`(Slip Opinion)
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`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2021
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`
`Syllabus
`
`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
`OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
`CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF
`
`OKLAHOMA
` No. 21–429. Argued April 27, 2022—Decided June 29, 2022
`
`
` In 2015, respondent Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta was charged by the
` State of Oklahoma for child neglect. Castro-Huerta was convicted in
`
`state court and sentenced to 35 years of imprisonment. While Castro-
` Huerta’s state-court appeal was pending, this Court decided McGirt v.
`
`Oklahoma, 591 U. S. ___. There, the Court held that the Creek Na-
`tion’s reservation in eastern Oklahoma had never been properly dises-
`tablished and therefore remained “Indian country.” Id., at ___. In
`light of McGirt, the eastern part of Oklahoma, including Tulsa, is rec-
`ognized as Indian country. Following this development, Castro-
`Huerta argued that the Federal Government had exclusive jurisdiction
`to prosecute him (a non-Indian) for a crime committed against his step-
`daughter (a Cherokee Indian) in Tulsa (Indian country), and that the
`State therefore lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him. The Oklahoma
`Court of Criminal Appeals agreed and vacated his conviction. This
`Court granted certiorari to determine the extent of a State’s jurisdic-
`tion to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in
`
`Indian country.
`
`Held: The Federal Government and the State have concurrent jurisdic-
`
`tion to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in
`Indian country. Pp. 4–25.
`
`
`(a) The jurisdictional dispute in this case arises because Oklahoma’s
`territory includes Indian country. In the early Republic, the Federal
`Government sometimes treated Indian country as separate from state
`
`
`territory. See Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515. But that view has long
`
`since been abandoned. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S.
`60, 72. And the Court has specifically held that States have jurisdic-
`tion to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against non-Indi-
`
`
`
`ans in Indian country. United States v. McBratney, 104 U. S. 621; see
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`2
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`OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`
`also Draper v. United States, 164 U. S. 240, 244–247. Accordingly,
`States have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed in Indian coun-
`try unless preempted. Pp. 4–6.
`
`
`(b) Under Court precedent, a State’s jurisdiction in Indian country
`
`may be preempted by federal law under ordinary principles of federal
`preemption, or when the exercise of state jurisdiction would unlaw-
`
`
`fully infringe on tribal self-government. Neither serves to preempt
`state jurisdiction in this case. Pp. 6–20.
`
`
`(1) Castro-Huerta points to two federal laws—the General Crimes
`Act and Public Law 280—that, in his view, preempt Oklahoma’s au-
`
`thority to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians
`in Indian country. Neither statute, however, preempts the State’s ju-
`
`risdiction. Pp. 7–18.
`
`
`
`
`(i) The General Crimes Act does not preempt state authority to
`
`prosecute Castro-Huerta’s crime. It provides that “the general laws of
`the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed . . .
`within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States . . . shall
`
`extend to the Indian country.” 18 U. S. C. §1152. By its terms, the Act
`
`simply “extend[s]” the federal laws that apply on federal enclaves to
`
`Indian country. The Act does not say that Indian country is equivalent
`to a federal enclave for jurisdictional purposes, that federal jurisdic-
`
`tion is exclusive in Indian country, or that state jurisdiction is
`preempted in Indian country.
`
` Castro-Huerta claims that the General Crimes Act does indeed
`
`make Indian country the jurisdictional equivalent of a federal enclave.
`
`Castro-Huerta is wrong as a matter of text and precedent.
`
`Pointing to the history of territorial separation and Congress’s reen-
`actment of the General Crimes Act after this Court suggested in dicta
`
`in Williams v. United States, 327 U. S. 711, 714, that States lack juris-
`diction over crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in In-
`
`dian country, Castro-Huerta argues that Congress implicitly intended
`for the Act to provide the Federal Government with exclusive jurisdic-
`tion over crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian
`
`country. But the text of the Act says no such thing; the idea of territo-
`
`rial separation has long since been abandoned; and the reenactment
`
`canon cannot be invoked to override clear statutory language of the
`
`kind present in the General Crimes Act. Castro-Huerta notes that the
`Court has repeated the Williams dicta on subsequent occasions, but
`
`even repeated dicta does not constitute precedent and does not alter
`
`the plain text of the General Crimes Act. Pp. 7–16.
