`(Slip Opinion)
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2024
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`
`
`
`
`
`
` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
`
`
` BARNES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
`ESTATE OF BARNES, DECEASED v. FELIX ET AL.
`
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
` No. 23–1239. Argued January 22, 2025—Decided May 15, 2025
`
`Respondent Roberto Felix, Jr., a law enforcement officer, pulled over
`
`Ashtian Barnes for suspected toll violations. Felix ordered Barnes to
`exit the vehicle, but Barnes began to drive away. As the car began to
`
`move forward, Felix jumped onto its doorsill and fired two shots inside.
`
` Barnes was fatally hit but managed to stop the car. About five seconds
`elapsed between when the car started moving and when it stopped.
`
`Two seconds passed between the moment Felix stepped on the doorsill
`and the moment he fired his first shot.
`Barnes’s mother sued Felix on Barnes’s behalf, alleging that Felix
`
`
` violated Barnes’s Fourth Amendment right against excessive force.
`
`The District Court granted summary judgment to Felix, applying the
`
` Fifth Circuit’s “moment-of-threat” rule. The Court of Appeals af-
`firmed, explaining that the moment-of-threat rule requires asking only
`
`whether an officer was “in danger at the moment of the threat that
`resulted in [his] use of deadly force.” 91 F. 4th 393, 397. Under the
`
`
` rule, events “leading up to the shooting” are “not relevant.” Ibid. Here,
` the “precise moment of threat” was the “two seconds” when Felix was
`
`clinging to a moving car. Id., at 397–398. Because Felix could then
`have reasonably believed his life in danger, the panel held, the shoot-
`ing was lawful. Id., at 398.
`
`
`Held: A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force during
`a stop or arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, which re-
`quires that the force deployed be objectively reasonable from “the per-
`
`
`spective of a reasonable officer at the scene.” Graham v. Connor, 490
`U. S. 386, 396. The inquiry into the reasonableness of police force re-
`quires analyzing the “totality of the circumstances.” County of Los An-
`
`
`geles v. Mendez, 581 U. S. 420, 427–428; Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`2
`
`
`BARNES v. FELIX
`
`
`Syllabus
`1, 9. That analysis demands “careful attention to the facts and circum-
`stances” relating to the incident. Graham, 490 U. S., at 396.
`
`Most notable here, the “totality of the circumstances” inquiry has no
`time limit. While the situation at the precise time of the shooting will
`often matter most, earlier facts and circumstances may bear on how a
`
`reasonable officer would have understood and responded to later ones.
`Prior events may show why a reasonable officer would perceive other-
`
`wise ambiguous conduct as threatening, or instead as innocuous.
`
`Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U. S. 765, well illustrates this point. There,
`
`an officer’s use of deadly force was justified “at the moment” partly
`
`
`because of what had transpired in the preceding period. Id., at 777.
`
`The moment-of-threat rule applied below prevents that sort of at-
`tention to context, and thus conflicts with this Court’s instruction to
`analyze the totality of the circumstances. By limiting their view to the
`two seconds before the shooting, the lower courts could not take into
`account anything preceding that final moment. So, for example, they
`
`could not consider the reasons for the stop or the earlier interactions
`between the suspect and officer. And because of that limit, they could
`
`not address whether the final two seconds of the encounter would look
`different if set within a longer timeframe. A rule like that, which pre-
`
`cludes consideration of prior events in assessing a police shooting, is
`not reconcilable with the fact-dependent and context-sensitive ap-
`
`proach this Court has prescribed. A court deciding a use-of-force case
`cannot review the totality of the circumstances if it has put on chrono-
`
`logical blinders.
`
`The Court does not address a separate question about whether or
`how an officer’s own “creation of a dangerous situation” factors into the
`reasonableness analysis. The courts below never confronted that is-
`
`sue, and it was not the basis of the petition for certiorari. Pp. 4–9.
`91 F. 4th 393, vacated and remanded.
`KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. KAVANAUGH,
`
`J., filed a concurring opinion, in which THOMAS, ALITO, and BARRETT, JJ.,
`
`joined.
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`
` United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
` Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
`
` pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 23–1239
`_________________
` JANICE HUGHES BARNES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS RE-
`
`PRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ASHTIAN
`
`BARNES, DECEASED, PETITIONER v.
