No. 23-367
`In the Supreme Court of the United States
`
`STARBUCKS CORPORATION, PETITIONER
`
`
`
`v.
`
`M. KATHLEEN MCKINNEY, REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF
`REGION 15 OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
`BOARD, FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
`RELATIONS BOARD
`
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`
`BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT
`
`
`
` ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
`Solicitor General
`Counsel of Record
`EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
`Deputy Solicitor General
`AUSTIN L. RAYNOR
`Assistant to the Solicitor
`General
`Department of Justice
`Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
`SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
`(202) 514-2217
`
`JENNIFER A. ABRUZZO
`General Counsel
`PETER SUNG OHR
`Deputy General Counsel
`RICHARD BOCK
`Associate General Counsel
`RUTH E. BURDICK
`RICHARD J. LUSSIER
`Deputy Associate General
`Counsels
`DAVID HABENSTREIT
`ROBERT N. ODDIS
`Assistant General Counsels
`LAURA T. VAZQUEZ
`Deputy Assistant General
`Counsel
`LAURIE MONAHAN DUGGAN
`Supervisory Attorney
`National Labor Relations
` Board
`Washington, D.C. 20570
`
`
`
`
`

`

`QUESTION PRESENTED
`
`Whether the court of appeals applied the correct
`standard for granting interim injunctive relief under 29
`U.S.C. 160( j).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`(I)
`
`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`Opinions below .............................................................................. 1
`Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1
`Statutory provision involved ........................................................ 2
`Statement:
`A. Statutory background ..................................................... 2
`B. Factual background ......................................................... 4
`Summary of argument ................................................................. 9
`Argument ..................................................................................... 12
`A. The statutory context informs whether Section
`10( j) relief is “just and proper”:
`1. The statutory text requires a context-specific
`inquiry ...................................................................... 13
`2. Equity embraces statutory considerations .......... 15
`3. History confirms that statutory context is
`relevant to granting relief under Section 10( j) .... 20
`4. The NLRA’s framework informs courts’
`consideration of both the merits and equities ...... 25
`B. Either a two-factor or four-factor test may reflect
`the appropriate considerations..................................... 34
`C. Petitioner’s remaining arguments lack merit ............. 40
`Conclusion ................................................................................... 44
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases:
`
`
`
`Ahearn v. Jackson Hosp. Corp.,
`351 F.3d 226 (6th Cir. 2003) .............................. 35-37, 40, 41
`Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros.,
`348 U.S. 511 (1955).............................................................. 34
`American Foreign Serv. Ass’n v. Baker,
`895 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ........................................... 41
`Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell,
`480 U.S. 531 (1987) ....................................................... 32
`
`(III)
`
`

`

`Cases—Continued:
`
`Page
`
`IV
`
`Arlook v. S. Lichtenberg & Co.,
`952 F.2d 367 (11th Cir. 1992) ............................................. 35
`Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978) ......13, 27
`Bloedorn v. Francisco Foods, Inc.,
`276 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 2001) ......................................... 27, 28
`Chester v. Grane Healthcare Co.,
`666 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 2011) .................................................. 35
`Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
`Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ..................................................... 26
`Douds v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
`99 F. Supp. 474 (D.N.J. 1951) ............................................ 23
`Douds v. Local 294, 75 F. Supp. 414 (N.D.N.Y. 1947) ....... 23
`FTC v. Consumer Def., LLC,
`926 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2019) ............................................. 42
`Fleischut v. Nixon Detroit Diesel, Inc.,
`859 F.2d 26 (6th Cir. 1988) ................................................. 37
`Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979) ................... 26
`Frankl v. HTH Corp.,
`650 F.3d 1334 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
`566 U.S. 904 (2012).............................................................. 22
`Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944) ................ 31
`Frye v. District 1199, Health Care & Soc. Serv.
`Union, 996 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1993) .................................. 32
`Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States,
`371 U.S. 115 (1962).............................................................. 16
`Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944) .................. 9, 15, 16
`Jaffee v. Henry Heide, Inc.,
`115 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ........................................ 23
`Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 445 (2015)............................ 18
`Kinney v. Pioneer Press, 881 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1989) ..... 22
`Kobell v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union,
`965 F.2d 1401 (6th Cir. 1992) ............................................. 32
`
`
`
`

