(Slip Opinion)
`
`OCTOBER TERM, 2022
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
`NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`Syllabus
`
`ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL. v.
`MILLIGAN ET AL.
`APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
`No. 21–1086. Argued October 4, 2022—Decided June 8, 2023*
`The issue presented is whether the districting plan adopted by the State
`of Alabama for its 2022 congressional elections likely violated §2 of the
`Voting Rights Act, 52 U. S. C. §10301. As originally enacted in 1965,
`§2 of the Act tracked the language of the Fifteenth Amendment,
`providing that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
`not be denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous con-
`dition of servitude.” In City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, this
`Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment—and thus §2—prohibits
`States from acting with a “racially discriminatory motivation” or an
`“invidious purpose” to discriminate, but it does not prohibit laws that
`are discriminatory only in effect. Id., at 61–65 (plurality opinion).
`Criticism followed, with many viewing Mobile’s intent test as not suf-
`ficiently protective of voting rights. But others believed that adoption
`of an effects test would inevitably require a focus on proportionality,
`calling voting laws into question whenever a minority group won fewer
`seats in the legislature than its share of the population. Congress ul-
`timately resolved this debate in 1982, reaching a bipartisan compro-
`mise that amended §2 to incorporate both an effects test and a robust
`disclaimer that “nothing” in §2 “establishes a right to have members
`of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
`population.” §10301(b).
`——————
`
`*Together with No. 21–1087, Allen, Alabama Secretary of State, et al. v.
`Caster et al., on certiorari before judgment to the United States Court of
`Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
`
`
`

`

`
`
`2
`
`
`ALLEN v. MILLIGAN
`
`Syllabus
` In 1992, §2 litigation challenging the State of Alabama’s then-exist-
`ing districting map resulted in the State’s first majority-black district
`and, subsequently, the State’s first black Representative since 1877.
`Alabama’s congressional map has remained remarkably similar since
`that litigation. Following the 2020 decennial census, a group of plain-
`tiffs led by Alabama legislator Bobby Singleton sued the State, arguing
`that the State’s population growth rendered the existing congressional
`map malapportioned and racially gerrymandered in violation of the
`Equal Protection Clause. While litigation was proceeding, the Ala-
`bama Legislature’s Committee on Reapportionment drew a new dis-
`tricting map that would reflect the distribution of the prior decade’s
`population growth across the State. The resulting map largely resem-
`bled the 2011 map on which it was based and similarly produced only
`one district in which black voters constituted a majority. That new
`map was signed into law as HB1.
` Three groups of Alabama citizens brought suit seeking to stop Ala-
`bama’s Secretary of State from conducting congressional elections un-
`der HB1. One group (Caster plaintiffs) challenged HB1 as invalid un-
`der §2. Another group (Milligan plaintiffs) brought claims under §2
`and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And
`a third group (the Singleton plaintiffs) amended the complaint in their
`ongoing litigation to challenge HB1 as a racial gerrymander under the
`Equal Protection Clause. A three-judge District Court was convened,
`and the Singleton and Milligan actions were consolidated before that
`District Court for purposes of preliminary injunction proceedings,
`while Caster proceeded before one of the judges on a parallel track.
`After an extensive hearing, the District Court concluded in a 227-page
`opinion that the question whether HB1 likely violated §2 was not
`“close.” The Court preliminarily enjoined Alabama from using HB1 in
`forthcoming elections. The same relief was ordered in Caster.
`Held: The Court affirms the District Court’s determination that plain-
`tiffs demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on their claim
`that HB1 violates §2. Pp. 9–22, 25–34.
`
`(a) The District Court faithfully applied this Court’s precedents in
`concluding that HB1 likely violates §2. Pp. 9–15.
`
`
`(1) This Court first addressed the 1982 amendments to §2 in
`Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, and has for the last 37 years eval-
`uated §2 claims using the Gingles framework. Gingles described the
`“essence of a §2 claim” as when “a certain electoral law, practice, or
`structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an
`inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters.” Id.,
`at 47. That occurs where an “electoral structure operates to minimize
`or cancel out” minority voters’ “ability to elect their preferred candi-
`dates.” Id., at 48. Such a risk is greatest “where minority and majority
`
`

