`(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2023
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
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` Syllabus
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` ERLINGER v. UNITED STATES
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
` No. 23–370. Argued March 27, 2024—Decided June 21, 2024
`
` Paul Erlinger pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm
`
`in violation of 18 U. S. C. §922(g). At sentencing, the judge found Mr.
`Erlinger eligible for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career
`Criminal Act, §924(e)(1), which increases the penalty for a 922(g) con-
`viction from a maximum sentence of 10 years to a mandatory mini-
`mum sentence of 15 years when the defendant has three or more qual-
`
`ifying convictions for offenses committed on different occasions.
`Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit held in unrelated decisions that two
`of the offenses on which the government relied for Mr. Erlinger’s sen-
`
`tence enhancement no longer qualified as ACCA predicate offenses.
`
`
`The District Court vacated Mr. Erlinger’s sentence and scheduled re-
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`
`
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`sentencing. At the resentencing hearing, prosecutors again pursued
`an ACCA sentence enhancement based on a new set of 26-year-old con-
`
`victions for burglaries committed by Mr. Erlinger over the course of
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`
`several days. Mr. Erlinger protested that the burglaries were part of
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`a single criminal episode and did not occur on separate occasions, as
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`required by ACCA. Moreover, Mr. Erlinger argued that the question
`whether he committed these prior burglaries during a single episode
`
`or on distinct occasions required an assessment of the facts surround-
`ing those offenses, and that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments required
`that a jury make that assessment. The District Court rejected Mr.
`
`Erlinger’s request for a jury and issued a 15-year enhanced sentence.
`On appeal, the government confessed error. Pointing to this Court’s
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`recent decision in Wooden v. United States, 595 U. S. 360, which
`acknowledged that an ACCA “occasions inquiry” can be intensely fac-
`tual in nature, the government admitted that given the factual nature
`of the inquiry and its impact on a defendant’s sentence, the Constitu-
`
`tion requires a jury to decide unanimously and beyond a reasonable
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`2
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`ERLINGER v. UNITED STATES
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`Syllabus
`doubt whether Mr. Erlinger’s prior offenses were committed on differ-
`
`ent occasions. This Court granted certiorari and appointed counsel to
`defend the judgment below.
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`
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`Held: The Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unanimous jury to
`
`make the determination beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s
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`past offenses were committed on separate occasions for ACCA pur-
`poses. Pp. 5–26.
`
`(a) The Sixth Amendment promises that “[i]n all criminal prosecu-
`tions the accused” has “the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
`
`impartial jury.” Inherent in that guarantee is an assurance that any
`
`guilty verdict will issue only from a unanimous jury. Ramos v. Louisi-
`
`ana, 590 U. S. 83, 93. The Fifth Amendment further promises that the
`
`government may not deprive individuals of their liberty without “due
`
`process of law.” It safeguards for criminal defendants well-established
`common-law protections, including the “ancient rule” that the govern-
`
`ment must prove to a jury every one of its charges beyond a reasonable
`doubt. Together, these Amendments place the jury at the heart of our
`criminal justice system and ensure a judge’s power to punish is derived
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`wholly from, and remains always controlled by, the jury and its verdict.
`
`Blakely v. Washington, 542 U. S. 296, 306.
`
`The Court has repeatedly cautioned that trial and sentencing prac-
`tices must remain within the guardrails provided by these two Amend-
`
`ments. Thus in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, the Court held
`that a novel “sentencing enhancement” was unconstitutional because
`
`it violated the rule that only a jury may find “facts that increase the
`prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is ex-
`
`posed.” Id., at 490. This principle applies when a judge seeks to issue
`
`a sentence that exceeds the maximum penalty authorized by a jury’s
`findings as well as when a judge seeks to increase a defendant’s mini-
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`
`mum punishment. See, e.g., Alleyne v. United States, 570 U. S. 99,
`111–113. Pp. 5–10.
`
`
`(b) The government concedes what all of this means for Mr. Erlinger.
