`
`No. 21-1496
`
`IN THE
`Supreme Court of the United States
`
`
`TWITTER, INC.,
`
`v.
`
`Petitioner,
`
`MEHIER TAAMNEH, et al.,
`
`Respondents.
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
`
`
`
`
`SETH P. WAXMAN
` Counsel of Record
`PATRICK J. CAROME
`ARI HOLTZBLATT
`CLAIRE H. CHUNG
`AMY LISHINSKI
`ANDRES C. SALINAS
`NATHANIEL W. REISINGER
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
` HALE AND DORR LLP
`1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
`Washington, DC 20006
`(202) 663-6000
`seth.waxman@wilmerhale.com
`
`
`ALEX W. MILLER
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
` HALE AND DORR LLP
`7 World Trade Center
`250 Greenwich Street
`New York, NY 10007
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`QUESTIONS PRESENTED
`
`Under Section 2333 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, as
`amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism
`Act, U.S. nationals injured by “an act of international
`terrorism” that is “committed, planned, or authorized
`by” a designated foreign terrorist organization may sue
`any person who “aids and abets, by knowingly provid-
`ing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the
`person who committed such an act of international ter-
`rorism,” and recover treble damages.
` 18 U.S.C.
`§2333(a), (d)(2). The questions presented are:
`1. Whether a defendant that provides generic,
`widely available services to all its numerous users and
`“regularly” works to detect and prevent terrorists from
`using those services “knowingly” provided substantial
`assistance under Section 2333 merely because it alleg-
`edly could have taken more “meaningful” or “aggres-
`sive” action to prevent such use.
`2. Whether a defendant whose generic, widely
`available services were not used in connection with the
`specific “act of international terrorism” that injured the
`plaintiff may be liable for aiding and abetting under
`Section 2333.
`
`
`(i)
`
`
`
`
`
`PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
`
`Petitioner Twitter, Inc. was a defendant in the dis-
`trict court and an appellee in the court of appeals.
`Respondents Facebook, Inc. (now known as Meta
`Platforms, Inc.) and Google LLC were also defendants
`in the district court and appellees in the court of ap-
`peals. Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 12.6, Google LLC
`and Facebook, Inc. filed letters at the certiorari stage
`indicating that they support Petitioner.
`Lawrence
`Respondents Mehier
`Taamneh,
`Taamneh, Sara Taamneh, and Dimana Taamneh were
`plaintiffs in the district court and appellants in the
`court of appeals.
`
`
`CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
`
`Twitter, Inc. is a privately held company, and its
`parent corporation is X Holdings I, Inc. No publicly
`held corporation owns 10 percent or more of Twitter,
`Inc.
`
`(ii)
`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`QUESTIONS PRESENTED ............................................ i
`PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING .............................. ii
`CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ............. ii
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................... vi
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................... 1
`OPINIONS BELOW ........................................................... 4
`JURISDICTION .................................................................. 5
`STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..................... 5
`STATEMENT ...................................................................... 5
`A. Twitter And
`Its Policy Against
`Harmful Content ................................................... 5
`B. Statutory Background .......................................... 7
`C. This Case .............................................................. 10
`1. Plaintiffs’ Theory Of Liability .................... 10
`2. District Court Proceeding .......................... 14
`3. Court Of Appeals Proceeding .................... 17
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................................... 19
`ARGUMENT ...................................................................... 21
`I. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES A DEFENDANT
`TO SUBSTANTIALLY ASSIST A SPECIFIC
`“ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,”
`NOT A GENERAL TERRORISM CAMPAIGN ............... 22
`
`(iii)
`
`
`
`iv
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
`
`Page
`
`A. Section 2333(d) Requires That A
`Defendant Substantially Assist The
`“Act Of International Terrorism” That
`Gave Rise To The Claim .................................... 22
`B. Common Law Principles Confirm That
`Aiding And Abetting Requires
`Assisting The Principal Tort ............................. 26
`C. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously
`Construed Section 2333(d) ................................. 32
`II. SECTION
`2333(d) REQUIRES, AT A
`MINIMUM, THAT DEFENDANTS KNEW OF
`SPECIFIC
`ACCOUNTS
`THAT
`SUBSTANTIALLY ASSISTED THE REINA
`ATTACK AND THAT NOT BLOCKING THOSE
`ACCOUNTS WOULD
`SUBSTANTIALLY
`ASSIST SUCH AN ATTACK .......................................... 36
`A. Statutory Text, Halberstam, And
`Common Law Principles Require
`Specific Knowledge Of The Alleged
`Substantial Assistance ....................................... 37
`B. The Ninth Circuit Misconstrued The
`Statutory Knowledge Requirement ................. 43
`C. Decisions From Other Courts Of
`Appeals Confirm The Ninth Circuit’s
`Error ..................................................................... 45
`III. REVERSAL IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT
`FAR-REACHING HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES.......... 47
`CONCLUSION ................................................................. 52
`
`
`
`
`
`v
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
`
`APPENDIX: Statutory Provisions Involved
`18 U.S.C. §2331(1) ...................................................... 1a
`18 U.S.C. §2333(a) & (d) ............................................ 2a
`18 U.S.C. §2339B(1)(a) ............................................... 3a
`
`Page
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`vi
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`CASES
`
`Page(s)
`
`American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v.
