`(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2022
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
` Syllabus
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`
`BIDEN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.
`
`
`
`
`
`v. NEBRASKA ET AL.
`CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
`
`COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
`
` No. 22–506. Argued February 28, 2023—Decided June 30, 2023
`
`Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (Education Act) governs
`
`federal financial aid mechanisms, including student loans. 20 U. S. C.
`
` §1070(a). The Act authorizes the Secretary of Education to cancel or
` reduce loans in certain limited circumstances. The Secretary may can-
`
`
`
`cel a set amount of loans held by some public servants, see §§1078–10,
`
` 1087j, 1087ee. He may also forgive the loans of borrowers who have
`died or become “permanently and totally disabled,” §1087(a)(1); bor-
` rowers who are bankrupt, §1087(b); and borrowers whose schools
`
`
` falsely certify them, close down, or fail to pay lenders. §1087(c).
`The issue presented in this case is whether the Secretary has au-
`
`
` thority under the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students
`
`Act of 2003 (HEROES Act) to depart from the existing provisions of the
`
`Education Act and establish a student loan forgiveness program that
`will cancel about $430 billion in debt principal and affect nearly all
`
` borrowers. Under the HEROES Act, the Secretary “may waive or mod-
`ify any statutory or regulatory provision applicable to the student fi-
`nancial assistance programs under title IV of the [Education Act] as
`the Secretary deems necessary in connection with a war or other mili-
`
`tary operation or national emergency.” §1098bb(a)(1). As relevant
`here, the Secretary may issue such waivers or modifications only “as
`may be necessary to ensure” that “recipients of student financial assis-
`tance under title IV of the [Education Act affected by a national emer-
`
`gency] are not placed in a worse position financially in relation to that
`financial assistance because of
`[the national emergency].”
`§§1098bb(a)(2)(A), 1098ee(2)(C)–(D).
`
`
`In 2022, as the COVID–19 pandemic came to its end, the Secretary
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`2
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`BIDEN v. NEBRASKA
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`
`Syllabus
`invoked the HEROES Act to issue “waivers and modifications” reduc-
`ing or eliminating the federal student debt of most borrowers. Borrow-
`ers with eligible federal student loans who had an income below
`$125,000 in either 2020 or 2021 qualified for a loan balance discharge
`of up to $10,000. Those who previously received Pell Grants—a spe-
`
`cific type of federal student loan based on financial need—qualified for
`a discharge of up to $20,000.
`
`Six States challenged the plan as exceeding the Secretary’s statu-
`tory authority. The Eighth Circuit issued a nationwide preliminary
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`injunction, and this Court granted certiorari before judgment.
`Held:
`
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`1. At least Missouri has standing to challenge the Secretary’s pro-
`gram. Article III requires a plaintiff to have suffered an injury in
`
`fact—a concrete and imminent harm to a legally protected interest,
`like property or money—that is fairly traceable to the challenged con-
`duct and likely to be redressed by the lawsuit. Lujan v. Defenders of
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`Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561. Here, as the Government concedes,
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`the Secretary’s plan would cost MOHELA, a nonprofit government cor-
`poration created by Missouri to participate in the student loan market,
`an estimated $44 million a year in fees. MOHELA is, by law and func-
`
`tion, an instrumentality of Missouri: Labeled an “instrumentality” by
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`the State, it was created by the State, is supervised by the State, and
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`serves a public function. The harm to MOHELA in the performance of
`its public function is necessarily a direct injury to Missouri itself. The
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`Court reached a similar conclusion 70 years ago in Arkansas v. Texas,
`346 U. S. 368.
`
`
`The Secretary emphasizes that, as a public corporation, MOHELA
`
`has a legal personality separate from the State. But such an instru-
`mentality—created and supervised by the State to serve a public func-
`tion—remains “(for many purposes at least) part of the Government
`
`itself.” Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513 U. S.
`374, 397. The Secretary also contends that because MOHELA can sue
`on its own behalf, it—not Missouri—must be the one to sue. But where
`a State has been harmed in carrying out its responsibilities, the fact
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`that it chose to exercise its authority through a public corporation it
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`created and controls does not bar the State from suing to remedy that
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`harm itself. See Arkansas, 346 U. S. 368. With Article III satisfied,
`the Court need not consider the States’ other standing arguments. Pp.
`7–12.
`
`
`2. The HEROES Act allows the Secretary to “waive or modify” exist-
`ing statutory or regulatory provisions applicable to financial assis-
`tance programs under the Education Act, but does not allow the Sec-
`retary to rewrite that statute to the extent of canceling $430 billion of
`student loan principal. Pp. 12–26.
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`

