`(Slip Opinion)
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`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2022
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`
`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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`
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
`
`
`
`
` HAALAND, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL. v.
`
`
`
`
` BRACKEEN ET AL.
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
` No. 21–376. Argued November 9, 2022—Decided June 15, 2023*
`
`
`
` This case arises from three separate child custody proceedings governed
` by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), a federal statute that aims to
`
`
`keep Indian children connected to Indian families. ICWA governs
`state court adoption and foster care proceedings involving Indian chil-
`dren. Among other things, the Act requires placement of an Indian
`
`
`child according to the Act’s hierarchical preferences, unless the state
`
`court finds “good cause” to depart from them. 25 U. S. C. §§1915(a),
`(b). Under those preferences, Indian families or institutions from any
`
`tribe (not just the tribe to which the child has a tie) outrank unrelated
`
`non-Indians or non-Indian institutions. Further, the child’s tribe may
`pass a resolution altering the prioritization order. §1915(c). The pref-
`erences of the Indian child or her parent generally cannot trump those
`
`set by statute or tribal resolution.
`
`In involuntary proceedings, the Act mandates that the Indian child’s
`parent or custodian and tribe be given notice of any custody proceed-
`
`
`ings, as well as the right to intervene. §§1912(a), (b), (c). Section
`1912(d) requires a party seeking to terminate parental rights or to re-
`move an Indian child from an unsafe environment to “satisfy the court
`that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and
`rehabilitative programs designed to prevent breakup of the Indian
`
`
`family,” and a court cannot order relief unless the party demonstrates,
`
`by a heightened burden of proof and expert testimony, that the child is
`——————
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`*Together with No. 21–377, Cherokee Nation et al. v. Brackeen et al.,
`
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`No. 21–378, Texas v. Haaland, Secretary of the Interior, et al., and No.
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`
`
`21–380, Brackeen et al. v. Haaland, Secretary of the Interior, et al., also
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`
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`on certiorari to the same court.
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`
`
`

`

`
`HAALAND v. BRACKEEN
`
`
`Syllabus
`likely to suffer “serious emotional or physical damage” if the parent or
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`Indian custodian retains custody. §§1912(d), (e). Even for voluntary
`
`proceedings, a biological parent who gives up an Indian child cannot
`necessarily choose the child’s foster or adoptive parents. The child’s
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`tribe has “a right to intervene at any point in [a] proceeding” to place
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`
`a child in foster care or terminate parental rights, as well as a right to
`
`collaterally attack the state court’s custody decree. §§1911(c), 1914.
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`The tribe thus can sometimes enforce ICWA’s placement preferences
`
`against the wishes of one or both biological parents, even after the
`child is living with a new family. Finally, the States must keep certain
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`records related to child placements, see §1915(e), and transmit to the
`Secretary of the Interior all final adoption decrees and other specified
`information, see §1951(a).
`
`Petitioners—a birth mother, foster and adoptive parents, and the
`
`State of Texas—filed this suit in federal court against the United
`
`States and other federal parties. Several Indian Tribes intervened to
`defend the law alongside the federal parties. Petitioners challenged
`
`
`ICWA as unconstitutional on multiple grounds. They asserted that
`
`Congress lacks authority to enact ICWA and that several of ICWA’s
`requirements violate the anticommandeering principle of the Tenth
`Amendment. They argued that ICWA employs racial classifications
`that unlawfully hinder non-Indian families from fostering or adopting
`Indian children. And they challenged §1915(c)—the provision that al-
`lows tribes to alter the prioritization order—on the ground that it vio-
`
`
`lates the nondelegation doctrine.
`
`
`The District Court granted petitioners’ motion for summary judg-
`ment on their constitutional claims, and the en banc Fifth Circuit af-
`
`firmed in part and reversed in part. The Fifth Circuit concluded that
`
`ICWA does not exceed Congress’s legislative power, that §1915(c) does
`not violate the nondelegation doctrine, and that some of ICWA’s place-
`
`ment preferences satisfy the guarantee of equal protection. The Fifth
`Circuit was evenly divided as to whether ICWA’s other preferences—
`
`those prioritizing “other Indian families” and “Indian foster home[s]”
`over non-Indian families—unconstitutionally discriminate on the ba-
`sis of race, and thus affirmed the District Court’s ruling that these
`preferences are unconstitutional. As to petitioners’ Tenth Amendment
`
`arguments, the Fifth Circuit held that §1912(d)’s “active efforts” re-
`
`quirement, §1912(e)’s and §1912(f)’s expert witness requirements, and
`
`§1915(e)’s recordkeeping requirement unconstitutionally commandeer
`the States. And because it divided evenly with respect to other chal-
`
`lenged provisions (§1912(a)’s notice requirement, §1915(a) and
`
`§1915(b)’s placement preferences, and §1951(a)’s recordkeeping re-
`
`quirement), the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s holding that
`these requirements violate the Tenth Amendment.
`
`2
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`