`

`Cases—Continued:
`
`Page
`
`V
`
`Lebus v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc.,
`218 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. La. 1963) ...................................... 23
`McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co.,
`513 U.S. 352 (1995).............................................................. 38
`McKinney v. Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC,
`875 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2017) ............................................... 35
`Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union, Loc. No. 753 v. Lake
`Valley Farm Prod., 311 U.S. 91 (1940) ............................. 20
`Monessen Sw. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330 (1988) ........ 24
`Muffley v. Spartan Mining Co.,
`570 F.3d 534 (4th Cir. 2009) ................................... 22, 30, 34
`Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975) ........................ 30, 32
`NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967) ......... 31
`NLRB v. Electro-Voice, Inc.,
`83 F.3d 1559 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
`519 U.S. 1055 (1997) ...................................................... 31, 36
`NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) ............ 31
`NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Co.,
`306 U.S. 240 (1939)........................................................ 30, 32
`NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) ....... 26, 31
`NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944) ........... 26
`NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975) ............ 33
`NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254 (1968) ................... 26
`New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019) ............. 24
`Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) ........................ 34, 37, 41
`Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners,
`409 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2005) ............................................. 40
`Phoenix Ry. Co. v. Geary, 239 U.S. 277 (1915)................... 29
`Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,
`328 U.S. 395 (1946)............................................ 10, 18, 21, 33
`Pye v. Excel Case Ready, 238 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2001) ....... 36
`Reuben v. FDIC, 760 F. Supp. 934 (D.D.C. 1991) .............. 41
`
`
`
`

`

`Cases—Continued:
`
`Page
`
`VI
`
`SEC v. Zera Fin. LLC,
`2023 WL 8269775 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2023) ...................... 42
`SJT Holdings, Inc., McDonald’s USA,
`LLC, and McDonald’s Corp. and
`SEIU Nat’l Fast Food Workers Union,
`372 N.L.R.B. 82 (2023) ....................................................... 40
`Schaub v. Detroit Newspaper Agency,
`154 F.3d 276 (6th Cir. 1998) ............................................... 37
`Schaub v. West Michigan Plumbing & Heating, Inc.,
`250 F.3d 962 (6th Cir. 2001) ............................................... 35
`Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc.,
`517 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1975) .................................................. 21
`Sharp v. Parents in Cmty. Action, Inc.,
`172 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 1999) ................................. 22, 30, 41
`Sheeran v. American Com. Lines, Inc.,
`683 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1982) ............................................... 37
`Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984) ................ 4, 26
`Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,
`437 U.S. 153 (1978).............................................................. 34
`Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive
`Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519 (2015) ......................... 24
`United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
`221 U.S. 106 (1911).............................................................. 17
`United States v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco,
`310 U.S. 16 (1940) ............................................................... 18
`United States v. First Nat’l City Bank,
`379 U.S. 378 (1965).............................................................. 18
`United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183 (1939) .................... 16
`United Steelworkers v. United States,
`361 U.S. 39 (1959) ............................................................... 17
`University of Texas v. Camenisch,
`451 U.S. 390 (1981).............................................................. 28
`
`
`
`

