`
`Appendix A-1
`
`United States Court of Appeals
`Fifth Circuit
`FILED
`March 21, 2022
`Lyle W. Cayce Clerk
`
`
`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Fifth Circuit
`_____________
`
`No. 21-30335
`
`_____________
`
`Ariyan, Incorporated, doing business as Discount
`Corner; M. Langenstein & Sons, Incorporated;
`Prytania Liquor Store, Incorporated; West Prytania,
`Incorporated, doing business as Prytania Mail
`Service/Barbara West; British Antiques, L.L.C.,
`Bennet Powell; Arlen Brunson; Kristina Dupre; Brett
`Dupre; Gail Marie Hatcher; Betty Price; Et Al.,
`
`Plaintiffs—Appellants,
`
`versus
`
`Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans; Ghassan
`Korban, In his Capacity as Executive Director of
`Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans,
`
`Defendants—Appellees.
`_____________
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Eastern District of Louisiana
`USDC No. 2:21-CV-534
`_____________
`
`
`
`
`Appendix A-2
`
`
`Before Barksdale, Stewart, and Dennis, Circuit
`Judges. James L. Dennis, Circuit Judge:
`Plaintiffs who succeed in winning a money
`judgment against a state governmental entity in state
`court in Louisiana often find themselves in a
`frustrating situation. Though they have obtained a
`favorable judgment, they lack the means to enforce it.
`The Louisiana Constitution bars the seizure of public
`funds or property to satisfy a judgment against the
`state or its political subdivisions. La. Const. art. XII,
`§ 10(c). Instead, the Legislature or the political
`subdivision must make a specific appropriation in
`order to satisfy the judgment. Id.; La. R.S. 13:5109.
`And since Louisiana courts lack the power to force
`another branch of government
`to make an
`appropriation, the prevailing plaintiff has no judicial
`mechanism to compel the defendant to pay. See
`Newman Marchive P’ship, Inc. v. City of Shreveport,
`979 So. 2d 1262, 1265 (La. 2008). The “plaintiff who
`succeeds in an action against a governmental unit
`thus becomes a supplicant,” relying on the grace of the
`government to appropriate funds to satisfy her
`judgment. David W. Robertson, Tort Liability of
`Governmental Units in Louisiana, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 857,
`881 (1990).
`
`Finding themselves in this position, the Plaintiffs
`in this case, like others before them, have turned to
`the federal courts to force payment on their state court
`judgment. They claim that the Defendants’ failure to
`timely satisfy a state court judgment violates the
`Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The district
`court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss,
`applying long-standing precedent that there is no
`property right to timely payment on a judgment.
`
`We agree and AFFIRM.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Appendix A-3
`
`I.
`
`In 2013, the United States Army Corps of
`Engineers and the Sewerage and Water Board of New
`Orleans (the “SWB”) began construction on a massive
`flood control project across Uptown New Orleans as
`part of the Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control
`Program (“SELA”). The Uptown phase involved the
`construction of underground box culverts that run the
`length of several major thoroughfares. Plaintiffs are
`seventy landowners, including both businesses and
`private homeowners, who suffered property damage
`and economic loss as the result of SELA construction.
`The Plaintiffs filed suit in state court and obtained
`final judgments against the SWB for a combined $10.5
`million. Some of these judgments became final in early
`2018 and 2019, others as recently as fall 2020.
`
`As of January 2021, though, the Plaintiffs had not
`received any payment from the SWB. So, in March
`2021 they filed a § 1983 suit in district court under the
`theory that the SWB’s failure to comply with the state
`court judgments “creates a secondary Constitutional
`violation of Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment rights,” more
`specifically a violation of their due process rights and
`their rights to just compensation for a taking. As
`relief, the Plaintiffs requested a writ of execution
`seizing the SWB’s property in order to satisfy the
`judgments. Separately, the Plaintiffs’ complaint
`sought a declaration that the SWB is contractually
`obligated to seek reimbursement from the Army Corps
`for the judgments via a procedure the two entities
`agreed to, called the “Damages SOP.”