`

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`Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`3
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`
`Held:
`
`
`1. The Court declines to disturb the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion
`that ICWA is consistent with Congress’s Article I authority. Pp. 10–
`
`17.
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`
`
`(a) The Court has characterized Congress’s power to legislate with
`
`respect to the Indian tribes as “plenary and exclusive,” United States
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`v. Lara, 541 U. S. 193, 200, superseding both tribal and state authority,
`
`Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 56. The Court has traced
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`that power to multiple sources. First, the Indian Commerce Clause
`authorizes Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian
`
`
`Tribes,” U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3, and the Court has interpreted the
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`Indian Commerce Clause to reach not only trade, but also certain “In-
`
`dian affairs,” Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U. S. 163,
`192. The Treaty Clause provides a second source of power. The treaty
`power “does not literally authorize Congress to act legislatively,” since
`
`it is housed in Article II, but “treaties made pursuant to that power
`can authorize Congress to deal with ‘matters’ with which otherwise
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`‘Congress could not deal.’ ” Lara, 541 U. S., at 201. Also, principles
`
`inherent in the Constitution’s structure may empower Congress to act
`
`in the field of Indian affairs. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535,
`
`551–552. Finally, the “trust relationship between the United States
`and the Indian people” informs the exercise of legislative power.
`
`United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206, 225–226. In sum, Congress’s
`power to legislate with respect to Indians is well established and broad,
`but it is not unbounded. It is plenary within its sphere, but even a
`
`sizeable sphere has borders. Pp. 10–14.
`
`
`
`(b) Petitioners contend that ICWA impermissibly treads on the
`
`States’ traditional authority over family law. But when Congress val-
`idly legislates pursuant to its Article I powers, the Court “has not hes-
`itated” to find conflicting state family law preempted, “[n]otwithstand-
`
`ing the limited application of federal law in the field of domestic
`relations generally.” Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U. S. 46, 54. And the
`Court has recognized Congress’s power to displace the jurisdiction of
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`state courts in adoption proceedings involving Indian children. Fisher
`
`
`v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist. of Mont., 424 U. S. 382, 390
`
`(per curiam). Pp. 14–15.
`
`
`(c) Petitioners contend that no source of congressional authority
`authorizes Congress to regulate custody proceedings for Indian chil-
`dren. They suggest that the Indian Commerce Clause, for example,
`
`authorizes Congress to legislate only with respect to Indian tribes as
`government entities, not Indians as individuals. But this Court’s hold-
`
`ing more than a century ago that “commerce with the Indian tribes,
`means commerce with the individuals composing those tribes,” United
`
`States v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407, 417, renders that argument a dead end.
`
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`
`
`