`
`ROBERTO FELIX, JR., ET AL.
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
`[May 15, 2025]
`JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
`A police officer’s use of deadly force violates the Fourth
`
`Amendment when it is not “objectively reasonable.” Gra-
`ham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 397 (1989). And that inquiry
`into reasonableness, we have held, requires assessing the
`“totality of the circumstances.” Id., at 396 (quoting Tennes-
`see v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1, 9 (1985)).
`The question here is whether that framework permits
`
`
`courts, in evaluating a police shooting (or other use of force),
`to apply the so-called moment-of-threat rule used in the
`
`courts below. Under that rule, a court looks only to the cir-
`cumstances existing at the precise time an officer perceived
`the threat inducing him to shoot. Today, we reject that ap-
`proach as improperly narrowing the requisite Fourth
`
`Amendment analysis. To assess whether an officer acted
`
`reasonably in using force, a court must consider all the rel-
`evant circumstances, including facts and events leading up
`to the climactic moment.
`
`
`
`
`
`I
`
`On the afternoon of April 28, 2016, Roberto Felix, Jr., a
`
`
`
`

`

`2
`
`
`BARNES v. FELIX
`
`Opinion of the Court
`law enforcement officer patrolling a highway outside Hou-
`
`ston, received a radio alert about an automobile on the road
`
`with outstanding toll violations. Felix soon spotted the car,
`a Toyota Corolla, and turned on his emergency lights to in-
`itiate a traffic stop. The driver, Ashtian Barnes, pulled over
`to the highway’s shoulder.
`
`Parking his own car just behind, Felix walked to the Co-
`rolla’s driver-side door and asked Barnes for his license and
`proof of insurance. Barnes replied that he did not have his
`license with him, and that the car was a rental in his girl-
`friend’s name. As he spoke, Barnes rummaged through
`some papers inside the car, causing Felix to tell him several
`
`times to stop “digging around.” Felix also commented that
`
`he smelled marijuana, and asked if there was anything in
`
`the car he should know about. Barnes responded that he
`
`might have some identification in the trunk. So Felix told
`him to open the trunk from his seat. Barnes did so, while
`also turning off the ignition. All that happened (as a dash-
`
`cam recording of the incident shows) in less than two
`minutes.
`
`
`Then things began moving even faster. With his right
`hand resting on his holster, Felix told Barnes to get out of
`the car. Barnes opened the door but did not exit; instead,
`
`he turned the ignition back on. Felix unholstered his gun
`
`and, as the car began to move forward, jumped onto its door-
`sill. He twice shouted, “Don’t fucking move.” And with no
`visibility into the car (because his head was above the roof),
`he fired two quick shots inside. Barnes was hit, but man-
`aged to stop the car. Felix then radioed for back-up. By the
`time it arrived, Barnes was dead. All told, about five sec-
`onds elapsed between when the car started moving and
`
`when it stopped. And within that period, two seconds
`passed between the moment Felix stepped on the doorsill
`
`and the moment he fired his first shot.
`
`Barnes’s mother, Janice Barnes, sued Felix on her son’s
`
`behalf. The suit, brought under 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleged
`
`
`

`

`3
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`that Felix had violated Ashtian Barnes’s Fourth Amend-
`ment rights by using excessive force against him.
`
`
`The District Court granted summary judgment to Felix.
`The court explained that to prevail on her claim, Mrs.
`Barnes needed to show that Felix’s use of force was “objec-
`
`tively unreasonable.” 532 F. Supp. 3d 463, 468 (SD Tex.
`
`2021). In the usual excessive-force case, the court noted,
`the inquiry into reasonableness would involve considering
`
`a variety of circumstances. See id., at 468–469. But when
`an officer has used deadly force, the court continued, “the
`
`Fifth Circuit has developed a much narrower approach.”
