`(Slip Opinion)
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`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2020
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`
`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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`
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
` Syllabus
`
`
`
` TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
` No. 20–297. Argued March 30, 2021—Decided June 25, 2021
`
`The Fair Credit Reporting Act regulates the consumer reporting agencies
`that compile and disseminate personal information about consumers.
`15 U. S. C. §1681 et seq. The Act also creates a cause of action for con-
`
`sumers to sue and recover damages for certain violations. §1681n(a).
`
`TransUnion is a credit reporting agency that compiles personal and
`
`financial information about individual consumers to create consumer
`
`
`reports and then sells those reports for use by entities that request
`information about the creditworthiness of individual consumers. Be-
`ginning in 2002, TransUnion introduced an add-on product called
`
`OFAC Name Screen Alert. When a business opted into the Name
`Screen service, TransUnion would conduct its ordinary credit check of
`
`the consumer, and it would also use third-party software to compare
`the consumer’s name against a list maintained by the U. S. Treasury
`
`Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of terrorists,
`drug traffickers, and other serious criminals. If the consumer’s first
`
`and last name matched the first and last name of an individual on
`
`
`OFAC’s list, then TransUnion would place an alert on the credit report
`indicating that the consumer’s name was a “potential match” to a name
`
`on the OFAC list. At that time, TransUnion did not compare any data
`
`other than first and last names.
`
`
`
`A class of 8,185 individuals with OFAC alerts in their credit files
`
`sued TransUnion under the Fair Credit Reporting Act for failing to use
`reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of their credit files. The
`
`plaintiffs also complained about formatting defects in certain mailings
`
`sent to them by TransUnion. The parties stipulated prior to trial that
`
`only 1,853 class members (including the named plaintiff Sergio
`Ramirez) had their misleading credit reports containing OFAC alerts
`
`provided to third parties during the 7-month period specified in the
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`

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`2
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`TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ
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`
`Syllabus
`class definition. The internal credit files of the other 6,332 class mem-
`
`bers were not provided to third parties during the relevant time period.
`The District Court ruled that all class members had Article III stand-
`
`
`ing on each of the three statutory claims. The jury returned a verdict
`
`
`for the plaintiffs and awarded each class member statutory damages
`and punitive damages. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed
`
`in relevant part.
`Held: Only plaintiffs concretely harmed by a defendant’s statutory viola-
`tion have Article III standing to seek damages against that private de-
`fendant in federal court. Pp. 6–27.
`
`
`
`(a) Article III confines the federal judicial power to the resolution of
`“Cases” and “Controversies” in which a plaintiff has a “personal stake.”
`
`
`Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 819–820. To have Article III standing
`to sue in federal court, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that
`the plaintiff suffered concrete injury in fact. Lujan v. Defenders of
`
`
`
`Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561. Central to assessing concreteness is
`whether the asserted harm has a “close relationship” to a harm “tradi-
`
`tionally” recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American
`
`courts. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 340. That inquiry asks
`whether plaintiffs have identified a close historical or common-law an-
`alogue for their asserted injury. Physical or monetary harms readily
`qualify as concrete injuries under Article III, and various intangible
`harms—like reputational harms—can also be concrete. Ibid.
`
`
`“Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context
`of a statutory violation.” Ibid. The Court has rejected the proposition
`
`that “a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement
`whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to
`
`
`authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.” Id., at 341. An
`
`injury in law is not an injury in fact. Pp. 6–14.
`
`(b) The Court applies the fundamental standing requirement of con-
`
`crete harm to this case. Pp. 15–27.
`
`
`(1) In their reasonable-procedures claim, all 8,185 class members
`maintain that TransUnion did not do enough to ensure that mislead-
`ing OFAC alerts labeling them as potential terrorists were not in-
`cluded in their credit files. See §1681e(b). TransUnion provided third
`
`parties with credit reports containing OFAC alerts for 1,853 class
`
`members (including the named plaintiff Ramirez). Those 1,853 class
`
`
`members therefore suffered a harm with a “close relationship” to the
`harm associated with the tort of defamation. Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 341.
`Under longstanding American law, a person is injured when a defam-
`atory statement “that would subject him to hatred, contempt, or ridi-
`
`cule” is published to a third party. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,
`
`
`497 U. S. 1, 13. The Court has no trouble concluding that the 1,853
`class members suffered a concrete harm that qualifies as an injury in
`
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`