`

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`Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`Syllabus
`
`3
`
`voters consistently prefer different candidates” and where minority
`voters are submerged in a majority voting population that “regularly
`defeat[s]” their choices. Ibid.
` To prove a §2 violation under Gingles, plaintiffs must satisfy three
`“preconditions.” Id., at 50. First, the “minority group must be suffi-
`ciently large and [geographically] compact to constitute a majority in
`a reasonably configured district.” Wisconsin Legislature v. Wisconsin
`Elections Comm’n, 595 U. S. ___, ___ (per curiam). “Second, the mi-
`nority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive.” Gin-
`gles, 478 U. S., at 51. And third, “the minority must be able to demon-
`strate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it
`. . . to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” Ibid. A plaintiff who
`demonstrates the three preconditions must then show, under the “to-
`tality of circumstances,” that the challenged political process is not
`“equally open” to minority voters. Id., at 45–46. The totality of cir-
`cumstances inquiry recognizes that application of the Gingles factors
`is fact dependent and requires courts to conduct “an intensely local
`appraisal” of the electoral mechanism at issue, as well as a “searching
`practical evaluation of the past and present reality.” Id., at 79. Con-
`gress has not disturbed the Court’s understanding of §2 as Gingles con-
`strued it nearly 40 years ago. Pp. 9–11.
`
`
`(2) The extensive record in these cases supports the District
`Court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ §2 claim was likely to succeed under
`Gingles. As to the first Gingles precondition, the District Court cor-
`rectly found that black voters could constitute a majority in a second
`district that was “reasonably configured.” The plaintiffs adduced
`eleven illustrative districting maps that Alabama could enact, at least
`one of which contained two majority-black districts that comported
`with traditional districting criteria. With respect to the compactness
`criteria, for example, the District Court explained that the maps sub-
`mitted by one expert “perform[ed] generally better on average than”
`did HB1, and contained no “bizarre shapes, or any other obvious irreg-
`ularities.” Plaintiffs’ maps contained equal populations, were contig-
`uous, and respected existing political subdivisions. Indeed, some of
`plaintiffs’ proposed maps split the same (or even fewer) county lines
`than the State’s.
` The Court finds unpersuasive the State’s argument that plaintiffs’
`maps were not reasonably configured because they failed to keep to-
`gether the Gulf Coast region. Even if that region is a traditional com-
`munity of interest, the District Court found the evidence insufficient
`to sustain Alabama’s argument that no legitimate reason could exist
`to split it. Moreover, the District Court found that plaintiffs’ maps
`were reasonably configured because they joined together a different
`community of interest called the Black Belt—a community with a high
`
`

