`(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2020
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
`
` Syllabus
`
` CALIFORNIA ET AL. v. TEXAS ET AL.
`
`
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
` No. 19–840. Argued November 10, 2020—Decided June 17, 2021*
`
`The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as enacted in 2010 re-
`
`quired most Americans to obtain minimum essential health insurance
`coverage and imposed a monetary penalty upon most individuals who
`failed to do so. Amendments to the Act in 2017 effectively nullified the
`
`penalty by setting its amount to $0. Subsequently, Texas (along with
`
`
`
`over a dozen States and two individuals) brought suit against federal
`officials, claiming that without the penalty the Act’s minimum essen-
`
`
`tial coverage provision, codified at 26 U. S. C. §5000A(a), is unconsti-
`tutional. They sought a declaration that the provision is unconstitu-
`tional, a finding that the rest of the Act is not severable from
`§5000A(a), and an injunction against enforcement of the rest of the
`Act. The District Court determined that the individual plaintiffs had
`standing. It also found §5000A(a) both unconstitutional and not sev-
`erable from the rest of the Act. The Fifth Circuit agreed as to the ex-
`istence of standing and the unconstitutionality of §5000A(a), but con-
`cluded that the District Court’s severability analysis provided
`insufficient justification to strike down the entire Act. Petitioner Cal-
`
`ifornia and other States intervened to defend the Act’s constitutional-
`
`ity and to seek further review.
`
`Held: Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge §5000A(a)’s minimum
`
`essential coverage provision because they have not shown a past or
`future injury fairly traceable to defendants’ conduct enforcing the spe-
`
`cific statutory provision they attack as unconstitutional. Pp. 4–16.
`
`
`(a) The Constitution gives federal courts the power to adjudicate
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`
`
`——————
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`*Together with No. 19–1019, Texas et al. v. California et al., also on
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`certiorari to the same court.
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`

`

`2
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`CALIFORNIA v. TEXAS
`
`
`Syllabus
`only genuine “Cases” and “Controversies.” Art. III, §2. To have stand-
`ing, a plaintiff must “allege personal injury fairly traceable to the de-
`
`fendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
`
`
`
`requested relief.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 342.
`No plaintiff has shown such an injury “fairly traceable” to the “alleg-
`edly unlawful conduct” challenged here. Pp. 4–5.
`
`(b) The two individual plaintiffs claim a particularized individual
`
`harm in the form of past and future payments necessary to carry the
`
`minimum essential coverage that §5000A(a) requires. Assuming this
`
`pocketbook injury satisfies the injury element of Article III standing,
`
`it is not “fairly traceable” to any “allegedly unlawful conduct” of which
`the plaintiffs complain, Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751. Without a
`penalty for noncompliance, §5000A(a) is unenforceable. The individu-
`
`
`als have not shown that any kind of Government action or conduct has
`caused or will cause the injury they attribute to §5000A(a). The
`Court’s cases have consistently spoken of the need to assert an injury
`that is the result of a statute’s actual or threatened enforcement,
`
`whether today or in the future. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442
`U. S. 289, 298. Here, there is only the statute’s textually unenforcea-
`
`ble language.
`
`Unenforceable statutory language alone is not sufficient to establish
`standing, as the redressability requirement makes clear. Whether an
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`injury is redressable depends on the relationship between “the judicial
`
`
`relief requested” and the “injury” suffered. Allen, 468 U. S. at 753, n.
`
`19. The only relief sought regarding the minimum essential coverage
`provision is declaratory relief, namely, a judicial statement that the
`
`provision challenged is unconstitutional. But just like suits for every
`other type of remedy, declaratory-judgment actions must satisfy Arti-
`cle III’s case-or-controversy requirement. See MedImmune, Inc. v.
`Genentech, Inc., 549 U. S. 118, 126–127. Article III standing requires
`identification of a remedy that will redress the individual plaintiffs’
`injuries. Id., at 127. No such remedy exists here. To find standing to
`attack an unenforceable statutory provision would allow a federal
`court to issue what would amount to an advisory opinion without the
`
`possibility of an Article III remedy. Article III guards against federal
`
`
`courts assuming this kind of jurisdiction. See Carney v. Adams, 592
`U. S. ___, ___ . The Court also declines to consider Federal respond-
`
`ents’ novel alternative theory of standing first raised in its merits brief
`on behalf the individuals, as well as the dissent’s novel theory on be-
`half of the states, neither of which was directly argued by plaintiffs
`below nor presented at the certiorari stage. Pp. 5–10.
`
`(c) Texas and the other state plaintiffs have similarly failed to show
`that the pocketbook injuries they allege are traceable to the Govern-
`
`ment’s allegedly unlawful conduct. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
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`