`
`Id., at 469. Then, a court could ask only about the situation
`
`
`existing “at the moment of the threat” that sparked the fatal
`
`shooting. Ibid. (quoting Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F. 3d 985,
`991 (CA5 2011); emphasis in original). The District Court
`
`identified that moment as “the two seconds before Felix
`fired his first shot,” when he was standing on the doorsill of
`a moving vehicle. 532 F. Supp. 3d., at 471. At that moment,
`
`the court found, an officer could reasonably think himself
`“at risk of serious harm.” Id., at 472. And under the Fifth
`Circuit’s rule, that fact alone concluded the analysis. The
`court explained that it could not consider “what had tran-
`spired up until” those last two seconds, including Felix’s de-
`cision to jump onto the sill. Id., at 471. Although a “more
`robust examination” might have aided in assessing the rea-
`sonableness of the shooting, the court was “duty bound” by
`“Circuit precedent” to “limit[ its] focus” to the “exact mo-
`
`ment Felix was hanging onto Barnes’s” moving car. Id., at
`
`472.
`
`
`The Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining that it too was
`“[b]ound” by “this Circuit’s moment of threat doctrine.” 91
`F. 4th 393, 394, 397 (2024). Under that rule, the panel
`agreed, the “inquiry is confined to whether the officer[]”
`
`was “in danger at the moment of the threat that resulted in
`[his] use of deadly force.” Id., at 397. Any prior events
`“leading up to the shooting,” including actions the officer
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`4
`
`
`BARNES v. FELIX
`
`Opinion of the Court
`took, were simply “not relevant.” Ibid. (quoting Harris v.
`Serpas, 745 F. 3d 767, 772 (CA5 2014)). And here, as the
`District Court found, the “precise moment of the threat”
`
`was the “two seconds” when Felix was clinging to a moving
`car. 91 F. 4th, at 397–398. Because Felix could then have
`
`reasonably believed his life in danger, the panel concluded,
`his decision to shoot “did not violate Barnes’s constitutional
`rights.” Id., at 398.
`
`In a concurring opinion, Judge Higginbotham (who also
`authored the panel opinion) expressed “concern” with the
`
`Ibid. He
`Fifth Circuit’s moment-of-threat doctrine.
`
`thought that rule inconsistent with this Court’s directive to
`
`assess the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force, includ-
`ing deadly force, by “look[ing] to the totality of circum-
`
`stances.” Id., at 399. Under the totality approach, Judge
`Higginbotham wrote, a court could consider not just the
`“precise millisecond” when an officer deploys force, but eve-
`rything that “ha[d] transpired up until” that time. Ibid.
`And with that wider focus, Judge Higginbotham would
`have found that Felix’s shooting of Barnes was unreasona-
`
`ble. See id., at 401.
`
`We granted certiorari to address whether, in resolving
`Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims, courts may ap-
`ply the moment-of-threat rule just described. See 603 U. S.
`___ (2024). We hold they may not because that rule con-
`stricts the proper inquiry into the “totality of the circum-
`stances.”
`
`
`
`
`II
`
`
`A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive
`
`force during a stop or arrest is “analyzed under the Fourth
`Amendment.” Graham, 490 U. S., at 395; see Amdt. 4 (ap-
`plying to “seizures” of “persons”). The “touchstone of the
`Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’” as measured in
`
`objective terms. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403
`(2006). So the question in a case like this one, as this Court
`
`
`
`

`

`5
`
`
`
` Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`has often held, is whether the force deployed was justified
`from “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,”
`taking due account of both the individual interests and the
`governmental interests at stake. Graham, 490 U. S., at
`
`396; County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U. S. 420, 428
`(2017).
`That inquiry into the reasonableness of police force re-
`
`quires analyzing the “totality of the circumstances.” Id., at
`427–428; Garner, 471 U. S., at 9. There is no “easy-to-apply
`legal test” or “on/off switch” in this context. Scott v. Harris,
`550 U. S. 372, 382–383 (2007). Rather, the Fourth Amend-
`ment requires, as we once put it, that a court “slosh [its]
`way through” a “factbound morass.” Id., at 383. Or said
`
`more prosaically, deciding whether a use of force was objec-
`tively reasonable demands “careful attention to the facts
`
`and circumstances” relating to the incident, as then known
`to the officer. Graham, 490 U. S., at 396. For example, the
`“severity of the crime” prompting the stop can carry weight
`
`in the analysis. See ibid.; Garner, 471 U. S., at 11. So too
`
`
`can actions the officer took during the stop, such as giving
`warnings or otherwise trying to control the encounter. See
`
`
`id., at 12; Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U. S. 389, 397
`(2015). And the stopped person’s conduct is always relevant
`because it indicates the nature and level of the threat he
`poses, either to the officer or to others. See ibid.; Graham,
`
`490 U. S., at 396.
