`(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2021
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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`NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION,
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` INC., ET AL. v. BRUEN, SUPERINTENDENT OF NEW
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` YORK STATE POLICE, ET AL.
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`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
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`THE SECOND CIRCUIT
` No. 20–843. Argued November 3, 2021—Decided June 23, 2022
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`The State of New York makes it a crime to possess a firearm without a
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`license, whether inside or outside the home. An individual who wants
`to carry a firearm outside his home may obtain an unrestricted license
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`to “have and carry” a concealed “pistol or revolver” if he can prove that
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`“proper cause exists” for doing so. N. Y. Penal Law Ann. §400.00(2)(f ).
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`An applicant satisfies the “proper cause” requirement only if he can
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`“demonstrate a special need for self-protection distinguishable from
`that of the general community.” E.g., In re Klenosky, 75 App. Div. 2d
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`793, 428 N. Y. S. 2d 256, 257.
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`Petitioners Brandon Koch and Robert Nash are adult, law-abiding
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`New York residents who both applied for unrestricted licenses to carry
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`a handgun in public based on their generalized interest in self-defense.
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`The State denied both of their applications for unrestricted licenses,
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`allegedly because Koch and Nash failed to satisfy the “proper cause”
`requirement. Petitioners then sued respondents—state officials who
`oversee the processing of licensing applications—for declaratory and
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`injunctive relief, alleging that respondents violated their Second and
`Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying their unrestricted-license
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`applications for failure to demonstrate a unique need for self-defense.
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`The District Court dismissed petitioners’ complaint and the Court of
`Appeals affirmed. Both courts relied on the Second Circuit’s prior de-
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`cision in Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F. 3d 81, which had
`sustained New York’s proper-cause standard, holding that the require-
`ment was “substantially related to the achievement of an important
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`governmental interest.” Id., at 96.
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`2 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
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`Syllabus
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`Held: New York’s proper-cause requirement violates the Fourteenth
`Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-de-
`fense needs from exercising their Second Amendment right to keep and
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`bear arms in public for self-defense. Pp. 8–63.
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`(a) In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, and McDonald v.
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`Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, the Court held that the Second and Fourteenth
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`Amendments protect an individual right to keep and bear arms for
`self-defense. Under Heller, when the Second Amendment’s plain text
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`covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively pro-
`tects that conduct, and to justify a firearm regulation the government
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`must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s
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`historical tradition of firearm regulation. Pp. 8–22.
`(1) Since Heller and McDonald, the Courts of Appeals have devel-
`oped a “two-step” framework for analyzing Second Amendment chal-
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`lenges that combines history with means-end scrutiny. The Court re-
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`jects that two-part approach as having one step too many. Step one is
`broadly consistent with Heller, which demands a test rooted in the Sec-
`ond Amendment’s text, as informed by history. But Heller and McDon-
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`ald do not support a second step that applies means-end scrutiny in
`the Second Amendment context. Heller’s methodology centered on
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`constitutional text and history. It did not invoke any means-end test
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`such as strict or intermediate scrutiny, and it expressly rejected any
`interest-balancing inquiry akin to intermediate scrutiny. Pp. 9–15.
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`(2) Historical analysis can sometimes be difficult and nuanced,
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`but reliance on history to inform the meaning of constitutional text is
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`more legitimate, and more administrable, than asking judges to “make
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`difficult empirical judgments” about “the costs and benefits of firearms
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`restrictions,” especially given their “lack [of] expertise” in the field.
`McDonald, 561 U. S., at 790–791 (plurality opinion). Federal courts
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`tasked with making difficult empirical judgments regarding firearm
`regulations under the banner of “intermediate scrutiny” often defer to
`the determinations of legislatures. While judicial deference to legisla-
`tive interest balancing is understandable—and, elsewhere, appropri-
`ate—it is not deference that the Constitution demands here. The Sec-
`ond Amendment “is the very product of an interest balancing by the
`people,” and it “surely elevates above all other interests the right of
`law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms” for self-defense. Heller,
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`554 U. S., at 635. Pp. 15–17.