`To trigger ACCA’s mandatory minimum, the government had to prove,
`among other things, that his three predicate convictions were “com-
`
`mitted on occasions different from one another.” §924(e)(1). And as
`Wooden observed, deciding whether those past offenses occurred on
`
`three or more different occasions is a fact-laden task. As the govern-
`ment recognizes, virtually “any fact” that “increase[s] the prescribed
`
`range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed” must be
`resolved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or freely ad-
`mitted in a guilty plea). Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 490. Here, the sen-
`tencing court made a factual finding that Mr. Erlinger’s offenses oc-
`
`
`curred on at least three separate occasions. And as in Apprendi and
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`Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)
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`Syllabus
`Alleyne, that factual finding had the effect of increasing both the max-
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`imum and minimum sentences Mr. Erlinger faced. Thus, Mr. Erlinger
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`was entitled to have a jury resolve ACCA’s occasions inquiry unani-
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`mously and beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court decides no more
`than that. Pp. 10–12.
`
`(c) Court-appointed amicus cannot avoid this conclusion. Pp. 12–22.
`
`
`(1) Amicus relies on an exception announced in Almendarez-
`
`Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224, which he argues permits a judge
`to find certain facts related to a defendant’s past offenses, including
`whether he committed them on different occasions. That decision is
`
`an outlier. And the Court has described it as “at best an exceptional
`departure” from historic practice. Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 487. It per-
`
`sists as a “narrow exception” permitting judges to find only “the fact of
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`a prior conviction.” Alleyne, 570 U. S., at 111, n. 1. Pp. 13–15.
`
`(2) Amicus responds that if Almendarez-Torres permits a judge to
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`find the fact of a conviction, that necessarily implies that a judge may
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`also find the jurisdiction in which the underlying offense occurred and
`the date it happened, which is generally enough to resolve the occa-
`
`sions inquiry, making sending it to a jury pointless. This Court disa-
`
`grees. To answer such questions, a court will sometimes consult the
`Shepard documents in a case, which include judicial records, plea
`
`agreements, and colloquies between a judge and the defendant. See
`
`
`Shepard v. United States, 544 U. S. 13. This Court’s cases hold that a
`sentencing judge may use the information gleaned from Shepard doc-
`uments for the “limited function” of determining the fact of a prior con-
`viction and the then-existing elements of that offense. “[N]o more is
`
`
`allowed.” Mathis v. United States, 579 U. S. 500, 511. Moreover, often
`Shepard documents will not contain all the information needed to con-
`duct a sensible ACCA occasions inquiry, and they can also be “prone to
`
`error.” Mathis, 579 U. S., at 512. Pp. 15–19.
`
`
`(3) Amicus insists this Court’s Almendarez-Torres precedents are
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`mistaken, because the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ original meaning
`
`
`and common-law traditions authorize judges at sentencing to find all
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`manner of facts about an offender’s past crimes. But this Court has
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`been down this road many times before, and to reconsider all those
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`precedents now would require, at the least, convincing proof indeed.
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`See Gaudin, 515 U. S., at 515. Yet amicus offers nothing like that, and
`the evidence he does offer does more to hurt than help his cause. Ami-
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`cus points to supplemental information procedures that a few States
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`employed in the early 19th century. But a sentencing procedure fol-
`lowed by a few States hardly represents “convincing” proof that our
`precedents have mistaken the original meaning of the Fifth and Sixth
`
`Amendments. And in upholding one such scheme, the Court stressed
`that, under the law’s terms, even “the fact of former conviction” had to
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`4
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`ERLINGER v. UNITED STATES
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`Syllabus
`be “charged” by prosecutors and then “determined by a jury in a pro-
`ceeding thereby instituted.” Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616
`(1912). Amicus next turns to the Double Jeopardy Clause, which per-
`mits a judge to look into a defendant’s past conduct to ask whether the
`government has charged a defendant for the same crime a second time.
`While the Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant by prohibiting
`a judge from even empaneling a jury when the defendant has already
`faced trial on the charged crime, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ jury
`trial rights provide a defendant with entirely complementary protec-
`tions at a different stage of the proceedings by ensuring that, once a
`jury is lawfully empaneled, the government must prove beyond a rea-
`sonable doubt to a unanimous jury the facts necessary to sustain the
`punishment it seeks. Finally, amicus points to case law and statutes
`in four other States. But while this evidence may suggest that in a
`small number of jurisdictions, judges could find the existence, number,
`and dates of a defendant’s prior convictions, none of this provides a
`persuasive basis for revisiting this Court’s many precedents forbidding
`judges from doing more, let alone prove a longstanding tradition.