`3
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`Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
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`
`Syllabus
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`(a) The text of the HEROES Act does not authorize the Secretary’s
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`loan forgiveness program. The Secretary’s power under the Act to
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`“modify” does not permit “basic and fundamental changes in the
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`scheme” designed by Congress. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
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`American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U. S. 218, 225. Instead,
`“modify” carries “a connotation of increment or limitation,” and must
`
`be read to mean “to change moderately or in minor fashion.” Ibid.
`That is how the word is ordinarily used and defined, and the legal def-
`inition is no different.
`
`The authority to “modify” statutes and regulations allows the Secre-
`tary to make modest adjustments and additions to existing provisions,
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`not transform them. Prior to the COVID–19 pandemic, “modifications”
`issued under the Act were minor and had limited effect. But the “mod-
`ifications” challenged here create a novel and fundamentally different
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`loan forgiveness program. While Congress specified in the Education
`Act a few narrowly delineated situations that could qualify a borrower
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`for loan discharge, the Secretary has extended such discharge to nearly
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`every borrower in the country. It is “highly unlikely that Congress”
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`authorized such a sweeping loan cancellation program “through such
`a subtle device as permission to ‘modify.’” Id., at 231.
`
`
`
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`The Secretary responds that the Act authorizes him to “waive” legal
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`provisions as well as modify them—and that this additional term
`“grant[s] broader authority” than would “modify” alone. But the Sec-
`retary’s invocation of the waiver power here does not remotely resem-
`
`ble how it has been used on prior occasions, where it was simply used
`to nullify particular legal requirements. The Secretary next argues
`that the power to “waive or modify” is greater than the sum of its parts:
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`Because waiver allows the Secretary “to eliminate legal obligations in
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`their entirety,” the combination of “waive or modify” must allow him
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`“to reduce them to any extent short of waiver” (even if the power to
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`“modify” ordinarily does not stretch that far). But the challenged loan
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`forgiveness program goes beyond even that. In essence, the Secretary
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`has drafted a new section of the Education Act from scratch by “waiv-
`ing” provisions root and branch and then filling the empty space with
`radically new text.
`
`
`The Secretary also cites a procedural provision in the HEROES Act
`directing the Secretary to publish a notice in the Federal Register, “in-
`clud[ing] the terms and conditions to be applied in lieu of such statu-
`tory and regulatory provisions” as the Secretary has waived or modi-
`
`fied.
`§1098bb(b)(2). In the Government’s view, that language
`authorizes both “waiving and then putting [the Secretary’s] own re-
`quirements in”—a sort of “red penciling” of the existing law. But ra-
`ther than implicitly granting the Secretary authority to draft new sub-
`stantive statutory provisions at will, §1098bb(b)(2) simply imposes the
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`4
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`BIDEN v. NEBRASKA
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`Syllabus
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`obligation to report any waivers and modifications he has made. The
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`Secretary’s ability to add new terms “in lieu of” the old is limited to his
`authority to “modify” existing law. As with any other modification is-
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`sued under the Act, no new term or condition reported pursuant to
`
`
`§1098bb(b)(2) may distort the fundamental nature of the provision it
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`alters.
`
`In sum, the Secretary’s comprehensive debt cancellation plan is not
`a waiver because it augments and expands existing provisions dramat-
`ically. It is not a modification because it constitutes “effectively the
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`introduction of a whole new regime.” MCI, 512 U. S., at 234. And it
`cannot be some combination of the two, because when the Secretary
`seeks to add to existing law, the fact that he has “waived” certain pro-
`visions does not give him a free pass to avoid the limits inherent in the
`power to “modify.” However broad the meaning of “waive or modify,”
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`that language cannot authorize the kind of exhaustive rewriting of the
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`statute that has taken place here. Pp. 13–18.
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`
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`(b) The Secretary also appeals to congressional purpose, arguing
`that Congress intended “to grant substantial discretion to the Secre-
`tary to respond to unforeseen emergencies.” On this view, the unprec-
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`edented nature of the Secretary’s debt cancellation plan is justified by
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`the pandemic’s unparalleled scope. But the question here is not
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`whether something should be done; it is who has the authority to do it.
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`As in the Court’s recent decision in West Virginia v. EPA, given the
`“ ‘history and the breadth of the authority’ ” asserted by the Executive
`
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`and the “ ‘economic and political significance’ of that assertion,” the
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`Court has “ ‘reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress’ meant
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`to confer such authority.” 597 U. S. ___, ___ (quoting FDA v. Brown &
`Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 159–160).
`
`This case implicates many of the factors present in past cases rais-
`
`ing similar separation of powers concerns. The Secretary has never
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`previously claimed powers of this magnitude under the HEROES Act;
`“[n]o regulation premised on” the HEROES Act “has even begun to ap-
`
`
`proach the size or scope” of the Secretary’s program. Alabama Assn.
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`of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. ___,
`___ (per curiam). The “ ‘economic and political significance’ ” of the Sec-
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`
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`retary’s action is staggering. West Virginia, 597 U. S., at ___ (quoting
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`Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 160). And the Secretary’s assertion
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`of administrative authority has “conveniently enabled [him] to enact a
`program” that Congress has chosen not to enact itself. West Virginia,
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`597 U. S., at ___. The Secretary argues that the principles explained
`in West Virginia and its predecessors should not apply to cases involv-
`
`ing government benefits. But major questions cases “have arisen from
`all corners of the administrative state,” id., at ___, and this is not the
`
`
`first such case to arise in the context of government benefits. See King
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`5
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`Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
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`
`Syllabus
`v. Burwell, 576 U. S. 473, 485.
`
`All this leads the Court to conclude that “[t]he basic and consequen-
`
`tial tradeoffs” inherent in a mass debt cancellation program “are ones
`that Congress would likely have intended for itself.” West Virginia,
`
`597 U. S., at ___. In such circumstances, the Court has required the
`
`
`Secretary to “point to ‘clear congressional authorization’ ” to justify the
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`challenged program. Id., at ___, ___ (quoting Utility Air Regulatory
`
`
`Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302, 324). And as explained, the HEROES
`Act provides no authorization for the Secretary’s plan when examined
`using the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation—let alone “clear
`
`congressional authorization” for such a program. Pp. 19–25.
`Reversed and remanded.
`ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,
`ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. BARRETT, J.,
` filed a concurring opinion. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
`
`
`
` SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
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`