`
`The SWB filed a motion to dismiss under Rule
`12(b)(6) and the district court granted it. The court
`sympathized with the Plaintiffs’ frustrations, but
`noted that there were “centuries of precedent”
`establishing that a state’s failure to timely pay a state
`
`
`
`Appendix A-4
`
`
`federal
`judgment did not violate any
`court
`constitutional
`right. With
`no
`underlying
`constitutional right at issue, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim
`was “legally baseless.” The district court also declined
`to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ request for
`declaratory relief as a standalone claim, citing the
`“particularly local nature of this dispute.” Finally, the
`court denied Plaintiffs’ generic request to amend their
`complaint should a failure to state a claim be found,
`holding that any amendment would be futile.
`Plaintiffs appealed.
`
`
`II.
`
`We review dismissal of a case under Rule 12(b)(6) de
`novo, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and
`viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the
`plaintiff. Allen v. Walmart Stores, L.L.C., 907 F.3d 170,
`177 (5th Cir. 2018). “In the context of a 12(b)(6) motion
`in a section 1983 suit, the focus should be whether the
`complaint properly sets forth a claim of a deprivation of
`rights, privileges, or
`immunities secured by the
`Constitution or laws of the United States caused by persons
`acting under color of state law. If there is no deprivation
`of any protected right the claim is properly dismissed.”
`S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Supreme Ct. of State
`of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal citation
`omitted).
`
`Ordinarily a district court’s denial of a motion to
`amend a complaint is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
`Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 872
`(5th Cir. 2000). However, when denial is based on the
`futility of amendment, we “apply the same standard of
`legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. at
`873 (citation omitted). If the complaint, as amended,
`would be subject to dismissal, then amendment is futile
`and the district court was within its discretion to deny
`leave to amend. Id.
`
`
`
`
`
`Appendix A-5
`
`III.
`
`A.
`
`The Plaintiffs’ claim is fairly discrete. They “do
`not seek to re-litigate the legal or factual issues or
`compensation awards decided in the state courts.”
`Rather, their case “concerns an independent Takings
`Clause violation—the failure to timely pay just
`compensation once the compensation was determined
`and awarded.” This nonpayment is, according to the
`Plaintiffs, a “second taking,” and the only one at issue
`in their case.1
`
`More than a century ago, the Supreme Court
`decided the case of a pair of litigants in a similar
`situation as the Plaintiffs here. In Folsom v. City of
`New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285 (1883), two relators had
`obtained state court judgments against the City of
`New Orleans for property damage caused by riots in
`1873. In 1879, a new state constitution limited the
`taxes New Orleans could levy to just enough to cover
`the City’s budget. Id. at 287. The effect was that the
`relators were prevented from collecting on their
`judgments. Id. The relators argued that this state
`constitutional change deprived them of property
`without due process of law in violation of the
`Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Supreme Court
`rejected the argument, agreeing that the judgments
`were property, but holding that “the relators cannot
`be said to be deprived of them so long as they continue
`
`1 In their complaint, Plaintiffs asserted a separate due process
`violation “because Defendants have treated them differently
`than non-litigants merely because Plaintiffs have exercised their
`constitutional right to file suit.” Plaintiffs did not argue this
`claim in their briefs before the district court or in their briefs
`before this Court. It is therefore deemed abandoned. Yohey v.
`Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224 (5th Cir. 1993).
`
`
`
`Appendix A-6
`
`
`an existing liability against the city.” Id. at 289. In
`dissent, Justice Harlan wrote that an unenforceable
`judgment is no judgment at all. “Since the value of the
`judgment, as property, depends necessarily upon the
`remedies given for its enforcement, the withdrawal of
`all remedies for its enforcement, and compelling the
`owner to rely exclusively upon the generosity of the
`judgment debtor, is, I submit, to deprive the owner of
`his property.” Id. at 295.
`
`The Folsom majority’s notion of a judgment as an
`“existing liability,” conceptually distinct from its
`recovery, has only been reinforced in the intervening
`years. In Minton v. St. Bernard Parish School Board,
`this Court, citing Folsom, reiterated that “the
`property right created by a judgment against a
`government entity is not a right to payment at a
`particular time but merely the recognition of a
`continuing debt of that government entity.” 803 F.2d
`129, 132 (5th Cir. 1986). Based on that principle, we
`held that the government defendant’s “failure to
`appropriate funds to pay the debt to the Mintons does
`not constitute a taking in violation of the due process
`clause.” Id.
`
`in Freeman Decorating Company v.