`

`VII
`
`Cases—Continued:
`
`Page
`
`Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed’n No. 40,
`300 U.S. 515 (1937)........................................................ 18, 33
`Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) ......... 19
`Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
`555 U.S. 7 (2008) ............................................... 15, 21, 26, 36
`Wisconsin Cent. Ltd. v. United States,
`585 U.S. 274 (2018).............................................................. 14
`
`Statutes, regulations, and rules:
`
`
`
`Act of Aug. 28, 1958,
`Pub. L. No. 85-791, § 13(a)-(c), 72 Stat. 945-946 .............. 24
`Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,
`ch. 120, § 10( j), 61 Stat. 149 ..... 4-15, 18, 20-25, 27-33, 35-43
`§ 10, 61 Stat. 146-150 ....................................................... 24
`Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
`Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 704(d),
`73 Stat. 544-545 ................................................................... 24
`National Labor Relations Act,
`29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. .............................................................. 2
`29 U.S.C. 151 .................................................................... 33
`29 U.S.C. 153(d) ................................................................. 3
`29 U.S.C. 157 .................................................................... 30
`29 U.S.C. 158 ...................................................................... 2
`29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) ......................................................... 5, 6
`29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3) ......................................................... 5, 6
`29 U.S.C. 158(b) ............................................................... 32
`29 U.S.C. 160(a) ................................................................. 2
`29 U.S.C. 160(b) ............................................................. 2, 3
`29 U.S.C. 160(c) ................................................................. 3
`29 U.S.C. 160(e) ..................................................... 3, 13, 26
`29 U.S.C. 160(f ) ..................................................... 3, 13, 26
`29 U.S.C. 160( j).............................................. 2, 4, 9, 13, 28
`
`
`
`

`

`VIII
`
`Statutes, regulations, and rules—Continued:
`
`Page
`
`Norris-LaGuardia Act,
`ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (29 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) .......................... 20
`Trademark Clarification Act of 1984,
`Pub. L. No. 98-620, Tit. IV, § 402(31), 98 Stat. 3360 ....... 24
`29 C.F.R.:
`Section 101.2 ...................................................................... 2
`Section 101.4 .......................................................... 2, 26, 28
`Section 101.5 ...................................................................... 3
`Section 101.6 ...................................................................... 3
`Section 101.7 ...................................................................... 2
`Section 101.8 .......................................................... 3, 26, 28
`Section 101.10 .................................................................... 3
`Section 101.10(a) .............................................................. 26
`Section 101.11(a) .......................................................... 3, 26
`Section 101.11(b) ................................................................ 3
`Section 101.12(a) .......................................................... 3, 26
`Section 101.14 .................................................................... 3
`Section 101.38 .................................................................. 43
`Section 102.94(a) .......................................................... 4, 43
`Fed. R. Civ. P.:
`Rule 65(a) ......................................................................... 27
`Rule 65(a)(2) ..................................................................... 27
`
`Miscellaneous:
`
`Dan B. Dobbs & Caprice L. Roberts,
`Law of Remedies: Damages, Equity, Restitution
`(3d ed. 2018) ......................................................................... 42
`Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the
`English Language (1946) ................................................... 14
`Steven S. Gensler, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
`Rules and Commentary R. 65 Practice
`Comment. (Feb. 2024 update) ........................................... 43
`
`
`
`

`

`Miscellaneous—Continued:
`
`Page
`
`IX
`
`Frank W. McCulloch, New Problems in the
`Administration of the Labor-Management
`Relations Act: The Taft-Hartley Injunction,
`16 Sw. L.J. 82 (1962) ........................................................... 25
`National Labor Relations Board:
`Litigation - Injunction, https://www.nlrb.gov/
`reports/nlrb-case-activity-reports/unfair-
`labor-practice-cases/litigation/injunction-
`litigation (last visited Mar. 22, 2024) ....................... 39
`Section 10(j) Injunctions - Litigation Success
`Rate Report, https:// www.nlrb.gov/reports/
`nlrb-case-activity-reports/section-10j-
`injunctions-litigation-success-rate-report
`(last visited Mar. 22, 2024) .................................. 38, 39
`Unfair Labor Practice Charges Filed Each Year,
`https://www.nlrb.gov/reports/nlrb-case-
`activity-reports/unfair-labor-practice-cases/
`intake/unfair-labor-practice-charges
`(last visited Mar. 22, 2024) ........................................ 39
`Office of the General Counsel, NLRB,
`Section 10(j) Manual (Mar. 2020) ................................ 4, 28
`Oxford English Dictionary (1933):
`Vol. 5 ................................................................................. 14
`Vol. 8 ................................................................................. 14
`I. Herbert Rothenberg, Rothenberg On
`Labor Relations (1949) ...................................................... 25
`S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) ................ 20, 21
`Webster’s New International Dictionary
`(2d ed. 1958) ......................................................................... 14
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`In the Supreme Court of the United States
`
`
`
`No. 23-367
`
`STARBUCKS CORPORATION, PETITIONER
`v.
`M. KATHLEEN MCKINNEY, REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF
`REGION 15 OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
`BOARD, FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
`RELATIONS BOARD
`
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`
`BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT
`
`
`
`OPINIONS BELOW
`The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-39a)
`is reported at 77 F.4th 391. The order of the district court
`(Pet. App. 67a-121a) is not published in the Federal Sup-
`plement but is available at 2022 WL 5434206.
`
`JURISDICTION
`The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
`August 8, 2023. The petition for a writ of certiorari was
`filed on October 3, 2023, and granted on January 12, 2024.
`The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
`
`
`
`(1)
`
`