`

`4
`
`
`ALLEN v. MILLIGAN
`
`Syllabus
`proportion of similarly situated black voters who share a lineal con-
`nection to “the many enslaved people brought there to work in the an-
`tebellum period.”
` As to the second and third Gingles preconditions, the District Court
`determined that there was “no serious dispute that Black voters are
`politically cohesive, nor that the challenged districts’ white majority
`votes sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat Black voters’ preferred
`candidate.” The court noted that, “on average, Black voters supported
`their candidates of choice with 92.3% of the vote” while “white voters
`supported Black-preferred candidates with 15.4% of the vote.” Even
`Alabama’s expert conceded “that the candidates preferred by white
`voters in the areas that he looked at regularly defeat the candidates
`preferred by Black voters.” Finally, the District Court concluded that
`plaintiffs had carried their burden at the totality of circumstances
`stage given the racial polarization of elections in Alabama, where
`“Black Alabamians enjoy virtually zero success in statewide elections”
`and where “Alabama’s extensive history of repugnant racial and vot-
`ing-related discrimination is undeniable and well documented.” The
`Court sees no reason to disturb the District Court’s careful factual
`findings, which are subject to clear error review and have gone unchal-
`lenged by Alabama in any event. Pp. 11–15.
`
`(b) The Court declines to remake its §2 jurisprudence in line with
`Alabama’s “race-neutral benchmark” theory.
`
`
`(1) The Court rejects the State’s contention that adopting the race-
`neutral benchmark as the point of comparison in §2 cases would best
`match the text of the VRA. Section 2 requires political processes in a
`State to be “equally open” such that minority voters do not “have less
`opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
`political process and to elect representatives of their choice.”
`§10301(b). Under the Court’s precedents, a district is not equally open
`when minority voters face—unlike their majority peers—bloc voting
`along racial lines, arising against the backdrop of substantial racial
`discrimination within the State, that renders a minority vote unequal
`to a vote by a nonminority voter. Alabama would ignore this precedent
`in favor of a rationale that a State’s map cannot “abridge[ ]” a person’s
`right to vote “on account of race” if the map resembles a sufficient num-
`ber of race-neutral alternatives. But this Court’s cases have consist-
`ently focused, for purposes of litigation, on the specific illustrative
`maps that a plaintiff adduces. Deviation from that map shows it is
`possible that the State’s map has a disparate effect on account of race.
`The remainder of the Gingles test helps determine whether that pos-
`sibility is reality by looking to polarized voting preferences and the
`frequency of racially discriminatory actions taken by the State.
` The Court declines to adopt Alabama’s interpretation of §2, which
`
`

`

`
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`Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`Syllabus
`
`5
`
`would “revise and reformulate the Gingles threshold inquiry that has
`been the baseline of [the Court’s] §2 jurisprudence” for decades. Bart-
`lett v. Strickland, 556 U. S. 1, 16 (plurality opinion). Pp. 15–18.
`
`
`(2) Alabama argues that absent a benchmark, the Gingles frame-
`work ends up requiring the racial proportionality in districting that
`§2(b) forbids. The Court’s decisions implementing §2 demonstrate,
`however, that when properly applied, the Gingles framework itself im-
`poses meaningful constraints on proportionality. See Shaw v. Reno,
`509 U. S. 630, 633–634; Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 906; Bush v.
`Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 957 (plurality opinion). In Shaw v. Reno, for ex-
`ample, the Court considered the permissibility of a second majority-
`minority district in North Carolina, which at the time had 12 seats in
`the U. S. House of Representatives and a 20% black voting age popu-
`lation. 509 U. S., at 633–634. Though North Carolina believed §2 re-
`quired a second majority-minority district, the Court found North Car-
`olina’s approach an impermissible racial gerrymander because the
`State had “concentrated a dispersed minority population in a single
`district by disregarding traditional districting principles such as com-
`pactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions.” Id., at 647.
` The Court’s decisions in Bush and Shaw similarly declined to re-
`quire additional majority-minority districts under §2 where those dis-
`tricts did not satisfy traditional districting principles.
` The Court recognizes that reapportionment remains primarily the
`duty and responsibility of the States, not the federal courts. Section 2
`thus never requires adoption of districts that violate traditional redis-
`tricting principles and instead limits judicial intervention to “those in-
`stances of intensive racial politics” where the “excessive role [of race]
`in the electoral process . . . den[ies] minority voters equal opportunity
`to participate.” S. Rep. No. 97–417, pp. 33–34. Pp. 18–22.
`
`(c) To apply its race-neutral benchmark in practice, Alabama would
`require plaintiffs to make at least three showings. First, Alabama
`would require §2 plaintiffs to show that the illustrative maps adduced
`for the first Gingles precondition are not based on race. Alabama
`would next graft onto §2 a requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate, at
`the totality of circumstances stage, that the State’s enacted plan con-
`tains fewer majority-minority districts than what an “average” race-
`neutral plan would contain. And finally, Alabama would have plain-
`tiffs prove that any deviation between the State’s plan and a race-neu-
`tral plan is explainable “only” by race. The Court declines to adopt any
`of these novel requirements.
` Here, Alabama contends that because HB1 sufficiently “resembles”
`the “race-neutral” maps created by the State’s experts—all of which
`lack two majority-black districts—HB1 does not violate §2. Alabama’s
`reliance on the maps created by its experts Dr. Duchin and Dr. Imai is
`
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`