`

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`3
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`Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`
`Syllabus
`547 U. S. 332, 342. They allege two forms of injury: one indirect, one
`direct.
`
`
`
`(1) The state plaintiffs allege indirect injury in the form of in-
`
`creased costs to run state-operated medical insurance programs. They
`say the minimum essential coverage provision has caused more state
`
`residents to enroll in the programs. The States, like the individual
`
`plaintiffs, have failed to show how that alleged harm is traceable to
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`
`
`the Government’s actual or possible action in enforcing §5000A(a), so
`
`they lack Article III standing as a matter of law. But the States have
`also not shown that the challenged minimum essential coverage provi-
`sion, without any prospect of penalty, will injure them by leading more
`individuals to enroll in these programs. Where a standing theory rests
`on speculation about the decision of an independent third party (here
`
`an individual’s decision to enroll in a program like Medicaid), the
`plaintiff must show at the least “that third parties will likely react in
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`predictable ways.” Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 U. S.
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`___, ___. Neither logic nor evidence suggests that an unenforceable
`mandate will cause state residents to enroll in valuable benefits pro-
`grams that they would otherwise forgo. It would require far stronger
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`evidence than the States have offered here to support their counterin-
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`tuitive theory of standing, which rests on a “highly attenuated chain
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`
`
`of possibilities.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398, 410–411.
`Pp. 11–14.
`
`(2) The state plaintiffs also claim a direct injury resulting from a
`variety of increased administrative and related expenses allegedly re-
`quired by §5000A(a)’s minimum essential coverage provision. But
`other provisions of the Act, not the minimum essential coverage provi-
`sion, impose these requirements. These provisions are enforced with-
`
`
`out reference to §5000A(a). See 26 U. S. C. §§6055, 6056. A conclusion
`
`that the minimum essential coverage requirement is unconstitutional
`
`would not show that enforcement of these other provisions violates the
`
`Constitution. The other asserted pocketbook injuries related to the Act
`are similarly the result of enforcement of provisions of the Act that
`operate independently of §5000A(a). No one claims these other provi-
`
`sions violate the Constitution. The Government’s conduct in question
`is therefore not “fairly traceable” to enforcement of the “allegedly un-
`lawful” provision of which the plaintiffs complain—§5000A(a). Allen,
`
`468 U. S., at 751. Pp. 14–16.
`945 F. 3d. 355, reversed and remanded.
`BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
`and THOMAS, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.
`
`THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opin-
`
`ion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.
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`
`
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`

`

`_________________
` Nos. 19–840 and 19–1019
`_________________
`
` CALIFORNIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS
` v.
`
` TEXAS, ET AL.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
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` corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`19–840
`
`
`
`19–1019
`
`TEXAS, ET AL., PETITIONERS
`
`
`v.
`CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
`
`ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
`[June 17, 2021]
`JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
`
`As originally enacted in 2010, the Patient Protection and
`
`Affordable Care Act required most Americans to obtain
`minimum essential health insurance coverage. The Act
`also imposed a monetary penalty, scaled according to in-
`come, upon individuals who failed to do so. In 2017, Con-
`gress effectively nullified the penalty by setting its amount
`
`at $0. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115–97,
`§11081, 131 Stat. 2092 (codified in 26 U. S. C. §5000A(c)).
`
`Texas and 17 other States brought this lawsuit against
`
`the United States and federal officials. They were later
`joined by two individuals (Neill Hurley and John Nantz).
`The plaintiffs claim that without the penalty the Act’s min-
`
`imum essential coverage requirement is unconstitutional.
`
`Specifically, they say neither the Commerce Clause nor the
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`