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`(3) The test that the Court set forth in Heller and applies today
`requires courts to assess whether modern firearms regulations are
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`consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historical under-
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`standing. Of course, the regulatory challenges posed by firearms today
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`are not always the same as those that preoccupied the Founders in
`1791 or the Reconstruction generation in 1868. But the Constitution
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`Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)
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`Syllabus
`can, and must, apply to circumstances beyond those the Founders spe-
`cifically anticipated, even though its meaning is fixed according to the
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`understandings of those who ratified it. See, e.g., United States v.
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`Jones, 565 U. S. 400, 404–405. Indeed, the Court recognized in Heller
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`at least one way in which the Second Amendment’s historically fixed
`meaning applies to new circumstances: Its reference to “arms” does not
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`apply “only [to] those arms in existence in the 18th century.” 554 U. S.,
`at 582.
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`To determine whether a firearm regulation is consistent with the
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`Second Amendment, Heller and McDonald point toward at least two
`relevant metrics: first, whether modern and historical regulations im-
`pose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense, and sec-
`ond, whether that regulatory burden is comparably justified. Because
`“individual self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second
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`Amendment right,” these two metrics are “ ‘central’ ” considerations
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`when engaging in an analogical inquiry. McDonald, 561 U. S., at 767
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`(quoting Heller, 554 U. S., at 599).
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`To be clear, even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for
`historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass consti-
`tutional muster. For example, courts can use analogies to “longstand-
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`ing” “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such
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`as schools and government buildings” to determine whether modern
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`regulations are constitutionally permissible. Id., at 626. That said,
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`respondents’ attempt to characterize New York’s proper-cause require-
`ment as a “sensitive-place” law lacks merit because there is no histor-
`ical basis for New York to effectively declare the island of Manhattan
`a “sensitive place” simply because it is crowded and protected gener-
`ally by the New York City Police Department. Pp. 17–22.
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`(b) Having made the constitutional standard endorsed in Heller
`more explicit, the Court applies that standard to New York’s proper-
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`cause requirement. Pp. 23–62.
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`(1) It is undisputed that petitioners Koch and Nash—two ordi-
`nary, law-abiding, adult citizens—are part of “the people” whom the
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`Second Amendment protects. See Heller, 554 U. S., at 580. And no
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`party disputes that handguns are weapons “in common use” today for
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`self-defense. See id., at 627. The Court has little difficulty concluding
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`also that the plain text of the Second Amendment protects Koch’s and
`Nash’s proposed course of conduct—carrying handguns publicly for
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`self-defense. Nothing in the Second Amendment’s text draws a
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`home/public distinction with respect to the right to keep and bear
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`arms, and the definition of “bear” naturally encompasses public carry.
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`Moreover, the Second Amendment guarantees an “individual right to
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`possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,” id., at 592, and
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`confrontation can surely take place outside the home. Pp. 23–24.
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`4 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
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`(2) The burden then falls on respondents to show that New York’s
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`proper-cause requirement is consistent with this Nation’s historical
`tradition of firearm regulation. To do so, respondents appeal to a va-
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`riety of historical sources from the late 1200s to the early 1900s. But
`when it comes to interpreting the Constitution, not all history is cre-
`ated equal. “Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they
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`were understood to have when the people adopted them.” Heller, 554
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`U. S., at 634–635. The Second Amendment was adopted in 1791; the
`Fourteenth in 1868. Historical evidence that long predates or post-
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`dates either time may not illuminate the scope of the right. With these
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`principles in mind, the Court concludes that respondents have failed
`to meet their burden to identify an American tradition justifying New
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`York’s proper-cause requirement. Pp. 24–62.
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`(i) Respondents’ substantial reliance on English history and
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`custom before the founding makes some sense given Heller’s statement
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`that the Second Amendment “codified a right ‘inherited from our Eng-
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`lish ancestors.’ ” 554 U. S., at 599. But the Court finds that history
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`ambiguous at best and sees little reason to think that the Framers
`would have thought it applicable in the New World. The Court cannot
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`conclude from this historical record that, by the time of the founding,
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`English law would have justified restricting the right to publicly bear
`arms suited for self-defense only to those who demonstrate some spe-
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`cial need for self-protection. Pp. 30–37.