`
`Most notable here, the “totality of the circumstances” in-
`
`quiry into a use of force has no time limit. Of course, the
`situation at the precise time of the shooting will often be
`
`what matters most; it is, after all, the officer’s choice in that
`moment that is under review. But earlier facts and circum-
`
`stances may bear on how a reasonable officer would have
`understood and responded to later ones. Or as the Federal
`
`Government puts the point, those later, “in-the-moment”
`facts “cannot be hermetically sealed off from the context in
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`6
`
`
`BARNES v. FELIX
`
`Opinion of the Court
`which they arose.” Brief for United States as Amicus Cu-
`
`riae 14. Taking account of that context may benefit either
`
`party in an excessive-force case. Prior events may show, for
`example, why a reasonable officer would have perceived
`
`otherwise ambiguous conduct of a suspect as threatening.
`
`Or instead they may show why such an officer would have
`perceived the same conduct as innocuous. The history of
`
`the interaction, as well as other past circumstances known
`to the officer, thus may inform the reasonableness of the
`
`use of force.
`
`
`The Court’s decision in Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U. S.
`
`765 (2014), well illustrates the point. The excessive-force
`
`
`claim there concerned the fatal shooting of a driver at the
`
`end of a “dangerous car chase” lasting more than five
`minutes. Id., at 768. The driver had sped away from a traf-
`
`fic stop on a well-used road, and tried to outrun as many as
`
`six police cruisers at speeds sometimes exceeding 100 miles
`per hour. Eventually, the fleeing car ran into one of the
`cruisers and came “to a near standstill.” Id., at 776. The
`driver, though, still tried to escape, pumping the gas in a
`
`way that sent his wheels “spinning” and then putting the
`
`car into reverse. Ibid. At that point, one of the officers fired
`several shots into the car. In a suit brought against the
`
`officer, the driver’s daughter contended that those shots
`were taken when the chase was “already over.” Id., at 777.
`
`But this Court rejected that claim based on everything that
`had happened during the incident—the driver’s “outra-
`geously reckless” behavior over the prior “five minutes,” as
`
`well as his last-second efforts to again take flight. Id., at
`776. Given all of those events, the Court explained, a rea-
`sonable officer would have concluded that the driver was
`
`“intent on resuming” his getaway and, if allowed to do so,
`
`would “again pose a deadly threat for others.” Id., at 777.
`In short, the shooting was justified “at the moment” it oc-
`curred partly because of what had transpired in the preced-
`
`ing period. Ibid.
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`7
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`The moment-of-threat rule applied in the courts below
`
`prevents that sort of attention to context, and thus conflicts
`with this Court’s instruction to analyze the totality of the
`circumstances. Recall that the District Court and Fifth Cir-
`cuit limited their view to the two seconds before the shoot-
`ing, after Felix had stepped onto the doorsill of Barnes’s car.
`See supra, at 3–4. Those courts believed that, under Fifth
`
`Circuit precedent, they could not take into account any-
`thing preceding that final moment. See 532 F. Supp. 3d, at
`
`471 (excluding analysis of “what had transpired up until
`
`the shooting itself”); 91 F. 4th, at 397 (agreeing that “ac-
`tions leading up to the shooting are not relevant”). So, for
`
`example, they could not consider the reasons for the stop or
`the earlier conduct of, and interactions between, the sus-
`pect and officer. And because of that limit, they could not
`address whether the final two seconds of the encounter
`would look different if set within a longer timeframe. It is
`
`as though the Court in Plumhoff could consider only the in-
`stant when the chased car was at a “near standstill,” and
`not the earlier time when it zigzagged down a busy roadway
`
`at speed. 572 U. S., at 776. To be sure, historical facts will
`
`not often matter as much as they did there to the reasona-
`
` bleness analysis. See supra, at 6. And some of those facts
`may not be relevant at all. But no rule that precludes con-
`
`sideration of prior events in assessing a police shooting is
`reconcilable with the fact-dependent and context-sensitive
`approach we have prescribed. A court deciding a use-of-
`force case cannot review the totality of the circumstances if
`
`it has put on chronological blinders.
