No.
`
`In the Supreme Court of the United States
`
`
`VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL.,
`PETITIONERS
`
`v.
`
`THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION COMMISSION OF
`HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA, AND SALT LAKE
`COUNTY, UTAH, RESPONDENTS.
`
`
`
`ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`
`
`
`MICHAEL H. STEINBERG
`SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
`1888 Century Park East
`Los Angeles, CA 90067
`
`JUDSON O. LITTLETON
`SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
`1700 New York Ave., N.W.
`Washington, DC 20006
`
`ROBERT J. GIUFFRA, JR.
`Counsel of Record
`DAVID M.J. REIN
`MATTHEW A. SCHWARTZ
`SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
`125 Broad Street
`New York, NY 10004
`(212) 558-4000
`giuffrar@sullcrom.com
`
`
`Counsel for Petitioners Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. and
`Audi of America, LLC
`
`[Additional parties and counsel listed on signature page]
`
`
`
`
`
`In the Supreme Court of the United States
`
`
`VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL.,
`PETITIONERS
`
`v.
`
`THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION COMMISSION OF
`HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA, AND SALT LAKE
`COUNTY, UTAH, RESPONDENTS.
`
`
`
`ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`
`
`
`MICHAEL H. STEINBERG
`SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
`1888 Century Park East
`Los Angeles, CA 90067
`
`JUDSON O. LITTLETON
`SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
`1700 New York Ave., N.W.
`Washington, DC 20006
`
`ROBERT J. GIUFFRA, JR.
`Counsel of Record
`DAVID M.J. REIN
`MATTHEW A. SCHWARTZ
`SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
`125 Broad Street
`New York, NY 10004
`(212) 558-4000
`giuffrar@sullcrom.com
`
`
`Counsel for Petitioners Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. and
`Audi of America, LLC
`
`[Additional parties and counsel listed on signature page]
`
`
`
`
`
`QUESTION PRESENTED
`
`Title II of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) grants the U.S.
`Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) broad and ex-
`clusive authority to enforce auto manufacturers’ compli-
`ance with CAA standards over the entire useful life of
`their vehicles. To avoid conflicting regulation, Congress
`directed that “[n]o State or any political subdivision
`thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard re-
`lating to the control of emissions from new motor vehi-
`cles . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a).
`Exercising its authority, EPA reached a multi-billion-
`dollar resolution with petitioners relating to, among other
`things, post-sale software updates made to their vehicles
`on a nationwide basis. Certain state and local govern-
`ments nonetheless brought unprecedented lawsuits seek-
`ing billions more in penalties based on the same updates.
`The Ninth Circuit below—in direct conflict with final de-
`cisions of the Alabama Supreme Court and intermediate
`appellate courts in Tennessee and Minnesota—held that
`all 50 states and thousands of local governments may
`freely regulate manufacturers’ post-sale, nationwide up-
`dates to vehicle emission systems.
`The question presented is whether the CAA preempts
`state and local governments from regulating manufactur-
`ers’ post-sale, nationwide updates to vehicle emission sys-
`tems.
`
`(I)
`
`
`
`PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
`AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
`
`Petitioners are Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
`(“VWGoA”), Audi of America, LLC, Porsche Cars North
`America, Inc., and Robert Bosch LLC (“Bosch”).
`VWGoA is a wholly owned subsidiary of Volkswagen
`Aktiengesellschaft (“Volkswagen AG”). Audi of America,
`LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of VWGoA. Dr. Ing.
`h.c. F. Porsche AG (“Porsche AG”) owns the stock of two
`companies that own stock of a company that owns stock in
`differing shares of Porsche Cars North America, Inc. and
`has been described as an indirect parent corporation of
`Porsche Cars North America, Inc. Volkswagen AG is a
`publicly held German corporation that owns 10% or more
`of the stock of VWGoA, and owns indirectly 10% or more
`of the stock of Porsche AG.
`Petitioner Bosch is an indirect wholly owned subsidi-
`ary of Robert Bosch GmbH, which is a privately owned
`German company with 93.992% of its share capital being
`held by Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH, a charitable foun-
`dation.
`Respondents are the Environmental Protection Com-
`mission of Hillsborough County, Florida and Salt Lake
`County, Utah.
`
`(II)
`
`
`
`RELATED PROCEEDINGS
`
`United States District Court (N.D. Cal.):
`
`The Environmental Protection Commission of
`Hillsborough County, Florida v. Volkswagen AG
`et al., No. 16-cv-2210
`(MDL No. 2672)
`(Apr. 16, 2018)
`
`Salt Lake County v. Volkswagen Group of America et
`al., No.
`16-cv-5649
`(MDL No.
`2672)
` (Apr. 16, 2018)
`
`United States Court of Appeals (9th Cir.):
`
`In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Marketing, Sales
`Practices, and Products Liability Litigation,
`No. 18-15937 (June 1, 2020)
`
`(III)
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Opinions below ...................................................................... 1
`
`Jurisdiction ........................................................................... 1
`
`Provisions involved .............................................................. 2
`
`Statement .............................................................................. 3
`
`A. Background ............................................................ 8
`
`B. Facts and procedural history ............................. 11
`
`Reasons for granting the petition .................................... 14
`
`I.
`
`The decision below directly conflicts with final
`decisions of several state courts .............................. 14
`
`II. The question presented is
`exceptionally important ............................................ 16
`
`A. National uniformity in the regulation of
`emission systems has been of critical
`importance for decades ....................................... 16
`
`B. This issue has already arisen for another
`auto manufacturer and is likely to arise
`repeatedly going forward ................................... 20
`
`III. The decision below is incorrect ................................ 22
`
`A. The Ninth Circuit misconstrued the CAA’s
`framework and history ....................................... 22
`
`B. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the
`CAA’s express preemption clause is
`incorrect and conflicts with settled law ............ 24
`
`C. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the
`CAA’s savings clause is wrong and conflicts
`with the D.C. Circuit’s and EPA’s
`interpretations of that provision ........................ 28
`
`(IV)
`
`
`
`
`
`V
`
`D. The Ninth Circuit’s implied preemption
`analysis is incorrect ................................................ 31
`
`Conclusion ........................................................................... 34
`
`Appendix A: Court of Appeals Opinion,
`June 1, 2020 ................................................................... 1a
`
`Appendix B: District Court Opinion,
`April 16, 2018 .............................................................. 47a
`
`Appendix C: Court of Appeals Order Denying
`Rehearing,
`August 24, 2020 ........................................................... 88a
`
`Appendix D: Relevant Statutory Provisions ................ 90a
`
`Appendix E: Relevant Dictionary Definitions ........... 107a
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases:
`
`Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York,
`340 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ................. 25, 27
`
`Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,
`555 U.S. 70 (2008) ......................................... 6, 22, 24
`
`Arizona v. United States,
`567 U.S. 387 (2012) ................................................. 33
`
`Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian,
`140 S. Ct. 1335 (2020) ............................................. 34
`
`Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm.,
`531 U.S. 341 (2001) ................................................. 34
`
`Carchman v. Nash,
`473 U.S. 716 (1985) ................................................. 16
`
`In re Caterpillar, Inc.,
`2015 WL 4591236 (D.N.J. July 29, 2015) ............. 23
`
`Deal v. United States,
`508 U.S. 129 (1993) ................................................. 30
`
`DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia,
`577 U.S. 47 (2015) ................................................... 15
`
`Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air
`Quality Mgmt. Dist.,
`541 U.S. 246 (2004) ....................................... 6, 23, 27
`
`Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. EPA,
`88 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ....................... passim
`
`Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
`529 U.S. 861 (2000) ................................................. 31
`
`(VI)
`
`
`
`VII
`
`
`
`Cases—Continued:
`
`Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,
`513 U.S. 561 (1995) ................................................. 30
`
`Hillman v. Maretta,
`569 U.S. 483 (2013) ................................................. 15
`
`Jensen Family Farms, Inc. v. Monterey
`Bay Unified Air Pollution Control
`Dist.,
`644 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2011) .................................. 23
`
`Lagos v. United States,
`138 S. Ct. 1684 (2018) ............................................. 30
`
`Montana Dept. of Env. Quality v.
`Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft,
`Cause No. DDV-2016-1045 (Mont. Dist.
`Ct. Feb. 21, 2020) .................................................... 16
`
`Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
`504 U.S. 374 (1992) ........................................... 24, 25
`
`Murphy v. Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assn.,
`138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) ............................................. 22
`
`Nat. Assn. of Home Builders v. San
`Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution
`Control Dist.,
`627 F.3d 730 (9th Cir. 2010) .............................. 8, 22
`
`In re Office of Atty. Gen.,
`269 A.D.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) ...................... 26
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`VIII
`
`
`
`Cases—Continued:
`
`People v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft,
`2018 WL 3384883 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
`June 5, 2018) ..................................................... 16, 33
`
`Riley v. California,
`573 U.S. 373 (2014) ................................................. 16
`
`Rutledge v. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Assn.,
`141 S. Ct. 474 (2020) ..................................... 6, 24, 25
`
`Sims v. Fla., Dept. of Hwy. Safety & Motor
`Vehicles
`862 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1989) .............................. 26
`
`State ex rel. Slatery v. Volkswagen
`Aktiengesellschaft,
`2019 WL 1220836 (Tenn. Ct. App.
`Mar. 13, 2019) ................................................ passim
`
`Smith v. City of Jackson,
`544 U.S. 228 (2005) ................................................. 30
`
`State v. Volkswagen AG,
`279 So. 3d 1109 (Ala. 2018) .................... 3, 14, 16, 33
`
`State v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft,
`2018 WL 3349094 (Mo. Cir. Ct.
`June 26, 2018) ......................................................... 16
`
`State ex rel. Swanson v. Volkswagen
`Aktiengesellschaft,
`2018 WL 6273103 (Minn. Ct. App.
`Dec. 3, 2018) ................................................... passim
`
`United States v. Locke,
`529 U.S. 89 (2000) ................................................... 23
`
`
`
`IX
`
`
`
`Cases—Continued:
`
`In re Volkswagen Clean Diesel Litig.,
`Cause No. D-1-GN-16-000370 (Tex.
`Dist. Ct. Feb. 21, 2018) .......................................... 16
`
`State ex rel. Yost v. Volkswagen
`Aktiengesellschaft,
`137 N.E.3d 1267 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019) .................. 16
`
`Statutes:
`
`2 U.S.C. § 2163 .............................................................. 29
`
`7 U.S.C. § 2262 .............................................................. 30
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ......................................................... 2
`
`42 U.S.C.
`§ 7507 ......................................................................... 7
`§ 7521(a) ................................................................ 6, 9
`§ 7521(d) ................................................................ 6, 9
`§ 7522(a) .................................................................. 10
`§ 7523(b) .................................................................. 10
`§ 7524(a) .................................................................. 10
`§ 7524(c) ................................................................... 10
`§ 7541(a) .................................................................... 9
`§ 7541(b) .................................................................... 9
`§ 7541(c) ............................................................... 9, 18
`§ 7541(h) .................................................... 7, 9, 28, 31
`§ 7542 ......................................................................... 9
`§ 7543(a) ......................................................... passim
`§ 7543(b) .................................................................... 7
`§ 7543(d) ......................................................... passim
`§ 7543(e)................................................................... 20
`
`Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) .............. 10, 24
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`X
`
`
`
`Rules and Regulatory Materials:
`
`40 C.F.R.
`§ 86.1805-04(a) .......................................................... 9
`§ 86.1845-04 ............................................................... 9
`§ 86.1846-01 ............................................................... 9
`
`59 Fed. Reg. 31,306 (June 17, 1994) ..................... 26, 31
`
`EPA, 2014-2017 Progress Report: Vehicle &
`Engine Compliance Activities
`(Apr. 2019) ..................................................... 5, 11, 18
`
`EPA, Clean Air Act Mobile Source Civil
`Penalty Policy—Vehicle and Engine
`Certification Requirements (Jan. 16,
`2009) ......................................................................... 10
`
`EPA, Field Fixes Related to Emission
`Control-Related Components, MSAPC
`Advisory Circular No. 2B (Mar. 17,
`1975) ......................................................................... 10
`
`Miscellaneous:
`
`A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law (1st
`ed. 2012) ............................................................ 28, 29
`
`Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968) (App.
`108a) ......................................................................... 29
`
`Bur. of Economic Analysis, Value Added by
`Industry as a Percentage of Gross
`Domestic Product ................................................... 17
`
`Bur. of Labor Statistics, Automotive
`Industry: Employment, Earnings, and
`Hours ....................................................................... 17
`
`Census Bur., Household Size by Vehicles
`Available .................................................................. 17
`
`
`
`XI
`
`
`
`Miscellaneous—Continued:
`
`H.R. Rep. No. 89-899 (1965) ........................................ 17
`
`H.R. Rep. No. 90-728 (1967) ...................... 17, 25, 26, 32
`
`Webster’s Third New International
`Dictionary (2002) (App. 107a) ............................... 29
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`In the Supreme Court of the United States
`
`
`
`No.
`
`
`VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL.,
`PETITIONERS
`
`v.
`
`THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION COMMISSION OF
`HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA, AND SALT LAKE
`COUNTY, UTAH, RESPONDENTS.
`
`
`
`ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`
`
`OPINIONS BELOW
`
`The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, 1a-
`46a) is reported at 959 F.3d 1201. The opinion of the dis-
`trict court
`(App., infra, 47a-87a)
`is reported at
`310 F. Supp. 3d 1030.
`
`JURISDICTION
`
`The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
`June 1, 2020. A timely petition for rehearing was denied
`on August 24, 2020. App., infra, 88a-89a. On March 19,
`2020, this Court extended the deadline to file petitions for
`writs of certiorari in all cases due on or after that date to
`150 days from the date of the lower court judgment, order
`
`(1)
`
`
`
`2
`
`denying discretionary review, or order denying a timely
`petition for rehearing. Order, 589 U.S. __ (Mar. 19, 2020),
`https://tinyurl.com/March19Order. The jurisdiction of
`this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
`
`PROVISIONS INVOLVED
`
`Pertinent statutory provisions are reproduced in the
`appendix to this petition. App., infra, 90a-106a. Section
`209(a) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a), provides in rele-
`vant part:
`
`No State or any political subdivision thereof shall
`adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to
`the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or
`new motor vehicle engines subject to this part.
`
`Section 209(d) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(d), pro-
`vides:
`
`Nothing in this part shall preclude or deny to any
`State or political subdivision thereof the right other-
`wise to control, regulate, or restrict the use, operation,
`or movement of registered or licensed motor vehicles.
`
`Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1),
`provides in relevant part:
`
`The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and
`from time to time revise) in accordance with the provi-
`sions of this section, standards applicable to the emis-
`sion of any air pollutant from any class or classes of
`new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines,
`which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pol-
`lution which may reasonably be anticipated to endan-
`ger public health or welfare. Such standards shall be
`applicable to such vehicles and engines for their useful
`life (as determined under subsection (d), relating to
`useful life of vehicles for purposes of certification),
`
`
`
`3
`
`whether such vehicles and engines are designed as
`complete systems or incorporate devices to prevent or
`control such pollution.
`
`Section 207(h)(2) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7541(h)(2),
`provides:
`
`Nothing in section 7543(a) of this title shall be con-
`strued to prohibit a State from testing, or requiring
`testing of, a motor vehicle after the date of sale of such
`vehicle to the ultimate purchaser (except that no new
`motor vehicle manufacturer or dealer may be required
`to conduct testing under this paragraph).
`
`STATEMENT
`
`This case concerns a question of critical importance to
`the automobile industry that has divided courts across the
`country: whether Congress in the CAA, by vesting EPA
`with exclusive authority to set and enforce emission
`standards for vehicles during their entire useful life, also
`intended to allow 50 states and thousands of local govern-
`ments to regulate manufacturers’ post-sale, nationwide
`updates to vehicle emission systems. The decision below
`recognized such state and local authority for the first time
`in the more than 50 years since Congress directed EPA to
`regulate auto emissions. This Court’s review is warranted
`for several reasons.
`First, the Ninth Circuit’s decision squarely conflicts
`with final decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court and
`intermediate courts of appeals in Minnesota and Tennes-
`see holding that the CAA preempts state and local gov-
`ernment actions challenging manufacturers’ post-sale up-
`dates to emission systems. See State v. Volkswagen AG,
`279 So. 3d 1109 (Ala. 2018) (“Alabama”); State ex rel. Slat-
`ery v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 2019 WL 1220836
`(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2019) (“Tennessee”); State ex rel.
`
`
`
`4
`
`Swanson v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 2018 WL
`6273103 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2018) (“Minnesota”).
`Those courts addressed this legal question on the same
`set of allegations brought against the same defendants,
`yet reached the exact opposite conclusion from the Ninth
`Circuit. This case presents the ideal vehicle to resolve this
`conflict. At a minimum, petitioners respectfully submit
`that this Court should call for the views of the Solicitor
`General, who declined the Ninth Circuit’s request to par-
`ticipate as amicus “at this stage of the litigation.” C.A.
`Dkt. 70, at 2.
`Second, this issue is of urgent significance to the auto-
`mobile industry, which contributes 2.1% to the U.S. Gross
`Domestic Product and supplies products to 90% of U.S.
`households. Since 1967, EPA has exclusively regulated
`manufacturers’ post-sale changes, such as software up-
`dates, to their cars’ emission control systems. The deci-
`sion below upends that longstanding history by conclud-
`ing that all 50 states and thousands of localities can sepa-
`rately regulate such manufacturer updates.
`Permitting thousands of governments to regulate
`post-sale, nationwide updates will impose conflicting reg-
`ulation on manufacturers. EPA’s evaluation of emissions
`updates involves the highly technical exercise of judgment
`over numerous potential tradeoffs, such as weighing one
`type of pollutant against another and balancing emissions
`reductions against the potential for engine or vehicle dam-
`age. Under the Ninth Circuit’s decision, if any state or
`locality disagrees with EPA’s determinations, manufac-
`turers could face what that court described as “staggering
`liability” from state and local enforcement actions. App.,
`infra, 45a. The threat of such state and local regulation
`will discourage manufacturers from making beneficial
`modifications to emission systems.
`
`
`
`5
`
` This is not a theoretical concern: the State of Ohio,
`for example, has explicitly claimed that it has the author-
`ity to challenge EPA-approved updates. See infra at 19.
`And, citing the Ninth Circuit’s decision, one of the re-
`spondents (Hillsborough County) has already brought an
`analogous lawsuit against Daimler AG, petitioner Robert
`Bosch LLC, and their affiliates seeking relief that con-
`flicts with the careful balance that EPA struck in its reso-
`lution with Daimler over the same conduct. See infra at
`20-21.
`The Ninth Circuit mistakenly assumed that manufac-
`turers’ post-sale emission updates are “rare.” App., infra,
`45a. In fact, now that emission control systems are com-
`puter-operated, manufacturers apply post-sale software
`updates to, on average, six million cars every year under
`EPA oversight. EPA, 2014-2017 Progress Report: Vehi-
`cle & Engine Compliance Activities (Apr. 2019), at 7
`(“EPA Recall Report”), https://tinyurl.com/EPAR-
`ecallReport (manufacturer recalls affected over 24 million
`cars between 2014 and 2017).
`Third, the Ninth Circuit’s decision misconstrues the
`CAA and conflicts with numerous decisions from this
`Court and others interpreting its provisions. Congress
`enacted Title II of the CAA to avoid exposing auto manu-
`facturers to an “anarchic patchwork” of federal, state, and
`local regulation, which would needlessly increase the cost
`of vehicles to consumers. Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. EPA,
`88 F.3d 1075, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted).
`Congress included a sweeping express preemption provi-
`sion in § 209(a) of the CAA, which provides that “[n]o
`State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or at-
`tempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of
`emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle
`engines subject to this part.” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (empha-
`ses added). The Ninth Circuit misinterpreted § 209(a) to
`
`
`
`6
`
`draw a bright-line between “new” and “used” cars, such
`that preemption ends at the point of initial sale. See infra
`at 24. This interpretation gives no effect to the expansive
`phrase “relating to”—a phrase that this Court has recog-
`nized “indicates Congress’ intent to pre-empt a large area
`of state law,” Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 85
`(2008), and to bar state regulation with any “connection
`with or reference to” the relevant subject matter,
`Rutledge v. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Assn., 141 S. Ct. 474, 479
`(2020) (quotation omitted); see infra at 24-25. The Ninth
`Circuit’s interpretation also contradicts the interpretation
`of other federal courts and EPA, which have long inter-
`preted § 209(a) to preempt state and local regulation of
`post-sale conduct that “relates back” to the original de-
`sign of a motor vehicle. The post-sale updates here nec-
`essarily relate back to the cars’ original (noncompliant)
`software because the updates modified that factory-in-
`stalled software.
`Moreover, in interpreting § 209(a), the Ninth Circuit
`did not follow this Court’s instruction in Engine Manu-
`facturers Association v. South Coast Air Quality Man-
`agement District to examine how EPA enforces CAA
`standards to identify the “standard-enforcement efforts
`that are proscribed by § 209.” 541 U.S. 246, 253 (2004).
`The CAA commands EPA to regulate manufacturers’
`emissions-related conduct throughout a car’s “useful life,”
`42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), (d)(1), through a number of obliga-
`tions and enforcement provisions that expressly apply to
`manufacturers after the sale of such cars, refuting the
`Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that EPA’s exclusive role safe-
`guarded under § 209(a) ends once a car is sold.1 The CAA
`
`
`1
`Congress gave California an exception from preemption and
`allowed other states to adopt and enforce California’s EPA-approved
`
`
`
`7
`
`also expressly bars states from requiring emissions test-
`ing by manufacturers, an essential tool for enforcing emis-
`sion compliance. 42 U.S.C. § 7541(h)(2).
`The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on a novel and over-
`broad interpretation of § 209(d), which preserves state
`and local authority to “otherwise” regulate the “use, oper-
`ation, or movement” of vehicles, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(d). The
`Ninth Circuit’s reading of “operation” to include manufac-
`turer software updates cannot be squared with the plain
`meaning of § 209(d)—which contemplates regulation of
`how cars are driven or used—and conflicts with the D.C.
`Circuit’s and EPA’s interpretation of § 209(d).
`Finally, the Ninth Circuit erred in finding no implied
`preemption. The comprehensive structure of the CAA
`demonstrates Congress’s intent that EPA exclusively
`regulate auto manufacturers’ emissions compliance be-
`fore and after vehicles are sold. Multiple interrelated
`CAA provisions grant EPA alone the authority to regu-
`late every aspect of manufacturers’ nationwide conduct
`throughout the “useful life” of their cars, including by set-
`ting federal emission standards, requiring manufacturers
`to conduct testing of in-use vehicles, overseeing manufac-
`turers’ post-sale warranty obligations, administering
`post-sale recalls, and penalizing manufacturers’ post-sale
`CAA violations. See infra, at 8-10. Conversely, Congress
`stripped states of even basic enforcement tools like re-
`quiring manufacturer emissions testing. Overlapping
`regulation by states and localities would conflict with that
`clear congressional purpose.
`
`
`standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7543(b), 7507. This exception is not relevant
`here because local governments like respondents may not enforce
`California’s standards.
`
`
`
`8
`
`Likewise, the Ninth Circuit’s decision hinders EPA’s
`ability to achieve expedient, nationwide resolutions of fu-
`ture CAA violations, as manufacturers will know that set-
`tling with EPA could trigger copycat state and local gov-
`ernment actions, as occurred here. Congress instructed
`EPA to consider specific factors in assessing penalties,
`and EPA has promulgated a comprehensive policy for do-
`ing so. The potential for innumerable state and local fol-
`low-on actions will make it infeasible for EPA to discharge
`that mandate. That respondents—just two counties—
`seek billions of dollars per year in penalties for conduct
`that EPA comprehensively enforced vividly illustrates
`this conflict. See infra at 32-33.
`This Court should grant the petition.
`
`A. Background
`
`1. In the CAA, Congress allocated responsibility for
`air pollution differently based on the source of emissions.
`Title I governs stationary sources, like power plants,
`which are subject to “federally encouraged state control.”
`Engine Mfrs. Assn., 88 F.3d at 1079. Title II governs mo-
`bile sources, like cars, and provides that “the EPA, and
`with the EPA’s permission California, are responsible for
`regulating emissions from motor vehicles and other mo-
`bile sources.” Nat. Assn. of Home Builders v. San
`Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control Dist.,
`627 F.3d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus, pursuant to Title
`II, EPA has been the exclusive regulator of auto manufac-
`turers’ compliance with emission control laws for more
`than 50 years.
`2. Congress granted EPA authority to regulate man-
`ufacturers’ emissions-related conduct both before sale
`and throughout their “useful life”:
`
` Manufacturers must certify to EPA that their cars
`will comply with federal standards throughout
`
`
`
`9
`
`their “useful life” (10 years or 120,000 miles).
`42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), (d)(1); 40 C.F.R. § 86.1805-
`04(a).
`
` Manufacturers must provide EPA-specified war-
`ranties for emission control systems and bear the
`cost of fixing them for years after sale. 42 U.S.C.
`§ 7541(a)(1), (a)(3), (b)(2)(c).
`
` EPA has “establish[ed] . . . methods and proce-
`dures” to test “whether, when in actual use” cars
`“compl[y] with . . . emission standards.” 42 U.S.C.
`§ 7541(b). EPA requires manufacturers to conduct
`“in-use verification testing,” including of “high
`mileage” post-sale cars. 40 C.F.R. §§ 86.1845-04,
`86.1846-01.
`
` Manufacturers must “establish and maintain rec-
`ords” of emissions testing on in-use cars during
`their useful life and “make reports and provide in-
`formation
`[EPA] may reasonably require.”
`42 U.S.C. § 7542.
`
` If EPA determines that “a substantial number of
`any class or category of vehicles or engines” in use
`do not conform to EPA standards at any point dur-
`ing their “useful life,” EPA may order a nationwide
`recall. 42 U.S.C. § 7541(c)(1).
`
`3. To protect EPA’s exclusive authority, Congress en-
`acted a sweeping express preemption provision: “No
`State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or at-
`tempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of
`emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle
`engines subject to this part.” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). Con-
`gress also barred states from requiring emissions testing
`by auto manufacturers “after the date of sale.” 42 U.S.C.
`§ 7541(h)(2).