`

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`Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
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`Syllabus
`
`3
`
`
`fact.
`
`The credit files of the remaining 6,332 class members also contained
`misleading OFAC alerts, but the parties stipulated that TransUnion
`
`did not provide those plaintiffs’ credit information to any potential
`
`creditors during the designated class period. The mere existence of
`inaccurate information, absent dissemination, traditionally has not
`provided the basis for a lawsuit in American courts. The plaintiffs can-
`
`
`not demonstrate that the misleading information in the internal credit
`files itself constitutes a concrete harm.
`
`
`The plaintiffs advance a separate argument based on their exposure
`to the risk that the misleading information would be disseminated in
`
`the future to third parties. The Court has recognized that material
`
`risk of future harm can satisfy the concrete-harm requirement in the
`
`context of a claim for injunctive relief to prevent the harm from occur-
`ring, at least so long as the risk of harm is sufficiently imminent and
`
`
`substantial. See Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 341–342 (citing Clapper v. Am-
`nesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398). But TransUnion advances a persua-
`
`
`
`
`sive argument that the mere risk of future harm, without more, cannot
`
`qualify as a concrete harm in a suit for damages. The 6,332 plaintiffs
`
`did not demonstrate that the risk of future harm materialized. Nor
`did those plaintiffs present evidence that the class members were in-
`dependently harmed by their exposure to the risk itself. The risk of
`
`future harm cannot supply the basis for their standing. Pp. 16–24.
`
`
`
`(2) In two other claims, all 8,185 class members complained about
`formatting defects in certain mailings sent to them by TransUnion.
`But the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the format of TransUn-
`ion’s mailings caused them a harm with a close relationship to a harm
`traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American
`
`courts. See Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 341.
`
`
`The plaintiffs argue that TransUnion’s formatting violations created
`
`a risk of future harm, because consumers who received the information
`in the dual-mailing format were at risk of not learning about the OFAC
`alert in their credit files and thus not asking for corrections. The risk
`
`of future harm on its own is not enough to support Article III standing
`for their damages claim. In any event, the plaintiffs here made no
`
`effort to explain how the formatting error prevented them asking for
`
`corrections to prevent future harm.
`
`The United States as amicus curiae asserts that the plaintiffs suf-
`
`fered a concrete “informational injury” from TransUnion’s formatting
`
`violations. See Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U. S. 11; Public
`
`
`
`Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U. S. 440. But the plaintiffs here
`did not allege that they failed to receive any required information.
`They argued only that they received the information in the wrong for-
`
`
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`

`

`4
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` TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ
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`Syllabus
`mat. Moreover, an asserted informational injury that causes no ad-
`verse effects does not satisfy Article III. Pp. 24–27.
`
` 951 F. 3d 1008, reversed and remanded.
`KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
`C. J., and ALITO, GORSUCH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a
`
`dissenting opinion, in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.,
`joined. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER and SO-
`TOMAYOR, JJ., joined.
`
`
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`