`
`
`
`
`(ii) Castro-Huerta’s attempt to invoke Public Law 280, 67 Stat.
`
`588, is also unpersuasive. That law affirmatively grants certain States
`
`(and allows other States to acquire) broad jurisdiction to prosecute
`
`state-law offenses committed by or against Indians in Indian country.
`
`
`
`
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`

`

`
`
`3
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`Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)
`
`
`Syllabus
`18 U. S. C. §1162; 25 U. S. C. §1321. Castro-Huerta contends that the
`law’s enactment in 1953 would have been pointless surplusage if
`States already had concurrent jurisdiction over crimes committed by
`
`
`non-Indians against Indians in Indian country. But Public Law 280
`
`contains no language preempting state jurisdiction. And Public Law
`
`280 encompasses far more than just non-Indian on Indian crimes.
`Thus, resolution of the narrow jurisdictional issue here does not negate
`
`the significance of Public Law 280. Pp. 16–18.
`
`(2) The test articulated in White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
`
`Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, does not bar the State from prosecuting crimes
`
`committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country. There,
`the Court held that even when federal law does not preempt state ju-
`
`risdiction under ordinary preemption analysis, preemption may still
`
`occur if the exercise of state jurisdiction would unlawfully infringe
`
`
`upon tribal self-government. Id., at 142–143. Under Bracker’s balanc-
`ing test, the Court considers tribal interests, federal interests, and
`
`
`state interests. Id., at 145. Here, the exercise of state jurisdiction
`would not infringe on tribal self-government. And because a State’s
`
`jurisdiction is concurrent with federal jurisdiction, a state prosecution
`
`would not preclude an earlier or later federal prosecution. Finally, the
`
`State has a strong sovereign interest in ensuring public safety and
`criminal justice within its territory, including an interest in protecting
`
`both Indian and non-Indian crime victims. Pp. 18–20.
`
`(c) This Court has long held that Indian country is part of a State,
`
`
`not separate from it. Under the Constitution, States have jurisdiction
`to prosecute crimes within their territory except when preempted by
`federal law or by principles of tribal self-government. The default is
`
`
`that States have criminal jurisdiction in Indian country unless that
`
`jurisdiction is preempted. And that jurisdiction has not been
`
`preempted here. Pp. 21–25.
`Reversed and remanded.
`KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
`C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed a
`dissenting opinion, in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.,
`joined.
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
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` Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
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` corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 21–429
`_________________
`
` OKLAHOMA, PETITIONER v. VICTOR MANUEL
` CASTRO-HUERTA
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL
`
`APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA
`[June 29, 2022]
`JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.
`This case presents a jurisdictional question about the
`
`prosecution of crimes committed by non-Indians against In-
`dians in Indian country: Under current federal law, does
`
`the Federal Government have exclusive jurisdiction to pros-
`
`ecute those crimes? Or do the Federal Government and the
`
`State have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute those
`
`crimes? We conclude that the Federal Government and the
`
`State have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes com-
`mitted by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.
`
`I
`
`In 2015, Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta lived in Tulsa, Ok-
`
`lahoma, with his wife and their several children, including
`Castro-Huerta’s then-5-year-old stepdaughter, who is a
`Cherokee Indian. The stepdaughter has cerebral palsy and
`is legally blind. One day in 2015, Castro-Huerta’s sister-in-
`law was in the house and noticed that the young girl was
`sick. After a 911 call, the girl was rushed to a Tulsa hospi-
`tal in critical condition. Dehydrated, emaciated, and cov-
`ered in lice and excrement, she weighed only 19 pounds. In-
`vestigators later found her bed filled with bedbugs and
`
`
`
`

`

`2
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` OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` cockroaches.
`
`
`When questioned, Castro-Huerta admitted that he had
`severely undernourished his stepdaughter during the pre-
`ceding month. The State of Oklahoma criminally charged
`both Castro-Huerta and his wife for child neglect. Both
`
`were convicted. Castro-Huerta was sentenced to 35 years
`
`of imprisonment, with the possibility of parole. This case
`
`concerns the State’s prosecution of Castro-Huerta.