`

`4
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`
`
`HAALAND v. BRACKEEN
`
`
`Syllabus
`Petitioners also assert that ICWA takes the “commerce” out of the In-
`
`dian Commerce Clause because “children are not commodities that can
`be traded.” Brief for Individual Petitioners 16. This point, while rhe-
`torically powerful, ignores the Court’s precedent interpreting the In-
`dian Commerce Clause to encompass not only trade but also other In-
`dian affairs. Petitioners next argue that ICWA cannot be authorized
`
`by principles inherent in the Constitution’s structure because those
`principles “extend, at most, to matters of war and peace.” Brief for
`
`Petitioner Texas 28. Again, petitioners make no argument that takes
`this Court’s cases on their own terms. The Court has referred gener-
`ally to the powers “necessarily inherent in any Federal Government”
`
`and has offered non-military examples, such as “creating departments
`of Indian affairs.” Lara, 541 U. S., at 201–202. Petitioners next ob-
`
`serve that ICWA does not implement a federal treaty, but Congress
`did not purport to enact ICWA pursuant to its treaty power and the
`Fifth Circuit did not uphold ICWA on that rationale. Finally, petition-
`ers turn to criticizing this Court’s precedent as inconsistent with the
`
`
`Constitution’s original meaning, but they neither ask the Court to
`
`
`overrule the precedent they criticize nor try to reconcile their approach
`
`with it. If there are arguments that ICWA exceeds Congress’s author-
`ity as precedent stands today, petitioners do not make them here. Pp.
`
`15–17.
`
`
`
`2. Petitioners’ anticommandeering challenges, which address three
`categories of ICWA provisions, are rejected. Pp. 18–29.
`
`
`
`(a) First, petitioners challenge certain requirements that apply in
`involuntary proceedings to place a child in foster care or terminate pa-
`
`
`rental rights, focusing on the requirement that an initiating party
`demonstrate “active efforts” to keep the Indian family together.
`
`§1912(d). Petitioners contend this subsection directs state and local
`
`agencies to provide extensive services to the parents of Indian chil-
`dren, even though it is well established that the Tenth Amendment
`bars Congress from “command[ing] the States’ officers, or those of their
`political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
`program.” Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 935. To succeed,
`petitioners must show that §1912(d) harnesses a State’s legislative or
`executive authority. But the provision applies to “any party” who ini-
`tiates an involuntary proceeding, thus sweeping in private individuals
`
`
`and agencies as well as government entities. A demand that either
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`public or private actors can satisfy is unlikely to require the use of sov-
`
`ereign power. Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 584 U. S.
`___, ___–___. Petitioners nonetheless insist that States institute the
`
`
`vast majority of involuntary proceedings. But examples of private
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`suits are not hard to find. And while petitioners treat “active efforts”
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`as synonymous with “government programs,” state courts have applied
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`

`

`5
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`Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`the “active efforts” requirement in private suits too. That is consistent
`
`with ICWA’s findings, which describe the role that both public and pri-
`vate actors played in the unjust separation of Indian children from
`
`their families and tribes. §1901. Given all this, it is implausible that
`§1912(d) is directed primarily, much less exclusively, at the States.
`
`
`Legislation that applies “evenhandedly” to state and private actors
`
`does not typically implicate the Tenth Amendment. Murphy, 584
`
`U. S., at ___. Petitioners would distinguish the Court’s precedents so
`holding on the grounds that those cases addressed laws regulating a
`State’s commercial activity, while ICWA regulates a State’s “core sov-
`ereign function of protecting the health and safety of children within
`its borders.” Brief for Petitioner Texas 66. This argument is presum-
`ably directed at situations in which only the State can rescue a child
`from neglectful parents. But the State is not necessarily the only op-
`
`
`tion for rescue, and §1912(d) applies to other types of proceedings too.
`Petitioners do not distinguish between these varied situations, much
`
`less isolate a domain in which only the State can act. If there is a core
`of involuntary proceedings committed exclusively to the sovereign,
`
`Texas neither identifies its contours nor explains what §1912(d) re-
`quires of a State in that context. Petitioners have therefore failed to
`show that the “active efforts” requirement commands the States to de-
`ploy their executive or legislative power to implement federal Indian
`
`policy. And as for petitioners’ challenges to other provisions of §1912—
`the notice requirement, expert witness requirement, and evidentiary
`
`standards—the Court doubts that requirements placed on a State as
`litigant implicate the Tenth Amendment. But regardless, these provi-
`sions, like §1912(d), apply to both private and state actors, so they too
`
`pose no anticommandeering problem. Pp. 18–23.
`
`
`(b)
` Petitioners next challenge ICWA’s placement preferences, set
`
`
`forth in §1915. Petitioners assert that this provision orders state agen-
`
`cies to perform a “diligent search” for placements that satisfy ICWA’s
`
`
`hierarchy. Just as Congress cannot compel state officials to search da-
`
`
`tabases to determine the lawfulness of gun sales, Printz, 521 U. S., at
`902–904, petitioners argue, Congress cannot compel state officials to
`search for a federally preferred placement. As with §1912, petitioners
`
`have not shown that the “diligent search” requirement, which applies
`to both private and public parties, demands the use of state sovereign
`authority. Moreover, §1915 does not require anyone, much less the
`
`
`States, to search for alternative placements; instead, the burden is on
`the tribe or other objecting party to produce a higher-ranked place-
`
`ment. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U. S. 637, 654. So, as it
`
`
`stands, petitioners assert an anticommandeering challenge to a provi-
`sion that does not command state agencies to do anything.
`
`State courts are a different matter. ICWA indisputably requires
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
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`