`Grim, 440 P.2d 621 (Kan. 1968) ................................ 35
`BMG Rights Management (US) LLC v. Cox
`Communications, Inc., 881 F.3d 293 (4th
`Cir. 2018) ...................................................................... 43
`Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief &
`Development, 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008)
`(en banc) ......................................................................... 8
`Cain v. Twitter Inc., 2018 WL 4657275 (N.D.
`Cal. Sept. 24, 2018) ..................................................... 11
`Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455 (8th Cir.
`1991) ................................................................. 36, 40, 44
`Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
`Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
`164 (1994) ................................................... 23, 26, 29, 49
`Colon v. Twitter, Inc., 14 F.4th 1213 (11th Cir.
`2021) ............................................................................. 11
`Copeland v. Twitter, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 3d 965
`(N.D. Cal. 2018) ........................................................... 11
`Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., 921 F.3d 617 (6th Cir.
`2019) ....................................................................... 11, 48
`Duke v. Feldman, 226 A.2d 345 (Md. 1967) ................... 27
`Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 881 F.3d 739 (9th Cir.
`2018) ......................................................................... 7, 48
`Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir.
`2019) ............................................................................. 11
`
`
`
`
`
`vii
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
`
`Page(s)
`
`Gallardo by and through Vasallo v. Marstiller,
`142 S. Ct. 1751 (2022) ................................................. 25
`Gonnella v. SEC, 954 F.3d 536 (2d Cir. 2020) ............... 28
`Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir.
`1983) .................................................................... passim
`Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S.
`1 (2010) ........................................................................... 8
`Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,
`503 U.S. 258 (1992) ....................................................... 7
`Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168
`(D.C. Cir. 1980) ........................................................... 40
`Kaplan v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 999 F.3d
`842 (2d Cir. 2021) ........................................................ 46
`Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397 (Okla. 1958) ................... 27
`Landy v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 486
`F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973) ............................................... 29
`Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579
`F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978) ............................................... 41
`Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021) ............. 25
`Palmucci v. Twitter Inc., 2019 WL 1676079
`(N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2019)............................................ 11
`Pennie v. Twitter, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 874
`(N.D. Cal. 2017) ........................................................... 11
`Retana v. Twitter, Inc., 1 F.4th 378 (5th Cir.
`2021) ............................................................................. 11
`Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014) ............ 27
`
`
`
`
`
`viii
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
`
`Page(s)
`
`Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82 (2d Cir.
`2013) ............................................................................... 8
`Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr, 551
`U.S. 47 (2007) ........................................................ 38, 44
`Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir.
