`
`
`
`No. 20-440
`IN THE
`Supreme Court of the United States
`___________
`MINERVA SURGICAL, INC.,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`HOLOGIC, INC., CYTYC SURGICAL PRODUCTS, LLC,
`Respondents.
`
`___________
`On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
`Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
`___________
`REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
`___________
`
`ROBERT N. HOCHMAN*
`VERA M. ELSON
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH CAROLINE A. WONG
` & ROSATI, P.C.
`SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
`650 Page Mill Road
`One South Dearborn
`Palo Alto, CA 94304
`Chicago, IL 60603
`(312) 853-7000
`(650) 493-9300
`
`rhochman@sidley.com
`EDWARD G. POPLAWSKI
`
`JILLIAN SHERIDAN
`OLIVIA M. KIM
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH STONECIPHER
`SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
` & ROSATI, P.C.
`1501 K Street, N.W.
`633 West Fifth Street
`Washington, D.C. 20005
`Suite 1550
`(202) 736-8000
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`
`(323) 210-2900
`Counsel for Petitioner
` * Counsel of Record
`
`April 7, 2021
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`2
`
`2
`
`Page
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................
`ii
`INTRODUCTION .................................................
`1
`ARGUMENT .........................................................
`2
`I. ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL SHOULD BE
`ELIMINATED ...............................................
`A. Assignor Estoppel Contradicts The
`Patent Act’s Text ......................................
`B. Neither Stare Decisis Nor Any
`Presumption That Congress Silently
`Adopted Assignor Estoppel Supports The
`Doctrine ....................................................
`1. Assignor Estoppel Was Not Settled By
`Formica Or A Consensus In 1952 ......
`2. Congress Did Not Incorporate Assignor
`Estoppel Into The Patent Act ..............
`3. Stare Decisis Does Not Support
`Assignor Estoppel ............................... 11
`C. Assignor Estoppel Is Contrary To Patent
`Policy ........................................................ 15
`II. IF ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL SURVIVES, IT
`SHOULD BE CONSTRAINED..................... 19
`CONCLUSION ..................................................... 23
`
`
`
`2
`
`3
`
`5
`
`(i)
`
`
`
`ii
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`6
`
`3
`
`Page
`CASES
`Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 908
`F.3d 792 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ........................... 16
`Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc.,
`135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015) ................................
`Automatic Paper Mach. Co. v. Marcalus Mfg.
`Co., 147 F.2d 608 (3d Cir.), aff’d sub nom.
`Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326
`U.S. 249 (1945) ........................................... 8, 10
`Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine
`Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950),
`overruled in part by Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,
`395 U.S. 653 (1969) .................................... 14
`Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804
`(2019) .......................................................... 12
`Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill.
`Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) ......................
`Brand Plastics Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 267 F.
`Supp. 1010 (C.D. Cal. 1967), rev’d in part
`on other grounds per curiam by Dow Chem.
`Co. v. Dart Indus., Inc., 475 F.2d 124 (9th
`Cir. 1973) ....................................................
`Brown v. Insurograph, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 828
`(D. Del. 1950) ..............................................
`Brown v. Lapham, 27 F. 77 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
`1886) ........................................................... 14
`Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264
`(1821) .......................................................... 11
`Diamond Sci. Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d
`1220 (Fed. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S.
`1265 (1988) (mem.) .....................................
`Douglass v. U.S. Appliance Corp., 177 F.2d
`98 (9th Cir. 1949) .......................................
`Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chi. Metallic Mfg.
`Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947) ....................... 4, 15, 21
`
`4
`
`5
`
`8
`
`4
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
`
`Page
`
`4
`
`Erickson v. Wiper, 157 N.W. 592 (N.D.
`1916) ........................................................... 10
`Eureka Co. v. Bailey Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
`488 (1871) ................................................... 14
`Funderburk v. Magnolia Sugar Co-op., Inc.,
`8 So. 2d 374 (La. Ct. App. 1942) ................ 10
`Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61
`6
`(1946) ..........................................................
`Haughey v. Lee, 151 U.S. 282 (1894) ............ 19
`Hiatt v. Twomey, 21 N.C. 315 (1836) ............
`9
`Hope Basket Co. v. Prod. Advancement
`Corp., 187 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1951) .........
`Hopkins v. Lee, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 109
`(1821) .......................................................... 10
`Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc.,
`137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017) ................................ 10
`Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun.
`Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448
`(2018) ........................................................ 13, 15
`Jeter v. Hewitt, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 352
`(1860) .......................................................... 10
`Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct.
`2401 (2015) ............................................ passim
`Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
`289 (1856) ................................................. 13, 14
`Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568
`U.S. 519 (2013) ........................................... 11
`Klein v. Peterson, 696 F. Supp. 695 (D.D.C.
`1988), aff’d, 866 F.2d 412 (Fed. Cir. 1989) .. 20
`Lawes v. Purser (1856) 119 Eng. Rep. 1110
`(KB) ............................................................. 13
`Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653
`(1969) ...................................................... passim
`Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 137 S. Ct.
`553 (2017) ...................................................
`
`6
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
`
`9
`
`4
`
`6
`
`Page
`Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (2020) ...............
`6
`Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) .........
`6
`Inc. v. B/E
`MAG Aerospace
`Indus.,
`Aerospace, Inc., 816 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir.
`2016) ...........................................................
`Nat’l Welding Equip. Co. v. Hammon
`Precision Equip. Co., 165 F. Supp. 788
`(N.D. Cal. 1958) ..........................................
`NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513
`(1984) ..........................................................
`Paramount Publix Corp. v. Am. Tri-Ergon
`Corp., 294 U.S. 464 (1935) ......................... 19
`Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349
`(2005) ..........................................................
`Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572
`U.S. 663 (2014) ...........................................
`Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224
`(1892) .......................................................... 12
`Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390
`(2020) ........................................................ 12, 15
`SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348
`(2018) ..........................................................
`SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First
`Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954
`(2017) .......................................................... 5, 18
`Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326
`U.S. 249 (1945) ........................................... 3, 13
`Shell Oil Co. v. Trailer & Truck Repair Co.,
`828 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1987) ....................... 10
`Sibbald v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
`488 (1838) ................................................... 10
`Sprigg v. Bank of Mount Pleasant, 35 U.S.
`(10 Pet.) 257 (1836) .................................... 10
`State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) ...... 15
`
`7
`
`7
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`
`v
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
`
`5
`
`Page
`Inc. v.
`Interface
`Tate Access Floors,
`Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357
`(Fed. Cir. 2002) .......................................... 13
`Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Techs., LP, 140 S.
`Ct. 1367 (2020) ........................................... 15
`Timken-Detroit Axle Co. v. Alma Motor Co.,
`163 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1947) .......................
`United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U.S.
`310 (1905) ................................................... 14
`Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica
`Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342 (1924) ...... 1, 11, 19
`Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519
`(1992) .......................................................... 21
`
`
`STATUTES
`18 U.S.C. § 1001 ............................................ 20
`35 U.S.C. § 115 ..............................................
`9
`
`
`§ 282(b) ..........................................
`2
`Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 .....
`2
`
`SCHOLARLY AUTHORITIES
`Adam Bain & Ugo Colella, Interpreting
`Federal Statutes of Limitations, 37
`Creighton L. Rev. 493 (2004) .....................
`William Green, Note, Stare Decisis, 14 Am.
`L. Rev. 609 (1880) ...................................... 10
`Robert Wyness Millar, The Historical
`Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res
`Judicata, 35 Ill. L. Rev. 41 (1940) ............. 10
`Note, The Doctrine of Estoppel in Patent
`Litigation, 55 Yale L.J. 842 (1946) ............ 8, 9
`
`7
`
`
`
`
`
`vi
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
`
`Page
`Recent Case, Consent Decree Adjudicating
`Validity of Patent Without Making
`Finding of Infringement Held Not Res
`Judicata, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1318 (1946) ....
`
`5
`
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`9
`28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 7 ......
`31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 10 .............. 10
`21 Corpus Juris § 25 (William Mack ed.,
`1920) ........................................................... 10
`9 W.S. Holdsworth, A History of English
`Law (1925) .................................................. 10
`2 William C. Robinson, The Law of Patents
`for Useful Inventions § 456 (1890) .............
`Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading
`Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
`(2012) ..........................................................
`
`9
`
`6
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`According to Hologic, this Court in 1924 settled
`whether assignor estoppel is part of the Patent Act in
`Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v.
`Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342 (1924), and
`Congress acquiesced when it did not expressly reject
`assignor estoppel in 1952. But Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395
`U.S. 653 (1969), has already determined that, by 1952,
`assignor estoppel “could no longer be considered the
`‘general rule.’” Id. at 664-66.
`Hologic’s argument thus rests on an unsound
`foundation. Congress cannot have silently adopted a
`doctrine that was, at best, in evident decline by 1952.
`Assignor estoppel has never been the kind of settled
`common-law doctrine that Congress can be thought to
`assume applies in patent cases. And stare decisis
`cannot be used to save a doctrine this Court has never
`applied but only limited, including in Formica.
`Assignor estoppel
`is an
`ill-conceived atextual
`doctrine developed by lower courts. It should, like
`licensee estoppel, be abandoned. Doing so would serve
`the paramount public interest in invalidating bad
`patents, without meaningful countervailing costs.
`There is no reason to believe that abandoning assignor
`estoppel would inhibit patent transactions. And other
`law remains in place to preserve the public interest in
`good faith that concerns the Government.
`If this Court retains the doctrine, it should set clear
`limits. (1) Not-yet-issued patent claims have no
`analogy in the rights protected by estoppel by deed and
`cannot form the basis of estoppel. (2) Section 112
`defenses should be allowed because the scope of what
`was invented must be determined to assess the scope
`of any estoppel. And (3) requiring reliance on a
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`representation of validity ensures that assignor
`estoppel is used only as a shield to prevent unfairness,
`not a sword to defeat legitimate competition.
`ARGUMENT
`I. ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL SHOULD BE
`ELIMINATED.
`A. Assignor Estoppel Contradicts The
`Patent Act’s Text.
`The Patent Act mandates that invalidity “shall be” a
`defense in “any action.” 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). Hologic and
`the Government simply ignore what this Court said
`just three years ago about remarkably similar
`language in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct.
`1348, 1354 (2018). They also ignore the cases rejecting
`atextual glosses on such clear language in the Patent
`Act. See Br. 19 (citing cases).
`Instead, Hologic argues that the text says nothing
`about whether particular defendants may assert
`invalidity. Resp. 23; U.S. Br. 22. But Hologic cannot
`square the requirement that invalidity be a defense in
`“any action” for infringement with its effort to deny
`Minerva an invalidity defense in this action for
`infringement. Indeed, the Patent Act used to provide
`that “the defendant may” raise invalidity. Act of July
`8, 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. 198, 208. Hologic agrees
`today’s language reflects no substantive change.
`B. Neither
`Stare Decisis Nor Any
`Presumption That Congress Silently
`Adopted Assignor Estoppel Supports The
`Doctrine.
`Hologic suggests two reasons to depart from the text:
`Congress
`supposedly
`silently
`ratified assignor
`estoppel in 1952 and stare decisis. The essential
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`premises of Hologic’s arguments are that Formica
`incorporated assignor estoppel into the Patent Act in
`1924, and that by 1952 the issue was settled. Neither
`holds.
`
`1. Assignor Estoppel Was Not Settled By
`Formica Or A Consensus In 1952.
`a. This Court has already made clear that Formica
`did not write assignor estoppel into the Patent Act. In
`Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Manufacturing Co., this
`Court wondered out loud the “extent” to which
`assignor estoppel “may be deemed to have survived the
`Formica decision or to be restricted by it.” 326 U.S.
`249, 254 (1945). In Lear, this Court said Formica had
`“stringently limited” and “undermin[ed]” assignor
`estoppel, and, when “carr[ied] … to its logical
`conclusion” meant that patent estoppel could not
`prevent a defense based on prior art that a patent
`“w[as] not novel at all.” 395 U.S. at 664-65. This Court
`has also characterized Formica as “remov[ing] …
`restrictions on those who would challenge the validity
`of patents.” Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill.
`Found., 402 U.S. 313, 344-45 (1971). There is no way
`to square Hologic’s view that Formica settled assignor
`estoppel into patent law with this Court’s own
`statements about the case.
`This Court has also made clear that by 1952 assignor
`estoppel was certainly not “about as firmly settled as
`interpretive propositions can get.” See Resp. 20. To the
`contrary, as of 1950, both licensee and assignor
`estoppel had been “so eroded that [they] could no
`longer be considered the ‘general rule.’” Lear, 395 U.S.