`

`2
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`CALIFORNIA v. TEXAS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Tax Clause (nor any other enumerated power) grants Con-
`gress the power to enact it. See U. S. Const., Art. I, §8.
`They also argue that the minimum essential coverage re-
`
`
`quirement is not severable from the rest of the Act. Hence,
`they believe the Act as a whole is invalid. We do not reach
`
`these questions of the Act’s validity, however, for Texas and
`the other plaintiffs in this suit lack the standing necessary
`to raise them.
`
`
`
`I
`A
`
`
`We begin by describing the provision of the Act that the
`plaintiffs attack as unconstitutional. The Act says in rele-
`
`vant part:
`“(a) Requirement to maintain minimum essen-
`tial coverage
`
`
`
`“An applicable individual shall . . . ensure that the
`individual, and any dependent . . . who is an applicable
`individual, is covered under minimum essential cover-
`age . . . .
`“(b) Shared responsibility payment
`
`“(1) In general
`
`“If a taxpayer who is an applicable individual . . .
`
`fails to meet the requirement of subsection (a) . . . there
`is hereby imposed on the taxpayer a penalty . . . in the
`amount determined under subsection (c).
`
`
`“(2) Inclusion with return
`
`“Any penalty imposed by this section . . . shall be in-
`cluded with a taxpayer’s return . . . for the taxable
`year . . . .” 26 U. S. C. §5000A.
`
`The Act defines “applicable individual” to include all tax-
`payers who do not fall within a set of exemptions. See
`
`§5000A(d). As first enacted, the Act set forth a schedule of
`penalties applicable to those who failed to meet its mini-
`mum essential coverage requirement. See §5000A(c)
`
`
`
`

`

`3
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` Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`(2012). The penalties varied with a taxpayer’s income and
`
`exempted, among others, persons whose annual incomes
`fell below the federal income tax filing threshold. See
`§5000A(e) (2012). And the Act required that those subject
`to a penalty include it with their annual tax return. See
`
`§5000A(b)(2) (2012). In 2017, Congress amended the Act by
`setting the amount of the penalty in each category in
`§5000A(c) to “$0,” effective beginning tax year 2019. See
`
`§11081, 131 Stat. 2092.
`
`Before Congress amended the Act, the Internal Revenue
`Service (IRS) had implemented §5000A(b) by requiring in-
`
`dividual taxpayers to report with their federal income tax
`
`return whether they carried minimum essential coverage
`
`(or could claim an exemption). After Congress amended the
`
`Act, the IRS made clear that the statute no longer requires
`
`taxpayers to report whether they do, or do not, maintain
`
`that coverage. See IRS, Publication 5187, Tax Year 2019,
`p. 5 (“Form 1040 . . . will not have the ‘full-year health care
`coverage or exempt’ box and Form 8965, Health Coverage
`Exemptions, will no longer be used as the shared responsi-
`bility payment is reduced to zero”).
`B
`
`In 2018, Texas and more than a dozen other States (state
`
`plaintiffs) brought this lawsuit against the Secretary of
`Health and Human Services and the Commissioner of In-
`ternal Revenue, among others. App. 12, 34. They sought a
`declaration that §5000A(a)’s minimum essential coverage
`provision is unconstitutional, a finding that the rest of the
`Act is not severable from §5000A(a), and an injunction
`
`against the rest of the Act’s enforcement. Id., at 61–63.
`
`Hurley and Nantz (individual plaintiffs) soon joined them.
`
`Although nominally defendants to the suit, the United
`
`States took the side of the plaintiffs. See Brief for Federal
`Respondents 12–13 (arguing that the Act is unconstitu-
`tional). Therefore California, along with 15 other States
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`
`

