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`
`OFFICE OF THE CLERK
`SUPREME COURT 11 q
`
`IN THE
`^ FILED
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED ^T^f^
`Palani Karupaiyan, Petitioner.
`Vs.
`INTERNATIONAL SOS;
`ACCESS STAFFING, LLC;
`KAPITAL DATA CORP;
`DESSI NIKOLOVA, Individually and in her official capacity
`as director, product engineering of the international SOS;
`GREGORY HARRIS, Individually and in his official capacity
`team leader, mobile applications of the international SOS;
`KUMAR MANGALA, Individually and in their official
`capacity as founder and CEO of the Kapital Data Corp;
`MIKE WEINSTEIN, Individually and in his official capacity
`principal product engineering of the Access Staffing LLC,
`Respondents.
`PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`to the United States Court of Appeals
`for the Third Circuit
`
`as
`
`as
`
`Palani Karupaiyan.
`Pro se, Petitioner,
`Email: palanikav@gmail.com
`212-470-2048(m)
`
`

`

`I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
`a) In Civil rights complaint, when the Plaintiff alleged that Joint-
`employers did not nay to the plaintiff is enough for FCP Rule 8(a)’s
`short and plain statement requirement?
`Conley v. Gibson. 355 US 41 - Supreme Court 1957@ 48 ‘Following the simple
`guide of Rule 8 (f) that "all vleadinss shall be so construed as to do substantial
`justice”
`
`Sullivan u. Little Huntins Park. Inc , 396 US 229 - Supreme Court 1969 @ 239-
`240
`W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from
`the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant
`the necessary relief. And it is also well settled, that where legal rights have
`been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such
`invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong
`done. "Id., at 684.
`b) When the complaint survived for motion under FCP Rule 12(b)(6), Dist
`Court dismissed the complaint under Rule 8(a) and USCA 3rd circuit
`affirmed under Rule 8(a) is error?
`Davis v. Ruby Foods. Inc.. 269 F. 3d 818 - Court of Appeals, 7th Cir
`2001 @ 821
`"If the [trial] Court understood the allegations sufficiently to determine that
`they could state a claim for relief, the complaint has satisfied Rule 8." Kittav
`v. Kornstein. 230 F. 3d 531 - Court of Appeals. 2nd Circuit 2000 at 541
`
`c) When the plaintiff Independent Software engineer is not paid
`by the joint-employers for his Computer Software work to
`them. Should the Dist Court 8c USCA 3rd deny the copyright
`ownership to the plaintiff independent software engineer?
`The Copyright Act of 1976 (Act 1976
`17 U.S. C. §§ 201(a),
`17U.S.C. § 102(a).
`U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 8
`
`l
`
`

`

`Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 US 730 -Supr.
`Ct 1989
`d) United States Court of Appeals' one judge alone deliver the opinion for
`a unanimous Court?
`
`I (a) PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
`All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page
`I (b) No related case(s)
`
`2
`
`

`

`1
`
`1
`
`1
`
`1 2
`
`2 2 3
`
`4 5 7 7 7
`
`8 8
`
`8 9 9
`
`II. Table of Contents
`Contents
`I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED........................................................................................
`a) In Civil rights complaint, when the Plaintiff alleged that Joint-employers did
`not pay to the plaintiff is enough for FCP Rule 8(a)’s short and plain statement
`requirement?......................................................................................................................
`b) When the complaint survived for motion under FCP Rule 12(b)(6), Dist Court
`dismissed the complaint under Rule 8(a) and USCA 3rd circuit affirmed under
`Rule 8(a) is error?...................................................... ......................................................
`c) When the plaintiff Independent Software engineer is not paid by the joint-
`employers for his Computer Software work to them. Should the Dist Court &
`USCA 3rd deny the copyright ownership to the plaintiff independent software
`engineer?............................................................................................................................
`d) United States Court of Appeals’ one judge alone deliver the opinion for a
`unanimous Court?............................................................................................................
`I (a) PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
`I (b) No related case(s)..............................
`II. Table of Contents..................................
`Index to Appendices...................
`III. Table of Authorities..... ...........
`IV. Petition for Writ Of Certiorari
`V. Opinions Below........................
`VI. Jurisdiction...............................
`VII.CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
`Title -VII..........................................................................................................
`Copyright...................................................................................................................
`VIII. Statement of the Case.........................................................................................
`Dist Court Proceeding..............................................................................................
`USCA 3rd Circuit proceeding....................................................................................
`6 challenges in Petition for Panel and En Banc rehearing.............................
`a) The Plaintiff s SAC/Reconsideration should be reviewed under Rule 20
`along with Rule 8 when the defendants were Joint employers.......................
`
`12
`13
`
`13
`
`3
`
`

