate the guard rails that have
`curbed excessive patent damages awards for well over
`a century.
`OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW
`The Federal Circuit’s first decision in this case is
`reported at 767 F.3d 1308 (VirnetX I) and reproduced
`at App. 77a-125a.
`The Federal Circuit’s second decision, which peti-
`tioner challenges here, is reported at 748 F. App’x 332
`(VirnetX II) and reproduced at App. 1a-2a. The order
`denying rehearing and rehearing en banc is unre-
`ported and reproduced at App. 128a-129a.
`The district court’s decision denying Apple’s post-
`trial motion on damages is reported at 324 F. Supp.
`3d 836 and reproduced at App. 3a-76a.
`JURISDICTION
`The Federal Circuit entered judgment on January
`15, 2019. On August 1, 2019, that court denied Apple’s
`timely petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc.
`App. 128a-129a. On October 18, 2019, the Chief Jus-
`tice extended the time in which to file a petition for a
`writ of certiorari to and including December 29, 2019.
`This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
`
`

`

`5
`
`STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
`Section 284 of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 284,
`provides in relevant part:
`Upon finding for the claimant the court shall
`award the claimant damages adequate to
`compensate for the infringement, but in no
`event less than a reasonable royalty for the
`use made of the invention by the infringer, to-
`gether with interest and costs as fixed by the
`court.
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`6
`
`STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
`
`Apple’s Feature-Rich Mobile Devices Revolution-
`ize The Industry
`Apple revolutionized the mobile device industry
`when it released the first iPhone in 2007. See CA.I
`1808. While it has “Phone” in its name, this
`touchscreen device has many thousands of features
`and is more accurately described as a handheld com-
`puter. CA.I 1808-10. This Court has twice commented
`on the iPhone’s “broad range” of features that come
`preloaded, Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc., 137
`S. Ct. 429, 433 (2016), and that can be added by in-
`stalling applications (aka apps), Apple Inc. v. Pepper,
`139 S. Ct. 1514, 1518 (2019).
`Besides the iPhone, Apple produces several other
`feature-rich mobile devices, including iPad tablets
`and iPod touches, all capable of “pretty much any-
`thing you can imagine.” CA.I 1807. Apple also contin-
`ues to make more traditional Macintosh desktop and
`laptop computers (Macs). CA.I 1805-06.
`
`
`1 “CA.I” refers to the Court of Appeals appendix in VirnetX
`I (the first appellate ruling in this case). “CA.II” refers to the
`Court of Appeals appendix in VirnetX II (the second appellate
`ruling in this case and the one at issue in this petition). “Dkt.”
`refers to the Court of Appeals docket in VirnetX II, No. 18-1197
`(Fed. Cir.).
`
`

`

`7
`
`
`
`CA.II 10,096.
`This case concerns only aspects of two of the thou-
`sands of features that come preinstalled on the Apple
`products described above (which we will call “Apple
`devices”). In particular, this case involves two inter-
`net-security measures. When people use the internet,
`their devices communicate data to other internet-con-
`nected computers or devices. For example, when users
`visit www.amazon.com, they are actually sending
`data back and forth between their devices and the
`website “server”—the computer that stores and deliv-
`ers Amazon’s website content. CA.II 2250. Without
`encryption of the transmitted data, eavesdroppers
`could see that data. CA.II 2263-66.
`
`

`

`8
`
`There are many ways to protect this information.
`The two at issue here are (1) encryption used by an
`Apple application called “FaceTime” and (2) an Apple
`security feature called “VPN On Demand.” The first,
`found in FaceTime, enables users to privately vide-
`oconference each other on Apple devices. FaceTime
`communications are transmitted over the internet. To
`protect these communications from eavesdropping,
`FaceTime encrypts what a caller sees and hears, but
`the identities of the callers are not hidden from view.
`CA.II 1533-34; see App. 81a-82a.
`The second Apple feature at issue here, VPN On
`Demand, provides a method of securing data trans-
`mitted while browsing the web. A “virtual private net-
`work,” or VPN, encrypts web traffic even while
`browsing on a public network, e.g., while using a ho-
`tel’s Wi-Fi. Organizations often use VPNs so employ-
`ees can securely access their office’s private server
`from a remote location. CA.I 1322-23. Apple’s VPN On
`Demand feature makes establishing a VPN easy and
`customizable for individual users, allowing them to
`specify a list of domain names (e.g., www.ama-
`zon.com) for which they want to automatically estab-
`lish a VPN and protect their web browsing from
`snooping. See App. 82a-84a.
`
`VirnetX Sues Apple For Patent Infringement But
`The PTO Invalidates All Asserted Claims
`VirnetX owns several patents for secure commu-
`nication technology. Rather than selling products, it
`seeks to sell licenses for its patents. Most of VirnetX’s
`licensing efforts have failed with respect to large com-
`panies like Google, Samsung, and Verizon. CA.I 1258-
`
`