`

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` Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
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` corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 20–297
`_________________
`TRANSUNION LLC, PETITIONER v. SERGIO L.
`
`RAMIREZ
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`[June 25, 2021]
`JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.
`
`To have Article III standing to sue in federal court, plain-
`tiffs must demonstrate, among other things, that they suf-
`fered a concrete harm. No concrete harm, no standing.
`Central to assessing concreteness is whether the asserted
`harm has a “close relationship” to a harm traditionally rec-
`ognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American
`courts—such as physical harm, monetary harm, or various
`intangible harms including (as relevant here) reputational
`
`harm. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 340–341
`(2016).
`
`In this case, a class of 8,185 individuals sued TransUn-
`
`
`ion, a credit reporting agency, in federal court under the
`Fair Credit Reporting Act. The plaintiffs claimed that
`
`TransUnion failed to use reasonable procedures to ensure
`
`the accuracy of their credit files, as maintained internally
`by TransUnion. For 1,853 of the class members, TransUn-
`ion provided misleading credit reports to third-party busi-
`
`nesses. We conclude that those 1,853 class members have
`demonstrated concrete reputational harm and thus have
`Article III standing to sue on the reasonable-procedures
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`
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`

`

`2
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` TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ
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`Opinion of the Court
` claim. The internal credit files of the other 6,332 class
`
`members were not provided to third-party businesses dur-
`ing the relevant time period. We conclude that those 6,332
`
`class members have not demonstrated concrete harm and
`
`thus lack Article III standing to sue on the reasonable-pro-
`cedures claim.
`In two other claims, all 8,185 class members complained
`
`about formatting defects in certain mailings sent to them
`by TransUnion. But the class members other than the
`named plaintiff Sergio Ramirez have not demonstrated that
`
`the alleged formatting errors caused them any concrete
`
`harm. Therefore, except for Ramirez, the class members do
`
`not have standing as to those two claims.
`Over Judge McKeown’s dissent, the U. S. Court of Ap-
`
`peals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that all 8,185 class mem-
`bers have standing as to all three claims. The Court of Ap-
`
`peals approved a class damages award of about $40 million.
`In light of our conclusion that (i) only 1,853 class members
`have standing for the reasonable-procedures claim and
`(ii) only Ramirez himself has standing for the two format-
`ting claims relating to the mailings, we reverse the judg-
`
`ment of the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for further
`
`proceedings consistent with this opinion.
`I
`
`In 1970, Congress passed and President Nixon signed the
`Fair Credit Reporting Act. 84 Stat. 1127, as amended, 15
`
`U. S. C. §1681 et seq. The Act seeks to promote “fair and
`
`accurate credit reporting” and to protect consumer privacy.
`§1681(a). To achieve those goals, the Act regulates the con-
`sumer reporting agencies that compile and disseminate
`personal information about consumers.
`
`The Act “imposes a host of requirements concerning the
`creation and use of consumer reports.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Rob-
`ins, 578 U. S. 330, 335 (2016). Three of the Act’s require-
`
`

`

`3
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` Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`ments are relevant to this case. First, the Act requires con-
`sumer reporting agencies to “follow reasonable procedures
`
`to assure maximum possible accuracy” in consumer reports.
`§1681e(b). Second, the Act provides that consumer report-
`ing agencies must, upon request, disclose to the consumer
`
`“[a]ll information in the consumer’s file at the time of the
`request.” §1681g(a)(1). Third, the Act compels consumer
`reporting agencies to “provide to a consumer, with each
`written disclosure by the agency to the consumer,” a “sum-
`mary of rights” prepared by the Consumer Financial Pro-
`
`tection Bureau. §1681g(c)(2).
`
`The Act creates a cause of action for consumers to sue and
`
`recover damages for certain violations. The Act provides:
`“Any person who willfully fails to comply with any require-
`ment imposed under this subchapter with respect to any
`consumer is liable to that consumer” for actual damages or
`for statutory damages not less than $100 and not more than
`
`
`$1,000, as well as for punitive damages and attorney’s fees.
`
`§1681n(a).
`
`TransUnion is one of the “Big Three” credit reporting
`agencies, along with Equifax and Experian. As a credit re-
`porting agency, TransUnion compiles personal and finan-
`cial information about individual consumers to create con-
`
`sumer reports. TransUnion then sells those consumer
`reports for use by entities such as banks, landlords, and car
`dealerships that request information about the creditwor-
`
`thiness of individual consumers.
`
`Beginning in 2002, TransUnion introduced an add-on
`product called OFAC Name Screen Alert. OFAC is the U. S.
`
`Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.
`OFAC maintains a list of “specially designated nationals”
`
`who threaten America’s national security. Individuals on
`the OFAC list are terrorists, drug traffickers, or other seri-
`
`ous criminals. It is generally unlawful to transact business
`
`with any person on the list. 31 CFR pt. 501, App. A (2020).
`
`TransUnion created the OFAC Name Screen Alert to help
`
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`