`

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` Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
` Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
`
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` pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
`_________________
`
` No. 22–506
`_________________
`
`JOSEPH R. BIDEN, PRESIDENT OF THE
`
` UNITED STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
`
`NEBRASKA, ET AL.
`
` ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
`
`STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
`[June 30, 2023]
` CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
`Court.
`
`To ensure that Americans could keep up with increasing
`
`international competition, Congress authorized the first
`federal student loans in 1958—up to a total of $1,000 per
`student each year. National Defense Education Act of 1958,
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`72 Stat. 1584. Outstanding federal student loans now total
`
`$1.6 trillion extended to 43 million borrowers. Letter from
`
`Congressional Budget Office to Members of Congress, p. 3
`(Sept. 26, 2022) (CBO Letter). Last year, the Secretary of
`Education established the first comprehensive student loan
`forgiveness program, invoking the Higher Education Relief
`Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (HEROES Act) for
`authority to do so. The Secretary’s plan canceled roughly
`$430 billion of federal student loan balances, completely
`
`erasing the debts of 20 million borrowers and lowering the
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`median amount owed by the other 23 million from $29,400
`to $13,600. See ibid.; App. 243. Six States sued, arguing
`that the HEROES Act does not authorize the loan cancella-
`
`tion plan. We agree.
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`
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`