`
`
`That point is so evident that not even Felix quarrels with
`it; his defense of the decisions below instead relies on taking
`a different view of their meaning and of the question they
`
`raise. First, the agreement with what we have said: Yes,
`Felix acknowledges, prior events are not “off limits” in the
`reasonableness inquiry, for they may “inform the perspec-
`tive of the reasonable officer.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 79; Brief for
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`8
`
`
`BARNES v. FELIX
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Respondent 2. Just so. But now the divergence: According
`
`to Felix, the courts below acted consistently with that all-
`times-considered principle. The Fifth Circuit’s moment-of-
`threat doctrine, Felix argues, in fact allows courts to assess
`many pre-shooting facts and circumstances—and courts ap-
`plying it often do so. See id., at 20 (citing other Fifth Circuit
`
`decisions). All that the doctrine bars is a single kind of in-
`
`quiry—into whether an officer’s earlier error itself “created
`the need for deadly force.” Id., at 21; see Tr. of Oral Arg.
`53. And on that issue, Felix submits, the Fifth Circuit is
`right: “[A]n officer doesn’t lose his right to defend himself
`
`just because” he previously “made a mistake.” Ibid.
`
`But whatever might be said of Fifth Circuit law gener-
`ally, the decisions below applied a rule about timing. As
`shown above, both lower courts took pains to explain that,
`in evaluating the shooting’s reasonableness, they could look
`
`only to a two-second snippet of the encounter. See supra,
`at 3–4. And because that was the reasoning in the case be-
`fore us, that is the reasoning we must address. It could
`
`make no difference to our decision here if the Fifth Circuit
`
`in other cases eschewed a strict time limit, as Felix claims.
`
`And anyway, we are not sure Felix correctly describes the
`
`overall state of Fifth Circuit law. Consider Harris v.
`Serpas—a Fifth Circuit decision relied on below. See 91 F.
`4th, at 397. The court there noted the plaintiffs’ recital of
`several historical facts—actions of both the suspect and the
`
`officer in the period prior to the shooting. See 745 F. 3d, at
`
`772. And the court recognized that this Court’s decisions
`directed an inquiry into the “the ‘totality of the circum-
`
`stances.’” Ibid. (quoting Graham, 490 U. S., at 396). But
`
`
`then came the following: “This [Circuit], however, has nar-
`
`rowed that test” in deadly force cases, holding that the in-
`quiry there is “confined to whether the [officer] was in dan-
`ger at the moment of the threat that resulted in the
`[officer’s] shooting.” Ibid. (alterations in original). The
`
`
`
`
`

`

`9
`
`
`It is so ordered.
`
`
`
` Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`problem with the statement is apparent. As we have ex-
`plained, a court cannot thus “narrow” the totality-of-the-cir-
`
`cumstances inquiry, to focus on only a single moment. It
`must look too, in this and all excessive-force cases, at any
`relevant events coming before.
`
`
`We do not address here the different question Felix raises
`
`about use-of-force cases: whether or how an officer’s own
`“creation of a dangerous situation” factors into the reason-
`
`ableness analysis. Brief for Respondent 22; see supra, at 8.
`
`As in another of our recent Fourth Amendment cases, that
`
`issue is not properly before us. See Mendez, 581 U. S., at
`429, n. The courts below never confronted the issue, pre-
`cisely because their inquiry was so time-bound. In looking
`
`at only the two seconds before the shot, they excluded from
`
`view any actions of the officer that allegedly created the
`
`danger necessitating deadly force. See supra, at 3–4. So,
`to use the obvious example, the courts below did not address
`
`the relevance, if any, of Felix stepping onto the doorsill of
`Barnes’s car. And because they never considered that issue,
`it was not the basis of the petition for certiorari. The ques-
`tion presented to us was one of timing alone: whether to
`look only at the encounter’s final two seconds, or also to con-
`
`sider earlier events serving to put those seconds in context.
`
`
`With that matter resolved, we return everything else to
`the courts below. It is for them now to consider the reason-
`ableness of the shooting, using the lengthier timeframe we
`have prescribed.