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`(ii) Respondents next direct the Court to the history of the Col-
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`onies and early Republic, but they identify only three restrictions on
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`public carry from that time. While the Court doubts that just three
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`colonial regulations could suffice to show a tradition of public-carry
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`regulation, even looking at these laws on their own terms, the Court is
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`not convinced that they regulated public carry akin to the New York
`law at issue. The statutes essentially prohibited bearing arms in a
`way that spread “fear” or “terror” among the people, including by car-
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`rying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.” See 554 U. S., at 627.
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`Whatever the likelihood that handguns were considered “dangerous
`and unusual” during the colonial period, they are today “the quintes-
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`sential self-defense weapon.” Id., at 629. Thus, these colonial laws
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`provide no justification for laws restricting the public carry of weapons
`that are unquestionably in common use today. Pp. 37–42.
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`(iii) Only after the ratification of the Second Amendment in
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`1791 did public-carry restrictions proliferate. Respondents rely heav-
`ily on these restrictions, which generally fell into three categories:
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`common-law offenses, statutory prohibitions, and “surety” statutes.
`None of these restrictions imposed a substantial burden on public
`carry analogous to that imposed by New York’s restrictive licensing
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`regime.
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`Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)
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`Syllabus
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`Common-Law Offenses. As during the colonial and founding peri-
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`ods, the common-law offenses of “affray” or going armed “to the terror
`of the people” continued to impose some limits on firearm carry in the
`antebellum period. But there is no evidence indicating that these com-
`mon-law limitations impaired the right of the general population to
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`peaceable public carry.
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`Statutory Prohibitions. In the early to mid-19th century, some
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`States began enacting laws that proscribed the concealed carry of pis-
`tols and other small weapons. But the antebellum state-court deci-
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`sions upholding them evince a consensus view that States could not
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`altogether prohibit the public carry of arms protected by the Second
`Amendment or state analogues.
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`Surety Statutes. In the mid-19th century, many jurisdictions began
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`adopting laws that required certain individuals to post bond before
`carrying weapons in public. Contrary to respondents’ position, these
`surety statutes in no way represented direct precursors to New York’s
`proper-cause requirement. While New York presumes that individu-
`als have no public carry right without a showing of heightened need,
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`the surety statutes presumed that individuals had a right to public
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`carry that could be burdened only if another could make out a specific
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`showing of “reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace.”
`Mass. Rev. Stat., ch. 134, §16 (1836). Thus, unlike New York’s regime,
`a showing of special need was required only after an individual was
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`reasonably accused of intending to injure another or breach the peace.
`And, even then, proving special need simply avoided a fee.
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`In sum, the historical evidence from antebellum America does
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`demonstrate that the manner of public carry was subject to reasonable
`regulation, but none of these limitations on the right to bear arms op-
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`erated to prevent law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs
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`from carrying arms in public for that purpose. Pp. 42–51.
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`(iv) Evidence from around the adoption of the Fourteenth
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`Amendment also does not support respondents’ position. The “discus-
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`sion of the [right to keep and bear arms] in Congress and in public
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`discourse, as people debated whether and how to secure constitutional
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`rights for newly free slaves,” Heller, 554 U. S., at 614, generally
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`demonstrates that during Reconstruction the right to keep and bear
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`arms had limits that were consistent with a right of the public to peace-
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`ably carry handguns for self-defense. The Court acknowledges two
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`Texas cases—English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 and State v. Duke, 42 Tex.
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`455—that approved a statutory “reasonable grounds” standard for
`public carry analogous to New York’s proper-cause requirement. But
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`these decisions were outliers and therefore provide little insight into
`how postbellum courts viewed the right to carry protected arms in pub-
`lic. See Heller, 554 U. S., at 632. Pp. 52–58.
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` 6 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
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`Syllabus
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`(v) Finally, respondents point to the slight uptick in gun regu-
`lation during the late-19th century. As the Court suggested in Heller,
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`however, late-19th-century evidence cannot provide much insight into
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`the meaning of the Second Amendment when it contradicts earlier ev-
`idence. In addition, the vast majority of the statutes that respondents
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`invoke come from the Western Territories. The bare existence of these
`localized restrictions cannot overcome the overwhelming evidence of
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`an otherwise enduring American tradition permitting public carry.