`

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`4
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`CALIFORNIA v. TEXAS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`and the District of Columbia (state intervenors), intervened
`in order to defend the Act’s constitutionality, see App. 12–
`13, as did the U. S. House of Representatives at the appel-
`late stage, see id., at 3.
`
`After taking evidence, the District Court found that the
`
`individual plaintiffs had standing to challenge the constitu-
`tionality of the minimum essential coverage provision,
`§5000A(a). See Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579,
`
`593–595 (ND Tex. 2018). The court held that the minimum
`
`essential coverage provision is unconstitutional and not
`severable from the rest of the Act. It granted relief in the
`form of a declaration stating just that. Id., at 595–619. It
`then stayed its judgment pending appeal. See Texas v.
`United States, 352 F. Supp. 3d 665 (ND Tex. 2018).
`
`On appeal, a panel majority agreed with the District
`Court that the plaintiffs had standing and that the mini-
`
`mum essential coverage provision was unconstitutional.
`
`See Texas v. United States, 945 F. 3d 355, 377–393 (CA5
`2019). It found that the District Court’s severability anal-
`
`ysis, however, was “incomplete.” Id., at 400. It wrote that
`
`“[m]ore [wa]s needed to justify” the District Court’s order
`
`striking down the entire Act. Id., at 401. And it remanded
`the case for further proceedings. Id., at 402–403.
`
`The state intervenors, defending the Act, asked us to re-
`
`view the lower court decision. We granted their petition for
`
`certiorari.
`
`
`II
`
`
`We proceed no further than standing. The Constitution
`
`gives federal courts the power to adjudicate only genuine
`“Cases” and “Controversies.” Art. III, §2. That power in-
`cludes the requirement that litigants have standing. A
`
`plaintiff has standing only if he can “allege personal injury
`fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful con-
`
`duct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”
`DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 342 (2006)
`
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`

`

`5
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` Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lujan v. De-
`fenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561 (1992). Neither
`the individual nor the state plaintiffs have shown that the
`
`injury they will suffer or have suffered is “fairly traceable”
`to the “allegedly unlawful conduct” of which they complain.
`A
`
`We begin with the two individual plaintiffs. They claim
`
`a particularized individual harm in the form of payments
`they have made and will make each month to carry the min-
`imum essential coverage that §5000A(a) requires. The in-
`
`dividual plaintiffs point to the statutory language, which,
`they say, commands them to buy health insurance. Brief
`for Respondent-Cross Petitioner Hurley et al. 19–20. But
`even if we assume that this pocketbook injury satisfies the
`injury element of Article III standing, see Whitmore v. Ar-
`kansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990), the plaintiffs neverthe-
`less fail to satisfy the traceability requirement.
`
`Their problem lies in the fact that the statutory provision,
`while it tells them to obtain that coverage, has no means of
`enforcement. With the penalty zeroed out, the IRS can no
`longer seek a penalty from those who fail to comply. See 26
`U. S. C. §5000A(g) (setting out IRS enforcement only of the
`taxpayer’s failure to pay the penalty, not of the taxpayer’s
`failure to maintain minimum essential coverage). Because
`of this, there is no possible Government action that is caus-
`ally connected to the plaintiffs’ injury—the costs of purchas-
`ing health insurance. Or to put the matter conversely, that
`injury is not “fairly traceable” to any “allegedly unlawful
`
`conduct” of which the plaintiffs complain. Allen v. Wright,
`468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984). They have not pointed to any
`way in which the defendants, the Commissioner of Internal
`
`Revenue and the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
`will act to enforce §5000A(a). They have not shown how any
`
`other federal employees could do so either. In a word, they
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`