`Pp. 19–23.
`
`
`(4) Amicus argues that leaving the occasions inquiry to juries
`would do more to prejudice than to protect defendants. That concern,
`like arguments about efficiency, cannot alter the demands of the Fifth
`and Sixth Amendments. Tools such as bifurcation in any event exist
`to address the prejudicial effect evidence about a defendant’s past
`crimes can have on a jury. Pp. 23–26.
`77 F. 4th 617, vacated and remanded.
` GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
`C. J., and THOMAS, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. ROB-
`ERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, J., filed concurring opinions. KAVANAUGH, J.,
`filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined, and in which JACK-
`SON, J., joined except as to Part III. JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opin-
`ion.
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` Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)
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`Opinion of the Court
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
` Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
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` pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 23–370
`_________________
`PAUL ERLINGER, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
`[June 21, 2024]
`JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.
`
`This case concerns the Armed Career Criminal Act
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`
`(ACCA) and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. ACCA im-
`poses lengthy mandatory prison terms on certain defend-
`ants who have previously committed three violent felonies
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`or serious drug offenses on separate occasions. The ques-
`tion we face is whether a judge may decide that a defend-
`ant’s past offenses were committed on separate occasions
`under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, or
`whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unani-
`mous jury to make that determination beyond a reasonable
`doubt.
`
`I
`In 2017, the federal government charged Paul Erlinger
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`under 18 U. S. C. §922(g) with being a felon unlawfully in
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`possession of a firearm. At the time, a conviction for that
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`offense ordinarily carried a sentence of up to 10 years in
`prison. §924(a)(2) (2012 ed.). But the government also
`
`charged Mr. Erlinger under ACCA. And under that statute,
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`a defendant found guilty of violating §922(g) can face even
`more severe punishment. Specifically, if the defendant has
`three prior convictions for “violent felon[ies]” or “serious
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` ERLINGER v. UNITED STATES
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`Opinion of the Court
`drug offense[s]” that were “committed on occasions differ-
`
`ent from one another,” ACCA increases the prison term he
`faces to a minimum of 15 years and a maximum of life.
`§924(e)(1) (2012 ed.).
`
`
`Mr. Erlinger pleaded guilty to violating §922(g). But in
`doing so, he stressed that his previous convictions were
`
`more than a decade old and since then he had turned his
`life around, secured a steady job, built a family, and re-
`mained free from drugs. Tr. of Plea and Sentencing Hear-
`
`ing in No. 2:18–cr–00013 (SD Ind., Oct. 24, 2018), ECF Doc.
`67, p. 24. In light of these facts, the sentencing judge stated
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`that a 5-year prison term would represent a “fair sentence.”
`Id., at 30. But the judge also found it more likely than not
`that Mr. Erlinger’s past included three ACCA-qualifying of-
`fenses committed on three different occasions. Id., at 17.
`
`
`And based on that finding, the court concluded, it had no
`
`
`authority to issue a 5-year sentence. Id., at 29–30. Instead,
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`ACCA required a sentence of at least 15 years. That was
`“too high” for Mr. Erlinger’s crime, the court emphasized,
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`but it had “no power” to order anything less. Ibid.
`
`
`Shortly after the court issued a 15-year sentence con-
`sistent with ACCA, the ground shifted. The Seventh Cir-
`cuit issued decisions indicating that two of the three of-
`fenses on which the district court had relied to invoke
`
`ACCA did not qualify as “violent felon[ies]” or “serious drug
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`offense[s].” 77 F. 4th 617, 619 (2023) (citing United States
`v. Glispie, 978 F. 3d 502 (2020), and United States v. De La
`
`
`Torre, 940 F. 3d 938 (2019)). That left Mr. Erlinger with
`only one qualifying prior conviction, not the three ACCA re-
`quires. Recognizing as much, the district court vacated its
`sentence and set the case for a new sentencing hearing. Or-
`der, ECF Doc. 81.