`at 664. It was “impossible” to limit Scott Paper so that
`assignors could not establish invalidity. Id. at 666. In
`1945, Justice Frankfurter observed that Scott Paper
`“repudiated” the doctrine. 326 U.S. at 261-64
`(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
`
`
`
`
`4
`Just a year after Scott Paper, this Court said that
`the ruling had authorized an assignor “to challenge the
`validity of the patent.” Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chi.
`Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 400 (1947). Hologic
`suggests that the quote
`is misleading because
`Katzinger notes how the assignor in Scott Paper was
`allowed to demonstrate invalidity. Resp. 24 n.2. But
`the fact that the assignor was allowed to demonstrate
`invalidity makes the ruling inconsistent with assignor
`estoppel. How is irrelevant.
`Ignoring all this, Hologic asserts that Scott Paper
`“reaffirmed” Formica’s supposed adoption of assignor
`estoppel. Resp. 5-6. But the passage Hologic cites
`(pages 251-52) merely describes the doctrine, as it had
`been applied by lower courts and described in Formica.
`There is no endorsement.
`b. This Court was not the only authority to notice
`that assignor estoppel was unsettled by 1952. The
`Ninth Circuit questioned the doctrine’s continued
`vitality after Scott Paper. Douglass v. U.S. Appliance
`Corp., 177 F.2d 98, 101 (9th Cir. 1949). The Sixth
`Circuit recognized that Scott Paper at least may have
`“modified” patent estoppel. Hope Basket Co. v. Prod.
`Advancement Corp., 187 F.2d 1008, 1012 (6th Cir.
`1951). Other courts ruling after 1952, but relying on
`the law as of 1952, refused to apply assignor estoppel.
`Nat’l Welding Equip. Co. v. Hammon Precision Equip.
`Co., 165 F. Supp. 788, 791-92 (N.D. Cal. 1958); Brand
`Plastics Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 267 F. Supp. 1010,
`1011-13 (C.D. Cal. 1967), rev’d in part on other
`grounds, 475 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1973).
`In 1946, the Government described Formica to this
`Court as offering only “implied approval” of assignor
`estoppel and “[q]uer[ied]” whether this approval was,
`“since the decision in Scott Paper … entitled to further
`weight.” U.S. Br., Katzinger, 329 U.S. 394 (Nos. 70 &
`
`
`
`
`5
`71), 1946 WL 62818 at 5 & n.2. Legal scholars also
`viewed assignor estoppel as being eroded away. Br. 30;
`Recent Case, Consent Decree Adjudicating Validity of
`Patent Without Making Finding of Infringement Held
`Not Res Judicata, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1318 (1946).
`As Congress was considering a reenactment of the
`Patent Act in 1952, no mention is made of assignor
`estoppel except to call attention to its uncertain status
`and advocate for its legislative adoption. Br. 30-31.
`The 88 lower court cases Hologic has compiled do not
`demonstrate a “universal” consensus as of 1952. Only
`two were decided after Scott Paper, which “are too few
`to establish a settled, national consensus.” SCA
`Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby
`Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 965 (2017). Worse still,
`neither case treats assignor estoppel as settled.
`In Timken-Detroit Axle Co. v. Alma Motor Co., 163
`F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1947), a licensee estoppel case, the
`court refused to consider whether estoppel applied
`because the issue had been waived. Id. at 191. Yet it
`indicated, with a “But cf.” citation of Scott Paper, that
`its application was questionable following that ruling.
`Id. at 191-92. Brown v. Insurograph, Inc., 90 F. Supp.
`828 (D. Del. 1950), similarly declined to decide
`whether assignor estoppel applied. Id. at 830-31.
`While the court thought “[i]t appear[ed] that” assignor
`estoppel was the general rule, the court could not
`“determine[]” its application. Id.
`Incorporate
`2. Congress Did Not
`Assignor Estoppel Into The Patent
`Act.
`To infer Congressional endorsement of assignor
`estoppel from Congressional inaction under the
`circumstances prevailing in 1952 would revolutionize
`presumptions regarding Congressional adoption of
`
`
`
`
`
`6
`judicial rulings. It would impose an impossible burden
`on Congress to police court decisions and seize for
`courts substantial policymaking authority even in the
`face of clear statutory language.
`a. The prior-construction canon has important limits
`that Hologic whistles past.
`First, the canon “has no application where, among
`other things, the [interpretation] was far from settled.”
`Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1947 (2020) (cleaned up).
`Even this Court’s grant of a writ of certiorari can
`defeat a uniform and “long-established practice” of
`federal courts. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr.,
`Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1386-87 (2015); id. at 1394-95
`(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Any uncertainty defeats
`the canon. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,
`Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 322-25
`(2012).
`It is neither appropriate nor possible for courts to
`infer Congressional endorsement of an interpretation
`while the interpretation remains “fluid,” not fixed.
`Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1946).
`If a statute with contested meanings is reenacted,
`“Congress cannot be presumed to have adopted one
`standard over the other.” NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,
`465 U.S. 513, 524-25 (1984); see Lightfoot v. Cendant
`Mortg. Corp., 137 S. Ct. 553, 563-64 (2017). Applying
`the canon in those circumstances would conceal a
`judicial policy judgment behind a mask of supposed
`Congressional acquiescence.
`Second, the prior-construction canon applies only to
`a “judicial interpretation of a statute.” Lorillard v.
`Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) (emphasis added).
`None of the cases in Hologic’s appendices rooted
`assignor estoppel in the Patent Act, and neither did
`Formica. Infra at 11.
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`b. Hologic separately relies on the canon that
`Congress “legislate[s] against a background of
`common-law adjudicatory principles.” Resp. 21.
`Assignor estoppel is not the kind of common-law
`principle that merits such treatment.
`As with the prior-construction canon, a common-law
`principle inconsistent with statutory text cannot be
`grafted onto a statute by judicial decree if it is not truly
`well-established. See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-
`Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 679-82 (2014); Pasquantino
`v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 359-368 (2005).
`Assignor estoppel was not well established in 1952.
`Indeed,
`the risk of undermining Congress’s
`policymaking authority is even greater with respect to
`this canon. Congress first enacted a version of section
`282(b)
`in the 1790s, which Hologic agrees
`is
`substantively the same as that which prevailed in
`1952 and now. Resp. 22. In the 1790s, assignor
`estoppel had just been created in England, and would
`not be recognized in the United States for more than
`80 years. So when Congress first adopted the relevant
`statutory language assignor estoppel was “so new to
`the common law landscape that Congress could not
`have intended its incorporation.” Adam Bain & Ugo
`Colella, Interpreting Federal Statutes of Limitations,
`37 Creighton L. Rev. 493, 503 (2004). Yet Hologic
`would have this Court read the re-adoption of
`essentially the same language more than 150 years
`later as incorporating a common-law rule that courts
`created (and questioned) in the interim.
`Hologic argues that “[r]eenacting language that was
`already on the books when courts were consistently
`applying assignor estoppel cannot possibly have been
`intended to abrogate the doctrine.” Resp. 22. But that
`is backward. Congress is not required to affirmatively
`abrogate common-law doctrines as they arise or gain
`
`
`
`
`8
`recognition in lower courts. Hologic’s approach would
`place an extraordinary burden on Congress to police
`courts’ common-law policymaking. “When a precedent
`is based on a judge-made rule and is not grounded in
`anything that Congress has enacted, we cannot
`‘properly place on the shoulders of Congress’ the entire
`burden of correcting ‘the Court’s own error.’” Kimble v.
`Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2418 (2015)
`(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting Girouard, 328
`U.S. at 69-70).
`That is especially true when the common-law rule
`has to be distorted to fit within the statutory scheme.
`Assignor estoppel is a judicial patent law innovation
`inspired by a common-law rule; it is not the application
`of a common-law rule in patent litigation.
`For example, an assignor challenging the validity of
`an assigned patent alleges the property belongs to the
`public. By contrast, a seller of land disputing validity
`of title is not seeking to commit the property to the
`public. When such a seller does seek to commit land to
`the public, estoppel by deed does not apply. Note, The
`Doctrine of Estoppel in Patent Litigation, 55 Yale L.J.
`842, 845-46 (1946); Automatic Paper Mach. Co. v.
`Marcalus Mfg. Co., 147 F.2d 608, 613-14 (3d Cir.), aff’d
`sub nom. Scott Paper, 326 U.S. 249.