`After Castro-Huerta was convicted and while his appeal
`
`was pending in state court, this Court decided McGirt v.
`
`Oklahoma, 591 U. S. ___ (2020). In McGirt, the Court held
`
`
`
`
`that Congress had never properly disestablished the Creek
`Nation’s reservation in eastern Oklahoma. As a result, the
`
`Court concluded that the Creek Reservation remained “In-
`dian country.” Id., at ___–___, ___, ___ (slip op., at 1–3, 17,
`
`28). The status of that part of Oklahoma as Indian country
`meant that different jurisdictional rules might apply for the
`prosecution of criminal offenses in that area. See 18
`U. S. C. §§1151–1153. Based on McGirt’s reasoning, the
`
`Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals later recognized that
`several other Indian reservations in Oklahoma had like-
`
` wise never been properly disestablished. See, e.g., State
`ex rel. Matloff v. Wallace, 2021 OK CR 21, ¶15, 497 P. 3d
`
`686, 689 (reaffirming recognition of the Cherokee, Choctaw,
`and Chickasaw Reservations); Grayson v. State, 2021 OK
`CR 8, ¶10, 485 P. 3d 250, 254 (Seminole Reservation).
`
`In light of McGirt and the follow-on cases, the eastern
`part of Oklahoma, including Tulsa, is now recognized as In-
`dian country. About two million people live there, and the
`vast majority are not Indians.
`The classification of eastern Oklahoma as Indian country
`
`
`has raised urgent questions about which government or
`governments have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes commit-
`
`ted there. This case is an example: a crime committed in
`what is now recognized as Indian country (Tulsa) by a non-
`
`
`
`

`

`3
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` Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Indian (Castro-Huerta) against an Indian (his stepdaugh-
`ter). All agree that the Federal Government has jurisdic-
`tion to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against
`Indians in Indian country. The question is whether the
`Federal Government’s jurisdiction is exclusive, or whether
`
`the State also has concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal
`Government.
`
`
`
`In the wake of McGirt, Castro-Huerta argued that the
`Federal Government’s jurisdiction to prosecute crimes com-
`mitted by a non-Indian against an Indian in Indian country
`is exclusive and that the State therefore lacked jurisdiction
`to prosecute him. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
`peals agreed with Castro-Huerta. Relying on an earlier Ok-
`lahoma decision holding that the federal General Crimes
`Act grants the Federal Government exclusive jurisdiction,
`the court ruled that the State did not have concurrent ju-
`
`risdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians
`against Indians in Indian country. The court therefore va-
`
`cated Castro-Huerta’s conviction. No. F–2017–1203 (Apr.
`
`29, 2021); see also Bosse v. State, 2021 OK CR 3, 484 P. 3d
`286; Roth v. State, 2021 OK CR 27, 499 P. 3d 23.
`
`While Castro-Huerta’s state appellate proceedings were
`ongoing, a federal grand jury in Oklahoma indicted Castro-
`
`Huerta for the same conduct. Castro-Huerta accepted a
`
`plea agreement for a 7-year sentence followed by removal
`from the United States. (Castro-Huerta is not a U. S. citi-
`
`zen and is unlawfully in the United States.) In other words,
`
`putting aside parole possibilities, Castro-Huerta in effect
`received a 28-year reduction of his sentence as a result of
`McGirt.
`
`
`Castro-Huerta’s case exemplifies a now-familiar pattern
`
`in Oklahoma in the wake of McGirt. The Oklahoma courts
`
`have reversed numerous state convictions on that same ju-
`risdictional ground. After having their state convictions re-
`versed, some non-Indian criminals have received lighter
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`4
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`OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
`
`Opinion of the Court
`sentences in plea deals negotiated with the Federal Govern-
`ment. Others have simply gone free. Going forward, the
`State estimates that it will have to transfer prosecutorial
`responsibility for more than 18,000 cases per year to the
`
`Federal and Tribal Governments. All of this has created a
`significant challenge for the Federal Government and for
`the people of Oklahoma. At the end of fiscal year 2021, the
`U. S. Department of Justice was opening only 22% and 31%
`
`of all felony referrals in the Eastern and Northern Districts
`of Oklahoma. Dept. of Justice, U. S. Attorneys, Fiscal Year
`2023 Congressional Justification 46. And the Department
`recently acknowledged that “many people may not be held
`accountable for their criminal conduct due to resource con-
`straints.” Ibid.