`

`6
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`
`HAALAND v. BRACKEEN
`
`
`Syllabus
`them to apply the placement preferences in making custody determi-
`
`nations. §§1915(a), (b). But Congress can require state courts, unlike
`state executives and legislatures, to enforce federal law. See New York
`v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 178–179. Petitioners draw a distinc-
`tion between requiring state courts to entertain federal causes of ac-
`tion and requiring them to apply federal law to state causes of action,
`but this argument runs counter to the Supremacy Clause. When Con-
`gress enacts a valid statute, “state law is naturally preempted to the
`extent of any conflict with a federal statute.” Crosby v. National For-
`eign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363, 372. That a federal law modifies a
`
`state law cause of action does not limit its preemptive effect. See, e.g.,
`
`
`Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U. S. 483, 493–494 (federal law establishing
`
`order of precedence for life insurance beneficiaries preempted state
`
`law). Pp. 23–25.
`
`
`
`(c) Finally, petitioners insist that Congress cannot force state
`courts to maintain or transmit records of custody proceedings involv-
`ing Indian children. But the anticommandeering doctrine applies “dis-
`
`tinctively” to a state court’s adjudicative responsibilities. Printz, 521
`U. S., at 907. The Constitution allows Congress to require “state
`
`judges to enforce federal prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions
`relat[e] to matters appropriate for the judicial power.” Ibid. (emphasis
`deleted). In Printz, the Court indicated that this principle may extend
`to tasks that are “ancillary” to a “quintessentially adjudicative task”—
`
`such as “recording, registering, and certifying” documents. Id., at 908,
`
`n. 2. Printz described numerous historical examples of Congress im-
`
`posing recordkeeping and reporting requirements on state courts.
`These early congressional enactments demonstrate that the Constitu-
`tion does not prohibit the Federal Government from imposing adjudi-
`
`
`cative tasks on state courts. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 723. The
`
`Court now confirms what Printz suggested: Congress may impose an-
`cillary recordkeeping requirements related to state-court proceedings
`
`without violating the Tenth Amendment. Here, ICWA’s recordkeeping
`requirements are comparable to the historical examples. The duties
`ICWA imposes are “ancillary” to the state court’s obligation to conduct
`child custody proceedings in compliance with ICWA. Printz, 521 U. S.,
`at 908, n. 2. Pp. 25–29.
`
`3. The Court does not reach the merits of petitioners’ two additional
`claims—an equal protection challenge to ICWA’s placement prefer-
`ences and a nondelegation challenge to §1915(c), the provision allow-
`ing tribes to alter the placement preferences—because no party before
`the Court has standing to raise them. Pp. 29–34.
`
`
`(a) The individual petitioners argue that ICWA’s hierarchy of
`preferences injures them by placing them on unequal footing with In-
`
`
`
`
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`

`

`7
`
`
`Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`dian parents who seek to adopt or foster an Indian child. But the in-
`
`
`dividual petitioners have not shown that this injury is “likely” to be
`
`
`
`
`“redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S.
`___, ___. They seek an injunction preventing the federal parties from
`enforcing ICWA and a declaratory judgment that the challenged pro-
`visions are unconstitutional. Yet enjoining the federal parties would
`not remedy the alleged injury, because state courts apply the place-
`ment preferences, and state agencies carry out the court-ordered place-
`
`ments. §§1903(1), 1915(a), (b). The state officials who implement
`
`ICWA are “not parties to the suit, and there is no reason they should
`be obliged to honor an incidental legal determination the suit pro-
`
`duced.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 569 (plurality
`
`opinion). Petitioners’ request for a declaratory judgment suffers from
`the same flaw. The individual petitioners insist that state courts are
`likely to defer to a federal court’s interpretation of federal law, thus
`giving rise to a substantial likelihood that a favorable judgment will
`
`redress their injury. But such a theory would mean redressability
`would be satisfied whenever a decision might persuade actors who are
`not before the court—contrary to Article III’s strict prohibition on “is-
`
`suing advisory opinions.” Carney v. Adams, 592 U. S. ___, ___. It is a
`federal court’s judgment, not its opinion, that remedies an injury. The
`individual petitioners can hope for nothing more than an opinion, so
`they cannot satisfy Article III. Pp. 29–32.
`
`
`
`(b) Texas has no equal protection rights of its own, South Carolina
`
`v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 323, and it cannot assert equal protection
`claims on behalf of its citizens against the Federal Government, Alfred
`
`
`L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U. S. 592, 610,
`
`
`
`n. 16. The State’s creative arguments for why it has standing despite
`
`these settled rules also fail. Texas’s argument that ICWA requires it
`to “break its promise to its citizens that it will be colorblind in child-
`custody proceedings,” Reply Brief for Texas 15, is not the kind of “con-
`
`crete” and “particularized” “invasion of a legally protected interest”
`
`necessary to demonstrate an injury in fact, Lujan, 504 U. S., at 560.
`
`Texas also claims a direct pocketbook injury associated with the costs
`of keeping records, providing notice in involuntary proceedings, and
`
`producing expert testimony before moving a child to foster care or ter-
`minating parental rights. But these alleged costs are not “fairly trace-
`able” to the placement preferences, which “operate independently” of
`
`the provisions Texas identifies. California v. Texas, 593 U. S. ___, ___.
`Texas would continue to incur the complained-of costs even if it were
`
`relieved of the duty to apply the placement preferences. Because Texas
`
`is not injured by the placement preferences, neither would it be injured
`
`by a tribal resolution that altered those preferences pursuant to
`
`§1915(c). Texas therefore does not have standing to bring either its
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`
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`
`
`

`

`8
`
`
`
`HAALAND v. BRACKEEN
`
`
`Syllabus
`equal protection or its nondelegation claims. And although the indi-
`vidual petitioners join Texas’s nondelegation challenge to §1915(c),
`they raise no independent arguments about why they would have
`
`standing to bring this claim. Pp. 32–34.
`994 F. 3d 249, affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated and remanded
`in part.
`
` BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
` C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and JACKSON, JJ.,
`
`
` joined. GORSUCH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and
`
`JACKSON, JJ., joined as to Parts I and III. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concur-
`ring opinion. THOMAS, J., and ALITO, J., filed dissenting opinions.
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
` Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
`
` pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
`_________________
` Nos. 21–376, 21–377, 21–378 and 21–380
`_________________
`DEB HAALAND, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,
`
` ET AL., PETITIONERS
`
` v.
` CHAD EVERET BRACKEEN, ET AL.
`
`21–376
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`CHEROKEE NATION, ET AL., PETITIONERS
`
`21–377
`
`v.
`CHAD EVERET BRACKEEN, ET AL.
`
`
`
`
`
`21–378
`
`TEXAS, PETITIONER
`
`v.
`DEB HAALAND, SECRETARY OF THE
`
`INTERIOR, ET AL.
`
`
`
`CHAD EVERET BRACKEEN, ET AL., PETITIONERS
`
`
`21–380
`
`v.
`DEB HAALAND, SECRETARY OF THE
`
`INTERIOR, ET AL.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
`[June 15, 2023]
`JUSTICE BARRETT delivered the opinion of the Court.
`This case is about children who are among the most vul-
`
`nerable: those in the child welfare system. In the usual
`
`course, state courts apply state law when placing children
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`
`
`

`

`2
`
`
`
`
` HAALAND v. BRACKEEN
`
`Opinion of the Court
`in foster or adoptive homes. But when the child is an In-
`dian, a federal statute—the Indian Child Welfare Act—gov-
`erns. Among other things, this law requires a state court
`to place an Indian child with an Indian caretaker, if one is
`
`available. That is so even if the child is already living with
`a non-Indian family and the state court thinks it in the
`
`child’s best interest to stay there.
`
`
`Before us, a birth mother, foster and adoptive parents,
`and the State of Texas challenge the Act on multiple consti-
`tutional grounds. They argue that it exceeds federal au-
`thority, infringes state sovereignty, and discriminates on
`the basis of race. The United States, joined by several In-
`dian Tribes, defends the law. The issues are complicated—
`so for the details, read on. But the bottom line is that we
`reject all of petitioners’ challenges to the statute, some on
`the merits and others for lack of standing.
`I
`A
`
`In 1978, Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act
`
`(ICWA) out of concern that “an alarmingly high percentage
`of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often un-
`
`warranted, of their children from them by nontribal public
`
`and private agencies.” 92 Stat. 3069, 25 U. S. C. §1901(4).
`Congress found that many of these children were being
`“placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and insti-
`
`tutions,” and that the States had contributed to the problem
`by “fail[ing] to recognize the essential tribal relations of In-
`dian people and the cultural and social standards prevail-
`
`ing in Indian communities and families.” §§1901(4), (5).
`This harmed not only Indian parents and children, but also
`
`Indian tribes. As Congress put it, “there is no resource that
`is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of In-
`dian tribes than their children.” §1901(3). Testifying be-
`
`fore Congress, the Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band of
`
`Choctaw Indians was blunter: “Culturally, the chances of
`
`
`
`

`

`3
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`
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` Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Indian survival are significantly reduced if our children, the
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`only real means for the transmission of the tribal heritage,
`are to be raised in non-Indian homes and denied exposure
`to the ways of their People.” Hearings on S. 1214 before the
`Subcommittee on Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the
`House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th
`Cong., 2d Sess., 193 (1978).
`
`
`The Act thus aims to keep Indian children connected to
`Indian families. “Indian child” is defined broadly to include
`not only a child who is “a member of an Indian tribe,” but
`also one who is “eligible for membership in an Indian tribe
`
`and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”
`§1903(4). If the Indian child lives on a reservation, ICWA
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`grants the tribal court exclusive jurisdiction over all child
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`custody proceedings, including adoptions and foster care
`proceedings. §1911(a). For other Indian children, state and
`tribal courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction, although the
`state court is sometimes required to transfer the case to
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`tribal court. §1911(b). When a state court adjudicates the
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`proceeding, ICWA governs from start to finish. That is true
`regardless of whether the proceeding is “involuntary” (one
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`to which the parents do not consent) or “voluntary” (one to
`which they do).
`
`Involuntary proceedings are subject to especially strin-
`gent safeguards. See 25 CFR §23.104 (2022); 81 Fed. Reg.
`38832–38836 (2016). Any party who initiates an “involun-
`tary proceeding” in state court to place an Indian child in
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`foster care or terminate parental rights must “notify the
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`parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe.”
`§1912(a). The parent or custodian and tribe have the right
`
`to intervene in the proceedings; the right to request extra
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`time to prepare for the proceedings; the right to “examine
`all reports or other documents filed with the court”; and, for
`indigent parents or custodians, the right to court-appointed
`counsel. §§1912(a), (b), (c). The party attempting to termi-
`
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`