`

`
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` BIDEN v. NEBRASKA
`
`Opinion of the Court
`I
`A
`
`
`The Higher Education Act of 1965 (Education Act) was
`
`enacted to increase educational opportunities and “assist in
`making available the benefits of postsecondary education to
`
`eligible students . . . in institutions of higher education.” 20
`U. S. C. §1070(a). To that end, Title IV of the Act restruc-
`tured federal financial aid mechanisms and established
`three types of federal student loans. Direct Loans are, as
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`the name suggests, made directly to students and funded
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`by the federal fisc; they constitute the bulk of the Federal
`
`Government’s student lending efforts. See §1087a et seq.
`The Government also administers Perkins Loans—
`government-subsidized, low-interest loans made by schools
`to students with significant financial need—and Federal
`Family Education Loans, or FFELs—loans made by private
`lenders and guaranteed by the Federal Government. See
`
`§§1071 et seq., 1087aa et seq. While FFELs and Perkins
`
`Loans are no longer issued, many remain outstanding.
`§§1071(d), 1087aa(b).
`
`The terms of federal loans are set by law, not the market,
`so they often come with benefits not offered by private lend-
`ers. Such benefits include deferment of any repayment un-
`til after graduation, loan qualification regardless of credit
`
`history, relatively low fixed interest rates, income-sensitive
`repayment plans, and—for undergraduate students with fi-
`nancial need—government payment of interest while the
`borrower is in school. Dept. of Ed., Federal Student Aid,
`Federal Versus Private Loans.
`
`The Education Act specifies in detail the terms and con-
`ditions attached to federal loans, including applicable inter-
`est rates, loan fees, repayment plans, and consequences of
`default. See §§1077, 1080, 1087e, 1087dd. It also author-
`izes the Secretary to cancel or reduce loans, but only in cer-
`tain limited circumstances and to a particular extent. Spe-
`
`cifically, the Secretary can cancel a set amount of loans held
`
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`
`2
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`

`3
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` Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
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`Opinion of the Court
`by some public servants—including teachers, members of
`the Armed Forces, Peace Corps volunteers, law enforce-
`ment and corrections officers, firefighters, nurses, and li-
`brarians—who work in their professions for a minimum
`
`number of years. §§1078–10, 1087j, 1087ee. The Secretary
`can also forgive the loans of borrowers who have died or
`been “permanently and totally disabled,” such that they
`
`cannot “engage in any substantial gainful activity.”
`
`§1087(a)(1). Bankrupt borrowers may have their loans for-
`given. §1087(b). And the Secretary is directed to discharge
`loans for borrowers falsely certified by their schools, bor-
`rowers whose schools close down, and borrowers whose
`
`schools fail to pay loan proceeds they owe to lenders.
`
`§1087(c).
`Shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Con-
`
`gress became concerned that borrowers affected by the cri-
`sis—particularly those who served in the military—would
`
`need additional assistance. As a result, it enacted the
`
`Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of
`
`2001. That law provided the Secretary of Education, for a
`
`limited period of time, with “specific waiver authority to re-
`spond to conditions in the national emergency” caused by
`the September 11 attacks. 115 Stat. 2386. Rather than al-
`low this grant of authority to expire by its terms at the end
`
`of September 2003, Congress passed the Higher Education
`Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (HEROES
`Act). 117 Stat. 904. That Act extended the coverage of the
`2001 statute to include any war or national emergency—
`not just the September 11 attacks. By its terms, the Secre-
`tary “may waive or modify any statutory or regulatory pro-
`vision applicable to the student financial assistance pro-
`grams under title IV of the [Education Act] as the Secretary
`
`deems necessary in connection with a war or other military
`20 U. S. C.
`operation
`or national
`emergency.”
`
`
`
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`