`1991) ............................................................................. 41
`SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974) ................ 41
`SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. 1996) ..................... 28
`SEC v. Goble, 682 F.3d 934 (11th Cir. 2012) .................. 28
`SEC v. Life Partner Holdings, Inc., 854 F.3d
`765 (5th Cir. 2017) ....................................................... 28
`Siegel v. HSBC North America Holdings, Inc.,
`933 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2019) .................................. 45, 46
`Sinclair for Tucker v. Twitter, Inc., 2019 WL
`10252752 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2019) .......................... 11
`Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
`Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) ............................. 42
`Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d
`Cir. 2010) ...................................................................... 42
`Weiss v. National Westminster Bank, PLC,
`993 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2021) ........................................ 46
`Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d
`84 (5th Cir. 1975) ........................... 10, 36, 38, 40, 41, 42
`
`DOCKETED CASES
`Clayborn v. Twitter, Inc., No. 19-15043 (9th
`Cir.) ............................................................................... 11
`
`
`
`
`
`ix
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
`
`Page(s)
`Gonzalez v. Google LLC, No. 21-1333 (U.S.) ........... 11, 17
`Megalla v. Twitter, Inc., No. 3:18-cv-00543
`(N.D. Cal.) .................................................................... 11
`
`STATUTORY PROVISIONS
`15 U.S.C. §78t ..................................................................... 28
`The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C.
`§§2331 et seq. ................................................................ 7
`§2331 ..................................................................... 5, 8, 25
`§2333 .................................................................... passim
`§2333 Note ..................................................................... 3
`§2335 ............................................................................. 48
`18 U.S.C.
`§2339A .......................................................................... 14
`§2339B .................................................. 2, 5, 8, 14, 15, 25
`§2339C .......................................................................... 14
`28 U.S.C. §1254 .................................................................... 5
`Pub. L. No. 112-239, 126 Stat. 1632 (2013) ..................... 48
`Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016) ..... 3, 8, 9, 23, 33
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`162 Cong. Rec. H5239 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 2016) ................ 9
`Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ......................... 24
`Cambridge English Dictionary
`(2022),
`https://tinyurl.com/mrx83rt7 .................................... 24
`
`
`
`
`
`x
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
`
`Page(s)
`
`Mackintosh, Kate & Patrick Duplat, Study of
`the Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism
`Measures on Principled Humanitarian
`Action
`(July 2013), https://tinyurl.com/
`mtstzjpp ................................................................. 50, 51
`Restatement (Second) of Torts (Oct. 2022
`Update) .................................................................. 26, 41
`Senate Legislative Counsel for the Senate
`Committee on the Judiciary, 114th Cong.,
`S. 2040 Substitute Redline (Comm. Print.
`2016), https://tinyurl.com/47cxuysc ........................... 9
`Twitter Blog, New Tweets per second record,
`and how!
`(Aug. 16, 2013), https://
`tinyurl.com/42ebxke9
`(visited Nov. 28,
`2022) ............................................................................... 6
`Twitter Rules (as of Jan. 1, 2017), https://
`tinyurl.com/2snjkx8x
`(visited Nov. 28,
`2022) (Internet archive version) ................................ 6
`Twitter,
`Transparency Reports,
`July-
`December
`2016,
`https://tinyurl.com/
`bdhjk2ak (visited Nov. 28, 2022) (Internet
`archive version) ............................................................ 7
`Twitter, Transparency Reports, January-June
`2017, https://tinyurl.com/r7sdu3wx (visited
`Nov. 28, 2022) (Internet archive version) ................. 7
`Twitter, Transparency Reports, January-June
`2018, https://tinyurl.com/56bkk4k2 (visited
`Nov. 28, 2022) (Internet archive version) ................. 7
`
`
`
`
`
`xi
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
`
`Page(s)
`
`July-
`Transparency Reports,
`Twitter,
`December
`2018,
`https://tinyurl.com/
`bddbpvtb (visited Nov. 28, 2022) (Internet
`archive version) ............................................................ 7
`Twitter, Transparency Reports, January-June
`2019, https://tinyurl.com/2vxcsbv8 (visited
`Nov. 28, 2022) (Internet archive version) ................. 7
`Twitter,
`Transparency Reports,
`July-
`December
`2021,
`https://tinyurl.com/
`y58wkkaj (visited Nov. 28, 2022) ............................... 7
`Twitter, Violent Organizations Policy, https://
`tinyurl.com/8wu6u2km (visited Nov. 28,
`2022) ............................................................................... 6
`U.S. Department of State, Designated Foreign
`Terrorist
`Organizations,
`https://
`tinyurl.com/em9y6a9d
`(visited Nov. 28,
`2022) ............................................................................... 9
`USAID, Fact Sheet #11: Syria—Complex
`Emergency
`(Sept. 30, 2022), https://
`tinyurl.com/2zf64twn ................................................. 50
`Yayla, Ahmet S., Combating Terrorism Center
`at West Point, The Reina Nightclub Attack
`and the Islamic State Threat to Turkey, 10
`CTC Sentinel 9
`(Mar. 2017), https://
`tinyurl.com/24v96rkf .................................................. 12
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IN THE
`Supreme Court of the United States
`
`No. 21-1496
`
`
`TWITTER, INC.,
`
`v.
