`(Slip Opinion)
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`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2024
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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`
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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`
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
`
` Syllabus
`
` GUTIERREZ v. SAENZ ET AL.
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
` No. 23–7809. Argued February 24, 2025—Decided June 26, 2025
`
`
`
`
`
` In 1998, Texas charged Ruben Gutierrez with capital murder for his in-
`
`volvement in the killing of Escolastica Harrison. The State’s theory at
`
` trial was that Gutierrez wielded one of the two screwdrivers used to
`stab Harrison to death in her mobile home. The jury convicted
`
` Gutierrez of capital murder. At the sentencing phase of Gutierrez’s
`
` trial, the jury was required to answer whether Texas proved beyond a
`
`reasonable doubt that Gutierrez “actually caused” Harrison’s death or,
`
`if not, “that he intended to kill [her]” or “anticipated that a human life
`
`would be taken.” Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071(2)(b)(2).
`
` The jury answered yes, and Gutierrez was sentenced to death.
` For nearly 15 years, Gutierrez has sought DNA testing of evidence
`
`
`he claims would prove he was not in Harrison’s home the night of the
`
` murder. Texas’s Article 64 allows DNA testing where a “convicted per-
` son establishes by a preponderance of the evidence” that he “would not
`
`have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through
`DNA testing,” among other criteria. Art. 64.03(a)(2)(B). Invoking Ar-
`ticle 64, Gutierrez twice moved in state court for DNA testing of un-
`
`tested crime scene evidence. The trial court denied his first request in
`2010, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) affirmed. The
`
`court reasoned that even if Gutierrez’s DNA was not found on the
`
`tested items, that would not establish his innocence of capital murder
`because he would still be a party to the robbery that resulted in Har-
`rison’s death. The court concluded that Gutierrez could not use Article
`
`
`64 to show he was wrongly sentenced to death unless he could also
`establish his innocence of the underlying crime. In 2019, Gutierrez
`
`again sought DNA testing, but Texas courts denied his motion. On
`appeal, the TCCA reiterated that DNA testing was not available to
`
`
`
`

`

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`
`2
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`GUTIERREZ v. SAENZ
`
`
`Syllabus
`show only death penalty ineligibility.
`
`
`Gutierrez then filed suit in federal court under 42 U. S. C. §1983
`against Luis Saenz, the district attorney who has custody of the un-
`tested evidence. Gutierrez argued that Texas’s DNA testing proce-
`dures violated his liberty interests in utilizing state postconviction pro-
`
`cedures. The District Court agreed and granted declaratory relief,
`
`
`finding it fundamentally unfair that Texas gives prisoners the right to
`challenge their death sentence through habeas petitions but prevents
`them from obtaining DNA testing to support those petitions unless
`they can establish innocence of the underlying crime. The Fifth Cir-
`cuit vacated the District Court’s judgment and held that Gutierrez
`
`lacked standing to bring his §1983 suit, finding that his claimed injury
`
`was not redressable because a declaratory judgment would be unlikely
`
`to cause the prosecutor to “reverse course and allow testing.” 93 F. 4th
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`267, 272.
`
`
`Held: Gutierrez has standing to bring his §1983 claim challenging
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`Texas’s postconviction DNA testing procedures under the Due Process
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`Clause. Pp. 6–14.
`
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`(a) Individuals convicted of crimes in state court “have a liberty in-
`
`terest in demonstrating [their] innocence with new evidence under
`
`state law.” District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Os-
`
`
`
`borne, 557 U. S. 52, 68. For that reason, a state-created right to post-
`conviction procedures can sometimes create rights to other procedures
`essential to realizing the state-created right. In Skinner v. Switzer,
`562 U. S. 521, the Court held that a Texas prisoner could file a due
`
`process claim under §1983 against a prosecutor where the prisoner al-
`
`leged that the prosecutor’s refusal to turn over evidence deprived him
`of his liberty interests in utilizing state procedures to obtain reversal
`
`of his conviction or to obtain a pardon or reduction of his sentence. The
`Court reasoned that, while the prisoner could not challenge in federal
`court the state court decisions denying his Article 64 motions, he could
`allege in a federal §1983 action that Article 64 unconstitutionally pre-
`
`vented him from obtaining such testing.
`
`
`The question of a state prisoner’s standing to bring a due process
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`claim against the custodian of his evidence was first addressed in Reed
`
`v. Goertz, 598 U. S. 230, where the Court confronted another challenge
`to Texas’s postconviction DNA testing law. Reed alleged, among other
`things, that Article 64’s chain-of-custody requirement was unconstitu-
`
`tional and effectively prevented many individuals from obtaining DNA
`testing. The Court held that Reed had standing to pursue declaratory
`relief. First, Reed adequately alleged an injury: denial of access to the
`requested evidence. Second, the state prosecutor caused Reed’s injury
`by denying access to the evidence. Finally, if a federal court concluded
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`