`

`19
`
`22
`
`22
`
`23
`25
`
`b) District Court ruling that the SAC does not specify which of the defendants
`each of the counts is directed toward is error when defendants were joint-
`employer .......................................................................................................................
`c) District Court denying the request to appoint attorney prejudiced the
`plaintiff.........................................................................................................................
`d) When the complaint survived for motion under FCP Rule 12(b)(6),
`dismissing the complaint under Rule 8 is error......................................................
`e) Appellant pray this Court to Reconsider the opinion that Pltf SAC is
`untimely........................................................................................................................
`23
`f) District Court denied of Plaintiff summary Judgement and motion for 50%
`copy-right of the software is error and this Court should reconsider it the
`affirmation on this matter..........................................................................................
`IX. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT...............................................................
`a) In Civil rights complaint, when the Plaintiff alleged that Joint-employers did
`not pay to the plaintiff is enough for FCP Rule 8(a)’s short and plain statement
`requirement?....................................................................................................................
`b) When the complaint survived for motion under FCP Rule 12(b)(6), Dist Court
`dismissed the complaint under Rule 8(a) and USCA 3rd circuit affirmed under
`Rule 8(a) is error?...........................................................................................................
`c) When the plaintiff Independent Software engineer is not paid by the joint-
`employers for his Computer Software programming work to them. Should the Dist
`Court & USCA 3rd deny the copyright ownership to the plaintiff independent
`software engineer?.................................................................................................
`d) United States Court of Appeals’ one judge alone deliver the opinion for a
`unanimous Court?..................................................................................................
`X. CONCLUSION
`XI. Certificate of Compliance for Word Count and Font
`
`25
`
`28
`
`29
`
`31
`32
`32
`
`Index to Appendices
`1) Appendix A, Court of Appeals Opinion Dec 22, 2021
`la
`2) Appendix B, Court of Appeals - Judgment...............
`5a
`3) Appendix C, District Court Order-dismiss the complaint on Apr 22 2021 ...7a
`4) Appendix D, Dist.Court Order1- deny the reconsideration on Jun 25 2021. 16a
`5) Appendix E, USCA Order Denying Rehearing
`18a
`6) Appendix E, USCA Order Denying Rehearing.
`18a
`
`1 USCA 3rd circuit ruled as Reconsideration motion.
`
`4
`
`