`
`In light of the sudden significance of this jurisdictional
`question for public safety and the criminal justice system in
`Oklahoma, this Court granted certiorari to decide whether
`a State has concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Gov-
`
`ernment to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians
`
`against Indians in Indian country. 595 U. S. ___ (2022).1
`
`II
`
`The jurisdictional dispute in this case arises because Ok-
`lahoma’s territory includes Indian country. Federal law de-
`fines “Indian country” to include, among other things, “all
`land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
`
`jurisdiction of the United States Government.” 18 U. S. C.
`
`§1151.
`
`
`To begin with, the Constitution allows a State to exercise
`
`jurisdiction in Indian country. Indian country is part of the
`
`State, not separate from the State. To be sure, under this
`Court’s precedents, federal law may preempt that state ju-
`
`risdiction in certain circumstances. But otherwise, as a
`——————
`1Both the United States and the Cherokee Nation, along with several
`
`
` other Tribes, filed amicus briefs in this case articulating their views on
`the legal questions before the Court.
`
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`

`

`5
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` Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`matter of state sovereignty, a State has jurisdiction over all
`
`of its territory, including Indian country. See U. S. Const.,
`Amdt. 10. As this Court has phrased it, a State is generally
`“entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all the ter-
`ritory within her limits.” Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How.
`
`212, 228 (1845).
`In the early years of the Republic, the Federal Govern-
`
`ment sometimes treated Indian country as separate from
`
`state territory—in the same way that, for example, New
`Jersey is separate from New York. Most prominently, in
`
`the 1832 decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 561,
`this Court held that Georgia state law had no force in the
`
`Cherokee Nation because the Cherokee Nation “is a distinct
`community occupying its own territory.”
`
`But the “general notion drawn from Chief Justice Mar-
`
`shall’s opinion in Worcester v. Georgia” “has yielded to
`
`
`closer analysis.” Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369
`U. S. 60, 72 (1962). “By 1880 the Court no longer viewed
`
`reservations as distinct nations.” Ibid. Since the latter half
`of the 1800s, the Court has consistently and explicitly held
`
`that Indian reservations are “part of the surrounding State”
`and subject to the State’s jurisdiction “except as forbidden
`
`by federal law.” Ibid.
`
` To take a few examples: In 1859, the Court stated:
`
`States retain “the power of a sovereign over their persons
`
`and property, so far as” “necessary to preserve the peace of
`
`the Commonwealth.” New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble, 21
`How. 366, 370 (1859).
`
`
`In 1930: “[R]eservations are part of the State within
`which they lie and her laws, civil and criminal, have the
`same force therein as elsewhere within her limits, save that
`they can have only restricted application to the Indian
`
`
`wards.” Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647, 651
`(1930).
`
`
`In 1946: “[I]n the absence of a limiting treaty obligation
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`6
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` OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
`
`Opinion of the Court
`or Congressional enactment each state ha[s] a right to ex-
`ercise jurisdiction over Indian reservations within its
`boundaries.” New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U. S. 496,
`499 (1946).
`
`In 1992: “This Court’s more recent cases have recognized
`
`the rights of States, absent a congressional prohibition, to
`exercise criminal (and, implicitly, civil) jurisdiction over
`
`non-Indians located on reservation lands.” County of Ya-
`kima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation,
`502 U. S. 251, 257–258 (1992).
`
`And as recently as 2001: “State sovereignty does not end
`at a reservation’s border.” Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U. S. 353,
`361 (2001).
`
`In accord with that overarching jurisdictional principle
`dating back to the 1800s, States have jurisdiction to prose-
`
`cute crimes committed in Indian country unless preempted.