`

`4
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`
`
`
` BIDEN v. NEBRASKA
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`
`
` §1098bb(a)(1).1
`
`The Secretary may issue waivers or modifications only
`
`
`“as may be necessary to ensure” that “recipients of student
`
`financial assistance under title IV of the [Education Act]
`who are affected individuals are not placed in a worse posi-
`tion financially in relation to that financial assistance be-
`cause
`of
`their
`status as affected
`individuals.”
`§1098bb(a)(2)(A). An “affected individual” is defined, in rel-
`evant part, as someone who “resides or is employed in an
`area that is declared a disaster area by any Federal, State,
`
`or local official in connection with a national emergency” or
`who “suffered direct economic hardship as a direct result of
`a war or other military operation or national emergency, as
`
`determined by the Secretary.” §§1098ee(2)(C)–(D). And a
`“national emergency” for the purposes of the Act is “a na-
`tional emergency declared by the President of the United
`States.” §1098ee(4).
`
`Immediately following the passage of the Act in 2003, the
`
`Secretary issued two dozen waivers and modifications ad-
`dressing a handful of specific issues. 68 Fed. Reg. 69312–
`69318. Among other changes, the Secretary waived the re-
`quirement that “affected individuals” must “return or repay
`an overpayment” of certain grant funds erroneously dis-
`bursed by the Government, id., at 69314, and the require-
`ment that public service work must be uninterrupted to
`qualify an “affected individual” for loan cancellation, id., at
`
`69317. Additional adjustments were made in 2012, with
`
`similar limited effects. 77 Fed. Reg. 59311–59318.
`
`
`
`——————
`1Like its 2001 predecessor, the HEROES Act enjoyed virtually unani-
`mous bipartisan support at the time of its enactment, passing by a 421-
`
`
`to-1 vote in the House of Representatives and a unanimous voice vote in
`
`the Senate. See 149 Cong. Rec. 7952–7953 (2003); id., at 20809; 147
`Cong. Rec. 20396 (2001); id., at 26292–26293. The single dissenting Rep-
`
`
`resentative later voiced his support for the Act, explaining that he
`“meant to vote ‘yea.’ ” 149 Cong. Rec. 8559 (statement of Rep. Miller).
`
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`

`5
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` Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`But the Secretary took more significant action in re-
`
`sponse to the COVID–19 pandemic. On March 13, 2020,
`the President declared the pandemic a national emergency.
`Presidential Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15337–
`15338 (2020). One week later, then-Secretary of Education
`Betsy DeVos announced that she was suspending loan re-
`payments and interest accrual for all federally held student
`
`loans. See Dept. of Ed., Breaking News: Testing Waivers
`
`and Student Loan Relief (Mar. 20, 2020). The following
`week, Congress enacted the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
`Economic Security Act, which required the Secretary to ex-
`tend the suspensions through the end of September 2020.
`134 Stat. 404–405. Before that extension expired, the Pres-
`ident directed the Secretary, “[i]n light of the national emer-
`gency,” to “effectuate appropriate waivers of and modifica-
`tions to” the Education Act to keep the suspensions in effect
`
`through the end of the year. 85 Fed. Reg. 49585. And a few
`
`months later, the Secretary further extended the suspen-
`sions, broadened eligibility for federal financial assistance,
`
`and waived certain administrative requirements (to allow,
`
`for example, virtual rather than on-site accreditation visits
`and to extend deadlines for filing reports). Id., at 79856–
`79863; 86 Fed. Reg. 5008–5009 (2021).
`
`
`Over a year and a half passed with no further action be-
`yond keeping the repayment and interest suspensions in
`place. But in August 2022, a few weeks before President
`Biden stated that “the pandemic is over,” the Department
`of Education announced that it was once again issuing
`“waivers and modifications” under the Act—this time to re-
`duce and eliminate student debts directly. See App. 257–
`
`259; Washington Post, Sept. 20, 2022, p. A3, col. 1. During
`the first year of the pandemic, the Department’s Office of
`
`General Counsel had issued a memorandum concluding
`that “the Secretary does not have statutory authority to
`provide blanket or mass cancellation, compromise, dis-
`
`charge, or forgiveness of student loan principal balances.”
`
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`