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`See Heller, 554 U. S., at 614. Moreover, these territorial laws were
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`rarely subject to judicial scrutiny, and absent any evidence explaining
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`why these unprecedented prohibitions on all public carry were under-
`stood to comport with the Second Amendment, they do little to inform
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`“the origins and continuing significance of the Amendment.” Ibid.; see
`also The Federalist No. 37, p. 229. Finally, these territorial re-
`strictions deserve little weight because they were, consistent with the
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`transitory nature of territorial government, short lived. Some were
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`held unconstitutional shortly after passage, and others did not survive
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`a Territory’s admission to the Union as a State. Pp. 58–62.
`(vi) After reviewing the Anglo-American history of public carry,
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`the Court concludes that respondents have not met their burden to
`identify an American tradition justifying New York’s proper-cause re-
`quirement. Apart from a few late-19th-century outlier jurisdictions,
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`American governments simply have not broadly prohibited the public
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`carry of commonly used firearms for personal defense. Nor have they
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`generally required law-abiding, responsible citizens to “demonstrate a
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`special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general
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`community” to carry arms in public. Klenosky, 75 App. Div. 2d, at 793,
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`428 N. Y. S. 2d, at 257. P. 62.
`(c) The constitutional right to bear arms in public for self-defense is
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`not “a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules
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`than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.” McDonald, 561 U. S., at 780
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`(plurality opinion). The exercise of other constitutional rights does not
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`require individuals to demonstrate to government officers some special
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`need. The Second Amendment right to carry arms in public for self-
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`defense is no different. New York’s proper-cause requirement violates
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`the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with
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`ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep and
`bear arms in public. Pp. 62–63.
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`818 Fed. Appx. 99, reversed and remanded.
`THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
`and ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. ALITO, J.,
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`filed a concurring opinion. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in
` which ROBERTS, C. J., joined. BARRETT, J., filed a concurring opinion.
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`BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN,
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`JJ., joined.
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` Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
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` corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
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` No. 20–843
`_________________
`NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION,
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` INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. KEVIN P. BRUEN, IN
`HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SUPERINTENDENT
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`OF NEW YORK STATE POLICE, ET AL.
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`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
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`APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
`[June 23, 2022]
`JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
`In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (2008),
`and McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742 (2010), we recog-
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`nized that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect
`the right of an ordinary, law-abiding citizen to possess a
`handgun in the home for self-defense. In this case, petition-
`ers and respondents agree that ordinary, law-abiding citi-
`zens have a similar right to carry handguns publicly for
`their self-defense. We too agree, and now hold, consistent
`with Heller and McDonald, that the Second and Fourteenth
`Amendments protect an individual’s right to carry a hand-
`gun for self-defense outside the home.
`The parties nevertheless dispute whether New York’s li-
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`censing regime respects the constitutional right to carry
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`handguns publicly for self-defense. In 43 States, the gov-
`ernment issues licenses to carry based on objective criteria.
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`But in six States, including New York, the government fur-
`ther conditions issuance of a license to carry on a citizen’s
`showing of some additional special need. Because the State
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` 2 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
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`Opinion of the Court
`of New York issues public-carry licenses only when an ap-
`plicant demonstrates a special need for self-defense, we con-
`clude that the State’s licensing regime violates the Consti-
`tution.
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`I
`A
`New York State has regulated the public carry of hand-
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`guns at least since the early 20th century. In 1905, New
`York made it a misdemeanor for anyone over the age of 16
`to “have or carry concealed upon his person in any city or
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`village of [New York], any pistol, revolver or other firearm
`without a written license . . . issued to him by a police mag-
`istrate.” 1905 N. Y. Laws ch. 92, §2, pp. 129–130; see also
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`1908 N. Y. Laws ch. 93, §1, pp. 242–243 (allowing justices
`of the peace to issue licenses). In 1911, New York’s “Sulli-
`van Law” expanded the State’s criminal prohibition to the
`possession of all handguns—concealed or otherwise—with-
`out a government-issued license. See 1911 N. Y. Laws ch.
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`195, §1, p. 443. New York later amended the Sullivan Law
`to clarify the licensing standard: Magistrates could “issue
`to [a] person a license to have and carry concealed a pistol
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`or revolver without regard to employment or place of pos-
`sessing such weapon” only if that person proved “good
`moral character” and “proper cause.” 1913 N. Y. Laws ch.