`
`There, prosecutors once more pursued a 15-year ACCA
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`sentence. This time, though, they pointed to a new set of
`prior convictions arising from burglaries Mr. Erlinger com-
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`mitted when he was 18 years old—some 26 years before his
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` Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)
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`Opinion of the Court
`§922(g) charge. Tr. of Video Resentencing Hearing, ECF
`Doc. 120, at 37–38. As the government told it, within a span
`
`of days Mr. Erlinger burglarized a pizza shop, a sporting
`goods store, and two restaurants. Ibid. Because each of
`these burglaries occurred on different occasions, the gov-
`ernment submitted, each could serve as an ACCA predicate
`and collectively they could support an ACCA sentence. Id.,
`at 39–40.
`
`Mr. Erlinger protested. He maintained that his decades-
`old burglaries had not occurred on four separate occasions
`but during a single criminal episode, all of which meant he
`still lacked the three prior offenses ACCA requires. Id., at
`
`20. More than that, Mr. Erlinger argued, the question
`
`whether he committed his prior burglaries during a single
`episode or on distinct occasions required an assessment of
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`the facts surrounding those offenses. Id., at 22–23. And,
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`he contended, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments entitled
`him to have a jury make that assessment. Id., at 23.
`The district court rejected Mr. Erlinger’s request for a
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`jury. It proceeded to find for itself that each of his 26-year-
`old burglaries occurred on distinct occasions. Id., at 48–49.
`
`
`Armed with this finding, the court held that Mr. Erlinger
`had at least three previous ACCA-qualifying offenses and
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`once more issued a 15-year sentence. Again, the court said
`that it thought the result “unfortunate” and “excessive.”
`Id., at 50. But, again, it said ACCA left it no choice. Id., at
`50–51.
`
`
`On appeal, Mr. Erlinger renewed his argument that the
`Fifth and Sixth Amendments entitled him to have a jury
`decide whether his burglaries occurred on different occa-
`sions. But this time, the government confessed error. The
`Constitution, it said, “requires a jury” to decide unani-
`mously and beyond a reasonable doubt whether Mr. Er-
`linger’s ACCA predicates were “‘committed on occasions
`different from one another.’” 77 F. 4th, at 619, 620.
`
`In explaining its turnabout, the government pointed to
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` ERLINGER v. UNITED STATES
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`Opinion of the Court
` this Court’s recent decision in Wooden v. United States, 595
`
`U. S. 360 (2022). That decision did not directly address
`whether a judge may, or a jury must, resolve disputes about
`whether multiple crimes occurred on multiple occasions.
`
`Id., at 365, n. 3; see id., at 397, n. 7 (GORSUCH, J., concur-
`
`ring in judgment). But, the government acknowledged,
`
`Wooden did hold that ACCA’s occasions “inquiry” can re-
`quire an examination of a “range” of facts, including
`
`whether the defendant’s past offenses were “committed
`
`close in time,” whether they were committed near to or far
`
`from one another, and whether the offenses were “similar
`or intertwined” in purpose and character. Id., at 369. And
`
`given the intensely factual nature of this inquiry and the
`
`impact its resolution can have on a defendant’s sentence,
`the government admitted, a jury must resolve it. That con-
`clusion, the government represented, flows directly from
`this Court’s consistent holdings that the Fifth and Sixth
`Amendments generally guarantee a defendant the right to
`have a unanimous jury find beyond a reasonable doubt any
`fact that increases his exposure to punishment. Brief for
`United States in No. 22–1926 (CA7), pp. 9–11.
`
`
`Despite the government’s concession, the Seventh Circuit
`
`refused to disturb the district court’s sentence. 77 F. 4th,
`
`at 621–622. That left Mr. Erlinger to petition this Court for
`
`certiorari. The government filed a brief in support of his
`petition. In it, the government argued that a number of
`courts of appeals have refused requests for juries in cases
`like Mr. Erlinger’s and that “this Court’s intervention is
`necessary to ensure that the circuits correctly recognize de-
`fendants’ constitutional rights in this context.” Brief for
`
`United States on Pet. for Cert. 5–6.
`
`We agreed to take up Mr. Erlinger’s case to decide
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`whether ACCA’s occasions inquiry must be resolved by a
`jury. 601 U. S. ___ (2023). Because the government now
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`agrees with Mr. Erlinger about the proper resolution of that
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`question, we appointed Nick Harper to defend the judgment
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` Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)
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`Opinion of the Court
` below as amicus curiae. 601 U. S. ___ (2023). He has ably
` discharged his responsibilities.