`Again,
`Encuentro Las Americas Trade Corporation, our
`Court held that there was no Takings Clause violation
`where the City of New Orleans failed to make timely
`payment on a state court judgment because there had
`been no taking of any property. “[T]he only property
`right [the plaintiff] has is the recognition of City’s [sic]
`continuing debt.” 352 F. App’x 921, 924 (5th Cir.
`2009); see also Guilbeau v. Par. of St. Landry, 341 F.
`App’x 974 (5th Cir. 2009); cf. Evans v. City of Chicago,
`689 F.2d 1286, 1297 n.13
`(7th Cir. 1982)
`(distinguishing Folsom because Illinois Constitution
`created property right to immediate payment on a
`judgment). In short, “[a] party cannot be said to be
`
`
`
`Appendix A-7
`
`
`deprived of his property in a judgment because at the
`time he is unable to collect it.” Folsom, 109 U.S. at
`289. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claim that their property has
`been taken by the SWB’s failure to timely pay must
`fail under Folsom.
`
`The Plaintiffs try to get around this precedent in
`two ways. First, they argue that Folsom and its
`progeny are distinguishable because the underlying
`judgments in those cases sounded in state tort and
`contract law, while the Plaintiffs’ judgments are based
`on violations of a federal constitutional right. But
`Plaintiffs’ underlying state court cases were not based
`on any asserted federal right. As the SWB pointed out
`in briefing, and as the record shows, Plaintiffs’ state
`court judgments were for violations of Louisiana law,
`not for violations of the Fifth Amendment Takings
`Clause as the Plaintiffs have asserted to this Court.
`But even if the underlying judgments were based on
`violations of federal rights, we are not sure why that
`distinction would make a difference. After all, under
`Plaintiffs’ theory, the SWB’s failure to pay the
`judgments constitutes an “independent” or “second”
`Fifth Amendment taking of their property, namely the
`purported property right to be paid timely on a
`judgment. But since Folsom said there is no property
`right to timely payment on a judgment, there must be
`something special about a judgment based on federal
`constitutional rights that confers this additional
`property interest for the Plaintiffs’ argument to
`succeed. Plaintiffs do not explain why the legal right
`underlying a judgment would create this additional
`property right for some judgments and not others, and
`it remains unclear to us. It seems that a judgment
`compensating someone for a breach of contract should
`confer no less a property interest than a judgment
`compensating someone for the police’s excessive force.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Appendix A-8
`
`Vogt v. Board of Commissioners of Orleans Levee
`District, 294 F.3d 684 (5th Cir. 2002), and Lafaye v.
`City of New Orleans, No. 2:20-CV-41, 2021 WL 886118
`(E.D. La. Mar. 9, 2021), also do not aid the Plaintiffs
`in escaping Folsom’s holding. In Vogt, the Court
`stated in dicta that the governmental defendant’s
`refusal to satisfy a judgment could constitute a taking.
`294 F.3d at 697. But the judgment in that case was, in
`part, a declaratory judgment by the state courts that
`mineral royalties in the government defendant’s
`possession were the property of the plaintiff. Id. at
`688. The government’s refusal to “pay over the
`retained royalties constitutes a taking because the
`governmental entity is withholding private property
`from its owners.” Id. at 697. This situation, where the
`judgment debtor
`is
`in possession of property
`determined to belong to the creditor, is different from
`a judgment wherein the debtor owes compensation to
`the creditor. Lafaye turns on the exact same
`distinction. As the district court wrote in that case,
`“[b]oth Vogt and this case involve the government’s
`refusal to return private property to its rightful
`owner.” Lafaye, 2021 WL 886118, at *9. Plaintiffs’
`judgments here are for compensation and damages,
`not for the return of private property that “the
`government has forcibly appropriated . . . without a
`claim of right.” Vogt, 294 F.3d at 697.
`
`Plaintiffs’ second argument is that two Supreme
`Court cases—Williamson County Regional Planning
`Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
`U.S. 172 (1985) and Knick v. Township of Scott,
`Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019)—provide a
`federal
`forum
`for
`their
`claim.