`

`9
`
`60. Instead, VirnetX has typically licensed its technol-
`ogy to smaller companies in settlement agreements
`meant to avoid expensive litigation. See CA.II 1857-
`60.
`In 2010, VirnetX sued Apple, alleging that
`FaceTime and VPN On Demand infringed four pa-
`tents: U.S. Patent Nos. 7,418,504, 7,921,211,
`6,502,135, and 7,490,151. The four are similar, each
`“claim[ing] technology for providing security over net-
`works such as the Internet.” App. 80a. VirnetX ac-
`cused FaceTime of infringing the ’504 and ’211
`patents, which disclose a system that supports estab-
`lishing secure communication links between devices
`on the internet. Id. And it accused VPN On Demand
`of infringing the ’135 and ’151 patents, which disclose
`a system for identifying secure websites and creating
`a corresponding VPN. App. 82a.
`Apple responded by petitioning the PTO to inval-
`idate these four patents. Through these various pro-
`ceedings
`(and others
`initiated by additional
`interested parties), the PTO has invalidated every pa-
`tent claim VirnetX has asserted against Apple, find-
`ing all either anticipated or obvious. See, e.g., Decision
`Granting Renewed Petition to Sever Merger and Re-
`newed Petition to Terminate Reexamination Proceed-
`ing, Reexamination Nos. 95/001,697 & 95/00,1714
`(Oct. 16, 2019) (continuing prosecution of claims of
`’151 patent); Decision on Appeal, Cisco Systems, Inc.
`v. VirnetX Inc., 2018 WL 798782, Reexamination No.
`95/001,679 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 6, 2018), appeal pending,
`No. 19-1671 (Fed. Cir. docketed Mar. 19, 2019) (inval-
`idating claims of ’135 patent); Black Swamp IP, LLC
`v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2016-00693, -00957, Paper No. 14
`
`

`

`10
`
`(P.T.A.B. June 12, 2017), appeal pending, Nos. 17-
`2593, -2594 (Fed. Cir. docketed Sept. 25, 2017) (inval-
`idating claims of ’504 and ’211 patents). Indeed,
`across nearly 35 proceedings, 14 examiners and adju-
`dicators at the PTO have held the patents in suit, or
`closely related patents in the same families, invalid.
`For the two patents underlying the FaceTime al-
`legations (the ’504 and ’211 patents), the Federal Cir-
`cuit recently affirmed the PTO’s rulings with respect
`to all claims (or claims indistinguishable therefrom,
`as explained below, infra at 36-37). See VirnetX Inc.
`v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 776 F. App’x 698, 700 (Fed. Cir.
`2019) (relevant claims of the ’504 patent) (VirnetX
`Reexamination Appeal I); VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`931 F.3d 1363, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (relevant
`claims of the ’211 patent) (VirnetX Reexamination Ap-
`peal II).
`That means the PTO will issue final certificates
`officially cancelling the patent claims affirmed as un-
`patentable by the Federal Circuit. See 35 U.S.C.
`§ 316(a) (2006).
`
`Meanwhile, VirnetX Proceeds To Trial And Wins
`A $439 Million Judgment
`While the PTO was reexamining the validity of
`the patents, VirnetX went to trial against Apple in
`federal district court. This was unusual: District
`courts are “nearly uniform” in staying infringement
`litigation pending final adjudication of cancellation
`proceedings at the PTO. NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC Am.,
`
`

`

`11
`
`Inc., No. 2:13-cv-1058-WCB, 2015 WL 1069111, at *6
`(E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2015).
`In November 2012, a jury found that FaceTime
`and VPN On Demand infringed the asserted patent
`claims, and that Apple had not proved by clear and
`convincing evidence that the asserted claims were in-
`valid. It awarded VirnetX about $368 million in dam-
`ages. App. 84a. The Federal Circuit affirmed the
`validity determinations, as well as the infringement
`verdict with respect to VPN On Demand, but it re-
`versed the finding that FaceTime infringed. App. 79a-
`80a. The court also rejected VirnetX’s damages meth-
`odology. App. 107a.
`On retrial in 2016, the jury reinstated the in-
`fringement finding against FaceTime. App. 8a. The
`jury also redetermined damages for both FaceTime
`and VPN On Demand, this time awarding over $302
`million. Id. With prejudgment interest, enhanced
`damages, costs and attorney’s fees, the total judgment
`was over $439 million. Id. at 66a-67a; CA.II 71.
`As relevant here, the big difference between the
`two trials was VirnetX’s approach to damages. The
`first time around, VirnetX had started with the
`pricetag of each Apple product (the “royalty base”)
`and then attempted to gauge the portion of that value
`that the patented technology contributed. In other
`words, VirnetX made some attempt to comply with
`the long-established requirement that a patentee
`must “give evidence tending to separate or apportion
`the defendant’s profits and the patentee’s damages
`between the patented feature and the unpatented fea-
`tures.” App. 108a (quoting Garretson, 111 U.S. at
`
`