`6
`
`
`ALLEN v. MILLIGAN
`
`Syllabus
`misplaced because those maps do not accurately represent the district-
`ing process in Alabama. Regardless, the map-comparison test that Al-
`abama proposes is flawed in its fundamentals. Neither the text of §2
`nor the fraught debate that produced it suggests that “equal access” to
`the fundamental right of voting turns on technically complicated com-
`puter simulations. Further, while Alabama has repeatedly empha-
`sized that HB1 cannot have violated §2 because none of plaintiffs’ two
`million odd maps contained more than one majority-minority district,
`that (albeit very big) number is close to irrelevant in practice, where
`experts estimate the possible number of Alabama districting maps
`numbers is at least in the trillion trillions.
` Alabama would also require plaintiffs to demonstrate that any devi-
`ations between the State’s enacted plan and race-neutral alternatives
`“can be explained only by racial discrimination.” Brief for Alabama 44
`(emphasis added). But the Court’s precedents and the legislative com-
`promise struck in the 1982 amendments clearly rejected treating dis-
`criminatory intent as a requirement for liability under §2. Pp. 22, 25–
`30.
`
`(d) The Court disagrees with Alabama’s assertions that the Court
`should stop applying §2 in cases like these because the text of §2 does
`not apply to single-member redistricting and because §2 is unconstitu-
`tional as the District Court applied it here. Alabama’s understanding
`of §2 would require abandoning four decades of the Court’s §2 prece-
`dents. The Court has unanimously held that §2 and the Gingles frame-
`work apply to claims challenging single-member districts. Growe v.
`Emison, 507 U. S. 25, 40. As Congress is undoubtedly aware of the
`Court’s construction of §2 to apply to districting challenges, statutory
`stare decisis counsels staying the course until and unless Congress
`acts. In any event, the statutory text supports the conclusion that §2
`applies to single-member districts. Indeed, the contentious debates in
`Congress about proportionality would have made little sense if §2’s
`coverage was as limited as Alabama contends.
` The Court similarly rejects Alabama’s argument that §2 as applied
`to redistricting is unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment.
`The Court held over 40 years ago “that, even if §1 of the [Fifteenth]
`Amendment prohibits only purposeful discrimination,” City of Rome v.
`United States, 446 U. S. 156, 173, the VRA’s “ban on electoral changes
`that are discriminatory in effect is an appropriate method of promoting
`the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment,” id., at 177. Alabama’s con-
`tention that the Fifteenth Amendment does not authorize race-based
`redistricting as a remedy for §2 violations similarly fails. The Court is
`not persuaded by Alabama’s arguments that §2 as interpreted in Gin-
`gles exceeds the remedial authority of Congress.
` The Court’s opinion does not diminish or disregard the concern that
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`

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`Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`Syllabus
`
`7
`
`§2 may impermissibly elevate race in the allocation of political power
`within the States. Instead, the Court simply holds that a faithful ap-
`plication of precedent and a fair reading of the record do not bear those
`concerns out here. Pp. 30–34.
`Nos. 21–1086, 582 F. Supp. 3d 924, and 21–1087, affirmed.
` ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part
`III–B–1. SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., joined that opinion in
`full, and KAVANAUGH, J., joined except for Part III–B–1. KAVANAUGH, J.,
`filed an opinion concurring in all but Part III–B–1. THOMAS, J., filed a
`dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined, in which BARRETT, J.,
`joined as to Parts II and III, and in which ALITO, J., joined as to Parts II–
`A and II–B. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J.,
`joined.
`
`
`

`

`
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`Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
`Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
`pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`Nos. 21–1086 and 21–1087
`_________________
`WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
`ET AL., APPELLANTS
`v.
`EVAN MILLIGAN, ET AL.
`ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
`THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
`
`21–1086
`
`
`
`21–1087
`
`WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
`ET AL., PETITIONERS
`v.
`MARCUS CASTER, ET AL.
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
`STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`[June 8, 2023]
` CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
`Court, except as to Part III–B–1.*
` In January 2022, a three-judge District Court sitting in
`Alabama preliminarily enjoined the State from using the
`districting plan it had recently adopted for the 2022 con-
`gressional elections, finding that the plan likely violated
`Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U. S. C. §10301. This
`Court stayed the District Court’s order pending further re-
`view. 595 U. S. ___ (2022). After conducting that review,
`we now affirm.
`——————
`*JUSTICE KAVANAUGH joins all but Part III–B–1 of this opinion.
`
`

`

`2
`
`
`ALLEN v. MILLIGAN
`
`Opinion of the Court
`I
`A
` Shortly after the Civil War, Congress passed and the
`States ratified the Fifteenth Amendment, providing that
`“[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
`be denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previ-
`ous condition of servitude.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 15, §1. In
`the century that followed, however, the Amendment proved
`little more than a parchment promise. Jim Crow laws like
`literacy tests, poll taxes, and “good-morals” requirements
`abounded, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301,
`312–313 (1966), “render[ing] the right to vote illusory for
`blacks,” Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v.
`Holder, 557 U. S. 193, 220–221 (2009) (THOMAS, J., concur-
`ring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Congress
`stood up to little of it; “[t]he first century of congressional
`enforcement of the [Fifteenth] Amendment . . . can only be
`regarded as a failure.” Id., at 197 (majority opinion).
` That changed in 1965. Spurred by the Civil Rights move-
`ment, Congress enacted and President Johnson signed into
`law the Voting Rights Act. 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 52
`U. S. C. §10301 et seq. The Act “create[d] stringent new
`remedies for voting discrimination,” attempting to forever
`“banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting.” Kat-
`zenbach, 383 U. S., at 308. By 1981, in only sixteen years’
`time, many considered the VRA “the most successful civil
`rights statute in the history of the Nation.” S. Rep. No. 97–
`417, p. 111 (1982) (Senate Report).
` These cases concern Section 2 of that Act. In its original
`form, Ҥ2 closely tracked the language of the [Fifteenth]
`Amendment” and, as a result, had little independent force.
`Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, 594 U. S. ___,
`___ (2021) (slip op., at 3).1 Our leading case on §2 at the
`
`——————
`1 As originally enacted, §2 provided that “[n]o voting qualification or
`
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`

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`Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`time was City of Mobile v. Bolden, which involved a claim
`by black voters that the City’s at-large election system ef-
`fectively excluded them from participating in the election of
`city commissioners. 446 U. S. 55 (1980). The commission
`had three seats, black voters comprised one-third of the
`City’s population, but no black-preferred candidate had
`ever won election.
` The Court ruled against the plaintiffs. The Fifteenth
`Amendment—and thus §2—prohibits States from acting
`with a “racially discriminatory motivation” or an “invidious
`purpose” to discriminate. Id., at 61–65 (plurality opinion).
`But it does not prohibit laws that are discriminatory only
`in effect. Ibid. The Mobile plaintiffs could “register and
`vote without hindrance”—“their freedom to vote ha[d] not
`been denied or abridged by anyone.” Id., at 65. The fact
`that they happened to lose frequently was beside the point.
`Nothing the City had done “purposeful[ly] exclu[ded]” them
`“from participati[ng] in the election process.” Id., at 64.
` Almost immediately after it was decided, Mobile “pro-
`duced an avalanche of criticism, both in the media and
`within the civil rights community.” T. Boyd & S. Markman,
`The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legisla-
`tive History, 40 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1347, 1355 (1983)
`(Boyd & Markman). The New York Times wrote that the
`decision represented “the biggest step backwards in civil
`rights to come from the Nixon Court.” N. Y. Times, Apr. 23,
`1980, p. A22. And the Washington Post described Mobile
`as a “major defeat for blacks and other minorities fighting
`electoral schemes that exclude them from office.” Washing-
`ton Post, Apr. 23, 1980, p. A5. By focusing on discrimina-
`tory intent and ignoring disparate effect, critics argued, the
`Court had abrogated “the standard used by the courts to
`——————
`prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be im-
`posed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge
`the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
`color.” 42 U. S. C. §1973 (1970 ed.).
`
`

`

`4
`
`
`ALLEN v. MILLIGAN
`
`Opinion of the Court
`determine whether [racial] discrimination existed . . . :
`Whether such discrimination existed.” It’s Results That
`Count, Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 3, 1982, p. 8–A.
` But Mobile had its defenders, too. In their view, aban-
`doning the intent test in favor of an effects test would inev-
`itably require a focus on proportionality—wherever a mi-
`nority group won fewer seats in the legislature than its
`share of the population, the charge could be made that the
`State law had a discriminatory effect. That, after all, was
`the type of claim brought in Mobile. But mandating racial
`proportionality in elections was regarded by many as intol-
`erable. Doing so, wrote Senator Orrin Hatch in the Wash-
`ington Star, would be “strongly resented by the American
`public.” Washington Star, Sept. 30, 1980, p. A–9. The Wall
`Street Journal offered similar criticism. An effects test
`would generate “more, not less, racial and ethnic polariza-
`tion.” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 19, 1982, p. 28.
` This sharp debate arrived at Congress’s doorstep in 1981.
`The question whether to broaden §2 or keep it as is, said
`Hatch—by then Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee be-
`fore which §2 would be debated—“involve[d] one of the most
`substantial constitutional issues ever to come before this
`body.” 2 Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Consti-
`tution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th
`Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 1 (1982).
` Proceedings in Congress mirrored the disagreement that
`had developed around the country. In April 1981, Con-
`gressman Peter W. Rodino, Jr.—longtime chairman of the
`House Judiciary Committee—introduced a bill to amend
`the VRA, proposing that the words “to deny or abridge” in
`§2 be replaced with the phrase “in a manner which results
`in a denial or abridgement.” H. R. 3112, 97th Cong., 1st
`Sess., 2 (as introduced) (emphasis added). This was the ef-
`fects test that Mobile’s detractors sought.
` But those wary of proportionality were not far behind.
`Senator Hatch argued that the effects test “was intelligible
`
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`

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`5
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`Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)
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`Opinion of the Court
`only to the extent that it approximated a standard of pro-
`portional representation by race.” Boyd & Markman 1392.
`The Attorney General had the same concern. The effects
`test “would be triggered whenever election results did not
`mirror the population mix of a particular community,” he
`wrote, producing “essentially a quota system for electoral
`politics.” N. Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1982, p. 23.
` The impasse was not resolved until late April 1982, when
`Senator Bob Dole proposed a compromise. Boyd & Mark-
`man 1414. Section 2 would include the effects test that
`many desired but also a robust disclaimer against propor-
`tionality. Seeking to navigate any tension between the two,
`the Dole Amendment borrowed language from a Fourteenth
`Amendment case of ours, White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755
`(1973), which many in Congress believed would allow
`courts to consider effects but avoid proportionality. The
`standard for liability in voting cases, White explained, was
`whether “the political processes leading to nomination and
`election were not equally open to participation by the group
`in question—[in] that its members had less opportunity
`than did other residents in the district to participate in the
`political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.”
`Id., at 766.
` The Dole compromise won bipartisan support and, on
`June 18, the Senate passed the 1982 amendments by an
`overwhelming margin, 85–8. Eleven days later, President
`Reagan signed the Act into law. The amended §2 reads as
`follows:
` “(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting
`or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or
`applied by any State or political subdivision in a man-
`ner which results in a denial or abridgement of the
`right of any citizen of the United States to vote on ac-
`count of race or color . . . as provided in subsection (b).
` “(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if,
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`6
`
`
`ALLEN v. MILLIGAN
`
`Opinion of the Court
`based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that
`the political processes leading to nomination or election
`in the State or political subdivision are not equally
`open to participation by members of a class of citizens
`. . . in that its members have less opportunity than
`other members of the electorate to participate in the
`political process and to elect representatives of their
`choice. The extent to which members of a protected
`class have been elected to office in the State or political
`subdivision is one circumstance which may be consid-
`ered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes
`a right to have members of a protected class elected in
`numbers equal to their proportion in the population.”
`52 U. S. C. §10301.
`
`B
` For the first 115 years following Reconstruction, the
`State of Alabama elected no black Representatives to Con-
`gress. See Singleton v. Merrill, 582 F. Supp. 3d 924, 947
`(ND Ala. 2022) ( per curiam). In 1992, several plaintiffs
`sued the State, alleging that it had been impermissibly di-
`luting the votes of black Alabamians in violation of §2. See
`Wesch v. Hunt, 785 F. Supp. 1491, 1493 (SD Ala.). The law-
`suit produced a majority-black district in Alabama for the
`first time in decades. Id., at 1499. And that fall, Birming-
`ham lawyer Earl Hillard became the first black Representa-
`tive from Alabama since 1877. 582 F. Supp. 3d, at 947.
` Alabama’s congressional map has “remained remarkably
`similar” after Wesch. Brief for Appellants in No. 21–1086
`etc., p. 9 (Brief for Alabama). The map contains seven con-
`gressional districts, each with a single representative. See
`Supp. App. 205–211; 582 F. Supp. 3d, at 951. District 1 en-
`compasses the Gulf Coast region in the southwest; District
`2—known as the Wiregrass region—occupies the southeast;
`District 3 covers the eastern-central part of the State; Dis-
`tricts 4 and 5 stretch width-wise across the north, with the
`
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`