`Plaintiffs
`misunderstand those cases. They are right that Knick
`and Williamson County discuss when a plaintiff may
`file a Takings Clause claim in federal court, but the
`cases say nothing about whether failure to timely pay
`a state court judgment constitutes a taking or any
`
`
`
`Appendix A-9
`
`
`other deprivation of a federal right actionable under
`§ 1983. Whether a claim
`is ripe
`for
`federal
`adjudication, as Williamson County and Knick
`decided, is very different from whether certain facts
`state a claim at all. Amici’s citations to Supreme Court
`dicta that the Fifth Amendment is “self-executing”
`and that a property owner “acquires a right to
`compensation immediately upon an uncompensated
`taking” also fail to address the actual issue presented
`by Plaintiffs’ appeal, namely whether a government’s
`failure to timely pay a court judgment constitutes a
`taking in the first place. Neither Williamson County
`nor Knick speak to that question. Plaintiffs’ § 1983
`claim remains foreclosed by Folsom.
`
`B.
`
`Plaintiffs invoked federal question jurisdiction,
`relying on their Fifth Amendment claim, to bring this
`suit. With that claim dismissed, the district court
`declined to exercise
`jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
`separate claim for a declaration of the parties’ rights
`and duties under the Damages SOP. The Declaratory
`Judgment Act “does not of itself confer jurisdiction on
`the federal courts.” Jolly v. United States, 488 F.2d 35,
`36 (5th Cir. 1974). Without an underlying federal
`claim, or any other basis for jurisdiction asserted by
`the Plaintiffs, the district court properly declined to
`hear Plaintiffs’ standalone claim to declaratory relief.
`
`As a final matter, the district court also properly
`declined to grant leave to Plaintiffs to amend their
`complaint. Though Rule 15(a)’s mandate that leave to
`amend must be “freely give[n] . . . when justice so
`requires” significantly
`limits a district court’s
`discretion, a district court still acts within its bounds
`when it denies leave because amendment would be
`futile. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Futility here means
`“that the amended complaint would fail to state a
`
`
`
`Appendix A-10
`
`
`claim upon which relief could be granted.” Stripling,
`234 F.3d at 873. The Plaintiffs did not specify what
`amendments they wished to make, or attach an
`amended pleading. Rather they simply asked for leave
`to amend “if their pleadings are found to be deficient
`in any manner.” This
`failure to specify how
`amendment would cure the fundamental deficiencies
`in their pleading, especially when the core of
`Plaintiffs’ claims is so clearly foreclosed by settled law,
`supports the district court’s determination that
`amendment would be futile. See Legate v. Livingston,
`822 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 2016). We cannot say the
`court abused its discretion.
`
`IV.
`
`Like the district court, we understand the
`Plaintiffs’
`frustration. They have succeeded
`in
`winning a money judgment. Without any judicial
`means to recover, they are compelled “to rely
`exclusively upon the generosity of the judgment
`debtor.” Folsom, 109 U.S. at 295 (Harlan, J.,
`dissenting). But the Plaintiffs’ case before the district
`court turned entirely on a purported property interest
`not recognized in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.
`They therefore failed to state a claim for relief, and the
`district court properly dismissed their case.
`
`We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
`
`
`
`
`
`Appendix B-1
`
`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Fifth Circuit
`
`FILED
`March 21, 2022
`Lyle W. Cayce
`Clerk
`
`
`No. 21-30335
`
`Ariyan, Incorporated, doing business as Discount
`Corner; M. Langenstein & Sons, Incorporated;
`Prytania Liquor Store, Incorporated; West Prytania,
`Incorporated, doing business as Prytania Mail
`Service/Barbara West; British Antiques, L.L.C.,
`Bennet Powell; Arlen Brunson; Kristina Dupre; Brett
`Dupre; Gail Marie Hatcher; Betty Price; Et Al,
`
`Plaintiffs—Appellants,
`
`versus
`
`Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans; Ghassan
`Korban, In his Capacity as Executive Director of
`Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans,
`
`Defendants—Appellees.
`
`
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Eastern District of Louisiana
`USDC No. 2:21-CV-534
`
`Before Barksdale, Stewart, and Dennis, Circuit
`Judges.
`
`J U D G M E N T
`
`This cause was considered on the record on
`appeal and the briefs on file.
`
`
`
`Appendix B-2
`
`
`
`IT IS ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the
`judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
`
`IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellants
`pay to Appellees the costs on appeal to be taxed by the
`Clerk of this Court.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Appendix C-1
`
`
`Case 2:21-cv-00534-MLCF-JVM Filed 06/09/21
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN
`DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
`
`ARIYAN, INC., ET AL.