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`608, §1, p. 1629.
`Today’s licensing scheme largely tracks that of the early
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`1900s. It is a crime in New York to possess “any firearm”
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`without a license, whether inside or outside the home, pun-
`ishable by up to four years in prison or a $5,000 fine for a
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`felony offense, and one year in prison or a $1,000 fine for a
`misdemeanor. See N. Y. Penal Law Ann. §§265.01–b (West
`2017), 261.01(1) (West Cum. Supp. 2022), 70.00(2)(e) and
`(3)(b), 80.00(1)(a) (West 2021), 70.15(1), 80.05(1). Mean-
`while, possessing a loaded firearm outside one’s home or
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`place of business without a license is a felony punishable by
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`Opinion of the Court
`up to 15 years in prison.
`§§265.03(3) (West 2017),
`70.00(2)(c) and (3)(b), 80.00(1)(a).
`A license applicant who wants to possess a firearm at
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`home (or in his place of business) must convince a “licensing
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`officer”—usually a judge or law enforcement officer—that,
`among other things, he is of good moral character, has no
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`history of crime or mental illness, and that “no good cause
`exists for the denial of the license.” §§400.00(1)(a)–(n)
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`(West Cum. Supp. 2022). If he wants to carry a firearm
`outside his home or place of business for self-defense, the
`applicant must obtain an unrestricted license to “have and
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`carry” a concealed “pistol or revolver.” §400.00(2)(f ). To
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`secure that license, the applicant must prove that “proper
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`cause exists” to issue it. Ibid. If an applicant cannot make
`that showing, he can receive only a “restricted” license for
`public carry, which allows him to carry a firearm for a lim-
`ited purpose, such as hunting, target shooting, or employ-
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`ment. See, e.g., In re O’Brien, 87 N. Y. 2d 436, 438–439, 663
`N. E. 2d 316, 316–317 (1996); Babernitz v. Police Dept. of
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`City of New York, 65 App. Div. 2d 320, 324, 411 N. Y. S. 2d
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`309, 311 (1978); In re O’Connor, 154 Misc. 2d 694, 696–698,
`585 N. Y. S. 2d 1000, 1003 (Westchester Cty. 1992).
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`No New York statute defines “proper cause.” But New
`York courts have held that an applicant shows proper cause
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`only if he can “demonstrate a special need for self-protection
`distinguishable from that of the general community.” E.g.,
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`In re Klenosky, 75 App. Div. 2d 793, 428 N. Y. S. 2d 256, 257
`(1980). This “special need” standard is demanding. For ex-
`ample, living or working in an area “‘noted for criminal ac-
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`tivity’” does not suffice. In re Bernstein, 85 App. Div. 2d
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`574, 445 N. Y. S. 2d 716, 717 (1981). Rather, New York
`courts generally require evidence “of particular threats, at-
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`tacks or other extraordinary danger to personal safety.”
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`In re Martinek, 294 App. Div. 2d 221, 222, 743 N. Y. S. 2d
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`80, 81 (2002); see also In re Kaplan, 249 App. Div. 2d 199,
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`201, 673 N. Y. S. 2d 66, 68 (1998) (approving the New York
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`4 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
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`Opinion of the Court
`City Police Department’s requirement of “‘extraordinary
`personal danger, documented by proof of recurrent threats
`to life or safety’” (quoting 38 N. Y. C. R. R. §5–03(b))).
`When a licensing officer denies an application, judicial re-
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`view is limited. New York courts defer to an officer’s appli-
`cation of the proper-cause standard unless it is “arbitrary
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`and capricious.” In re Bando, 290 App. Div. 2d 691, 692,
`735 N. Y. S. 2d 660, 661 (2002). In other words, the decision
`“must be upheld if the record shows a rational basis for it.”
`
`Kaplan, 249 App. Div. 2d, at 201, 673 N. Y. S. 2d, at 68. The
`rule leaves applicants little recourse if their local licensing
`officer denies a permit.