`

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`6
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`
`CALIFORNIA v. TEXAS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`have not shown that any kind of Government action or con-
`duct has caused or will cause the injury they attribute to
`§5000A(a).
`
`The plaintiffs point to cases concerning the Act that they
`believe support their standing. But all of those cases con-
`cerned the Act when the provision was indisputably enforce-
`able, because the penalty provision was still in effect. See
`
`Brief for Respondent-Cross Petitioner Hurley et al. 22 (cit-
`ing Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. United States Dept. of Health
`
`and Human Servs., 648 F. 3d 1235, 1243 (CA11 2011);
`
`Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 651 F. 3d 529, 535
`
`
`(CA6 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F. 3d
`253, 266–268 (CA4 2011)); cf. National Federation of Inde-
`pendent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U. S. 519 (2012) (as-
`sessing the constitutionality of the Act with the penalty pro-
`
`vision). These cases therefore tell us nothing about how the
`
`statute is enforced, or could be enforced, today.
`
`It is consequently not surprising that the plaintiffs can-
`not point to cases that support them. To the contrary, our
`cases have consistently spoken of the need to assert an in-
`jury that is the result of a statute’s actual or threatened en-
`
`
`forcement, whether today or in the future. See, e.g., Babbitt
`
`v. Farm Workers, 442 U. S. 289, 298 (1979) (“A plaintiff who
`challenges a statute must demonstrate a realistic danger of
`sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s opera-
`tion or enforcement” (emphasis added)); Virginia v. Ameri-
`
`can Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U. S. 383, 392 (1988) (re-
`quiring “threatened or actual injury resulting from the
`putatively illegal action” (internal quotation marks omit-
`
`ted)). In the absence of contemporary enforcement, we have
`
`said that a plaintiff claiming standing must show that the
`likelihood of future enforcement is “substantial.” Susan B.
`
`Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 164 (2014); see also
`
`Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923) (“The
`party who invokes the power [of Article III courts] must be
`
`able to show, not only that the statute is invalid, but that
`
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`