`

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` HAALAND v. BRACKEEN
`
`Opinion of the Court
`nate parental rights or remove an Indian child from an un-
`
`safe environment must first “satisfy the court that active
`efforts have been made to provide remedial services and re-
`
`habilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of
`the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuc-
`cessful.” §1912(d). Even then, the court cannot order a fos-
`
`ter care placement unless it finds “by clear and convincing
`evidence, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses,
`that the continued custody of the child by the parent or In-
`dian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or
`physical damage to the child.” §1912(e). To terminate pa-
`rental rights, the court must make the same finding “be-
`yond a reasonable doubt.” §1912(f ).
`
`
`The Act applies to voluntary proceedings too. Relinquish-
`ing a child temporarily (to foster care) or permanently (to
`adoption) is a grave act, and a state court must ensure that
`a consenting parent or custodian knows and understands
`“the terms and consequences.” §1913(a). Notably, a biolog-
`ical parent who voluntarily gives up an Indian child cannot
`
`necessarily choose the child’s foster or adoptive parents.
`
`The child’s tribe has “a right to intervene at any point in [a]
`proceeding” to place a child in foster care or terminate pa-
`rental rights, as well as a right to collaterally attack the
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`state court’s decree. §§1911(c), 1914. As a result, the tribe
`can sometimes enforce ICWA’s placement preferences
`against the wishes of one or both biological parents, even
`after the child is living with a new family. See Mississippi
`
`Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U. S. 30, 49–52
`(1989).
`
`ICWA’s placement preferences, which apply to all cus-
`tody proceedings involving Indian children, are hierar-
`chical: State courts may only place the child with someone
`in a lower-ranked group when there is no available place-
`
`ment in a higher-ranked group. For adoption, “a preference
`
`shall be given” to placements with “(1) a member of the
`child’s extended family; (2) other members of the Indian
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`5
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` Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.” §1915(a). For
`
`foster care, a preference is given to (1) “the Indian child’s
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`extended family”; (2) “a foster home licensed, approved, or
`specified by the Indian child’s tribe”; (3) “an Indian foster
`home licensed or approved by an authorized non-Indian li-
`censing authority”; and then (4) another institution “ap-
`proved by an Indian tribe or operated by an Indian organi-
`zation which has a program suitable to meet the Indian
`child’s needs.” §1915(b). For purposes of the placement
`
`preferences, an “Indian” is “any person who is a member of
`an Indian tribe,” and an “Indian organization” is “any group
`. . . owned or controlled by Indians.” §§1903(3), (7). To-
`gether, these definitions mean that Indians from any tribe
`(not just the tribe to which the child has a tie) outrank un-
`related non-Indians for both adoption and foster care. And
`for foster care, institutions run or approved by any tribe
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`outrank placements with unrelated non-Indian families.
`
`Courts must adhere to the placement preferences absent
`“good cause” to depart from them. §§1915(a), (b).
`
`The child’s tribe may pass a resolution altering the prior-
`itization order. §1915(c). If it does, “the agency or court
`effecting the placement shall follow such order so long as
`the placement is the least restrictive setting appropriate to
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`the particular needs of the child.” Ibid. So long as the “least
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`restrictive setting” condition is met, the preferences of the
`Indian child or her parent cannot trump those set by stat-
`ute or tribal resolution. But, “[w]here appropriate, the pref-
`erence of the Indian child or parent shall be considered” in
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`making a placement. Ibid.
`
`The State must record each placement, including a de-
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`scription of the efforts made to comply with ICWA’s order
`of preferences. §1915(e). Both the Secretary of the Interior
`
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`and the child’s tribe have the right to request the record at
`any time. Ibid. State courts must also transmit all final
`adoption decrees and specified information about adoption
`proceedings to the Secretary. §1951(a).
`
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`

`
`
` HAALAND v. BRACKEEN
`
`Opinion of the Court
`B
`
`This case arises from three separate child custody pro-
`
`ceedings governed by ICWA.
`1
`
`A. L. M. was placed in foster care with Chad and Jennifer
`Brackeen when he was 10 months old. Because his biolog-
`ical mother is a member of the Navajo Nation and his bio-
`
`logical father is a member of the Cherokee Nation, he falls
`within ICWA’s definition of an “Indian child.” Both the
`
`Brackeens and A. L. M.’s biological parents live in Texas.
`
`
`After A. L. M. had lived with the Brackeens for more than
`a year, they sought to adopt him. A. L. M.’s biological
`mother, father, and grandmother all supported the adop-
`
`tion. The Navajo and Cherokee Nations did not. Pursuant
`to an agreement between the Tribes, the Navajo Nation
`designated A. L. M. as a member and informed the state
`court that it had located a potential alternative placement
`
`
`with