`6
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` BIDEN v. NEBRASKA
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Memorandum from R. Rubinstein to B. DeVos, p. 8 (Jan. 12,
`2021). After a change in Presidential administrations and
`shortly before adoption of the challenged policy, however,
`the Office of General Counsel “formally rescinded” its ear-
`lier legal memorandum and issued a replacement reaching
`the opposite conclusion. 87 Fed. Reg. 52945 (2022). The
`new memorandum determined that the HEROES Act
`“grants the Secretary authority that could be used to effec-
`
`tuate a program of targeted loan cancellation directed at
`addressing the financial harms of the COVID–19 pan-
`
`demic.” Id., at 52944. Upon receiving this new opinion, the
`
`Secretary issued his proposal to cancel student debt under
`
`the HEROES Act. App. 257–259. Two months later, he
`published the required notice of his “waivers and modifica-
`tions” in the Federal Register. 87 Fed. Reg. 61512–61514.
`
`The terms of the debt cancellation plan are straightfor-
`ward: For borrowers with an adjusted gross income below
`
`$125,000 in either 2020 or 2021 who have eligible federal
`loans, the Department of Education will discharge the bal-
`ance of those loans in an amount up to $10,000 per bor-
`rower.2 Id., at 61514 (“modif[ying] the provisions of ” 20
`
`
`U. S. C. §§1087, 1087dd(g); 34 CFR pt. 647, subpt. D (2022);
`34 CFR §§682.402, 685.212). Borrowers who previously re-
`ceived Pell Grants qualify for up to $20,000 in loan cancel-
`lation. 87 Fed. Reg. 61514. Eligible loans include “Direct
`Loans, FFEL loans held by the Department or subject to
`
`collection by a guaranty agency, and Perkins Loans held by
`the Department.” Ibid. The Department of Education esti-
`mates that about 43 million borrowers qualify for relief, and
`the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the plan
`will cancel about $430 billion in debt principal. See App.
`119; CBO Letter 3.
`
`
`
`——————
`2A borrower filing “jointly or as a Head of Household, or as a qualifying
`widow(er),” qualifies for loan cancellation with an adjusted gross income
`lower than $250,000. 87 Fed. Reg. 61514.
`
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`

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`7
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` Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`B
`
`Six States moved for a preliminary injunction, claiming
`
`that the plan exceeded the Secretary’s statutory authority.
`The District Court held that none of the States had stand-
`ing to challenge the plan and dismissed the suit. ___
`F. Supp. 3d ___ (ED Mo. 2022). The States appealed, and
`the Eighth Circuit issued a nationwide preliminary injunc-
`tion pending resolution of the appeal. The court concluded
`that Missouri likely had standing through the Missouri
`Higher Education Loan Authority (MOHELA or Authority),
`
`a public corporation that holds and services student loans.
`
`52 F. 4th 1044 (2022). It further concluded that the State’s
`challenge raised “substantial” questions on the merits and
`that the equities favored maintaining the status quo pend-
`
`ing further review. Id., at 1048 (internal quotation marks
`omitted).
`
`With the plan on pause, the Secretary asked this Court
`to vacate the injunction or to grant certiorari before judg-
`ment, “to avoid prolonging this uncertainty for the millions
`of affected borrowers.” Application 4. We granted the peti-
`tion and set the case for expedited argument. 598 U. S. ___
`(2022).
`
`
`
`
`II
`
`
`Before addressing the legality of the Secretary’s program,
`we must first ensure that the States have standing to chal-
`lenge it. Under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff
`
`needs a “personal stake” in the case. TransUnion LLC v.
`
`Ramirez, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 7). That is,
`the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—a con-
`crete and imminent harm to a legally protected interest,
`like property or money—that is fairly traceable to the chal-
`
`lenged conduct and likely to be redressed by the lawsuit.
`Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561
`(1992). If at least one plaintiff has standing, the suit may
`
`proceed. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional
`
`
`
`

`

`8
`
`
`
`
` BIDEN v. NEBRASKA
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` Rights, Inc., 547 U. S. 47, 52, n. 2 (2006). Because we con-
`clude that the Secretary’s plan harms MOHELA and
`thereby directly injures Missouri—conferring standing on
`
`that State—we need not consider the other theories of
`standing raised by the States.
`
`Missouri created MOHELA as a nonprofit government
`
`corporation to participate in the student loan market. Mo.
`Rev. Stat. §173.360 (2016). The Authority owns over $1 bil-
`lion in FFELs. MOHELA, FY 2022 Financial Statement 9
`
`(Financial Statement). It also services nearly $150 billion
`worth of federal loans, having been hired by the Depart-
`ment of Education to collect payments and provide cus-
`tomer service to borrowers. Id., at 4, 8. MOHELA receives
`
`an administrative fee for each of the five million federal ac-
`counts it services, totaling $88.9 million in revenue last
`year alone. Ibid.
`
`
`Under the Secretary’s plan, roughly half of all federal bor-
`
`rowers would have their loans completely discharged. App.
`119. MOHELA could no longer service those closed ac-
`counts, costing it, by Missouri’s estimate, $44 million a year
`in fees that it otherwise would have earned under its con-
`tract with the Department of Education. Brief for Respond-
`ents 16. This financial harm is an injury in fact directly
`
`traceable to the Secretary’s plan, as both the Government
`
`and the dissent concede. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 18; post, at 5
`
`(KAGAN, J., dissenting).
`The plan’s harm to MOHELA is also a harm to Missouri.
`
`
`MOHELA is a “public instrumentality” of the State. Mo.
`Rev. Stat. §173.360. Missouri established the Authority to
`perform the “essential public function” of helping Missouri-
`ans access student loans needed to pay for college. Ibid.;
`see Todd v. Curators of University of Missouri, 347 Mo. 460,
`464, 147 S. W. 2d 1063, 1064 (1941) (“Our constitution rec-
`ognizes higher education as a governmental function.”). To
`fulfill this public purpose, the Authority is empowered by
`the State to invest in or finance student loans, including by
`
`
`
`
`