`
`
` II
`A
`Prominent among the reasons colonists cited in the Dec-
`
`
`laration of Independence for their break with Great Britain
`
`was the fact Parliament and the Crown had “depriv[ed]
`
` [them] in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury.” ¶20.
`
`For centuries, English law had recognized the right to trial
`
`by jury. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 151 (1968).
`Yet, as tensions grew between the British Empire and its
`American Colonies, imperial authorities responded by
`stripping away that ancient right. By their lights, colonial
`juries “‘were not to be trusted’” because they found for de-
`fendants too often. D. Lovejoy, Rights Imply Equality: The
`Case Against Admiralty Jurisdiction in America, 1764–
`
`1776, 16 Wm. & Mary Q. 459, 468 (1959). To secure more
`vigorous enforcement of the Stamp Act and other unpopular
`
`
`
`laws, authorities directed more and more cases to vice-
`
`admiralty courts where crown-appointed judges, rather
`than local juries, decided the defendant’s fate. Jones v.
`United States, 526 U. S. 227, 245–246 (1999). Just as au-
`thorities hoped, the tactic proved “‘most effective’” at secur-
`ing the verdicts they wished. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
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`439 U. S. 322, 340, n. 3 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
`
`(quoting 11 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 110
`(1966)).
`
`After securing their independence, the founding genera-
`tion sought to ensure what happened before would not hap-
`pen again. As John Adams put it, the founders saw repre-
`sentative government and trial by jury as “the heart and
`lungs” of liberty. Letter from Clarendon to W. Pym (Jan.
`27, 1766), in 1 Papers of John Adams 169 (R. Taylor ed.
`1977). “[W]ithout them,” he wrote, we “have no other forti-
`fication . . . against being ridden like horses, fleeced like
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`6
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` ERLINGER v. UNITED STATES
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`Opinion of the Court
`
` sheep, worked like cattle, and fed and clothed like swine
`
`and hounds.” Ibid. Reflecting that sentiment, the right to
`trial by jury in criminal cases was, on one telling, the only
`right included in every newly enacted state constitution. A.
`
`Alschuler & A. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury
`in the United States, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 870 (1994).
`Those who drafted our Federal Constitution took just as
`
`strong a stand on the jury trial right. As originally pro-
`posed, the Constitution promised that “[t]he Trial of all
`Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.”
`
`Art. III, §2, cl. 3. In the ratification debates that followed,
`
`some questioned the adequacy of this provision; even with
`
`it, they feared, the new federal government might fall prey
`
`to the kinds of temptations that led the British to restrict
`
`the jury trial right in the colonies. That right, they argued,
`
`had to be “guard[ed] with the most jealous circumspection.”
`
`A [New Hampshire] Farmer, No. 3, June 6, 1788, quoted in
`
`The Complete Bill of Rights 681 (N. Cogan 2d ed. 2015) (in-
`ternal quotation marks and italics omitted). To address
`this and other concerns about the new Constitution, James
`
`Madison agreed to draft a series of amendments we now
`know as the Bill of Rights. No fewer than three of those ten
`amendments touch on the right to trial by jury, two with
`
`implications for criminal cases. Amdts. 5, 6, 7. Madison
`himself described protections for the jury trial right as
`among “the most valuable” that appear in “the whole list”
`of amendments he produced. 1 Annals of Cong. 755 (1789).
`
`The Sixth Amendment promises that “[i]n all criminal
`
`prosecutions the accused” has “the right to a speedy and
`
`public trial, by an impartial jury.” Inhering in that guaran-
`tee is an assurance that a guilty verdict will issue only from
`a unanimous jury. Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. 83, 93
`
`
`(2020). The Fifth Amendment further promises that the
`government may not deprive individuals of their liberty
`without “due process of law.” It is a promise that safe-
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`Opinion of the Court
`guards for criminal defendants those procedural protec-
`tions well established at common law, including the “an-
`
`cient rule” that the government must prove to a jury every
`
`one of its charges beyond a reasonable doubt. United States
`
`
`v. Haymond, 588 U. S. 634, 641 (2019) (plurality opinion);
`see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 477–478 (2000);
`
`United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 510 (1995); Sullivan
`v. Louisiana, 508 U. S. 275, 277–278 (1993).
`
`
`The Fifth and Sixth Amendments placed the jury at the
`heart of our criminal justice system. From the start, those
`
`provisions were understood to require the government to
`include in its criminal charges “‘all the facts and circum-
`
`stances which constitute the offence.’” Apprendi, 530 U. S.,
`at 478 (quoting J. Archbold, Pleading and Evidence in
`Criminal Cases 44 (15th ed. 1862)). Should an “indictment
`
`or ‘accusation . . . lack any particular fact which the laws
`
`ma[d]e essential to the punishment,’ it was treated as ‘no
`
`accusation’ at all.” Haymond, 588 U. S., at 642 (quoting 1
`
`J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure §87, p. 55 (2d ed. 1872) (some
`alterations omitted)). And at all times the “‘truth of every
`accusation’” against a defendant had to be “‘confirmed by
`the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [his] equals and neigh-
`bours.’” Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 477 (quoting 4 W. Black-
`
`stone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 343 (1769);
`
`emphasis deleted).
`
`Equally, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments sought to en-
`sure that a judge’s power to punish would “deriv[e] wholly”
`from, and remain always “control[led]” by, the jury and its
`
`verdict. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U. S. 296, 306 (2004).
`
`Ordinarily, common-law crimes carried “specific sanctions,
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`and ‘[o]nce the facts of the offense were determined by the
`jury, the judge was meant simply to impose the prescribed
`sentence.’” Haymond, 588 U. S., at 642 (quoting Alleyne v.
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`United States, 570 U. S. 99, 108 (2013) (plurality opinion)).
`Even when it came to early American statutes that gave
`judges a measure of discretion in selecting among possible
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`Opinion of the Court
`sentences, “the ranges themselves were linked to particular
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`facts” found by the jury. Alleyne, 570 U. S., at 109 (collect-
`ing examples). All of which guaranteed that a judge could
`not “‘swell the penalty above what the law . . . provided for
`the acts’” found by a jury of the defendant’s peers. Hay-
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`mond, 588 U. S., at 642 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 519
`(THOMAS, J., concurring)).
`
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`These principles represent not “procedural formalit[ies]”
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`but “fundamental reservation[s] of power” to the American
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`people. Blakely, 542 U. S., at 305–306. By requiring the
`Executive Branch to prove its charges to a unanimous jury
`beyond a reasonable doubt, the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
`ments seek to mitigate the risk of prosecutorial overreach
`and misconduct, including the pursuit of “pretended of-
`fenses” and “arbitrary convictions.” The Federalist No. 83,
`
`p. 499 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); accord, Federal Farmer, Letter
`XV (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2 The Complete Anti-Feder-
`
`alist 320 (H. Storing ed. 1981). By requiring a unanimous
`jury to find every fact essential to an offender’s punishment,
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`those amendments similarly seek to constrain the Judicial
`Branch, ensuring that the punishments courts issue are not
`the result of a judicial “inquisition” but are premised on
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`laws adopted by the people’s elected representatives and
`facts found by members of the community. Blakely, 542
`U. S., at 307; Haymond, 588 U. S., at 640–641. Both of
`these checks on governmental power, the framers appreci-
`ated, were “anchor[s]” essential to prevent a slide back to-
`ward regimes like the vice-admiralty courts they so des-
`pised. Letter from T. Jefferson to T. Paine (July 11, 1789),
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`reprinted in 15 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 266, 269 (J.
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`Boyd ed. 1958).
`With the passage of time, and accelerating in earnest in
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`the 20th century, various governments in this country
`sought to experiment with new trial and sentencing prac-
`tices. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 363–
`
`367 (1989); Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 247–248
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`Opinion of the Court
`(1949); see also P. Tappan, Sentencing Under the Model Pe-
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`nal Code, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 528, 529–532 (1958).
`But in case after case, this Court has cautioned that, while
`some experiments may be tolerable, all must remain within
`the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ guardrails.
`
`So, for example, in Apprendi this Court faced a case in-
`volving a New Jersey offense that ordinarily carried a max-
`imum sentence of 10 years in prison. 530 U. S., at 468. The
`State, however, had adopted a novel “sentencing enhance-
`ment” that purported to allow a judge to impose an even
`longer term of imprisonment after finding, by a preponder-
`ance of the evidence, that the offender’s crime was moti-
`vated by racial bias. Id., at 468–471. Relying on that stat-
`utory authority, the sentencing
`judge ordered the
`defendant to serve 12 years in prison. Id., at 471. This
`
`Court found the sentence unconstitutional, and did so for a
`by-now familiar reason: Only a jury may find “‘facts that
`increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a crimi-
`nal defendant is exposed.’” Id., at 490.
`
`It is a principle we have since reiterated in response to a
`variety of other recent sentencing innovations. See Hay-
`mond, 588 U. S., at 644 (collecting cases). And it is a prin-
`ciple, we have observed, that does not just apply when a
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`judge seeks to issue a sentence that exceeds the maximum
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`penalty authorized by a jury’s findings (or a guilty plea). It
`is a principle that also applies when a judge seeks to in-
`crease a defendant’s minimum punishment. Alleyne illus-
`
`trates the point. There, we confronted a case in which a
`jury had convicted the defendant of a crime that usually
`carried a sentence of between five years and life in prison.
`570 U. S., at 103–104. But a separate statutory “sentencing
`
`enhancement” ostensibly allowed the judge to transform
`that 5-year minimum sentence into a 7-year minimum sen-
`tence if he found a certain additional fact by a preponder-
`ance of the evidence. Ibid. That innovation, too, the Court
`held, improperly invaded the jury’s province because “[a]
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`Opinion of the Court
`fact that increases” a defendant’s exposure to punishment,
`whether by triggering a higher maximum or minimum sen-
`tence, must “be submitted to a jury” and found unanimously
`and beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at 111–113.
`
`The principles Apprendi and Alleyne discussed are so
`firmly entrenched that we have now overruled several deci-
`sions inconsistent with them. See, e.g., Hurst v. Florida,
`577 U. S. 92, 101–102 (2016) (overruling Hildwin v. Flor-
`ida, 490 U. S. 638 (1989) (per curiam), and Spaziano v. Flor-
`
`ida, 468 U. S. 447 (1984)); Alleyne, 570 U. S., at 107 (over-
`
`ruling Harris v. United States, 536 U. S. 545 (2002)); Ring
`
`v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584, 609 (2002) (overruling Walton v.
`Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990)).
`B
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`Commendably, the government concedes before us, as it
`
`did before the court of appeals, what all this means for Mr.
`Erlinger’s case and others like it. Under §922(g), Mr. Er-
`linger faced between 0 and 10 years in prison. §924(a)(2)
`(2012 ed.). To trigger ACCA and expose him to longer
`prison terms, the government had to prove that his past in-
`
`cluded three convictions for “violent felon[ies]” or “serious
`drug offense[s]” that were “committed on occasions differ-
`ent from one another.” §924(e)(1). And under Wooden, de-
`
`ciding whether those past offenses occurred on three or
`
`more different occasions is a fact-laden task. Were the
`crimes “committed close in time”? 595 U. S., at 369. How
`about the “[p]roximity” of their “location[s]”? Ibid. Were
`the offenses “similar or intertwined” in purpose and char-
`acter? Ibid. All these questions, Wooden observed, “may be
`
`relevant” to determining whether the offenses were com-
`mitted on one occasion or separate ones—and all require
`facts to be found before ACCA’s more punitive mandatory
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`minimum sentence may be lawfully deployed. Ibid.
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`As the government recognizes, there is no doubt what the
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`Constitution requires in these circumstances: Virtually
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`Opinion of the Court
`“any fact” that “‘increase[s] the prescribed range of penal-
`ties to which a criminal defendant is exposed’” must be re-
`solved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or
`freely admitted in a guilty plea). Apprendi, 530 U. S., at
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`490; see Brief for United States 9. Judges may not assume
`the jury’s factfinding function for themselves, let alone pur-
`port to perform it using a mere preponderance-of-the-evidence
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`standard. To hold otherwise might not portend a revival of
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`the vice-admiralty courts the framers so feared. See Part
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`II–A, supra. But all the same, it would intrude on a power
`the Fifth and Sixth Amendments reserve to the American
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`people.
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`Really, this case is as nearly on all fours with Apprendi
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`and Alleyne as an