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`4
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` TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ
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`Opinion of the Court
`businesses avoid transacting with individuals on OFAC’s
`list.
`When this litigation arose, Name Screen worked in the
`
`
`following way: When a business opted into the Name Screen
`
`service, TransUnion would conduct its ordinary credit
`check of the consumer, and it would also use third-party
`software to compare the consumer’s name against the
`OFAC list. If the consumer’s first and last name matched
`the first and last name of an individual on OFAC’s list, then
`TransUnion would place an alert on the credit report indi-
`cating that the consumer’s name was a “potential match” to
`a name on the OFAC list. TransUnion did not compare any
`data other than first and last names. Unsurprisingly,
`TransUnion’s Name Screen product generated many false
`
`positives. Thousands of law-abiding Americans happen to
`share a first and last name with one of the terrorists, drug
`
`traffickers, or serious criminals on OFAC’s list of specially
`designated nationals.
`
`Sergio Ramirez learned the hard way that he is one such
`
`individual. On February 27, 2011, Ramirez visited a Nis-
`san dealership in Dublin, California, seeking to buy a Nis-
`san Maxima. Ramirez was accompanied by his wife and his
`father-in-law. After Ramirez and his wife selected a color
`
`and negotiated a price, the dealership ran a credit check on
`
`both Ramirez and his wife. Ramirez’s credit report, pro-
`duced by TransUnion, contained the following alert:
`“***OFAC ADVISOR ALERT - INPUT NAME MATCHES
`NAME ON THE OFAC DATABASE.” App. 84. A Nissan
`salesman told Ramirez that Nissan would not sell the car
`to him because his name was on a “‘terrorist list.’” Id., at
`333. Ramirez’s wife had to purchase the car in her own
`name.
`
`The next day, Ramirez called TransUnion and requested
`
`a copy of his credit file. TransUnion sent Ramirez a mailing
`that same day that included his credit file and the statuto-
`rily required summary of rights prepared by the CFPB. The
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`5
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` Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
` mailing did not mention the OFAC alert in Ramirez’s file.
`
`The following day, TransUnion sent Ramirez a second
`mailing—a letter alerting him that his name was consid-
`ered a potential match to names on the OFAC list. The sec-
`ond mailing did not include an additional copy of the sum-
`mary of rights. Concerned about the mailings, Ramirez
`consulted a lawyer and ultimately canceled a planned trip
`to Mexico. TransUnion eventually removed the OFAC alert
`from Ramirez’s file.
`
`In February 2012, Ramirez sued TransUnion and alleged
`
`three violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. First, he
`
`alleged that TransUnion, by using the Name Screen prod-
`uct, failed to follow reasonable procedures to ensure the ac-
`curacy of information in his credit file. See §1681e(b). Sec-
`ond, he claimed that TransUnion failed to provide him with
`
`all the information in his credit file upon his request. In
`particular, TransUnion’s first mailing did not include the
`
`fact that Ramirez’s name was a potential match for a name
`on the OFAC list. See §1681g(a)(1). Third, Ramirez as-
`serted that TransUnion violated its obligation to provide
`him with a summary of his rights “with each written disclo-
`sure,” because TransUnion’s second mailing did not contain
`a summary of Ramirez’s rights. §1681g(c)(2). Ramirez re-
`quested statutory and punitive damages.
`
`
`Ramirez also sought to certify a class of all people in the
`United States to whom TransUnion sent a mailing during
`the period from January 1, 2011, to July 26, 2011, that was
`
` similar in form to the second mailing that Ramirez re-
`ceived. TransUnion opposed certification. The U. S. Dis-
`trict Court for the Northern District of California rejected
`
`TransUnion’s argument and certified the class. 301
`
`F. R. D. 408 (2014).
`Before trial, the parties stipulated that the class con-
`
`tained 8,185 members, including Ramirez. The parties also
`stipulated that only 1,853 members of the class (including
`Ramirez) had their credit reports disseminated by
`
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`