`

`12
`
`121). The Federal Circuit, however, reversed because
`VirnetX’s approach to this longstanding apportion-
`ment requirement was flawed. App.111a-116a.
`At the second trial, VirnetX did not even try to fix
`the errors the Federal Circuit had identified. Rather,
`VirnetX avoided apportionment entirely by abandon-
`ing any attempt to calculate damages based on the
`patents’ contribution to a royalty base. Instead, Vir-
`netX introduced licenses that it had previously nego-
`tiated with other companies for completely different
`devices. Specifically, VirnetX introduced six prior li-
`censes resulting from settlement agreements with
`other companies it had sued for infringement. CA.II
`1857. Those companies had agreed to pay VirnetX a
`percentage of their total sales (or a lump sum derived
`from that sales-based figure). CA.II 1778-80, 1843. At
`trial, VirnetX then repackaged these payments into
`per-unit rates by dividing total payments by total
`product units sold:
`
`License
`Microsoft
`Avaya
`Siemens
`Mitel
`Aastra
`NEC
`
`Per-Unit Rate
`$0.19
`$0.34
`$1.21
`$1.43
`$1.80
`$2.26
`
`
`
`

`

`13
`
`See CA.II 1783, 1855, 1869. The royalties varied by
`more than an order of magnitude. Yet, VirnetX just
`averaged these per-unit rates (i.e., added them to-
`gether and divided by six) to yield an “average rate”
`of $1.20. It then urged the jury to conclude that Apple
`would agree that VirnetX’s patents were worth $1.20
`in any device found to infringe. CA.II 1811-12.
`VirnetX’s expert acknowledged his back-of-the-
`envelope math did not weight the Microsoft agree-
`ment more than the others, even though that agree-
`ment “involved far more units and far more money”
`than any of the others. CA.II 1786. The $200 million
`Microsoft agreement, covering over a billion units in
`the United States and another billion units abroad,
`was given the same weight as a $22,000 agreement
`with Aastra for 12,000 units, a $47,000 agreement
`with NEC for 21,000 units, and a $55,000 agreement
`with Siemens for 46,000 units. CA.II. 1847, 1853-56.
`He also recognized that “the Apple devices in this case
`[were] far, far more complex” than the products li-
`censed in all of the agreements except for Microsoft’s,
`which bore the lowest per-unit rate. CA.II 1866. Those
`non-Microsoft licensed products were more conven-
`tional office desktop phones of the sort popular in
`many professional settings:
`
`

`

`14
`
`Comparison of Avaya and Apple Products
`
`Avaya IP Desk
`Phone, IP Conference
`Phone, IP PBX, and
`Communication Manager
`
`Apple Mac
`Computers, iPods,
`iPhones and iPads
`
`
`CA.II 10,096; see also CA.II 1867. VirnetX nonethe-
`less insisted that its expert’s unweighted average rep-
`resented “fair payment by Apple to VirnetX” for each
`infringing product sold. CA.II 1765; see also CA.II
`1785-86.
`In various motions, Apple had objected that this
`approach violated basic patent-law damages princi-
`ples because the rates were unapportioned: There was
`no evidence these rates reflected only the value that
`VirnetX’s patents contributed to Apple’s products. See
`CA.II 32, 37, 80.
`When pressed on these flaws, VirnetX’s expert as-
`serted that these rates must “have been apportioned
`to reflect the incremental contribution of VirnetX’s
`technology to those products,” because VirnetX had a
`policy of doing so. CA.II 1862. But he was “not certain”
`how VirnetX performed any apportionment. CA.II
`
`

`

`15
`
`1863. And he conceded that “the value of a license en-
`tered into in the settlement of litigation” could “repre-
`sent the value to the Defendant of making a lawsuit
`go away,” CA.II 1858, rather than the value of the pa-
`tented feature.
`The jury nevertheless accepted VirnetX’s invita-
`tion to multiply the average $1.20 rate by the number
`of accused Apple products (250 million) to arrive at a
`total royalty of over $302 million. CA.II 1819. The
`damages award was imposed in one undifferentiated
`amount, resting in part on products found to infringe
`both the FaceTime and VPN patents, and in part on
`products for which only FaceTime infringed. See
`CA.II 9; CA.II 1818-21.
`In a motion for a new trial, Apple asked the dis-
`trict court to set aside the damages judgment for fail-
`ure to prove apportionment. App. 18a-19a. But the
`cour

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket