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`IN THE
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`LINKEDIN CORPORATION,
`Applicant,
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`v.
`HIQ LABS, INC.,
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`Respondent.
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`APPLICATION TO THE HON. ELENA KAGAN FOR AN
`EXTENSION OF TIME WITHIN WHICH TO FILE A
`PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
`NINTH CIRCUIT
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`Pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 13.5, 22, and 30.3, LinkedIn Corporation
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`(“Applicant”) hereby move for an extension of time of 32 days, to and including March
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`9, 2020, for the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari. The United States Court of
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`Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion on September 9, 2019 (Exhibit 1), and
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`issued an order denying panel rehearing and rehearing en banc on November 8, 2019
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`(Exhibit 2). Unless an extension is granted, the deadline for filing the petition for
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`certiorari will be February 6, 2020. Applicants are filing this application at least ten
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`days before that date. See Sup. Ct. R. 13.5. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under
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`28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
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`1.
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`This case presents a recurring and important question on which the
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`1
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`courts of appeals are divided: whether an entity that deploys anonymous computer
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`“bots” that circumvent technical barriers and mass-harvests individuals’ personal
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`data from computer servers—even after the entity’s permission to access those servers
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`has been expressly denied by the website owner— “intentionally accesses a computer
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`without authorization” under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C.
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`1030(a)(2).
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`2.
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`Applicant is LinkedIn Corporation, an online professional social
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`networking site. Respondent hiQ Labs Inc. is a company whose business model is to
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`scrape and harvest LinkedIn member data and repackage and sell it to employers to,
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`e.g., alert them regarding which particular employees are likely looking for a new job.
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`hiQ circumvented various technical measures that LinkedIn had put in place to
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`prevent bots from scraping data. After LinkedIn sent hiQ a cease-and-desist letter
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`communicating to hiQ that its bots did not have permission to access and scrape
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`LinkedIn’s servers, hiQ sued LinkedIn in a declaratory judgment action asserting
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`various state law claims. The district court granted a preliminary injunction to hiQ,
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`holding that hiQ had presented “serious questions” regarding one of its state law
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`claims, and rejecting as a matter of law LinkedIn’s argument that the CFAA
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`preempted hiQ’s affirmative state law claims.
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`3.
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`The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It noted that the key question under the
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`CFAA was whether hiQ had accessed LinkedIn’s servers “without authorization”
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`when it scraped data after evading technical measures and after LinkedIn sent its
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`cease-and-desist letter. The Ninth Circuit held that although LinkedIn had
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`“ban[ned]” HiQ from its servers, a ban was distinct from refusing authorization, and
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`2
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`that accessing publicly-available sections of a website could never be “without
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`authorization” under the CFAA. Ex. 1, at 26. The Ninth Circuit further held that any
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`privacy interests that LinkedIn members held in their personal data was outweighed
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`by hiQ’s interests in maintaining its business model. Id. at 16.
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`4.
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`The issue presented here is the subject of disagreement among the
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`circuits. The Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts directly with a decision of the First
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`Circuit, which held that where a publicly-accessible website bans data scrapers,
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`further access by those scrapers is without authorization. See EF Cultural Travel BV v.
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`Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 60-63 (1st Cir. 2003). Moreover, every district court to have
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`considered the question has agreed with the First Circuit that a publicly available
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`website can be accessed “without authorization” under the CFAA.
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`5.
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`Good cause exists for this application. During the interval allotted for
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`preparing a petition for a writ of certiorari in this matter, undersigned counsel has
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`been required to devote time to numerous matters, including United States v.
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`Blaszczack (2d Cir. Nos. 18-2811, 18-2825, 18-2867, 18-2878) (petition for panel
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`rehearing or rehearing en banc due on February 3, 2020); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. et
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`al. v. Estate of Phyllis M. Malkin (11th Cir. No. 19-14689) (opening brief due February
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`5, 2020); United States House of Representatives v. Texas (S. Ct. No. 19-841) (reply in
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`support of certiorari due shortly after brief in opposition, which is due on February 3,
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`2020); Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, (3d Cir. Nos. 18-2797,
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`18-3124, 18-2889) (petition for certiorari due February 19, 2020). The requested
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`extension of time will allow counsel the additional time that is necessary to prepare a
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`well-researched and comprehensive petition. The requested extension will also allow
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`3
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`additional time for consultation with potential amici.
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`For the foregoing reasons, Applicant requests that an extension of time to and
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`including March 9, 2020 be granted, within which time Applicant may file a petition
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`for a writ of certiorari.
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`January 22, 2020
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`Respectfully submitted,
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` /s/ Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.
`Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.
`Counsel of Record
`Jonathan Meltzer
`Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
`1155 F Street, NW
`Seventh Floor
`Washington, DC 20004
`(202) 220-1100
`Donald.Verrilli@mto.com
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`Jonathan H. Blavin
`Rosemary T. Ring
`Nicholas D. Fram
`Marianna Y. Mao
`Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
`560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94105
`(415) 512-4000
`Counsel for Applicants
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`4
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