`
`
`
`10
`
`4. Congress specifically authorized EPA to regulate
`manufacturers’ tampering with emissions controls after
`cars are sold. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1693
`§ 7(a)(3) (1970) (making it unlawful “for any manufacturer
`or dealer” to tamper with emission controls “after such
`sale and delivery to the ultimate purchaser”), codified as
`amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(3)(A); see also 42 U.S.C.
`§ 7523(b). Congress also imposed specific penalties for
`tampering violations by manufacturers of “up to $25,000”
`per violation. 42 U.S.C. § 7524(a). Congress further di-
`rected EPA to balance statutory factors in assessing pen-
`alties for CAA violations—including the “gravity of the vi-
`olation,” “the economic benefit or savings (if any) result-
`ing from the violation,” and “the effect of the penalty on
`the violator’s ability to continue in business.” 42 U.S.C.
`§ 7524(c)(2).
`Starting in 1975, EPA has promulgated guidance out-
`lining how manufacturers may modify emission systems
`after sale without violating the CAA’s tampering prohibi-
`tion. EPA, Field Fixes Related to Emission Control-Re-
`lated Components, MSAPC Advisory Circular No. 2B, at
`1 (Mar. 17, 1975), https://tinyurl.com/FieldFixGuidance.
`Unsurprisingly, no state or locality has attempted to pro-
`vide any such guidance to manufacturers. EPA has also
`promulgated a detailed Civil Penalty Policy establishing a
`framework to apply the CAA’s statutory penalty factors.
`EPA, Clean Air Act Mobile Source Civil Penalty Pol-
`icy—Vehicle and Engine Certification Requirements
`(Jan. 16, 2009), https://tinyurl.com/EPAPenaltyPolicy.
`5. As national and global auto manufacturers’ associ-
`ations explained as amici below, post-sale software and
`other updates have become “even more frequent and im-
`portant” as cars have grown increasingly computerized.
`C.A. Dkt. 34, at 8. Manufacturers now conduct dozens of
`
`
`
`11
`
`emissions recalls affecting, on average, six million cars an-
`nually. EPA Recall Report, at 7. Field fixes, post-sale
`updates conducted outside of a recall, are even more fre-
`quent.
`Manufacturers’ updates to emission systems raise
`technical questions requiring scientific expertise and bal-
`ancing of competing regulatory objectives, whereby the
`update “reduc[es] some types of emissions while increas-
`ing others.” C.A. Dkt. 79, at 4. Updates may require ac-
`cepting emissions increases under certain conditions to
`prevent vehicle or engine damage, or to ensure proper
`start-up. Ibid. Manufacturers work closely with EPA to
`address these tradeoffs when remedying nonconformities
`in emission systems. See EPA Recall Report, at 62.
`EPA’s exclusive regulation of such updates has, so far,
`avoided potentially conflicting determinations by differ-
`ent regulators about such updates.
`6. Finally, § 209(d) reserves to states and localities the
`authority “otherwise to control, regulate, or restrict the
`use, operation, or movement of registered or licensed mo-
`tor vehicles.” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(d) (emphases added). In
`this provision, Congress preserved state authority over
`local conduct that does not intrude on EPA’s authority,
`such as through carpool lanes. See infra at 30-31.
`
`B. Facts and Procedural History
`
`1. In 2015, EPA issued notices of violation alleging
`that Volkswagen installed software “defeat devices” in
`new diesel cars that allowed them to emit higher levels of
`nitrogen oxides (“NOx”) than allowed under EPA regula-
`tions. EPA, Notice of Violation (Sept. 18, 201
Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.
After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.
Accept $ Charge
Still Working On It
This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.
Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.
A few More Minutes ... Still Working
It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.
Thank you for your continued patience.
This document could not be displayed.
We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
Set your membership
status to view this document.
With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll
get a whole lot more, including:
- Up-to-date information for this case.
- Email alerts whenever there is an update.
- Full text search for other cases.
- Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.
One Moment Please
The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.
Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.
Your document is on its way!
If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.
Sealed Document
We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.
If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.
Access Government Site