`In the leading case in the criminal context—the McBratney
`case from 1882—this Court held that States have jurisdic-
`tion to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against
`
`non-Indians in Indian country. United States v. McBratney,
`
`104 U. S. 621, 623–624 (1882). The Court stated that Colo-
`rado had “criminal jurisdiction” over crimes by non-Indians
`
`against non-Indians “throughout the whole of the territory
`within its limits, including the Ute Reservation.” Id., at
`624. Several years later, the Court similarly decided that
`Montana had criminal jurisdiction over crimes by non-Indi-
`ans against non-Indians in Indian country within that
`State. Draper v. United States, 164 U. S. 240, 244–247
`(1896). The McBratney principle remains good law.
`
`In short, the Court’s precedents establish that Indian
`
`country is part of a State’s territory and that, unless
`preempted, States have jurisdiction over crimes committed
`
`in Indian country.
`
`
`III
`The central question that we must decide, therefore, is
`
`
`
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`
`

`

`7
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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` Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`whether the State’s authority to prosecute crimes commit-
`
`ted by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country has
`been preempted. U. S. Const., Art. VI.
`
`Under the Court’s precedents, as we will explain, a
`
`State’s jurisdiction in Indian country may be preempted
`(i) by federal law under ordinary principles of federal
`preemption, or (ii) when the exercise of state jurisdiction
`would unlawfully infringe on tribal self-government.
`
`In Part III–A, we consider whether state authority to
`prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indi-
`ans in Indian country is preempted by federal law under
`ordinary principles of preemption. In Part III–B, we con-
`sider whether principles of tribal self-government preclude
`the exercise of state jurisdiction over crimes committed by
`non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.
`A
`
`
`Castro-Huerta points to two federal laws that, in his
`view, preempt Oklahoma’s authority to prosecute crimes
`committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian coun-
`try: (i) the General Crimes Act, which grants the Federal
`
`Government jurisdiction to prosecute crimes in Indian
`country, 18 U. S. C. §1152; and (ii) Public Law 280, which
`grants States, or authorizes States to acquire, certain addi-
`tional jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian country,
`
`67 Stat. 588; see 18 U. S. C. §1162; 25 U. S. C. §1321. Nei-
`ther statute preempts preexisting or otherwise lawfully as-
`sumed state authority to prosecute crimes committed by
`non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.
`1
`
`As relevant here, the General Crimes Act provides: “Ex-
`cept as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general
`
`
`laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses
`committed in any place within the sole and exclusive juris-
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`8
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`
`OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
`
`Opinion of the Court
`diction of the United States, except the District of Colum-
`bia, shall extend to the Indian country.” 18 U. S. C. §1152.
`
`By its terms, the Act does not preempt the State’s author-
`ity to prosecute non-Indians who commit crimes against In-
`dians in Indian country. The text of the Act simply “ex-
`
`tend[s]” federal law to Indian country, leaving untouched
`the background principle of state jurisdiction over crimes
`
`committed within the State, including in Indian country.
`
`Ibid.
`
`The Act also specifies the body of federal criminal law
`
`that extends to Indian country—namely, “the general laws
`of the United States as to the punishment of offenses com-
`mitted in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdic-
`
`
`tion of the United States.” Ibid. Those cross-referenced
`“general laws” are the federal laws that apply in federal en-
`claves such as military bases and national parks. Ibid.
`
`
`Importantly, however, the General Crimes Act does not
`say that Indian country is equivalent to a federal enclave
`
`for jurisdictional purposes. Nor does the Act say that fed-
`eral jurisdiction is exclusive in Indian country, or that state
`
`jurisdiction is preempted in Indian country.
`
`Under the General Crimes Act, therefore, both the Fed-
`eral Government and the State have concurrent jurisdiction
`
`to prosecute crimes committed in Indian country.2 The
`
`General Crimes Act does not preempt state authority to
`prosecute Castro-Huerta’s crime.
`
`To overcome the text, Castro-Huerta offers several coun-
`terarguments. None is persuasive.
`
`
`
`——————
`2To the extent that a State lacks prosecutorial authority over crimes
`
`
` committed by Indians in Indian country (a question not before us), that
` would not be a result of the General Crimes Act. Instead, it would be the
`
`result of a separate principle of federal law that, as discussed below, pre-
`
`
`cludes state interference with tribal self-government. See Part III–B,
`
`
`infra; White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 142–143,
`
`145 (1980); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 411 U. S. 164, 171−172
`(1973).
`
`
`
`

`

`9
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` Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`First, Castro-Huerta advances what he describes as a tex-
`
`tual argument. He contends that the text of the General
`Crimes Act makes Indian country the jurisdictional equiv-
`
`
`alent of a federal enclave. To begin, he points out that the
`
`Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute
`
`crimes committed in federal enclaves such as military bases
`
`and national parks. And then Castro-Huerta asserts that
`the General Crimes Act in effect equates federal enclaves
`
`and Indian country. Therefore, according to Castro-Huerta,
`
`it follows that the Federal Government also has exclusive
`
`jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed in Indian coun-
`try.
`
`Castro-Huerta’s syllogism is wrong as a textual matter.
`
`
`The Act simply borrows the body of federal criminal law
`that applies in federal enclaves and extends it to Indian
`country. The Act does not purport to equate Indian country
`and federal enclaves for jurisdictional purposes. Moreover,
`it is not enough to speculate, as Castro-Huerta does, that
`Congress might have implicitly intended a jurisdictional
`parallel between Indian country and federal enclaves.
`
`
`Castro-Huerta’s argument also directly contradicts this
`
` Court’s precedents. As far back as 1891, the Court stated
`that the phrase “sole and exclusive jurisdiction” in the Gen-
`
`eral Crimes Act is “only used in the description of the laws
`which are extended” to Indian country, not “to the jurisdic-
`
`tion extended over the Indian country.” In re Wilson, 140
`U. S. 575, 578 (1891). The Court repeated that analysis in
`1913, concluding that the phrase “sole and exclusive juris-
`
`diction” is “used in order to describe the laws of the United
`States which by that section are extended to the Indian
`
`country.” Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 268
`
`(1913).
`
`Stated otherwise, the General Crimes Act provides that
`the federal criminal laws that apply to federal enclaves also
`
`apply in Indian country. But the extension of those federal
`laws to Indian country does not silently erase preexisting
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` OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
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`Opinion of the Court
`or otherwise lawfully assumed state jurisdiction to prose-
`
`cute crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian country.
`
`Moreover, if Castro-Huerta’s interpretation of the Gen-
`
`eral Crimes Act were correct, then the Act would preclude
`States from prosecuting any crimes in Indian country—pre-
`sumably even those crimes committed by non-Indians
`against non-Indians—just as States ordinarily cannot pros-
`
`ecute crimes committed in federal enclaves. But this Court
`has long held that States may prosecute crimes committed
`
`
`by non-Indians against non-Indians in Indian country. See
`McBratney, 104 U. S., at 623–624; Draper, 164 U. S., at
`242–246. Those holdings, too, contravene Castro-Huerta’s
`
`argument regarding the General Crimes Act.
`
`In advancing his enclave argument, Castro-Huerta also
`tries to analogize the text of the General Crimes Act to the
`text of the Major Crimes Act. He asserts that the Major
`
`Crimes Act grants the Federal Government exclusive juris-
`diction to prosecute certain major crimes committed by In-
`
`dians in Indian country. But the Major Crimes Act contains
`substantially different language than the General Crimes
`
`Act. Unlike the General Crimes Act, the Major Crimes Act
`says that defendants in Indian country “shall be subject to
`the same law” as defendants in federal enclaves. See 18
`U. S. C. §1153 (“Any Indian who commits against the per-
`son or property of another Indian or other person any of ”
`
`
`certain major offenses “shall be subject to the same law and
`
`penalties as all other persons committing any of the above
`
`offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
`States”). So even assuming that the text of the Major
`Crimes Act provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction over
`
`major crimes committed by Indians in Indian country, see,
`
`e.g., United States v. John, 437 U. S. 634, 651, and n. 22
`(1978); Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U. S. 99, 103 (1993), that
`conclusion does not translate to the differently worded Gen-
`eral Crimes Act.