`

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`
`3
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`
`Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
`
`
`Syllabus
`that Texas’s postconviction DNA testing procedures violate due pro-
`cess, the state prosecutor’s justification for denying DNA testing would
`be eliminated, thereby removing the barrier between Reed and the re-
`
`
`
`quested testing. The same is true here. Like Reed, Gutierrez alleges
`that the local prosecutor’s denial of his DNA testing request deprived
`
`him of his liberty interests in utilizing state procedures to obtain an
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`acquittal or sentence reduction. As in Reed, the declaratory judgment
`
`Gutierrez seeks would redress that injury by changing the legal status
`of the parties and eliminating the state prosecutor’s allegedly unlawful
`
`
`justification for denying DNA testing. Pp. 6–8.
`
`(b) The Fifth Circuit recognized the clear parallels between this case
`
`and Reed but distinguished the cases, reasoning that the local prose-
`cutor in this case was unlikely to allow testing even if a federal court
`
`
`declared that Texas may not deny DNA testing that would affect only
`the punishment stage. Respondents, too, argue that Gutierrez lacks
`standing because the District Court’s reason for declaring part of Arti-
`
`
`cle 64 unconstitutional was only one of several independent state-law
`grounds supporting the prosecutor’s decision to deny access to the evi-
`dence. But this attempt to distinguish Reed fails twice over.
`
`First, to the extent the Fifth Circuit based its assessment of redress-
`ability on the declaratory judgment the District Court later issued, ra-
`ther than Gutierrez’s complaint, it turned the Article III standing in-
`quiry on its head. Gutierrez’s standing does not depend on the relief
`the District Court ultimately granted on the merits. The proper focus
`
`of the standing inquiry is the complaint, and Gutierrez’s complaint
`challenges not just Article 64’s limitation to actual innocence claims,
`
`
`but also the other barriers Article 64 erects between Gutierrez and
`DNA testing. Second, and more fundamentally, the Fifth Circuit erred
`
`in transforming the redressability inquiry into a guess about whether
`a favorable court decision will ultimately result in the prosecutor turn-
`
`ing over the DNA evidence. In Reed, the Court reasoned that, if a fed-
`eral court concludes that Texas’s postconviction DNA testing proce-
`dures violate due process, that court order would redress the injury by
`eliminating the state prosecutor’s reliance on Article 64 as a reason for
`
`denying DNA testing. The same is true here. A declaratory judgment
`
`
`
`
`in Gutierrez’s favor would redress his injury by removing the allegedly
`
`unconstitutional barrier Article 64 erected between Gutierrez and the
`
`requested testing. The Court in Reed was unmoved by the prosecutor’s
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`
`assertion that a declaratory judgment would not change his ultimate
`decision to turn over the evidence. The reason is simple: That a pros-
`ecutor might eventually find another reason to deny a prisoner’s DNA
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`testing request does not eliminate the prisoner’s standing to argue that
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`the cited reasons violated his rights under the Due Process Clause.
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`Pp. 8–13.
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`

`

`4
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`GUTIERREZ v. SAENZ
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`Syllabus
`
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`(c) Respondents also assert that this case is now moot because the
`state prosecutor refused Gutierrez’s DNA testing request even after
`
`the District Court issued the declaratory judgment. That claim fails,
`too. A procedural due process claim like Gutierrez’s is not mooted by
`the defendant’s mid-appeal promise that, regardless of the lawsuit’s
`
`outcome, the ultimate result will remain the same. Holding otherwise
`would allow defendants to manufacture mootness by ensuring that, no
`
`matter what procedures a court requires them to employ, the same
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`substantive outcome will follow. Article III requires no such result.
`Pp. 13–14.
`93 F. 4th 267, reversed and remanded.
`SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
`C. J., and KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined, and in which
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`BARRETT, J., joined as to all but Part II.B.2. BARRETT, J., filed an opinion
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`concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. THOMAS, J., filed a
`dissenting opinion. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
`THOMAS and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.
`
`
`
`