`
`Petitioner,
`
`MEHIER TAAMNEH, et al.,
`
`Respondents.
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`In the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act
`(JASTA), Congress enacted a traditional civil aiding-
`and-abetting provision, rooted in common law princi-
`ples. That provision creates a cause of action that can
`be asserted by any U.S. national injured by reason of
`“an act of international terrorism” against anyone who
`“aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial as-
`sistance, or who conspires with the person who commit-
`ted such an act of international terrorism.” 18 U.S.C.
`§2333(d)(2). The Ninth Circuit held that Twitter,
`Google, and Facebook (“Defendants”) could be liable
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`under this provision for the killing of Plaintiffs’ relative
`in an ISIS attack at the Reina nightclub in Turkey.
`The court so held despite acknowledging that Defend-
`ants had no “intent to further or aid ISIS’s terrorist ac-
`tivities” and had adopted and “regularly” enforced poli-
`cies against terrorist content, Pet.App.64a-65a, and de-
`spite the absence of any allegation that Defendants’
`services were used to plan or commit the Reina attack
`itself. According to the Ninth Circuit, it is enough for
`Plaintiffs to allege that Defendants were generally
`aware that ISIS adherents were somewhere among the
`billions using their ordinary services, this use benefit-
`ted the organization generally, and Defendants’ efforts
`to remove terrorist content were not sufficiently
`“meaningful” and “aggressive,” Pet.App.62a. That
`holding breaks sharply from the well-established legal
`framework for aiding and abetting and exposes ordi-
`nary businesses providing widely available goods or
`services and humanitarian organizations to staggering
`terrorism liability, burdensome discovery, and reputa-
`tional damage. This is not the law Congress created.
`The Ninth Circuit reached its mistaken conclusion
`by committing two fundamental errors that cannot be
`squared with the plain language of the statute, the gov-
`erning legal framework, or the common law principles
`on which the statute is based.
`First, the Ninth Circuit was wrong to hold that aid-
`ing-and-abetting liability can attach based on general-
`ized assistance to a terrorist organization, rather than
`assistance to the attack that injured the plaintiff. Con-
`gress enacted a separate statutory provision, 18 U.S.C.
`§2339B, to address the former scenario. But in enact-
`ing Section 2333(d), Congress imposed civil aiding-and-
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`abetting liability only where the defendant assists the
`specific “act of international terrorism” that injured the
`plaintiff. That act of international terrorism is the only
`actionable tort under Section 2333(d). Halberstam v.
`Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983)—which “provides
`the proper legal framework” for ATA aiding-and-
`abetting liability, Pub. L. No. 114-222, §2(a)(5), 130
`Stat. 852 (2016) (18 U.S.C. §2333 Note)—requires the
`same result, making clear the defendant must substan-
`tially assist the “principal violation” that gave rise to
`the claim. 705 F.2d at 477. Here, “Plaintiffs unambigu-
`ously conceded the act of international terrorism they
`allege is the Reina Attack itself.” Pet.App.64a. But
`Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants assisted in
`committing that attack at all, much less substantially.
`Second, the Ninth Circuit independently erred in
`holding that a defendant “knowingly” provides sub-
`stantial assistance if it was merely generally aware that
`terrorist adherents were among the many using its or-
`dinary services, notwithstanding a regularly enforced
`policy against such use. The statutory language de-
`mands that a defendant “knowingly provid[e] substan-
`tial assistance,” 18 U.S.C. §2333(d)(2), and Halberstam
`also requires the defendant to “knowingly and substan-
`tially assist” the principal tort, 705 F. 2d at 477. A de-
`fendant must therefore actually know of the particular
`substantial assistance it provided. Here that means, at
`a minimum, that Defendants must have known of spe-
`cific accounts that substantially assisted the Reina at-
`tack and also have known that not blocking those ac-
`counts would substantially assist such an attack. Yet
`Plaintiffs concede that Defendants “rarely knew about
`‘specific’ terrorism accounts or posts,” Opp. 17, and do
`not allege that any Defendant knew about yet failed to
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`block any account that was used to plan or commit the
`Reina attack or any other terrorist attack. What Plain-
`tiffs allege instead—that Defendants were generally
`aware some terrorist adherents were among the bil-
`lions using Defendants’ services—might, at most,
`amount to recklessness in some circumstances. But
`those allegations cannot establish that Defendants
`“knowingly provided substantial assistance,” especially
`where, as here, the aiding-and-abetting theory is prem-
`ised on Defendants’ alleged failure to do more to stop
`terrorists from misusing their widely available ser-
`vices.
`The Ninth Circuit’s errors would have disastrous
`consequences if left uncorrected. It is unclear what a
`business that broadly provides generalized services
`could do to avoid liability for aiding and abetting an act
`of
`international
`terrorism,
`because Plaintiffs
`acknowledge that Defendants regularly removed ter-
`rorist content from their platforms, and a plaintiff can
`always allege that a defendant could have done more.
`Congress did not enact a statute that attaches liability
`based on such an ill-defined and capacious theory. The
`Court should reverse.
`
`OPINIONS BELOW
`The Ninth Circuit’s decision (Pet.App.1a-150a) is
`reported at 2 F.4th 871. The district court’s order
`granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Pet.App.151a-
`180a) is reported at 343 F. Supp. 3d 904. The Ninth
`Circuit’s order denying panel rehearing and rehearing
`en banc (Pet.App.181a) is unreported.
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`JURISDICTION
`The Ninth Circuit entered judgment on June 22,
`2021. It denied Defendants’ timely petition for panel
`rehearing and rehearing en banc on December 27, 2021.
`On March 14, 2022, Justice Kagan extended the time for
`filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including
`May 26, 2022. The conditional petition for a writ of cer-
`tiorari was filed May 26, 2022, and granted October 3,
`2022. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
`§1254(1).
`
`STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
`The relevant subsections of 18 U.S.C. §§2331, 2333,
`and 2339B are set out in the appendix to this brief.
`App.1a-3a.
`
`STATEMENT
`A. Twitter And Its Policy Against Harmful Con-
`tent
`Twitter is a global communications company found-
`ed in 2006. It provides an Internet communications
`platform free of charge to hundreds of millions of indi-
`viduals who use the platform to share their views, en-
`gage with the views of others, and follow current
`events. People who promise to follow Twitter’s rules
`and terms of use may post “Tweets,” short messages
`limited to 280 characters that can also contain images,
`videos, and links to other websites or media sources.
`The brevity of Tweets and the ability to react in real
`time to current events have made Twitter a popular
`online platform. On any given day, users post more
`
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`than 500 million Tweets—5,700 Tweets per second.1
`The volume of Tweets increases when culturally nota-
`ble or newsworthy events occur. During a 2013 film
`airing in Japan, for example, more than 140,000 Tweets
`were posted in a single second.2
`Twitter welcomes diverse people, ideas, and infor-
`mation. At the same time, it is committed to providing
`a safe space for conversation, and has established poli-
`cies, processes, and tools to achieve that goal. Twitter’s
`rules against “threatening or promoting terrorism” and
`against using Twitter “for any unlawful purposes or in
`furtherance of illegal activities” have been important to
`that effort.3 As Plaintiffs concede, throughout the peri-
`od relevant to their claim, Twitter prohibited content
`promoting terrorism. Pet.App.64a-65a.4 Plaintiffs also
`
`
`1 Twitter Blog, New Tweets per second record, and how!
`(Aug. 16, 2013), https://tinyurl.com/42ebxke9 (visited Nov. 28,
`2022).
`2 Id.
`3 Twitter Rules (as of Jan. 1, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/
`2snjkx8x (Internet archive version) (visited Nov. 28, 2022). The
`attack at issue in this case occurred on January 1, 2017.
`4 Twitter’s current rules also prohibit terrorist content. Its
`Violent Organizations Policy bars individuals who “affiliate with
`and promote the illicit activities of a terrorist organization or vio-
`lent extremist group,” and prohibits content “engaging in or pro-
`moting acts on behalf of a violent organization; recruiting for a vio-
`lent organization; providing or distributing services (e.g., financial,
`media/propaganda) to further a violent organization’s stated goals;
`and using the insignia or symbol of violent organizations to pro-
`mote them or indicate affiliation or support,” among other things.