` CIVIL ACTION
`
`v.
`
`
`
`
`
`NO. 21-534
`
`SEWERAGE & WATER BOARD
`SECTION “F”
`OF NEW ORLEANS, ET AL.
`
`ORDER AND REASONS
`
`Before the Court is the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6)
`motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, the
`motion is GRANTED.
`
`Background
`
`When a flood-control project damaged their homes
`and businesses in Uptown New Orleans, the 70
`plaintiffs in this case took the defendant1 – the
`Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans (SWB) - to
`Louisiana state court.2
`In state-court actions
`“specifically
`not[ing]
`that
`‘any
`substantial
`interference with the free use and enjoyment of
`property may constitute a taking of property within
`the meaning of
`the
`federal and
`[Louisiana]
`constitutions,” the plaintiffs secured monetary awards
`
`1 In this case, the plaintiffs have also sued Ghassan Korban, “in
`his [official] capacity as Executive Director” of the SWB. Aside
`from prefatory language naming Korban as a defendant, the
`plaintiffs’ complaint mentions Korban just once (with regard to a
`written demand for payment the plaintiffs made upon the SWB).
`See Compl., ¶ 54.
`2 In their various state-court actions, the plaintiffs sought
`compensation for property damages, losses of residential use and
`enjoyment, and business losses occasioned by the project at issue.
`
`
`
`Appendix C-2
`
`
`for property damage and restrictions they sustained
`in connection with the project at issue. See Opp’n at 3.
`Acknowledging
`that
`those successful
`lawsuits
`resulted
`in
`“state
`court
`judgments
`[that]
`memorialized and quantified the just compensation to
`which [they] are entitled,” the plaintiffs now bring §
`1983 and declaratory judgment claims against the
`SWB in this Court for the SWB’s allegedly “unlawful
`refusal to pay” such compensation. See, e.g., id. at 6.
`The plaintiffs make no bones about their intention in
`bringing this federal action: as they put it, they “have
`exhausted their state court remedies in seeking just
`compensation from the [SWB], have not received the
`just compensation that was awarded, and now are
`seeking to enforce the payment of that
`just
`compensation in this Court.” See id. at 8. The SWB
`concedes that it has not yet made good on the
`plaintiffs’ damages awards but insists that it does
`plan to pay the plaintiffs in the future.
`
`Thus, with unpaid state-court judgments in hand
`and no “certainty at all that they will ever be paid just
`compensation for their loss of property interests,” the
`plaintiffs urge this Court to “recognize that a Section
`1983 claim is available when state actors take private
`property but fail to pay [a] state court judgment
`establishing the amount of just compensation due.”
`See id. at 6–7.
`
`Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for dismissal
`of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which
`relief can be granted. “To survive a motion to dismiss”
`under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
`sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
`claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
`v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
`Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To
`demonstrate a facially plausible basis for relief, a
`plaintiff must plead facts which allow “the court to
`
`
`
`Appendix C-3
`
`
`draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
`liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In determining
`whether a plaintiff has met this burden, a court must
`“accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view all facts
`in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” but must
`not accord an assumption of truth to conclusory
`allegations and threadbare assertions. Thompson v.
`City of Waco, 764 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2014).
`
`The foregoing presumptions are not to be applied
`mindlessly, however. Thus, in considering a motion to
`dismiss, the Court may review any documents
`attached to or incorporated into the plaintiff’s
`complaint by reference. Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-
`Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004). In
`addition, the Court may judicially notice matters of
`public record and other facts not subject to reasonable
`dispute. See United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana
`Health Plan of Tex. Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir.
`2003).
`
`II.
`
`With this standard in view, the Court proceeds to
`evaluate whether the plaintiffs’ complaint states a
`plausible claim for relief.
`
`A. Count One: § 1983 Claims
`
`1. The Plaintiffs Fail to State a Baseline Legal
`Violation
`
`The crux of the plaintiffs’ case is a § 1983 claim
`for asserted violations of the Takings Clause3 and
`
`3 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that
`private property shall not “be taken for public use[] without just
`compensation,” and is “made applicable to the States by the
`
`
`
`
`Appendix C-4
`
`
`constitutional due process and civil rights. See
`Compl., ¶¶ 56–68. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides injured
`plaintiffs with a cause of action when they have been
`deprived of federal rights under color of state law.”