`
`
`7
`
`Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`latter layered atop the former; District 6 is right in the
`State’s middle; and District 7 spans the central west. Id.,
`at 951.
` In 2020, the decennial census revealed that Alabama’s
`population had grown by 5.1%. See 1 App. 86. A group of
`plaintiffs led by Alabama legislator Bobby Singleton sued
`the State, arguing that the existing congressional map was
`malapportioned and racially gerrymandered in violation of
`the Equal Protection Clause. 582 F. Supp. 3d, at 938–939.
`While litigation was proceeding, the Alabama Legislature’s
`Committee on Reapportionment began creating a new dis-
`tricting map. Ibid. Although the prior decade’s population
`growth did not change the number of seats that Alabama
`would receive in the House, the growth had been unevenly
`distributed across the State, and the existing map was thus
`out of date.
` To solve the problem, the State turned to experienced
`mapmaker Randy Hinaman, who had created several dis-
`tricting maps that Alabama used over the past 30 years.
`Id., at 947–948. The starting point for Hinaman was the
`then-existing 2011 congressional map, itself a product of
`the 2001 map that Hinaman had also created. Civ. No. 21–
`1530 (ND Ala.), ECF Doc. 70–2, pp. 40, 93–94; see also 582
`F. Supp. 3d, at 950. Hinaman worked to adjust the 2011
`map in accordance with the redistricting guidelines set by
`the legislature’s Reapportionment Committee. Id., at 948–
`950; 1 App. 275. Those guidelines prioritized population
`equality, contiguity, compactness, and avoiding dilution of
`minority voting strength. 582 F. Supp. 3d, at 1035–1036.
`They also encouraged, as a secondary matter, avoiding in-
`cumbent pairings, respecting communities of interest, min-
`imizing the number of counties in each district, and pre-
`serving cores of existing districts. Id., at 1036–1037.
` The resulting map Hinaman drew largely resembled the
`2011 map, again producing only one district in which black
`voters constituted a majority of the voting age population.
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`8
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`
`ALLEN v. MILLIGAN
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Supp. App. 205–211. The Alabama Legislature enacted
`Hinaman’s map under the name HB1. 582 F. Supp. 3d, at
`935, 950–951. Governor Ivey signed HB1 into law on No-
`vember 4, 2021. Id., at 950.
`
`C
` Three groups of plaintiffs brought suit seeking to stop Al-
`abama’s Secretary of State from conducting