`

`7
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`
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` Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining
`some direct injury as the result of its enforcement”).
`
`
`The plaintiffs point out that these and other precedents
`
`concern injuries anticipated in the future from a statute’s
`later enforcement. Here, the plaintiffs say, they have al-
`ready suffered a pocketbook injury, for they have already
`
`bought health insurance. They also emphasize the Court’s
`
`statement in Lujan that, when a plaintiff is the “‘object’” of
`a challenged Government action, “‘there is ordinarily little
`
`question that the action . . . has caused him injury, and that
`a judgment preventing . . . the action will redress it.’” Brief
`
`for Respondent-Cross Petitioner Hurley et al. 18 (quoting
`
`Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562). But critically, unlike Lujan,
`here no unlawful Government action “fairly traceable” to
`§5000A(a) caused the plaintiffs’ pocketbook harm. Here,
`there is no action—actual or threatened—whatsoever.
`There is only the statute’s textually unenforceable lan-
`guage.
`
`To consider the matter from the point of view of another
`standing requirement, namely, redressability, makes clear
`that the statutory language alone is not sufficient. To de-
`termine whether an injury is redressable, a court will con-
`sider the relationship between “the judicial relief re-
`quested” and the “injury” suffered. Allen, 468 U. S., at 753,
`n. 19. The plaintiffs here sought injunctive relief and a de-
`claratory judgment. The injunctive relief, however, con-
`cerned the Act’s other provisions that they say are insever-
`
`able from the minimum essential coverage requirement.
`The relief they sought in respect to the only provision they
`attack as unconstitutional—the minimum essential cover-
`age provision—is declaratory relief, namely, a judicial
`statement that the provision they attacked is unconstitu-
`tional. See App. 61–63 (“Count One: Declaratory Judgment
`That the Individual Mandate of the ACA Exceeds Con-
`gress’s Article I Constitutional Enumerated Powers” (bold-
`face deleted)); 340 F. Supp. 3d, at 619 (granting declaratory
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`8
`
`
`CALIFORNIA v. TEXAS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`judgment on count I as to §5000A(a)); 352 F. Supp. 3d, at
`
`690 (severing and entering partial final judgment on count
`I).
` Remedies, however, ordinarily “operate with respect to
`
`specific parties.” Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic
`
`Assn., 584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (THOMAS, J., concurring)
`(slip op., at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the
`absence of any specific party, they do not simply operate “on
`legal rules in the abstract.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks
`omitted); see also Mellon, 262 U. S., at 488 (“If a case for
`preventive relief be presented, the court enjoins, in effect,
`
`not the execution of the statute, but the acts of the official,
`
`the statute notwithstanding”).
`
`This suit makes clear why that is so. The Declaratory
`
`
`Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. §2201, alone does not provide a
`court with jurisdiction. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petro-
`leum Co., 339 U. S. 667, 671–672 (1950); R. Fallon, J. Man-
`ning, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The
`
`Federal Courts and the Federal System 841 (7th ed. 2015)
`
`(that Act does “not confe[r] jurisdiction over declaratory ac-
`
`tions when the underlying dispute could not otherwise be
`
`heard in federal court”); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S.
`
`497, 506 (1961) (“[T]he declaratory judgment device does
`not . . . permit litigants to invoke the power of this Court to
`obtain constitutional rulings in advance of necessity”). In-
`stead, just like suits for every other type of remedy, declar-
`atory-judgment actions must satisfy Article III’s case-or-
`controversy requirement. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genen-
`tech, Inc., 549 U. S. 118, 126–127 (2007). At a minimum,
`this means that the dispute must “be ‘real and substantial’
`and ‘admit of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive
`character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what
`the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.’ ” Id.,
`at 127 (alteration omitted). Thus, to satisfy Article III
`
`standing, we must look elsewhere to find a remedy that will
`redress the individual plaintiffs’ injuries.
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`9
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` Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`What is that relief? The plaintiffs did not obtain dam-
`
`ages. Nor, as we just said, did the plaintiffs obtain an in-
`junction in respect to the provision they attack as unconsti-
`tutional. But, more than that: How could they have sought
`any such injunction? The provision is unenforceable. There
`
`is no one, and nothing, to enjoin. They cannot enjoin the
`
`Secretary of Health and Human Services, because he has
`no power to enforce §5000A(a) against them. And they do
`not claim that they might enjoin Congress. In these circum-
`stances, injunctive relief could amount to no more than a
`declaration that the statutory provision they attack is un-
`constitutional, i.e., a declaratory judgment. But once again,
`that is the very kind of relief that cannot alone supply ju-
`risdiction otherwise absent. See Nashville, C. & St. L. R.
`
`
`Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 262 (1933) (inquiring whether
`
`a suit for declaratory relief “would be justiciable in this
` Court if presented in a suit for injunction”); Medtronic, Inc.
`
`v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 571 U. S. 191, 197
`
`(2014) (noting that a court looks to “the nature of the threat-
`ened action in the absence of the declaratory judgment suit”
`to determine whether jurisdiction exists).
`
`
`The matter is not simply technical. To find standing here
`to attack an unenforceable statutory provision would allow
`a federal court to issue what would amount to “an advisory
`
`
`opinion without the possibility of any judicial relief.” Los
` Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 129 (1983) (Marshall, J., dis-
`
`senting); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environ-
`ment, 523 U. S. 83, 107 (1998) (to have standing, a plaintiff
`must seek “an acceptable Article III remedy” that will “re-
`dress a cognizable Article III injury”). It would threaten to
`grant unelected judges a general authority to conduct over-
`sight of decisions of the elected branches of Government.
`See United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 188 (1974)
`
`(Powell, J., concurring). Article III guards against federal
`courts assuming this kind of jurisdiction. See Carney v. Ad-
`ams, 592 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 4).
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`10
`
`
`CALIFORNIA v. TEXAS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Last, the federal respondents raised for the first time a
`
`novel alternative theory of standing on behalf of the indi-
`vidual plaintiffs in their merits brief. (The dissent, alone,
`puts forward a similar novel theory on behalf of the state
`
`plaintiffs.) That theory was not directly argued by the
`plaintiffs in the courts below, see 945 F. 3d, at 385–386, and
`n. 29, and was nowhere presented at the certiorari stage.
`
`We accordingly decline to consider it. Cf. Adarand Con-
`structors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U. S. 103, 109–110 (2001) (per
`curiam); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718,
`
`
`n. 7 (2005).
`
`
`
`B
`Next, we turn to the state plaintiffs. We conclude that
`
`
`Texas and the other state plaintiffs have similarly failed to
`
`show that they have alleged an “injury fairly traceable to
`
`the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct.” Cuno, 547
`U. S., at 342 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis
`
`added). They claim two kinds of pocketbook injuries. First,
`they allege an indirect injury in the form of the increased
`
`use of (and therefore cost to) state-operated medical insur-
`ance programs. Second, they claim a direct injury resulting
`from a variety of increased administrative and related ex-
`penses required, they say, by the minimum essential cover-
`age provision, along with other provisions of the Act that,
`
`they add, are inextricably “‘interwoven’” with it. Brief for
`Respondent-Cross Petitioner States 39.
`1
`First, the state plaintiffs claim that the minimum essen-
`
`tial coverage provision has led state residents subject to it
`to enroll in state-operated or state-sponsored insurance
`programs such as Medicaid, see 42 U. S. C. §§1396–1396w,
`
`the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), see
`§1397aa, and health insurance programs for state employ-
`ees. The state plaintiffs say they must pay a share of the
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
` Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`costs of serving those new enrollees. As with the individual
`plaintiffs, the States also have failed to show how this in-
`
`jury is directly traceable to any actual or possible unlawful
`
`Government conduct in enforcing §5000A(a). Cf. Clapper v.
`Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398, 414, n. 5 (2013) (“plain-
`tiffs bear the burden of . . . showing that the defendant’s ac-
`
`tual action has caused the substantial risk of harm” (em-
`phasis added)). That alone is enough to show that they, like
`the individual plaintiffs, lack Article III standing.
`
`
`But setting aside that pure issue of law, we need only ex-
`amine the initial factual premise of their claim to uncover
`
`another fatal weakness: The state plaintiffs have failed to
`show that the challenged minimum essential coverage pro-
`vision, without any prospect of penalty, will harm them by
`
`leading more individuals to enroll in these programs.
`
`We have said that, where a causal relation between in-
`
`jury and challenged action depends upon the decision of an
`independent third party (here an individual’s decision to
`enroll in, say, Medicaid), “standing is not precluded, but it
`is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish”
`
`Lujan, 504 U. S., at 562 (quoting Allen, 468 U. S., at 758);
`
`see also Clapper, 568 U. S., at 414 (expressing “reluctance
`to endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about
`the decisions of independent actors”). To satisfy that bur-
`den, the plaintiff must show at the least “that third parties
`will likely react in predictable ways.” Department of Com-
`
`merce v. New York, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 10).
`
`And, “at the summary judgment stage, such a party can no
`longer rest on . . . mere allegations, but must set forth . . .
`
`specific facts” that adequately support their contention.
`Clapper, 568 U. S., at 411–412 (internal quotation marks
`
`omitted). The state plaintiffs have not done so.
`
`The programs to which the state plaintiffs point offer
`their recipients many benefits that have nothing to do with
`the minimum essential coverage provision of §5000A(a).
`See, e.g., 42 U. S. C. §§1396o(a)–(b) (providing for no-cost
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` 11
`
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`
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`