`

`2
`
`STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED
`29 U.S.C. 160( j) provides:
` The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a
`complaint as provided in subsection (b) charging that
`any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair
`labor practice, to petition any United States district
`court, within any district wherein the unfair labor
`practice in question is alleged to have occurred or
`wherein such person resides or transacts business,
`for appropriate temporary relief or restraining or-
`der. Upon the filing of any such petition the court
`shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such per-
`son, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction to grant to
`the Board such temporary relief or restraining order
`as it deems just and proper.
`
`STATEMENT
`
`A. Statutory Background
`The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), 29
`U.S.C. 151 et seq., prohibits employers and unions from
`engaging in various unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. 158.
`The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board)
`enforces that prohibition. 29 U.S.C. 160(a).
`If a person believes that an employer or union has com-
`mitted an unfair labor practice, the person may file a
`charge with the agency. 29 C.F.R. 101.2. A regional di-
`rector, exercising authority delegated by the General
`Counsel, investigates the charge. 29 C.F.R. 101.4. Gen-
`erally, “[b]efore any complaint is issued or other formal
`action taken,” the regional director “affords an oppor-
`tunity to all parties for the submission and consideration
`of facts, argument, offers of settlement, or proposals of
`adjustment.” 29 C.F.R. 101.7.
`
`
`
`

`

`3
`
`If the investigation “reveals that there has been no vi-
`olation” of the Act “or the evidence is insufficient to sub-
`stantiate the charge,” then the regional director “recom-
`mends withdrawal of the charge by the person who filed,”
`and “dismisses the charge” if the person does not agree to
`withdraw it. 29 C.F.R. 101.5, 101.6. But if “the charge
`appears to have merit and efforts to dispose of it by infor-
`mal adjustment are unsuccessful,” the regional director
`issues a complaint. 29 C.F.R. 101.8; see 29 U.S.C. 153(d),
`160(b).
`An administrative law judge (ALJ) then holds a hear-
`ing and issues a recommended decision, “stating findings
`of fact and conclusions, as well as the reasons for the de-
`terminations on all material issues.” 29 C.F.R. 101.11(a);
`see 29 C.F.R. 101.10. If neither party challenges the
`ALJ’s decision, it becomes final as the order of the Board.
`29 C.F.R. 101.11(b). In the event a party files exceptions,
`the ALJ’s recommendation is subject to review by the
`Board, which independently reviews the record and issues
`a decision containing “findings of fact” and “conclusions of
`law.” 29 C.F.R. 101.12(a). If the Board finds that a party
`has engaged in an unfair labor practice, it “shall” order
`the party to “cease and desist” from the violation and to
`take such affirmative action, including “reinstatement of
`employees,” as will effectuate the policies of the Act. 29
`U.S.C. 160(c).
`The Board may petition for enforcement of its order in
`a court of appeals. 29 U.S.C. 160(e); see 29 C.F.R. 101.14.
`Any person aggrieved by the Board’s order may also seek
`review in a court of appeals. 29 U.SC. 160(f ); see 29
`C.F.R. 101.14. On review, the Board’s findings of fact are
`“conclusive” “if supported by substantial evidence.” 29
`U.S.C. 160(e) and (f ). Its legal conclusions are similarly
`
`
`
`