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`6
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` TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ
`
`Opinion of the Court
`TransUnion to potential creditors during the period from
`
`
` January 1, 2011, to July 26, 2011. The District Court ruled
`that all 8,185 class members had Article III standing. 2016
`WL 6070490, *5 (Oct. 17, 2016).
`At trial, Ramirez testified about his experience at the
`
`Nissan dealership. But Ramirez did not present evidence
`about the experiences of other members of the class.
`
`After six days of trial, the jury returned a verdict for the
`
`plaintiffs. The jury awarded each class member $984.22 in
`
`statutory damages and $6,353.08 in punitive damages for a
`total award of more than $60 million. The District Court
`rejected all of TransUnion’s post-trial motions.
`The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
`
`
`in relevant part. 951 F. 3d 1008 (2020). The court held that
`
`
`all members of the class had Article III standing to recover
`
`damages for all three claims. The court also concluded that
`
`Ramirez’s claims were typical of the class’s claims for pur-
`
` poses of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
`
`Finally, the court reduced the punitive damages award to
`$3,936.88 per class member, thus reducing the total award
`
`to about $40 million.
`Judge McKeown dissented in relevant part. As to the
`
`
`reasonable-procedures claim, she concluded that only the
`1,853 class members whose reports were actually dissemi-
`nated by TransUnion to third parties had Article III stand-
`
`ing to recover damages. In her view, the remaining 6,332
`
`class members did not suffer a concrete injury sufficient for
`standing. As to the two claims related to the mailings,
`Judge McKeown would have held that none of the 8,185
`class members other than the named plaintiff Ramirez had
`standing as to those claims.
`
`
`We granted certiorari. 592 U. S. ___ (2020).
`
`II
`
`The question in this case is whether the 8,185 class mem-
`bers have Article III standing as to their three claims. In Part
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`

`

`7
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` Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
` II, we summarize the requirements of Article III standing—
`
`in particular, the requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate a
`“concrete harm.” In Part III, we then apply the concrete-harm
`
`
`requirement to the plaintiffs’ lawsuit against TransUnion.
`
`A
`The “law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic
`
`idea—the idea of separation of powers.” Raines v. Byrd, 521
`U. S. 811, 820 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`Separation of powers “was not simply an abstract generali-
`zation in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the
`document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer
`of 1787.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 946 (1983) (inter-
`
`nal quotation marks omitted).
`Therefore, we start with the text of the Constitution. Ar-
`
`ticle III confines the federal judicial power to the resolution
`of “Cases” and “Controversies.” For there to be a case or
`
`controversy under Article III, the plaintiff must have a
`“‘personal stake’” in the case—in other words, standing.
`
`Raines, 521 U. S., at 819. To demonstrate their personal
`stake, plaintiffs must be able to sufficiently answer the
`question: “‘What’s it to you?’” Scalia, The Doctrine of
`Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Pow-
`ers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 882 (1983).
`To answer that question in a way sufficient to establish
`
`
`standing, a plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered an injury
`in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or immi-
`
`nent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant;
`
`and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial
`relief. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–
`561 (1992). If “the plaintiff does not claim to have suffered
`an injury that the defendant caused and the court can rem-
`
`edy, there is no case or controversy for the federal court to
`
`resolve.” Casillas v. Madison Avenue Assocs., Inc., 926
`F. 3d 329, 333 (CA7 2019) (Barrett, J.).
`
`