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`12
`
`
`CALIFORNIA v. TEXAS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Medicaid services furnished to children and pregnant
`women, and for emergency services, hospice care, and
`COVID–19 testing related services, among others, as well
`as “nominal” charges for other individuals and services);
`§1396o(c) (prohibiting Medicaid premiums for certain indi-
`viduals with family income below 150 percent of the poverty
`
`line and capping the premium at 10 percent of an eligible
`
`individual’s family income above that line); 26 U. S. C.
`
`§36B(c)(2)(C) (providing premium tax credits to make
`health insurance plans, including employer-sponsored
`plans, more affordable). Given these benefits, neither logic
`nor intuition suggests that the presence of the minimum
`essential coverage requirement would lead an individual to
`enroll in one of those programs that its absence would lead
`them to ignore. A penalty might have led some inertia-
`
`bound individuals to enroll. But without a penalty, what
`incentive could the provision provide?
`
`The evidence that the state plaintiffs introduced in the
`
`District Court does not show the contrary. That evidence
`consists of 21 statements (from state officials) about how
`new enrollees will increase the costs of state health insur-
`ance programs, see App. 79–191, 339–363, along with one
`statement taken from a 2017 Congressional Budget Office
`(CBO) Report, see id., at 306–311.
`
`
`Of the 21 statements, we have found only 4 that allege
`
`that added state costs are attributable to the minimum es-
`sential coverage requirement. And all four refer to that pro-
`vision as it existed before Congress removed the penalty ef-
`fective beginning tax