`

`4
`
`entitled to deference. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467
`U.S. 883, 891 (1984).
`Because an employer’s or union’s conduct may cause
`harm while the administrative process is pending, Con-
`gress has empowered the Board, after the issuance of a
`complaint, to petition a federal district court “for appro-
`priate temporary relief or restraining order” under Section
`10( j) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. 160( j). By longstanding agency
`practice, when an NLRB regional director concludes that
`an unfair-labor-practice case has merit and that tempo-
`rary relief would be appropriate, the regional director
`typically will submit a written memorandum to the Gen-
`eral Counsel recommending the initiation of Section 10( j)
`proceedings. See Office of the General Counsel, NLRB,
`Section 10( j) Manual § 5.2, at 15 (Mar. 2020) (10( j) Man-
`ual). If, upon review, the General Counsel agrees that
`such proceedings should be initiated, the General Counsel
`will present the recommendation to the Board. Ibid. If
`the Board then authorizes the proceeding, the regional di-
`rector will file a petition in district court. Id. § 5.5, at 17.
`A district court considering a Section 10( j) petition
`may “grant to the Board such temporary relief or re-
`straining order as it deems just and proper.” 29 U.S.C.
`160( j). In the event the district court grants relief,
`agency proceedings are expedited and accorded prior-
`ity. 29 C.F.R. 102.94(a).
`
`B. Factual Background
`1. Petitioner Starbucks Corp. operates a global chain
`of coffeehouses. Pet. App. 71a. In early 2022, employees
`at a Starbucks in Memphis, Tennessee, began an organiz-
`ing drive to join Workers United. Id. at 72a-73a. In re-
`sponse, petitioner allegedly used various unlawful tactics
`to stifle the drive, including disciplining one of the leaders
`of the organizing effort, id. at 74a; dramatically increasing
`
`
`
`

`

`5
`
`managerial oversight of the store, id. at 87a-88a; closing
`the store lobby during planned sit-ins, id. at 80a; and tak-
`ing down union organizing material, id. at 81a-82a. Peti-
`tioner’s alleged misconduct culminated in the firing of
`seven union activists, including five of the six members of
`the organizing committee. Id. at 5a-7a, 82a.
`Following the terminations, every employee on the
`morning shift at the Memphis store, with one exception,
`stopped wearing union pins. Pet. App. 6a-7a. And the
`“firings spread anxiety and fear among [employees] who
`were considering unionizing at other Starbucks loca-
`tions.” Id. at 7a. For example, employees at a store in
`Jackson, Tennessee reported a reluctance to organize af-
`ter petitioner posted a notice in their store detailing the
`termination of the Memphis employees. Ibid.
`In response to petitioner’s actions, the union filed
`unfair-labor-practice charges with the Board. Pet. App.
`7a. The union alleged that petitioner had unlawfully
`interfered with its employees’ right to form a union, see
`29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), and had unlawfully discriminated
`against union supporters, see 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3). Pet.
`App. 7a. After investigating the charges, the General
`Counsel issued an unfair-labor-practice complaint. Id. at
`7a-8a.1
`2. Following issuance of the complaint, the regional di-
`rector (respondent here) filed a petition for temporary re-
`lief on behalf of the agency in the United States District
`Court for the Western District of Tennessee. Pet. App.
`50a. In accordance with Section 10( j), the agency sought
`
`
`1 The union drive at the Memphis store was one of the first in a
`series of unionization efforts that eventually expanded to hundreds
`of petitioner’s stores nationwide. The breadth of petitioner’s re-
`sponse to that drive has led the NLRB to seek a total of 12 injunc-
`tions against petitioner in the past two years. See Pet. Br. 10.
`
`
`