`Twitter, Violent Organizations Policy, https://tinyurl.com/
`8wu6u2km (visited Nov. 28, 2022).
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`acknowledge that Twitter enforced that prohibition by
`removing terrorist content and accounts from its plat-
`form. Pet.App.64a; JA149-150.
`Since 2016, Twitter has publicly reported the num-
`ber of accounts terminated for violating its rules
`against terrorism-related content. According to those
`reports, Twitter has terminated over 1.7 million ac-
`counts for violating those rules since August 2015, in-
`cluding over 630,000 accounts between August 2015
`and December 31, 2016.5
`
`B. Statutory Background
`1. The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C.
`§§2331 et seq., allows U.S. nationals “injured … by rea-
`son of an act of international terrorism” to bring suit
`for treble damages in federal court. 18 U.S.C. §2333(a).
`Courts have construed “by reason of” to require proxi-
`mate causation, meaning an ATA claim can arise only
`from an injury proximately caused by “an act of inter-
`national terrorism.” See Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 881
`F.3d 739, 743-745 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Holmes v. Se-
`curities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268
`(1992)). The statute defines “international terrorism”
`to include “activities” that “involve violent acts or acts
`dangerous to human life that are a violation of” U.S. or
`
`5 Twitter, Transparency Reports, July-December 2016,
`https://tinyurl.com/bdhjk2ak (Internet archive version); January-
`June 2017, https://tinyurl.com/r7sdu3wx (archived); January-June
`2018, https://tinyurl.com/56bkk4k2
`(archived); July-December
`2018, https://tinyurl.com/bddbpvtb (archived); January-June 2019,
`https://tinyurl.com/2vxcsbv8
`(archived); July-December 2021,
`https://tinyurl.com/y58wkkaj (contains links for reports from July
`2019 onward) (all visited Nov. 28, 2022).
`
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`state criminal laws (or that would be if committed with-
`in their jurisdiction), and “appear to be intended” to
`“intimidate or coerce a civilian population” or to “influ-
`ence” or “affect” a government in certain ways. 18
`U.S.C. §2331(1).
`In 1996, Congress enacted Section 2339B, which
`makes it a crime to “knowingly provide[] material sup-
`port or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.”
`18 U.S.C. §2339B(a)(1). To violate this provision, “a
`person must have knowledge that the organization is a
`designated terrorist organization,” or that “the organi-
`zation has engaged or engages in” statutorily defined
`“terrorist activity” or “terrorism.”
` Id.; see id.
`§2339B(g)(6). This Court has held that Section 2339B
`requires “knowledge about the organization’s connec-
`tion to terrorism,” though “not specific intent to further
`the organization’s objectives.” Holder v. Humanitari-
`an Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2010).
`2. Prior to 2016, the ATA did not expressly encom-
`pass secondary liability. See Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708
`F.3d 82, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2013); Boim v. Holy Land Foun-
`dation for Relief & Development, 549 F.3d 685, 689 (7th
`Cir. 2008) (en banc). That year, Congress enacted
`JASTA to provide for civil secondary liability under the
`ATA. See 130 Stat. at 852 (§4). Section 2333(d) states
`that “[i]n an action under subsection (a) for an injury
`arising from an act of international terrorism commit-
`ted, planned, or authorized by an organization that had
`been designated as a foreign terrorist organization un-
`der section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
`(8 U.S.C. 1189), … liability may be asserted as to any
`person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing
`substantial assistance, or who conspires with the per-
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`son who committed such an act of international terror-
`ism.” 18 U.S.C. §2333(d)(2). ISIS is a designated for-
`eign terrorist organization. See U.S. Dep’t of State,
`Designated
`Foreign
`Terrorist
`Organizations,
`https://tinyurl.com/em9y6a9d (visited Nov. 28, 2022);
`JA48.