`

`7) Appendix F, Doctor Prescription for Urinal Bleeding
`20a
`8) Appendix G, Ultrasound Report -2 Urinal Bladder, 1 kidney dysfunction...2la
`9) Appendix H, Plaintiffs Affidavit that Joint-Employer did not pay me ... . 25a
`10) Appendix I, Plaintiffs Exhibit for Urine with Blood
`28a
`1 l)Appendix J, Proof of service........................................
`29a
`
`III. Table of Authorities
`
`Cases
`27
`Bell v. Hood. 327 U. S. 678.................................................
`15
`Bennett v. Schmidt. 153 F.3d 516, 518-19 (7th Cir.1998)
`11
`Briscoe v. Klaus. 538 F.3d 252, 262 (3d Cir. 2008).........
`Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid. 490 US 730 - Supreme Court 1989 ... 8
`28
`Conley v. Gibson. 355 US 41 - Supreme Court 1957...............................................
`14
`Davis v. Ruby Foods. Inc.. 269 F. 3d 818 - Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit 2001...
`27
`Estelle v. Gamble. 429 US 97 - Supreme Court 1976..............................................
`13
`Garrett v. Wexford Health. 938 F. 3d 69 - Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit 2019....
`13
`Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 520(1971).......................................................................
`31
`Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services. 138 S. Ct. 13 - Supreme Court 2017.
`20
`Harnase v. Lishtner. 916 F. 3d 138 - Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit 2019...
`15
`Holloway v.Arthur Andersen & Co.,566 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir.1977)
`20, 22, 24
`Kittay v.Kornstein. 230 F.3d 531, 541 (2d Cir. 2000)
`....16, 28
`Kuehl v. FDIC, supra, 8 F.3d.......................................
`Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narco Intellie & Coordi Unit. 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113
`S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517(1993)..........................
`15, 28
`Ostrzenski v. SeiseL 177 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir.1999)
`15
`Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.. 747 F. 2d 863 - Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit
`1984...........................................
`11
`Salahuddin v. Cuomo. 861 F.2d
`13, 17
`Schaedler v. Readins Easle Publication. Inc.. 370 F. 2d 795 - Court of Appeals, 3rd
`Circuit 1967
`18
`SEWRAZ v. Lons. Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit 2011.............................
`17
`Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F. 3d 83 - Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit 1995.
`17
`Simmons v. Abruzzo. 49 F.3d 83. 87 (2d Cir.1995)..................................
`16, 28
`Sommers v. Budeet Marketing. Inc..667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir.1982) (per
`curiam);......................................................................................................................
`Stanbury Law Firm. P.A. v. IRS, 221 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir.2000)..................
`Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park. Inc.. 396 US 229 - Supreme Court 1969............
`Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks. 281 U. S. 548, 569-570............................
`
`15
`17
`1, 27
`27
`
`5
`
`

`

`Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby. 241 U. S. 33, 39............................................
`Toevs u. Reid. 267F. App'x 817, 819-20 (10th Cir.2008)..................................
`Ulane v. Eastern Airlines. Inc.. 742 F.2dl081, 1084 (7th Cir.1984) ...
`Whelan Assoc, v. Maslow Dental Lab.. 797F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir.1986)
`Wvnder v. McMahon. 360 F.3d 73, 79 n.ll (2d Cir. 2004)..............................
`Statutes
`
`27
`18
`15
`30
`20
`
`8, 30
`
`888
`
`8, 30
`8
`
`15
`11
`26
`11
`11
`20,21
`28
`
`8,30
`
`17U.S. C.§§ 201(a).................................
`17U.S.C. § 102(a).....................................
`28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).................................
`42 U.S.C. 2000e........................................
`The Copyright Act of 1976.......................
`Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
`Rules
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)....
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)....
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)......
`Rule 20.........................
`Rule 8 (f).......................
`Constitutional Provisions
`U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 8
`
`6
`
`

`

`IV. Petition for Writ Of Certiorari
`Petitioner respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review
`
`the opinion/judgment/order below.
`
`V.
`Opinions Below
`a) The NOT PRECEDENTIAL opinion of the United States Court of
`
`Appeals 3rd Cir. appears at Appendix: A to the petition.
`
`Docket- 21-1853
`
`Opinion By GREENAWAY, Jr., PORTER, and NYGAARD, Circuit
`
`Judges.
`
`b) USCA 3r Cir. Order Denying Rehearing Penal and En Banc appears at
`
`Appendix: E. Judge Nygaard’s vote is limited to panel rehearing only.
`
`c) The United States District Court (ED-PA)’s Order of dismissing the
`
`complaint appears at Appendix: C to the petition.
`
`Docket -19-2259 - Hon. Petrese B. Tucker. U.S.D.J.
`
`d)
`
`The United States District Court (ED-PA)’s Order denying for
`
`reconsideration appears at Appendix: D to the petition.
`
`Petitioner is pro se and unaware the US District Court orders were
`published or not.
`VI. .Jurisdiction
`The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my
`
`case was Dec 22. 2021 at Appendix: A Pet.App-la
`
`7
`
`

`

`A timely filed petition for rehearing was denied by the United
`
`States Court of Appeals on Jan 19 2022. and a copy of the Order
`
`denying rehearing appears at Appendix: E. Pet.App-18a.
`
`The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. §
`
`1254(1).
`
`VIL CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
`INVOLVED
`Title -VII
`Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
`42 U.S.C. 2000e
`Copyright
`U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 8
`The Copyright Act of 1976
`17 U.S. C. §§ 201(a).,
`17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
`Community for Creative Non-Violence u. Reid. 490 US 730 -1989
`CReidT)
`
`8
`
`

`

`viii. Statement of the Case.
`Dist Court Proceeding
`The petitioner Palani Karupaiyan (“Petitioner”, “plaintiff’), filed civil
`
`right/ Title VII claims, unpaid/no payment. Copyright ownership
`
`complaint with US district for Easter Pennsylvania (Dist Court.
`
`“PAED”) against the Joint-employers INTERNATIONAL SOS (“isos”);
`
`ACCESS STAFFING, LLC (“access”); KAPITAL DATA CORP
`
`(“Kapital”); DESSI NIKOLOVA, Individually and in her official capacity
`
`as director, product engineering of the international SOS; GREGORY
`
`HARRIS, Individually and in his official capacity as team leader, mobile
`
`applications of the international SOS; KUMAR MANGALA,
`
`Individually and in their official capacity as founder and CEO of the
`
`Kapital Data Corp; MIKE WEINSTEIN, Individually and in his official
`
`capacity as principal product engineering of the Access Staffing LLC.
`
`Im pro se and English is not petitioner mother langue nor medium
`
`of school language. I found a sample complaint from internet and
`
`modified the complaint for my need. Also found a form for employment
`
`9
`
`

`

`discrimination complaint from US Courts’ site internet and filed this
`
`forms, filed the complaint against the employers.
`
`Along with complaint, plaintiff filed email consent form for receiving
`
`docket entries thru email.
`
`On May 6 2029, On District Court dismissed the complaint without
`
`prejudice and ordered the plaintiff to amend the complaint with 30
`
`days. See below ECF-46
`
`05/06/2020
`
`46 ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFFS AMENDED COMPLAINT IS DISMISSED
`WITHOUT PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT WITHIN 30 DAYS
`PLAINTIFF SHALL FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT. DEFENDANTS
`MOTIONS TO DISMISS, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ACCEPTING
`ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE AND ADDITIONAL SIX MOTIONS, AND FOR
`ADDITIONAL TIME ARE ALL DENIED AS MOOT. THE CLERK OF COURT IS
`DIRECTED TO CORRECT PLAINTIFF'S NAME ON THE DOCKET. ETC..
`SIGNED BY HONORABLE PETRjESE B. TUCKER ON 5/6/2020.5/6/2020
`ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED. NOT MAILED TO PRO SE.(sg,) (Emailed
`to litigant on 06/16/2020 per chambers) Modified on 6/16/2020 (nd,). (Entered:
`05/06/2020)
`Because of unavailability of email notification to prose with PACER
`
`of ED PA and Im homeless no address, due to Pandemic this order never
`
`reached the plaintiff. Same reasons, In the past district Court orders
`
`also did not reach the plaintiff. In fact the employer did not nay me so
`
`the home is evicted so plaintiff was not able to get the Dist Court order
`
`thru postal mail.
`
`At times corona virus was on peak, Due to my diabetic, situs
`
`inversus DNA ill-formed lung, heart problem petitioner was at highest
`
`risk.
`
`10
`
`

`

`Before May 06, 2020 order reaching the plaintiff, Defendants
`
`including Access filed motion to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ.
`
`P. 8(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)/ Poulis v. State Farm Fire
`
`and Cas. Co.. 747 F. 2d 863 - Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit 1984 and Briscoe u.
`
`Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 262 (3d Cir. 2008) ‘s six factors analysis as below.
`
`(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the
`adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to
`discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or
`the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other
`than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the
`meritoriousness of the claim or defense.
`
`When I tried to reach the Court for ordered date May 06 2020 , on
`
`Jun 16 2020, Dist court(chambers) entered the order in docket ECF-
`
`46(above picture), emailed me so I was not able to file the amended
`
`complaint with 30 days as Dist Court order which is not diabetic,
`
`disabled, unemployed, homeless plaintiffs fault.
`
`On Mar 22, 2021 filed motion of 50% copyright ownership of the
`
`software(s) and application plaintiff developed for the joint-employers
`
`and on Mar 25 2021, plaintiff filed a summary judgement for claims
`
`against all defendants and filed motion.
`
`For the 50% copyright ownership motion and Motion for summary
`
`judgment, the defendants stated that because of SAC is untimely(which
`
`li
`
`

`

`is not my fault) and/or Poulis’s 6 factor analysis complaint does not
`
`have threshold so they do not need to respond my motion for copyright
`
`and summary judgment.
`
`On Apr 22 2021 Dist Court dismissed the 2nd amended complaint
`
`(“SAC”) as defendants requited the court, denied 50% ownership of
`
`copyright motion, and denied the summary judgment against the
`
`defendants. App.7a.
`
`Timely appellant filed notice of appeal. Also filed proposed complaint
`
`with District Court which is ruled by USCA as reconsideration. When
`
`reconsideration is denied, App.l6a, appellant filed amended notice of
`
`appeal.
`
`USCA 3rd Circuit proceeding
`On appeal appellant passed every six factors of Poulis and Briscoe.
`
`On Dec 22, 2021, USCA for 3rd circuit NOT PRECEDENTIAL opinioned
`
`that Petitioner’s SAC violated the Rule 8. App.4a.
`
`Timely appellant filed Petition for Panel and En Banc rehearing
`
`with USCA with following 6 challenges.
`
`12
`
`

`

`6 challenges in Petition for Panel and En Banc rehearing
`a) The Plaintiff s SAC/Reconsideration should be reviewed
`under Rule 20 along with Rule 8 when the defendants
`were Joint employers.
`Dist Court dismissed the complaint for Rule 8 violation which is error.
`Under Rule 8, Plaintiff complaint should be Short and plain. In Garrett
`
`v. Wexford Health. 938 F. 3d 69 - Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit 2019 @ 94
`
`“We first consider Rule 8's "short” statement requirement. Certainly,
`there can be no single "proper length" for stating a particular claim. The
`level of factual detail will vary with the complexity of the claim asserted.
`Moore, supra, § 8.04[l][d].”
`In this case, the plaintiff is pro se and mother tongue is not English
`
`speaking. Every allegation/facts are short which is drafted with best effort of
`
`the plaintiff. In finding plaintiffs complaint legally sufficient, Supreme
`
`Court found that pro se pleadings should be held to "less strinsent standards"
`
`than those drafted by attorneys (Haines v. Kerner. 404 U.S. 520 (1971)).
`
`Nowhere in the District Court orders stated that this plaintiff did not take
`
`sufficient effort to amend the complaint.
`
`In Garrett, @ 96
`They argue that Garrett is "incapable or not willing to abide by the
`Court's instructions." Corr. Def. Supp. Br. 26. We disagree. It is
`apparent that Garrett made a genuine effort to revise his FAC to
`respond to the Magistrate Judge’s critique of the TAC. This is simply
`not a case in which leave to amend was previously given and the
`successive pleadings "remain prolix and unintelligible." See
`Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42.
`In conclusion, there are claims in Garrett’s pro se FAC against the
`Corrections Defendants that satisfy the "short and plain statement"
`13
`
`

`

`requirement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While the complaint is far from
`perfect, we cannot agree with the Magistrate Judge's assessment,
`adopted by the District Court, that "Plaintiffs factual and legal
`allegations are, to a substantial extent, incomprehensible" and that the
`FAC contains "virtually no detail as to who did what and when." JA 22.
`We are always mindful that the abuse of discretion standard of review
`is highly deferential. And we are not unsympathetic to the difficulties
`and frustrations the Magistrate Judge experienced in managing a case
`that involved various iterations of a complaint. Yet we simply cannot
`conclude that the District Court's sweeping dismissal of all the claims
`in the FAC was a [29] proper exercise of discretion. We will therefore
`vacate and remand the matter for further proceedings.
`This case plaintiff pro se, non-English mother tongue put every genuine
`
`effort to amend the complaint which undisputable.
`
`District Court ruled in Ecf-70 that
`“The Access Defendants contend that, "the SAC consists of nonsensical
`paragraphs, seemingly out of place and unnecessary exhibits, and
`lengthy ramblings,” and despite that length, "Neither the allegations,
`nor the causes of action, nor the parties against whom Plaintiff purports
`to bring these allegations, are clearly delineated." Def. 's Mot. To Dismiss
`(ECF 57). We agree”
`Because these reasons the entire complaint should be dismissed. The
`
`defendant did not harassed by the complaint. If the part of complaint is non-
`
`essential, either the Dist Court or defendant should file a motion to strike
`
`down that part only. In Davis v. Rubv Foods. Inc.. 269 F. 3d 818 - Court of
`
`Appeals, 7th Circuit 2001 @820-821
`
`"Rule 8, so far as bears on this case, requires that the complaint
`contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
`pleader is entitled to relief” and that "each averment of [the
`complaint] shall be simple, concise, and direct. "Fed. R. Civ. P.
`
`14
`
`

`

`8(a)(2), (e)(1). Mr. Davis's complaint does not satisfy these
`requirements (themselves, be it noted, rather repetitious — and is
`"averment," an archaic word of no clear meaning, simple, concise,
`and direct?). The complaint is not short, concise, or plain. It is 20
`pages long (though in a large typeface — at least 14-point), is
`highly repetitious, and includes material which, though sometimes
`charming is irrelevant (another example is the allegation that
`Davis is an FBI informant). There are some downright weird
`touches, such as the repeated assertion that Davis and his alleged
`harasser are, respectively, a "naturally occurring man" and a
`"naturally occurring woman," as if Davis were concerned about the
`standing of clones and transsexuals. (Rightly concerned—see
`Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc,. 742 Ft2dl081, 1084 (7th
`Cir.1984); Sommers v. Budset Marketing. Inc.,667 F.2d 748,
`750 (8th Cir.1982) (per curiam); Holloway v,Arthur
`Andersen & Co„566 F.2d 659, 661 (9th CirA977).) It *820
`nevertheless performs the essential function of a complaint under
`the civil rules, which is to put the defendant on notice of the
`plaintiff's claim. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narco Intellis &
`Coordi Unit. 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517
`(1993) Bennett v. Schmidt. 153F.3d 516, 518-19 (7th Cir.1998);
`Ostrzenski v. Seisel. 177 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir.1999).
`Indeed, because of its prolixity, it gives the defendant much
`more information about the plaintiffs conception of his case than
`the civil rules require (see the very brief model complaints in
`the Forms Appendix to the rules). And it appears to state a
`claim that would withstand challenge under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
`The question we must decide, therefore — surprisingly one of
`first impression in this circuit — is whether a District Court is
`authorized to dismiss a complaint merely because it contains
`repetitious and irrelevant matter, a disposable husk around a core
`of proper pleading. As our use of the word “disposable" implies, we
`think not, and therefore that it is an abuse of discretion.
`
`15
`
`

`

`In our many years of judging, moreover, we cannot recall
`many complaints that actually met the standard of chaste, Doric
`simplicity implied by Rule 8 and the model complaints in the
`Forms Appendix. Many lawyers strongly believe that a complaint
`should be comprehensive rather than brief and therefore cryptic.
`They think the more comprehensive pleading assists the judge in
`understanding the case and provides a firmer basis for settlement
`negotiations. This judgment by the bar has been accepted to the
`extent that complaints signed by a lawyer are never dismissed
`simply because they are not short, concise, and plain
`But the complaint contains everything that Rule 8 requires it
`to contain, and we cannot see what harm is done anyone by the fact
`that it contains more. Although the defendant would have been
`entitled to an order striking the irrelevant material from the
`complaint, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f), we doubt that it would have sought
`such an order, unless for purposes of harassment, because the
`extraneous allegations... cannot harm the defense. They are
`entirely ignorable. Excess burden was created in this case not by
`the eoccesses of Davis's complaint but by the action of the defendant
`in moving to dismiss the complaint and the action of the District
`Court in granting that motion.
`Were plaintiffs' confessed overdrafting their only sin, we
`would be inclined to agree that dismissal was an overly harsh
`penalty." Kuehl v. FDIC, supra. 8 F. 3d at 908. See also Simmons
`v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir.1995). Indeed; the punishment
`should be fitted to the crime, here only faintly blameworthy and
`entirely harmless.
`To the principle that the mere presence of extraneous matter
`does not warrant dismissal of a complaint under Rule 8, as to most
`generalizations about the law.
`We also take this opportunity to advise defense counsel
`against moving to strike extraneous matter unless its presence in
`
`16
`
`

`

`the complaint is actually prejudicial to the defense. Stanbury Law
`Firm. P.A. v. IRS, 221 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam)
`So District Court dismissing the SAC for the Access request is abuse of
`
`discretion.
`
`In Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F. 3d 83 - Court of Appeals, 2nd Cir.
`1995 @87
`When a complaint fails to comply with these requirements, the
`District Court has the power, on motion or sua sponte, to dismiss
`the complaint or to strike such parts as are redundant or
`immaterial. See Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d at 42
`This is especially true when the complaint states a claim that is on
`its face nonfrivolous. Indeed, in vacating the with-prejudice
`dismissal in Salahuddin v. Cuomo, we indicated that since the 15-
`page complaint, though prolix, gave the defendants notice of the
`substance of certain claims that were not frivolous on their face, a
`with-prejudice dismissal of even a subsequent similar amended
`complaint would be inappropriate. See 861 F.2d at 43 (suggesting
`that if future amended complaint failed to comply with Rule 8,
`Court could simply strike redundant or scandalous matter, leaving
`the nonfrivolous claims to be litigated).
`So District Court dismissing the SAC for the Access request is abuse of
`discretion
`In SEWRAZ v. Lons, Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit 2011,
`Regarding the length and complexity of Sewraz's complaint, the
`substantive portions of his complaint comprised 265 paragraphs in
`thirty-three pages. While Sewraz's computation of damages and
`specifics as to all of his losses were more detailed and repetitive
`than necessary in a complaint, his actual claims were easy to
`understand and were comprehensible without difficulty or
`guesswork.
`
`17
`
`

`

`Turning to the other factors, we find that the Defendants could
`easily determine what causes of action applied to them and what
`factual allegations supported each cause of action. While a
`defendant would likely need to read the complete factual
`background in order to see the big picture alleged, the facts are
`intelligible and clearly delineated as to each defendant. In
`addition, because Sewraz was proceeding prose, his complaint was
`entitled to greater leeway. See Toevs v. Reid. 267F. App'x 817, 819-
`20 (10th Cir.2008) (finding dismissal of twenty-three-page pro se
`complaint that was "not a model of conciseness" but “alleged
`violations of identifiable. . . rights supported by factual assertions
`tethered to particular defendants "was an abuse of discretion).
`Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the District Court abused
`its discretion in dismissing the complaint for failure to comply
`with Rule 8(a). Given that the complaint was clear and
`understandable and gave Defendants appropriate notice of the
`claims against them, the dismissal was improper. See Garst, 328
`F.3d at 378(holding that a Court could not dismiss a complaint
`merely because it contains repetitious and irrelevant matter, as
`"surplusage in a complaint can be ignored").
`So dismissing SAC under SEWRAZ also Dist Court's abuse of discretion.
`In Schaedler v. Reading Easle Publication. Inc.. 370 F. 2d 795 - Court of
`
`Appeals, 3rd Circuit 1967 @798
`
`Rule 12(e) authorizes a motion for a more definite statement if the
`complaint is "so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot
`reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading." It does not
`expressly authorize the dismissal of the complaint on
`noncompliance with an order granting the motion, but provides
`that "the Court may strike the pleading to which the motion was
`directed or make such order as it deems just."
`
`18
`
`

`

`....an effort is made to comply with the order of the Court granting
`it, the insufficiency of the effort does not justify automatic
`dismissal of the action.
`In the present case any inadequacy of the effort to amend the
`complaint must be judged in the extenuating circumstances that it
`was written by a lay litigant appearing pro se and that there is no
`reason to question the good faith of his attempt to comply with the
`Court's order.
`Under Schaedler Dist Court dismissing the SAC is abuse of discretion
`b) District Court ruling that the SAC does not specify which of
`the defendants each of the counts is directed toward is error
`when defendants were joint-employer
`See few claims of plaintiff in Reconsideration ECF-81, page-45, Count-
`
`11 failure to hire where plaintiff claimed ISOS failure to hire and paragraph
`
`39 plaintiff is unemployed.
`
`The foregoing paragraphs are realleged and incorporated by reference
`herein.
`173. On Mar 2nd week, when I applied the fulltime with ISOS.( job id
`19713), ISOS refused to hire me. For this job I have more experience and
`expertise and skilled than the job needed.
`174. Also as promised, ISOS failed to hire and/or promote me from
`Contract to hire TechLead. For this Tech Lead job I have all experience
`and expertise and skilled.
`175. Because of the race, color, retaliation, age, disability, genetic illness
`of the plaintiff, retaliation, defendant ISOS refused to hire/failure to
`promote the plaintiff.
`176. The Defendant ISOS, conduct as alleged above constitutes refused
`to hire/refused to promote in violation of Title VII, ADA/ADAAA,
`GINA, and the ADEA, PA human rights.
`Count:24. Failure to nav/failure to timely pav.
`
`19
`
`

`

`232 The foregoing paragraphs are realleged and incorporated by reference herein.
`233 Isos, access, Kapital refused to pay/refused timely pay, telling the plaintiff go to
`hell when plaintiff needed money for deadly medical expense.
`234 The Defendant’s ISOS, access , Kapital alleged above constitutes failure to
`pay/failure to timely pay in violation of Title VII, PHRA.RICO /false claim act or any
`plaintiff claimed acts.
`235 Plaintiff prays this Court for order the defendants following for failure to
`pay/failure to timely pay wrongdoing
`Joint employers refused to pay the plaintiff see Para 77 Mike
`
`Weinstein denied payment, para 84 Kumara Mangala denied payment,
`
`Para-86 Dessi Nikolova denied payment.
`
`Under Rule 20, In Harnase v. Lishtner, 916 F. 3d 138 - Court of
`Appeals, 2nd Cir 2019 @ 142-143
`Whi