`

`6
`
`relief pending resolution of the unfair-labor-practice pro-
`ceedings before the Board. Id. at 8a.
`The district court granted the agency’s petition in part.
`Pet. App. 67a-121a. The court explained that, under cir-
`cuit precedent, district courts may grant Section 10( j) re-
`lief only if there is “ ‘reasonable cause’ to believe that an
`unfair labor practice has occurred” and “injunctive relief
`is ‘just and proper.’ ” Id. at 88a (citation omitted).
`The district court first found reasonable cause to be-
`lieve that petitioner had committed unfair labor practices.
`Pet. App. 89a-108a. The court explained that the Board
`must offer a “substantial” legal theory and facts that are
`“supportive” of that theory, id. at 89a, though “factual in-
`consistencies are for the Board to review in its adminis-
`trative proceeding, not for the [c]ourt to resolve” on a Sec-
`tion 10( j) petition, id. at 97a. The court observed that the
`Act makes it unlawful for an employer “to interfere with,
`restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
`guaranteed” by the Act or to engage in “discrimination in
`regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
`condition of employment to * * * discourage membership
`in any labor organization.” Id. at 90a (quoting 29 U.S.C.
`158(a)(1) and (3)). And the court found sufficient evidence
`to support the agency’s claims that petitioner had inter-
`fered with its employees’ union activity and discriminated
`against employees to discourage union membership. Id.
`at 91a-108a.
`The district court then determined that a temporary
`injunction was just and proper. Pet. App. 108a-119a. The
`court explained that petitioner’s conduct—which included
`firing more than 80% of the union organizing committee
`at the Memphis store—had eroded support for the nas-
`cent unionization movement. Id. at 110a-111a. The court
`noted that petitioner’s actions had discouraged employees
`
`
`
`

`

`7
`
`from publicly supporting the union, wearing union pins,
`engaging in union protests, and discussing union activity
`in the Memphis store, and that the lone remaining mem-
`ber of the organizing committee expressed fear of recruit-
`ing others to join the union unless she felt “comfortable
`trusting them.” Id. at 111a-116a.
`The district court accordingly awarded the agency
`“some, but not all,” of the relief sought. Pet. App. 109a.
`The court issued a temporary injunction that, among
`other things, enjoined petitioner from discriminating
`against employees because of union activity and required
`the interim reinstatement of the seven discharged Mem-
`phis employees. Id. at 119a-121a; see id. at 119a (denying
`requested relief relating to distribution of court’s order).
`The district court and the court of appeals denied peti-
`tioner’s motions for a stay pending appeal. Pet. App. 40a-
`48a, 49a-66a.
`3. After the district court granted temporary relief,
`the ALJ issued his decision in the underlying agency pro-
`ceeding. See C.A. Doc. 62, at 4-63 (May 5, 2023). The ALJ
`found unlawful the majority of petitioner’s conduct cov-
`ered by the Section 10( j) injunction, including the dis-
`charges of five of the seven employees, the temporary
`store closure during planned pro-union activities, the in-
`creased presence of managers, and the removal of pro-
`union postings. Id. at 39-59. The ALJ dismissed the
`charges related to two of the discharges and the discipline
`of one of the employees. Id. at 48-59.
`Both the regional director and petitioner filed excep-
`tions to the ALJ’s decision, which are currently pending
`with the Board.
`4. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s in-
`junction. Pet. App. 1a-39a.
`
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`8
`
`The court of appeals observed that, under circuit prec-
`edent, the Board may obtain temporary relief pursuant to
`Section 10( j) only if it can show that “(1) there is ‘reason-
`able cause to believe that unfair labor practices have oc-
`curred’ and (2) injunctive relief is ‘just and proper,’ ”
`meaning “ ‘necessary to return the parties to status quo
`pending the Board’s proceedings in order to protect the
`Board’s remedial powers under the NLRA.’ ” Pet. App.
`10a (citations omitted). Petitioner did not contest the dis-
`trict court’s reasonable-cause finding, id. at 11a, and the
`court of appeals determined that the district court did not
`abuse its discretion in finding interim injunctive relief just
`and proper, id. at 11a-15a.
`The court of appeals upheld the district court’s finding
`that petitioner’s firing of seven employees who had en-
`gaged in pro-union activity harmed the union campaign in
`ways that a subsequent Board remedy could not repair.
`Pet. App. 12a. The court of appeals highlighted “actual
`evidence of chill,” including evidence that employees had
`stopped wearing union pins and discussing union activity
`after the discharges. Ibid. And it found “sufficient evi-
`dence” that “temporary relief [wa]s necessary to preserve
`the status quo pending resolution of the Board’s proceed-
`ings.” Id. at 15a. Although the court acknowledged that
`employees at the Memphis store had voted to unionize fol-
`lowing petitioner’s alleged misconduct, id. at 7a, it con-
`cluded that “a successful union election does not preclude
`the continuance of a chilling impact on employees’ willing-
`ness to exercise other rights safeguarded by the Act,” id.
`at 13a.
`Judge Readler issued a concurring opinion. Pet. App.
`18a-39a. He criticized the circuit precedent that had es-
`tablished a two-part test for evaluating requests for tem-
`porary injunctive relief under Section 10( j). Id. at 19a. He
`
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`