`
`Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Ap-
`peals and remand the case for further proceedings con-
`sistent with this opinion.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`1
`
`
`
` Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
`
` KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`No. 23–1239
`
`_________________
` JANICE HUGHES BARNES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS RE-
`
`PRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ASHTIAN
`
`BARNES, DECEASED, PETITIONER v.
`
`ROBERTO FELIX, JR., ET AL.
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
`[May 15, 2025]
` JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS,
`
`
` JUSTICE ALITO, and JUSTICE BARRETT join, concurring.
`
`
`I join the Court’s opinion. I agree that the officer’s actions
`
`during the traffic stop in this case should be assessed based
`
`on the totality of the circumstances. I write separately to
`
`add a few points about the dangers of traffic stops for police
`
`officers, particularly when as here the driver pulls away in
`the midst of the stop.
`
`
`Even for routine traffic violations, traffic stops are
`
`“fraught with danger to police officers.” Michigan v. Long,
`463 U. S. 1032, 1047 (1983). An “inordinate risk confront[s]
`
`an officer as he approaches a person seated in an
`
`
`automobile.” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 110
`(1977) (per curiam). That is in part because officers operate
`
`at a “tactical disadvantage” when “approaching an
`
`unknown vehicle, with limited visibility and unpredictable
`threats.” Brief for National Fraternal Order of Police as
`
`Amicus Curiae 4. As this Court noted nearly 50 years ago,
`
`“a significant percentage of murders of police officers occurs
`
`when the officers are making traffic stops.” Mimms, 434
`
`U. S., at 110 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S.
`
`218, 234, n. 5 (1973)). Traffic stops remain highly
`
`dangerous today. See Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of
`
`

`

`2
`
`
`BARNES v. FELIX
`
` KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
`
`
`Investigation, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and
`Assaulted, 2023 (2024) (Table 27). On April 8, 2023, two
`
`officers were shot and killed at an intersection in Cameron,
`
`Wisconsin, after stopping a car for a warrant and welfare
`check on the driver.1 On December 8, 2024, an officer was
`shot and killed after he pulled over a pickup truck with
`
`expired license plates in a Super 8 motel parking lot in
`
`Terrell, Texas. See Brief for State of Texas et al. as Amici
`Curiae 1, and n. 4. The list goes on and on.2
`
`Officers cannot let their guard down and assume that any
`
`particular traffic stop will be safe—even if a driver is pulled
`
`over for nothing more than a speeding violation, a broken
`
`taillight, or the like. The driver may be drunk, on drugs,
`armed, or some combination thereof. Or the driver may
`have committed (or may be about to commit) a serious
`
`“People detained for minor offenses” such as
`crime.
`ordinary traffic violations “can turn out to be the most
`
`devious and dangerous criminals.” Florence v. Board of
`
`
`Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 566 U. S. 318,
`
`334 (2012). Timothy McVeigh, the man responsible for the
`1995 Oklahoma City bombing, was stopped for a missing
`license plate, which ultimately led to his apprehension for
`the bombing. See ibid. Likewise, serial killer Ted Bundy
`was pulled over based on a stolen-vehicle alert in Pensacola,
`Florida. When informed that he was under arrest, Bundy
`kicked the officer’s legs out from under him, and the two
`
`
`struggled over the officer’s gun before the officer was able
`——————
` 1See Officer Down Memorial Page, Police Officer Emily Ann
`
`
`Breidenbach, https://www.odmp.org/officer/26693-police-officer-emily-
`ann-breidenbach; Officer Down Memorial Page, Police Officer Hunter
`Timothy
`Scheel,
`https://www.odmp.org/officer/26694-police-officer-
`
`hunter-timothy-scheel.
`2To be sure, officers sometimes use excessive force during traffic stops.
`
`
` When that happens, officers of course should be held to account for their
`actions. See Brief for Current and Former Law Enforcement Officials as
`
`
` Amici Curiae 22; Brief for California State Sheriffs’ Association et al. as
` Amici Curiae 10.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`3
`
`
`
` Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
`
` KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
`
`
`to subdue and arrest Bundy. See Bundy v. Dugger, 850
`F. 2d 1402, 1422 (CA11 1988); see also Brief for State of
`
`Texas et al. as Amici Curiae 11–12, and n. 12.