`Further, no one contests that estoppel by deed
`generally applies only when a deed contains
`representations of fact or title quality. Br. 34 (citing
`sources); Diamond Sci. Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d
`1220, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see Resp. 33; U.S. Br. 14
`n. 2. Even Hologic’s suggestion that estoppel by deed
`applies to quitclaim deeds concedes the point. See
`Resp. 33. According to the authority Hologic cites, “a
`quitclaim deed may give rise to estoppel by deed when
`the deed contains language showing that the grantor
`intended to convey and the grantee expected to acquire
`
`
`
`
`9
`a particular estate.” 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and
`Waiver § 7 (emphasis added). So one must find
`something in a patent assignment that amounts to a
`warranty of validity.
`There is no obvious place to look. “[T]here is no
`warranty of validity implied in any assignment of a
`patent right according to established patent law.” The
`Doctrine of Estoppel in Patent Litigation, supra, at
`845-46 & n.27; Hiatt v. Twomey, 21 N.C. 315, 317-18
`(1836).
`Hologic asserts that “assignors must sincerely
`believe that the patent rights they are conveying are
`valuable and valid.” Resp. 33. But merely accepting
`value for a sale is no warranty; sellers of quitclaim
`deeds receive value. Hologic and the Government point
`to the oath that the inventor believes herself to be the
`original inventor. 35 U.S.C. § 115. But an assignor’s
`good faith belief in an invention’s originality at a
`particular moment is no warranty that the patent is
`valid. An inventor does not warrant that there is, for
`example, no invalidating prior art—the inventor is not
`required to know everything. 2 William C. Robinson,
`The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions § 456 (1890).
`Claims are routinely amended or abandoned during
`prosecution as the inventor’s understanding evolves,
`Resp. 41, without violating the oath. The inventor oath
`is thus a red herring, not least because assignor
`estoppel applies even when the assignor did not
`execute the oath. See MAG Aerospace Indus., Inc. v.
`B/E Aerospace, Inc., 816 F.3d 1374, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir.
`2016).
`Courts must do still more work to transform estoppel
`by deed into assignor estoppel. Hologic and the
`Government insist that estoppel by deed does not
`require reliance. Resp. 33-34; U.S. Br. 14 n.2. But that
`is not the uniform (or majority) view; courts and
`
`
`
`
`10
`such a
`recognized
`long
`commentators have
`requirement. See, e.g., 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver
`§ 10; 21 Corpus Juris § 25, at 1067-68 (William Mack
`ed., 1920); Shell Oil Co. v. Trailer & Truck Repair Co.,
`828 F.2d 205, 209 (3d Cir. 1987); Automatic Paper, 147
`F.2d at 613-14; Funderburk v. Magnolia Sugar Co-op.,
`Inc., 8 So. 2d 374, 377 (La. Ct. App. 1942); Erickson v.
`Wiper, 157 N.W. 592, 598-99 (N.D. 1916).
`Transforming estoppel by deed
`into assignor
`estoppel is thus nothing like applying common-law
`preclusion principles in patent litigation. See Resp. 23;
`U.S. Br. 22. Preclusion rules are extraordinarily
`established. Robert Wyness Millar, The Historical
`Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata, 35 Ill.
`L. Rev. 41, 44-45 (1940) (res judicata and collateral
`estoppel date to at
`least the 1100s); 9 W.S.
`Holdsworth, A History of English Law 161 (1925)
`(equitable estoppel dates to mid-1600s); William
`Green, Note, Stare Decisis, 14 Am. L. Rev. 609, 613 &
`n.3 (1880) (law of the case dates to 1200s). From its
`earliest decisions, this Court treated these principles
`as
`“deeply …
`implanted
`in
`[the
`country’s]
`jurisprudence,” Jeter v. Hewitt, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 352,
`363-64 (1860) [res judicata], as in “every system of
`jurisprudence,” Hopkins v. Lee, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 109,
`114 (1821) [collateral estoppel]. See also Sprigg v.
`Bank of Mount Pleasant, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 257, 365
`(1836) [equitable estoppel]; Sibbald v. United States,
`37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 488, 492 (1838) [law of the case]. This
`Court’s decision in Impression Products, Inc. v.
`Lexmark International, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1531-33
`(2017), stood by a similarly settled common-law rule
`opposed to restraints on alienation of chattel.
`Assignor estoppel—never applied by this Court—has
`nothing like the historical pedigree of these common-
`law rules which can be applied wholesale in patent
`
`
`
`
`
`11
`litigation. Abandoning assignor estoppel would not
`threaten them. Blonder-Tongue is safe.