`

`8
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` TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate a concrete and par-
`
`ticularized injury caused by the defendant and redressable
`by the court ensures that federal courts decide only “the
`rights of individuals,” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137,
`
`170 (1803), and that federal courts exercise “their proper
`function in a limited and separated government,” Roberts,
`Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 Duke L. J.
`1219, 1224 (1993). Under Article III, federal courts do not
`adjudicate hypothetical or abstract disputes. Federal
`
`courts do not possess a roving commission to publicly opine
`
`on every legal question. Federal courts do not exercise gen-
`eral legal oversight of the Legislative and Executive
`
`Branches, or of private entities. And federal courts do not
`issue advisory opinions. As Madison explained in Philadel-
`phia, federal courts instead decide only matters “of a Judi-
`ciary Nature.” 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,
`p. 430 (M. Farrand ed. 1966).
`In sum, under Article III, a federal court may resolve only
`
`“a real controversy with real impact on real persons.”
`
`American Legion v. American Humanist Assn., 588 U. S.
`
`___, ___ (2019) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment) (slip
`op., at 10).
`
`B
`The question in this case focuses on the Article III re-
`
`quirement that the plaintiff ’s injury in fact be “concrete”—
`
`
`that is, “real, and not abstract.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578
`U. S. 330, 340 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted);
`see Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 158
`
`(2014); Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U. S. 488,
`493 (2009); Lujan, 504 U. S., at 560; Schlesinger v. Reserv-
`ists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 220–221 (1974).
`
`What makes a harm concrete for purposes of Article III?
`
`As a general matter, the Court has explained that “history
`
`and tradition offer a meaningful guide to the types of cases
`
`that Article III empowers federal courts to consider.”
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` Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc., 554
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` U. S. 269, 274 (2008); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better
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`Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 102 (1998). And with respect to
`the concrete-harm requirement in particular, this Court’s
`opinion in Spokeo v. Robins indicated that courts should as-
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`sess whether the alleged injury to the plaintiff has a “close
`relationship” to a harm “traditionally” recognized as provid-
`ing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts. 578 U. S., at
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`341. That inquiry asks whether plaintiffs have identified a
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`close historical or common-law analogue for their asserted
`injury. Spokeo does not require an exact duplicate in Amer-
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`ican history and tradition. But Spokeo is not an open-ended
`invitation for federal courts to loosen Article III based on
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`contemporary, evolving beliefs about what kinds of suits
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`should be heard in federal courts.
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` As Spokeo explained, certain harms readily qualify as
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`concrete injuries under Article III. The most obvious are
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`traditional tangible harms, such as physical harms and
`monetary harms. If a defendant has caused physical or
`monetary injury to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has suffered a
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` concrete injury in fact under Article III.
`Various intangible harms can also be concrete. Chief
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`among them are injuries with a close relationship to harms
`traditionally recognized as providing a basis for lawsuits in
`American courts. Id., at 340–341. Those include, for exam-
`ple, reputational harms, disclosure of private information,
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`and intrusion upon seclusion. See, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481
`U. S. 465, 473 (1987) (reputational harms); Davis v. Federal
`Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. 724, 733 (2008) (disclosure of
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`private information); see also Gadelhak v. AT&T Services,
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`Inc., 950 F. 3d 458, 462 (CA7 2020) (Barrett, J.) (intrusion
`upon seclusion). And those traditional harms may also in-
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`clude harms specified by the Constitution itself. See, e.g.,
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`Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 340 (citing Pleasant Grove City v.
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`Summum, 555 U. S. 460 (2009) (abridgment of free speech),
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`and Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508
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`U. S. 520 (1993) (infringement of free exercise)).
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`In determining whether a harm is sufficiently concrete to
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`qualify as an injury in fact, the Court in Spokeo said that
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`Congress’s views may be “instructive.” 578 U. S., at 341.
`Courts must afford due respect to Congress’s decision to im-