`Doe v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 215 (5th
`Cir. 1998). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff
`must first allege a threshold violation of constitutional
`or statutory rights. See, e.g., D.A. ex rel. Latasha A. v.
`Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir.
`2010).
`
`Here, the plaintiffs assert that the SWB’s refusal
`to pay their state-court judgments violates their Fifth
`Amendment “right” “to be actually paid
`just
`compensation for the taking of their property by
`inverse
`condemnation”
`“without unreasonable
` The Court
`delay.”4 See Compl., ¶¶ 58, 62.
`understands the plaintiffs’ frustrations, but this claim
`is legally baseless. Courts have consistently observed
`a distinction between a state’s taking of property
`without
`just compensation and
`its
`temporary
`retention of just compensation that has been fixed and
`awarded by a state court. In this district specifically,
`Judge Lemelle forcefully applied this principle in
`Violet Dock, where he dismissed a similar § 1983
`claim because a state’s temporary delay in paying a
`state-court
`judgment does not give rise to a
`
`
`Fourteenth Amendment.” U.S. CONST. amend. V; Kelo v. City of
`New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 n.1 (2005).
`
` The plaintiffs also claim that their Fourteenth Amendment
`“due process rights have been violated, because Defendants have
`treated them differently than non-litigants merely because
`Plaintiffs have exercised their constitutional right to file suit to
`protect their rights and property interests.” See Compl., ¶ 64.
`The plaintiffs’ claim in this regard has no basis in law.
`
` 4
`
`
`
`Appendix C-5
`
`
`constitutional violation.5 See 2019 WL 6307945, at *3.
`As he aptly concluded there:
`
`Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
`under § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint and
`opposition demonstrate that it is not
`seeking to bring a claim for the unlawful
`taking of the property expropriated by
`[the state agency defendant], because
`final
`judgment has already been
`rendered on that issue in state court.
`Rather plaintiff only wishes to pursue its
`entitlement
`to
`the
`state
`court’s
`compensation award and is attempting
`to use § 1983 as the vehicle for such
`relief. However, the “property right
`created by a
`judgment against a
`government entity is not a right to
`payment at a particular time, but merely
`the recognition of a continuing debt of
`that government entity.” Guilbeau v.
`Par. of St. Landry, 2008 WL 4948836, at
`*10 (W.D. La. Nov. 19, 2008), aff’d, 341
`F. App’x 974 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing
`Minton v. St. Bernard Par. Sch. Bd., 803
`F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1986)); Davis v.
`Cantrell, 2018 WL 6169255, at *5 (E.D.
`La. Nov. 26, 2018). Thus, defendant’s
`delay in paying . . . the state court’s
`judgment has not given rise to a Fifth
`Amendment
`violation. Additionally,
`plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish Minton
`and subsequent cases on the grounds
`that the judgments in those cases did not
`
`5 Recognizing the threat that Violet Dock poses to their case, the
`plaintiffs make much of the fact that the pronouncements of a
`sister section of this court do not bind the Court here. That is, of
`course, true in the abstract.
`
`
`
`
`
`Appendix C-6
`
`involve takings of private property is
`unavailing, because plaintiffs makes
`clear in its opposition that it is not
`seeking to relitigate the underlying
`takings claim or the amount of just
`compensation owed.
`
`Id. Judge Lemelle’s holding was grounded in
`centuries of precedent establishing that a state’s
`temporary deprivation of damages does not violate
`any constitutional right. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel.
`Folsom v. City of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 289
`(1883) (“A party cannot be said to be deprived of his
`property in a judgment because at the time he is
`unable to collect it.”); Minton, 803 F.2d at 132 (“[T]he
`property right created by a judgment against a
`government entity is not a right to payment at a
`particular time but merely the recognition of a
`continuing debt of that government entity.”). In
`addition, the length of delay in paying the judgments
`is not helpful to the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Guilbeau, 341
`F. App’x at 975 (deeming plaintiff’s “constitutional
`argument [] foreclosed by Minton” where state’s
`refusal to pay plaintiff’s damages had persisted for
`seventeen years).