`

`9
`
`
`
` Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`issuing bonds. §§173.385(1)(6)–(7). It may also service
`
`loans and collect
`“reasonable
`fees”
`for doing so.
`§§173.385(1)(12), (18). Its profits help fund education in
`Missouri: MOHELA has provided $230 million for develop-
`ment projects at Missouri colleges and universities and al-
`most $300 million in grants and scholarships for Missouri
`students. Financial Statement 10, 20.
`
`
`The Authority is subject to the State’s supervision and
`control. Its board consists of two state officials and five
`members appointed by the Governor and approved by the
`Senate. §173.360. The Governor can remove any board
`
`member for cause. Ibid. MOHELA must provide annual
`
`financial reports to the Missouri Department of Education,
`
`detailing its income, expenditures, and assets. §173.445.
`The Authority is therefore “directly answerable” to the
`State. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Missouri Employ-
`
`ers Mut. Ins. Co., 956 S. W. 2d 249, 254 (Mo. 1997). The
`State “set[s] the terms of its existence,” and only the State
`“can abolish [MOHELA] and set the terms of its dissolu-
`tion.” Id., at 254–255.
`
`By law and function, MOHELA is an instrumentality of
`Missouri: It was created by the State to further a public
`purpose, is governed by state officials and state appointees,
`reports to the State, and may be dissolved by the State. The
`Secretary’s plan will cut MOHELA’s revenues, impairing
`its efforts to aid Missouri college students. This acknowl-
`edged harm to MOHELA in the performance of its public
`function is necessarily a direct injury to Missouri itself.
`
`
`
`
`We came to a similar conclusion 70 years ago in Arkansas
`
`v. Texas, 346 U. S. 368 (1953). Arkansas sought to invoke
`
`our original jurisdiction in a suit against Texas, claiming
`
`that Texas had wrongfully interfered with a contract be-
`tween the University of Arkansas and a Texas charity. Id.,
`at 369. Texas argued that the suit could not proceed be-
`cause the University did “not stand in the shoes of the
`
`State.” Id., at 370. The harm to the University, as Texas
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`10
`
`
`
`
`
`
` BIDEN v. NEBRASKA
`
`Opinion of the Court
` saw it, was not a harm to Arkansas sufficient for the State
`to sue in its own name.
`We disagreed. We recognized that “Arkansas must, of
`
`
`course, represent an interest of her own and not merely that
`of her citizens or corporations.” Ibid. But we concluded
`that Arkansas was in fact seeking to protect its own inter-
`ests because the University was “an official state instru-
`mentality.” Ibid. The State had labeled the University “an
`instrument of the state in the performance of a governmen-
`tal work.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
`University served a public purpose, acting as the State’s
`
`“agen[t] in the educational field.” Id., at 371. The Univer-
`
`sity had been “created by the Arkansas legislature,” was
`“governed by a Board of Trustees appointed by the Gover-
`nor with consent of the Senate,” and “report[ed] all of its
`
`expenditures to the legislature.” Id., at 370. In short, the
`
`
`University was an instrumentality of the State, and “any
`injury under the contract to the University [was] an injury
`
`to Arkansas.” Ibid. So too here. Because the Authority is
`
`part of Missouri, the State does not seek to “rely on injuries
`
`suffered by others.” Post, at 2 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). It
`aims to remedy its own.
`The Secretary and the dissent assert that MOHELA’s in-
`
`juries should not