`pose a statutory prohibition or obligation on a defendant,
`and to grant a plaintiff a cause of action to sue over the de-
`fendant’s violation of that statutory prohibition or obliga-
`tion. See id., at 340–341. In that way, Congress may “ele-
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`vate to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete,
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`de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.”
`Id., at 341 (alterations and internal quotation marks omit-
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`ted); see Lujan, 504 U. S., at 562–563, 578; cf., e.g., Allen v.
`Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 757, n. 22 (1984) (discriminatory
`treatment). But even though “Congress may ‘elevate’
`harms that ‘exist’ in the real world before Congress recog-
`nized them to actionable legal status, it may not simply en-
`act an injury into existence, using its lawmaking power to
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`transform something that is not remotely harmful into
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`something that is.” Hagy v. Demers & Adams, 882 F. 3d
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`616, 622 (CA6 2018) (Sutton, J.) (citing Spokeo, 578 U. S.,
`at 341).
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`Importantly, this Court has rejected the proposition that
`“a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact re-
`quirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory
`right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindi-
`cate that right.” Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 341. As the Court
`emphasized in Spokeo, “Article III standing requires a con-
`crete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”
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`Ibid.
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`Congress’s creation of a statutory prohibition or obliga-
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`tion and a cause of action does not relieve courts of their
`responsibility to independently decide whether a plaintiff
`has suffered a concrete harm under Article III any more
`than, for example, Congress’s enactment of a law regulating
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`speech relieves courts of their responsibility to inde-
`pendently decide whether the law violates the First Amend-
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`ment. Cf. United States v. Eichman, 496 U. S. 310, 317–
`318 (1990). As Judge Katsas has rightly stated, “we cannot
`treat an injury as ‘concrete’ for Article III purposes based
`only on Congress’s say-so.” Trichell v. Midland Credit
`Mgmt., Inc., 964 F. 3d 990, 999, n. 2 (CA11 2020) (sitting by
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`designation); see Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 178; see also
`Raines, 521 U. S., at 820, n. 3; Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
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`Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41, n. 22 (1976); Muskrat
`v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 361–362 (1911).
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`For standing purposes, therefore, an important difference
`exists between (i) a plaintiff ’s statutory cause of action to
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`sue a defendant over the defendant’s violation of federal
`law, and (ii) a plaintiff ’s suffering concrete harm because of
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`the defendant’s violation of federal law. Congress may en-
`act legal prohibitions and obligations. And Congress may
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`create causes of action for plaintiffs to sue defendants who
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`violate those legal prohibitions or obligations. But under
`Article III, an injury in law is not an injury in fact. Only
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`those plaintiffs who have been concretely harmed by a de-
`fendant’s statutory violation may sue that private defend-
`ant over that violation in federal court. As then-Judge Bar-
`rett succinctly summarized, “Article III grants federal
`courts the power to redress harms that defendants cause
`plaintiffs, not a freewheeling power to hold defendants ac-
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`countable for legal infractions.” Casillas, 926 F. 3d, at 332.
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`To appreciate how the Article III “concrete harm” princi-
`ple operates in practice, consider two different hypothetical
`plaintiffs. Suppose first that a Maine citizen’s land is pol-
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`luted by a nearby factory. She sues the company, alleging
`that it violated a federal environmental law and damaged
`her property. Suppose also that a second plaintiff in Hawaii
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`files a federal lawsuit alleging that the same company in
`Maine violated that same environmental law by polluting
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`land in Maine. The violation did not personally harm the
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`plaintiff in Hawaii.
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`Even if Congress affords both hypothetical plaintiffs a
`cause of action (with statutory damages available) to sue
`over the defendant’s legal violation, Article III standing
`doctrine sharply distinguishes between those two scenar-
`ios. The first lawsuit may of course proceed in federal court
`because the plaintiff has suffered concrete harm to her
`property. But the second lawsuit may not proceed because
`that plaintiff has not suffered any physical, monetary, or
`cognizable intangible harm traditionally recognized as
`providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts. An un-
`injured plaintiff who sues in those circum