`
`This Court finds no reason not to follow the Violet
`Dock Court’s lead in this nearly identical case. Here,
`as in Violet Dock, the plaintiffs openly admit that they
`are suing not to determine the just compensation to
`which they are constitutionally entitled, but to enforce
`the state courts’ determinations of that very amount.
`That issue has been fully litigated in state court and
`the plaintiffs repeatedly acknowledge as much in their
`opposition. See, e.g., Opp’n at 8 (“Here, Plaintiffs are
`not seeking to re-litigate any issue decided by the
`state court. Plaintiffs recognize that the amount of
`compensation that is due is binding here. Instead,
`
`
`
`Appendix C-7
`
`
`Plaintiffs are seeking to compel payment of the just
`compensation judgments . . . .”).
`
`In search of a way to do so, the plaintiffs turn to
`the Supreme Court’s decision in Knick v. Township of
`Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019), which explicitly
`overruled the Court’s prior decision in Williamson
`County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
`Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). In Knick,
`the Court overruled the “state-litigation requirement
`of Williamson County” and accordingly held that “[a]
`property owner may bring a [federal] takings claim
`under § 1983 upon the taking of his property without
`just compensation by a local government.” Knick, 139
`S. Ct. at 2179. The Justices said nothing, however,
`about a plaintiff’s ability to bring a § 1983 suit to
`enforce a state court’s judgment in a takings case that
`has already been litigated in state court. To the
`contrary, the question in Knick was limited to
`whether Williamson County should have been
`overruled, and thus, whether “a property owner whose
`property has been taken by a local government has not
`suffered a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights –
`and thus cannot bring a federal takings claim in federal
`court – until a state court has denied his claim for just
`compensation under state law.” Id. at 2167.
`In overruling Williamson County, the Supreme
`Court left in place its decision in San Remo Hotel, L.P.
`v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323
`(2005), where it held that a “state court’s resolution of
`a claim for just compensation under state law
`generally has preclusive effect in any subsequent
`federal suit.” Id. In fact, San Remo’s continued
`application is a logical linchpin of the Knick decision.
`Indeed, but for San Remo preclusion, the pre-Knick
`
`
`
`Appendix C-8
`
`
`“takings plaintiff [would not have found] himself in
`[the] Catch-22” “preclusion trap” the Court took issue
`with in Knick; he still could not have gone “to federal
`court without going to state court first; but if he [went]
`to state court and [lost], his claim [would not] be
`barred in federal court.” See id. That was not the case
`in the pre-Knick world of San Remo and Williamson
`County.
`
`Thus, the plaintiffs’ core argument – namely, that
`“Knick Provides a Direct Legal Basis” for the
`plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims – rests on a fundamental
`misunderstanding of Knick and its interworking with
`San Remo. To the contrary, the defendants are correct
`that Knick makes “where to file a constitutional
`takings suit [] an either/or proposition”; a plaintiff
`who chooses to bring suit in state court cannot later
`come to federal court to relitigate issues the state
`court already decided. See Mot. at 12; see also San
`Remo, 545 U.S. at 341–48.
`
`That is precisely what the plaintiffs wish to do
`here.
`2. Practical and Structural Considerations Also
`Compel Dismissal
`
`
`Apart from the flaws in the plaintiffs’ claims that
`have already been discussed,
`consider
`the
`implications of blessing the plaintiffs’ transparent
`attempt to use § 1983 to collect a state- court judgment
`in federal court. Doing so would likely run afoul of the
`full faith and credit statute, encourage forum
`shopping, and erode the comity federal courts are to
`diligently maintain with state courts, who are
`
`
`
`Appendix C-9
`
`
`certainly capable of enforcing their own judgments.6
`
`This predictable parade of confusion has led
`countless federal courts, including this one, to resist
`calls to enforce judgments rendered in state court.
`See, e.g., Bennett v. City of New Orleans, 2004 WL
`60316, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 9, 2004) (“Plaintiffs’ claims
`impinge on comity principles that operate in the area
`of federal-state relations. To hold that every unpaid
`state court judgment provides a would-be plaintiff
`with a cognizable due process claim ‘would assign the
`federal courts the role of ombudsmen in monitoring
`the execution of state court judgments,’ a role that
`would surely be destructive of federal-state relations.”
`(quoting Biser v. Town of Bel Air, 991 F.2d 100, 105
`n.2 (4th Cir. 1993) (Wilkinson, J.)). Under no
`const
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