`
`So even though most traffic stops end without incident,
`traffic stops are nonetheless inherently risky for police
`
`officers. And when, as in this case, the driver suddenly
`pulls away in the midst of a stop, the risks multiply. A
`driver speeding away from a traffic stop could easily
`endanger bystanders and other drivers—especially if the
`
`fleeing driver is under the influence of alcohol or drugs, as
`
`might well be the case when a driver flees. Moreover, the
`
`very “fact that a suspect flees when suspected of a minor
`
`offense,” such as speeding or a failure to pay tolls, “could
`well be indicative of a larger danger.” Lange v. California,
`594 U. S. 295, 331 (2021) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in
`
`judgment). Fleeing from the traffic stop could suggest that
`
`the driver is preparing to commit or has committed a more
`
`serious crime—and is attempting to evade detection or
`
`arrest. The driver may have illegal drugs or an illegal gun
`in the car. Or the driver may be unlawfully in the country
`
`
`and fear removal if apprehended. He might have a warrant
`out for his arrest. He could have an abducted child in the
`car. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 18. Or as the tragic 2025 New
`Year’s terrorist attack in New Orleans illustrates, the
`
`driver might intend to use the car as a weapon. See id., at
`24.
`The possibilities are many. But the key point is a
`
`commonsense one: A driver who speeds away from a traffic
`stop can pose significant dangers to both the officer and the
`
`surrounding community.
`The question when a driver flees, therefore, is not merely
`
`
`whether the underlying traffic violation “presents risks to
`
`public safety”—it is also “whether flight,” and what that
`flight might indicate or enable, “does so.” Lange, 594 U. S.,
`
`at 331 (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). In those
`
`circumstances, in other words, it is not only the “severity of
`
`
`

`

`4
`
`
`BARNES v. FELIX
`
` KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
`
`
`the crime” that prompted the stop that is relevant to the
`“totality of the circumstances” inquiry. Graham v. Connor,
`
`490 U. S. 386, 396 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). The
`Fourth Amendment analysis must also take account of the
`suspect’s attempt “to evade” the officer “by flight.” Ibid.
`
`What should the officer do when a driver flees from a
`traffic stop? There are no easy or risk-free answers. Every
`feasible option poses some potential danger to the officer,
`
`the driver, or the public at large—and often to all three.
`And an officer in that situation must make a split-second
`choice among those various dangerous options.
`
`
`First, the officer could simply let the driver go. But
`
`because the fleeing driver might be a threat to the
`
`community, letting the driver go may exacerbate the
`
`dangers, rather than mitigate them. Encouraging officers
`to stand back and allow drivers to take off would also create
`“perverse incentives” for those who are stopped by the
`police. Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372, 385 (2007). If doing
`nothing in response to a fleeing driver became a known and
`
`regular practice among police officers, that would
`presumably embolden some drivers who otherwise might
`have thought twice about taking off.
`
`
`Of course, the officer could let the driver go in the moment
`
`but then attempt to catch the driver by, for example,
`
`tracking the car’s license plate or reviewing surveillance
`
`footage. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. But after letting the driver
`
`
`go, the police may not be able to later track down the car or
`the driver of the car. Even if the police are able to do so, the
`escaped driver may pose a serious risk to the public in the
`
`interim. And given that the driver has already shown a
`propensity to evade law enforcement by fleeing a traffic
`
`stop, attempting to execute an arrest upon finding the
`driver could itself be dangerous for the police and others.
`
`
`Second, the officer could get back in his police car and
`
`give chase, or could radio other officers to pursue the driver.
`But a high-speed chase likewise can be exceptionally
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
`
` KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
`
`
`
`dangerous to the officer, the driver, and others on the road.
` “Vehicular pursuits” are “often catastrophic.” Lange, 594
`
`U. S., at 324 (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment).
`
`
`Many real-world examples demonstrate as much. Plumhoff
`
`v. Rickard involved a “‘dangerous car chase’” in which the
`
`driver “tried to outrun as many as six police cruisers at
`
`speeds sometimes exceeding 100 miles per hour,” ending in
`
`
`the “fatal shooting” of the driver. Ante, at 6 (quoting 572
`
`U. S. 765, 768 (2014)). In Scott v. Harris, multiple police
`cars “with blue lights flashing and sirens blaring” chased
`the driver