`New York is not alone in requiring a permit to carry a
`
`
`
`handgun in public. But the vast majority of States—43 by
`our count—are “shall issue” jurisdictions, where authorities
`must issue concealed-carry licenses whenever applicants
`satisfy certain threshold requirements, without granting li-
`censing officials discretion to deny licenses based on a per-
`ceived lack of need or suitability.1 Meanwhile, only six
`
`——————
`1See Ala. Code §13A–11–75 (Cum. Supp. 2021); Alaska Stat.
`
`§18.65.700 (2020); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–3112 (Cum. Supp. 2021);
`
` Ark. Code Ann. §5–73–309 (Supp. 2021); Colo. Rev. Stat. §18–12–206
`
` (2021); Fla. Stat. §790.06 (2021); Ga. Code Ann. §16–11–129 (Supp.
`
` 2021); Idaho Code Ann. §18–3302K (Cum. Supp. 2021); Ill. Comp. Stat.,
`
`ch. 430, §66/10 (West Cum. Supp. 2021); Ind. Code §35–47–2–3 (2021);
`Iowa Code §724.7 (2022); Kan. Stat. Ann. §75–7c03 (2021); Ky. Rev. Stat.
`
`Ann. §237.110 (Lexis Cum. Supp. 2021); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §40:1379.3
`
`(West Cum. Supp. 2022); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 25, §2003 (Cum. Supp.
`2022); Mich. Comp. Laws §28.425b (2020); Minn. Stat. §624.714 (2020);
`Miss. Code Ann. §45–9–101 (2022); Mo. Rev. Stat. §571.101 (2016); Mont.
`Code Ann. §45–8–321 (2021); Neb. Rev. Stat. §69–2430 (2019); Nev. Rev.
`Stat. §202.3657 (2021); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §159:6 (Cum. Supp. 2021);
`
`N. M. Stat. Ann. §29–19–4 (2018); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §14–415.11
`(2021); N. D. Cent. Code Ann. §62.1–04–03 (Supp. 2021); Ohio Rev. Code
`Ann. §2923.125 (2020); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §1290.12 (2021); Ore. Rev.
`
`Stat. §166.291 (2021); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §6109 (Cum. Supp. 2016); S. C.
`Code Ann. §23–31–215(A) (Cum. Supp. 2021); S. D. Codified Laws §23–
`
`7–7 (Cum. Supp. 2021); Tenn. Code Ann. §39–17–1366 (Supp. 2021); Tex.
`Govt. Code Ann. §411.177 (West Cum. Supp. 2021); Utah Code §53–5–
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`States and the District of Columbia have “may issue” licens-
`ing laws, under which authorities have discretion to deny
`concealed-carry licenses even when the applicant satisfies
`the statutory criteria, usually because the applicant has not
`demonstrated cause or suitability for the relevant license.
`Aside from New York, then, only California, the District of
`Columbia, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New
`——————
`
`704.5 (2022); Va. Code Ann. §18.2–308.04 (2021); Wash. Rev. Code
`
`§9.41.070 (2021); W. Va. Code Ann. §61–7–4 (2021); Wis. Stat. §175.60
`
`(2021); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §6–8–104 (2021). Vermont has no permitting
`
`system for the concealed carry of handguns. Three States—Connecticut,
`
`Delaware, and Rhode Island—have discretionary criteria but appear to
`
`
`operate like “shall issue” jurisdictions. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §29–28(b)
`
`(2021); Del. Code, Tit. 11, §1441 (2022); R. I. Gen. Laws §11–47–11
`
`(2002). Although Connecticut officials have discretion to deny a
`concealed-carry permit to anyone who is not a “suitable person,” see
`
`
`Conn. Gen. Stat. §29–28(b), the “suitable person” standard precludes
`
`permits only to those “individuals whose conduct has shown them to be
`
`lacking the essential character of temperament necessary to be entrusted
`
`with a weapon.” Dwyer v. Farrell, 193 Conn. 7, 12, 475 A. 2d 257, 260
`
`(1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). As for Delaware, the State
`
`has thus far processed 5,680 license applications and renewals in fiscal
`
`year 2022 and has denied only 112. See Del. Courts, Super. Ct., Carrying
`
`Concealed Deadly Weapon (June 9, 2022), https://courts.delaware.gov/
`
`
`forms/download.aspx?ID=125408. Moreover, Delaware appears to have
`no licensing requirement for open carry. Finally, Rhode Island has a
`suitability requirement, see R. I. Gen. Laws §11–47–11, but the Rhode
`
`Island Supreme Court has flatly denied that the “[d]emonstration of a
`
`proper showing of need” is a component of that requirement. Gadomski
`
`v. Tavares, 113 A. 3d 387, 392 (2015). Additionally, some “shall issue”
`
`jurisdictions have so-called “constitutional carry” protections that allow
`
`
`certain individuals to carry handguns in public within the State without
`
`any permit whatsoever. See, e.g., A. Sherman, More States Remove Per-
`
`mit Requirement To Carry a Concealed Gun, PolitiFact (Apr. 12, 2022),
`https://www.politifact.com/article/2022/apr/12/more-states-remove-per-
`
`mit-requirement-carry-concea/ (“Twenty-five states now have permitless
`concealed carry laws . . . The states that have approved permitless carry
`
`
`
`
`laws are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
`
`
`
`Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New
`
`Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee,
`
`Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming”).