`In enacting JASTA, Congress deliberated on the
`scope and elements of secondary liability. Representa-
`tive Goodlatte, Chairman of the House Judiciary Com-
`mittee, noted that “JASTA’s extension of secondary
`liability under the Anti-Terrorism Act closely tracks
`the common law standard for aiding and abetting liabil-
`ity.” 162 Cong. Rec. H5239, H5240 (daily ed. Sept. 9,
`2016). He explained that revisions to the bill during the
`Senate markup—which specified that a defendant must
`“knowingly provid[e] substantial assistance”6—ensure
`that aiding-and-abetting liability “should only attach to
`persons who have actual knowledge that they are di-
`rectly providing substantial assistance to a designated
`foreign terrorist organization in connection with the
`commission of an act of international terrorism.” Id.
`(emphases added).
`In JASTA’s preamble, Congress stated that Hal-
`berstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983), “pro-
`vides the proper legal framework for how [secondary]
`liability should function in the context of” the ATA. 130
`Stat. at 852 (§2(a)(5)). Halberstam canvassed the com-
`mon law jurisprudence, including the Restatement
`(Second) of Torts and caselaw, and recognized three el-
`
`
`6 Senate Legis. Counsel for the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
`114th Cong., S. 2040 Substitute Redline (Comm. Print. 2016) (re-
`flecting amendment by Sen. Cornyn), https://tinyurl.com/47cxuysc.
`
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`ements of civil aiding-and-abetting liability: “(1) the
`party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrong-
`ful act that causes an injury; (2) the defendant must be
`generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal
`or tortious activity at the time that he provides the as-
`sistance; (3) the defendant must knowingly and sub-
`stantially assist the principal violation.” 705 F.2d at
`477-478. Halberstam adopted the elements as articu-
`lated in Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d
`84, 94-95 (5th Cir. 1975), and other cases, and noted that
`the second element requires not just “knowledge of the
`wrong’s existence” but also “awareness of a role in an
`improper activity,” and that the third element too con-
`tains a “scienter requirement” of knowledge. 705 F.2d
`at 478 n.8.
`Halberstam identified six factors for determining
`“how much aid is ‘substantial aid’” under the third ele-
`ment: (1) “the nature of the act encouraged”; (2) “the
`amount [and kind] of assistance given”; (3) “the defend-
`ant’s absence or presence at the time of the tort”; (4)
`the defendant’s “relation to the tortious actor”; (5) “the
`defendant’s state of mind”; and (6) the “duration of the
`assistance provided.” 705 F.2d at 483-484 (emphasis
`omitted).
`
`C. This Case
`1. Plaintiffs’ Theory Of Liability
`In the wake of JASTA’s enactment, lawsuits en-
`sued seeking to hold secondary actors liable under Sec-
`tion 2333(d) for terrorist attacks committed around the
`world. Defendants in this case have faced more than a
`
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`dozen such lawsuits.7 All of those suits—dismissed in
`every case but this one, where the court of appeals re-
`versed dismissal—share a similar theory of liability.
`The plaintiffs claimed that one or more Defendant was
`liable for aiding and abetting because content or ac-
`counts promoting terrorism had remained on the plat-
`forms, despite Defendants’ rules against such content
`and regular removal of it. Such use of Defendants’ ser-
`vices, the plaintiffs alleged, assisted a terrorist organi-
`zation’s operations in disseminating propaganda, fund-
`raising, or recruiting members. In no case were De-
`fendants alleged to have assisted directly in committing
`the attack that injured the plaintiffs, or to have inten-
`tionally supported a terrorist organization’s goals or
`activities.
`This lawsuit is no different. It arises from a Janu-
`ary 2017 attack committed by Abdulkadir Masharipov,
`who killed 39 people at the Reina nightclub in Istanbul,
`Turkey (“Reina attack”). JA49; JA116-117. Among the
`victims of the Reina attack was Nawras Alassaf, a citi-
`
`
`7 See Gonzalez v. Google LLC, No. 21-1333 (U.S.); Clayborn v.
`Twitter, Inc., No. 19-15043 (9th Cir.); Colon v. Twitter, Inc., 14
`F.4th 1213 (11th Cir. 2021); Retana v. Twitter, Inc., 1 F.4th 378
`(5th Cir. 2021); Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019);
`Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., 921 F.3d 617 (6th Cir. 2019); Palmucci v.
`Twitter Inc., 2019 WL 1676079 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2019), appeal
`filed, No. 19-15937 (9th Cir.); Sinc
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