`
`
`In short, the General Crimes Act does not treat Indian
`
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`Opinion of the Court
`country as the equivalent of a federal enclave for jurisdic-
`tional purposes. Nor does the Act make federal jurisdiction
`exclusive or preempt state law in Indian country.
`Second, Castro-Huerta contends that, regardless of the
`
`statutory text, Congress implicitly intended for the General
`
`
`Crimes Act to provide the Federal Government with exclu-
`sive jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians
`against Indians in Indian country.
`
`The fundamental problem with Castro-Huerta’s implicit
`
`
`intent argument is that the text of the General Crimes Act
`
`says no such thing. Congress expresses its intentions
`
`through statutory text passed by both Houses and signed
`by the President (or passed over a Presidential veto). As
`
`this Court has repeatedly stated, the text of a law controls
`
`over purported legislative intentions unmoored from any
`
`statutory text. The Court may not “replace the actual text
`
`with speculation as to Congress’ intent.” Magwood v. Pat-
`terson, 561 U. S. 320, 334 (2010). Rather, the Court “will
`
`presume more modestly” that “the legislature says what it
`means and means what it says.” Henson v. Santander Con-
`sumer USA Inc., 582 U. S. 79, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 10)
`
`(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see,
`
`e.g., McGirt, 591 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12) (“[W]ishes are
`
`
`not laws”); Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 587 U. S. ___,
`___ (2019) (lead opinion) (slip op., at 14) (The Supremacy
`
`Clause cannot “be deployed” “to elevate abstract and unen-
`acted legislative desires above state law”); Alexander v.
`Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 287–288 (2001) (The Court does
`not give “dispositive weight to the expectations that the en-
`acting Congress had formed in light of the contemporary le-
`gal context,” because we “begin (and find that we can end)
`
`our search for Congress’s intent with . . . text and structure”
`(internal quotation marks omitted)); Central Bank of Den-
`
`ver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S.
`164, 173 (1994) (“[T]he text of the statute controls our deci-
`sion”).
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` OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
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`Opinion of the Court
`To buttress his implicit intent argument, Castro-Huerta
`
`
`
` seizes on the history of the General Crimes Act. At the time
`of the Act’s earliest iterations in 1817 and 1834, Indian
`country was separate from the States. Therefore, at that
`time, state law did not apply in Indian country—in the
`same way that New York law would not ordinarily have ap-
`plied in New Jersey. But territorial separation—not juris-
`dictional preemption by the General Crimes Act—was the
`reason that state authority did not extend to Indian country
`at that time.
`Because Congress operated under a different territorial
`
`
`paradigm in 1817 and 1834, it had no reason at that time
`
`to consider whether to preempt preexisting or lawfully as-
`sumed state criminal authority in Indian country. For pre-
`sent purposes, the fundamental point is that the text of the
`General Crimes Act does not preempt state law. And this
`
`Court does not “rewrite a constitutionally valid statutory
`
`text under the banner of speculation about what Congress
`
`might have done had it faced a question that . . . it never
`faced.” Henson, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9). The history
`of territorial separation during the early years of the Re-
`public is not a license or excuse to rewrite the text of the
`
`General Crimes Act.
`
`As noted above, the Worcester-era understanding of In-
`
`dian country as separate from the State was abandoned
`later in the 1800s. After that change, Indian country in
`each State became part of that State’s territory. But Con-
`gress did not alter the General Crimes Act to make federal
`criminal jurisdiction exclusive in Indian country. To this
`
`day, the text of the General Crimes Act still does not make
`federal jurisdiction exclusive or preempt state jurisdiction.
`In 1882, in McBratney, moreover, this Court held that
`
`
`States have jurisdiction to prosecute at least some crimes
`
`committed in Indian country. Since 1882, therefore, Con-
`gress has been specifically aware that state criminal laws
`
`apply to some extent in Indian country. Yet since then,
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`Opinion of the Court
`Congress has never enacted new legislation that would ren-
`der federal juri