`
`

`

`
`6 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Jersey have analogues to the “proper cause” standard.2 All
`
`of these “proper cause” analogues have been upheld by the
`
`Courts of Appeals, save for the District of Columbia’s, which
`has been permanently enjoined since 2017. Compare Gould
`
`
`
`v. Morgan, 907 F. 3d 659, 677 (CA1 2018); Kachalsky v.
`County of Westchester, 701 F. 3d 81, 101 (CA2 2012); Drake
`
`
`v. Filko, 724 F. 3d 426, 440 (CA3 2013); United States v.
`Masciandaro, 638 F. 3d 458, 460 (CA4 2011); Young v. Ha-
`
`waii, 992 F. 3d 765, 773 (CA9 2021) (en banc), with Wrenn
`
`v. District of Columbia, 864 F. 3d 650, 668 (CADC 2017).
`B
`
`
`As set forth in the pleadings below, petitioners Brandon
`Koch and Robert Nash are law-abiding, adult citizens of
`Rensselaer County, New York. Koch lives in Troy, while
`
`Nash lives in Averill Park. Petitioner New York State Rifle
`& Pistol Association, Inc., is a public-interest group orga-
`nized to defend the Second Amendment rights of New York-
`ers. Both Koch and Nash are members.
`
`
`In 2014, Nash applied for an unrestricted license to carry
`a handgun in public. Nash did not claim any unique danger
`to his personal safety; he simply wanted to carry a handgun
`for self-defense. In early 2015, the State denied Nash’s ap-
`plication for an unrestricted license but granted him a re-
`
`stricted license for hunting and target shooting only. In late
`2016, Nash asked a licensing officer to remove the re-
`strictions, citing a string of recent robberies in his neigh-
`borhood. After an informal hearing, the licensing officer de-
`nied the request. The officer reiterated that Nash’s existing
`license permitted him “to carry concealed for purposes of off
`——————
`2See Cal. Penal Code Ann. §26150 (West 2021) (“Good cause”); D. C.
`
` Code §§7–2509.11(1) (2018), 22–4506(a) (Cum. Supp. 2021) (“proper rea-
` son,” i.e., “special need for self-protection”); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§134–2
`
`
`
`(Cum. Supp. 2018), 134–9(a) (2011) (“exceptional case”); Md. Pub. Saf.
`
`
` Code Ann. §5–306(a)(6)(ii) (2018) (“good and substantial reason”); Mass.
`
` Gen. Laws, ch. 140, §131(d) (2020) (“good reason”); N. J. Stat. Ann.
`§2C:58–4(c) (West Cum. Supp. 2021) (“justifiable need”).
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`7
`
`
`
` Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`road back country, outdoor activities similar to hunting,”
`
`such as “fishing, hiking & camping etc.” App. 41. But, at
`the same time, the officer emphasized that the restrictions
`were “intended to prohibit [Nash] from carrying concealed
`in ANY LOCATION typically open to and frequented by the
`
`general public.” Ibid.
`
`
`Between 2008 and 2017, Koch was in the same position
`as Nash: He faced no special dangers, wanted a handgun
`for general self-defense, and had only a restricted license
`permitting him to carry a handgun outside