`9
`
`was of the view that courts should instead use the “famil-
`iar” four-factor test for preliminary injunctive relief that
`they apply in other legal contexts. Id. at 18a.
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
` Section 10( j) empowers the Board to seek temporary
`injunctive relief against employers and unions pending
`administrative proceedings on an unfair-labor-practice
`complaint. A Section 10( j) injunction preserves the
`Board’s ability to remedy violations of rights and statu-
`tory protections enshrined in the NLRA. In exercising
`their equitable discretion to grant relief under that pro-
`vision, district courts should consider the broader stat-
`utory framework established by the NLRA and the
`function of Section 10( j) within that framework, as the
`court of appeals properly did in this case.
` A. Section 10( j) authorizes a district court to grant
`relief “as it deems just and proper.” 29 U.S.C. 160( j).
`The terms “just” and “proper” mean appropriate to the
`circumstances facing the court and the parties before it.
`In order to craft appropriate relief, a court necessarily
`needs to account for the relevant statutory context.
`Petitioner contends that the phrase “just and
`proper” evokes the four-factor test used to determine
`whether preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate in
`other contexts, and urges (Br. 2) “stringent” application
`of that test. Petitioner contends that the government
`requests a “departure” from those principles. Id. at 22
`(citation omitted). The government’s position, however,
`is not that courts should disregard traditional equitable
`principles, but rather that the statutory context should
`inform courts’ application of those principles.
`This Court has long embraced that proposition, in-
`cluding in the very cases on which petitioner relies. See,
`e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 330-331 (1944).
`
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`

`10
`
`And in the specific context of suits brought by a federal
`agency to enforce federal law, the Court has recognized
`time and again that equity assumes a more flexible
`character than in suits brought to vindicate purely pri-
`vate interests. See, e.g., Porter v. Warner Holding
`Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946).
`History confirms that statutory context is relevant
`to applying Section 10( j). The courts of appeals, includ-
`ing those that purportedly apply a four-factor test, uni-
`formly exercise their equitable discretion in light of the
`NLRA’s broader framework. Moreover, decisions tak-
`ing that approach extend all the way back to Section
`10( j)’s enactment, shedding light on the provision’s
`original meaning.
`The NLRA’s distinctive characteristics inform the
`assessment of both the merits and the equities under
`Section 10( j). As to the merits, a district court should
`keep in mind that the Board—not the courts—is re-
`sponsible for adjudicating the underlying unfair-labor-
`practice charge. Because a Section 10( j) injunction is
`designed to preserve the Board’s authority to adjudicate
`the case—not to supplant that authority—the district
`court is not called upon to conduct a full-blown merits
`inquiry. The agency’s preliminary assessment of the
`merits of the charge further supports a measure of def-
`erence at this stage.
`The NLRA’s framework also informs the harm anal-
`ysis. Because the Board is responsible for adjudicating
`the underlying charge, the irreparable-harm inquiry
`appropriately focuses on whether the Board’s ability to
`grant effective relief at the conclusion of administrative
`proceedings would be impaired in the absence of an in-
`junction. Moreover, certain harms that may be difficult
`to quantify—such as harm to the momentum of a union-
`
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`11
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`organizing drive—a