`3. Stare Decisis Does Not Support
`Assignor Estoppel.
`Formica’s non-essential statements about assignor
`estoppel are not entitled to stare decisis effect. Even if
`they were, circumstances have changed in ways that
`warrant abandoning the doctrine.
`a. While this Court’s observations about assignor
`estoppel in Formica are entitled to respect, they
`remain non-essential to the outcome and are not
`binding. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,
`399-400 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.); Kirtsaeng v. John
`Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 548 (2013).
`Formica announced no “rule” adopting assignor
`estoppel. It summarized “[t]he rule supported by”
`lower court decisions, and did not reject it. 266 U.S. at
`349. Nor did Formica declare that Congress intended
`for assignor estoppel to be part of the Patent Act.
`Formica noted only that the provision of the Patent
`Act authorizing assignments did not “seem[]” to
`provide a reason that the common-law doctrine should
`not apply. Id. at 348-49. Notably, the Court did not
`consider the provision of the Patent Act that mandates
`invalidity be available as a defense in “any action” for
`patent infringement.
`Hologic emphasizes that Formica says that “[i]f [the
`inventor’s] two-step process was new, and the estoppel
`requires us to hold as against [the inventor] that it
`was ….” Id. at 354. But that passage is consistent with
`Formica’s prior statement that the Court was not then
`rejecting the lower court view. The passage was not
`essential because the asserted estoppel “d[id] not
`affect [the inventor].” Id. at 355. This Court often
`favors a narrow ruling sufficient to resolve a case, so
`
`
`
`
`12
`that it may consider the broader ruling later. See Azar
`v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1814 (2019).
`Formica’s holding was that assignor estoppel could
`not prevent use of prior art to narrow claims. To reject
`assignor estoppel now would not disturb that holding.
`It would disturb at most only Formica’s more favorable
`dicta regarding assignor estoppel. And this Court has
`already done that in Scott Paper and Lear.
`b. Even if what Formica said about assignor estoppel
`were entitled to stare decisis effect, this Court should
`overrule it. Each factor this Court traditionally
`considers—“the quality of the decision’s reasoning; its
`consistency with related decisions; legal developments
`since the decision; and reliance on the decision”—
`favors eliminating assignor estoppel. Ramos v.
`Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1405 (2020) (cleaned up);
`Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2410-11.
`First, to the extent Formica endorsed assignor
`estoppel, it was poorly reasoned. Formica did not
`consider the public interest in invalidating bad
`patents—the fundamental consideration underlying a
`long line of this Court’s precedents. Indeed, Formica
`failed to address Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully,
`144 U.S. 224 (1892), in which this Court had already
`refused to estop a licensee from challenging a patent
`considering the public interest “that competition
`should not be repressed by worthless patents.” Id. at
`233-36. These are precisely the oversights that
`prompted this Court to reverse Hazeltine in Lear. 395
`U.S. at 663-68, 671.
`In the same vein, Formica did not even try to root
`assignor estoppel in the Patent Act. Formica discussed
`the provision authorizing assignment of patents, but
`did not root assignor estoppel there. And this Court
`has already indicated the doctrine cannot be rooted
`
`
`
`
`
`13
`there. Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 257. Rather than
`consult the statute, Formica looked to estoppel by deed
`while ignoring that doctrine’s poor fit with patent
`assignments. See supra at 8-10.
`Second, “[d]evelopments since [Formica] … have
`also ‘eroded’ the decision’s ‘underpinnings’ and left it
`an outlier.” Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun.
`Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2482-83 (2018).
`The core reasoning of Scott Paper eliminated any
`justification for assignor estoppel and “repudiated” the
`doctrine. Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 264 (Frankfurter, J.,
`dissenting); Lear, 395 U.S. at 664-66.
`Further, the distinction Formica made between
`construing claims in light of prior art and using prior
`art to show invalidity no longer exists. As Minerva
`argued and Hologic does not dispute, Br. 21, courts no
`longer “adopt [a] narrow construction in order to
`preserve the validity” of a patent in light of “prior art.”
`Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res.,
`Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The
`Government agrees. U.S. Br. 17 n.3. Today, to achieve
`the same result the Court reached in Formica
`assignors must be
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