`

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`Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
`Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
`pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`No. 23–7809
`_________________
`RUBEN GUTIERREZ, PETITIONER v. LUIS SAENZ,
`ET AL.
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
`[June 26, 2025]
` JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
` For nearly 15 years, petitioner Ruben Gutierrez has
`sought DNA testing of evidence that, he says, will help him
`prove he was never at the scene of the murder he was con-
`victed of committing. When the local prosecutor refused to
`test the evidence in his custody, Gutierrez filed suit under
`Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, arguing that Texas’s
`procedures for obtaining DNA testing violated his rights
`under the Due Process Clause. The District Court agreed
`and granted a declaratory judgment to that effect.
` The Fifth Circuit, however, held that Gutierrez lacked
`standing to bring his §1983 suit, reasoning that, even if a
`federal court declared Texas’s procedures unconstitutional,
`the local prosecutor would be unlikely to turn over the phys-
`ical evidence for DNA testing. That holding contravenes
`Reed v. Goertz, 598 U. S. 230 (2023), where this Court de-
`cided on analogous facts that another Texas prisoner had
`standing to sue the local prosecutor who denied him access
`to DNA testing. Id., at 234. Put simply, Reed held that a
`federal court order declaring “that Texas’s post-conviction
`DNA testing procedures violate due process” would redress
`the prisoner’s claimed injury by “eliminat[ing]” the state
`
`

`

`2
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`GUTIERREZ v. SAENZ
`
`Opinion of the Court
`prosecutor’s reliance on Article 64 as a reason for denying
`DNA testing. Ibid.; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art.
`64.01 (Vernon 2018). The same is true here and the Court
`therefore reverses.
`
`I
`A
` In 1998, Texas charged Ruben Gutierrez with capital
`murder for the killing of Escolastica Harrison at her mobile
`home in Brownsville, Texas. The State’s theory at trial was
`that Harrison had been stabbed to death with two different
`screwdrivers. To support its view that Gutierrez wielded
`one of the two screwdrivers in question, the State intro-
`duced a statement Gutierrez gave to the police, in which he
`acknowledged that he and two accomplices had planned to
`rob Harrison on the day she was killed and that he had been
`in Harrison’s home while one of his accomplices stabbed
`her. The jury convicted Gutierrez of capital murder.
` Texas law provides that a criminal defendant can be
`guilty of capital murder even where he was merely a party
`to a crime (such as robbery) that resulted in a person’s
`death. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§7.01, 7.02, 19.02, 19.03
`(West 2021 and Supp. 2024). A death sentence, however,
`may be imposed only if “the defendant actually caused the
`death of the deceased[,] . . . intended to kill the deceased or
`. . . anticipated that a human life would be taken.” Tex.
`Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071(2)(b)(2) (Vernon 2006);
`see also Johnson v. State, 853 S. W. 2d 527, 535 (Tex. Crim.
`App. 1992) (en banc) (“The Texas capital murder scheme
`does not allow an individual to be put to death for merely
`being a party to a murder”). To that end, the jury was re-
`quired at the sentencing phase of Gutierrez’s trial to answer
`whether Texas proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
`Gutierrez “actually caused” Harrison’s death or, if not, “that
`he intended to kill [her]” or “anticipated that a human life
`would be taken.” Art. 37.071(2)(b)(2). The jury answered
`
`

`

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`3
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`Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`yes, and Gutierrez was sentenced to death.
` Gutierrez has long maintained that the police coerced
`him into confessing that he was in Harrison’s home on the
`night of the murder. He insists that, as he twice told the
`police before the statement in which he purportedly con-
`fessed, he never entered the mobile home that night. Alt-
`hough Gutierrez never disputed that he and two accom-
`plices planned to rob Harrison, he contends that he thought
`his accomplices would merely rob Harrison’s empty mobile
`home and that no one would be harmed during the robbery.
`He accordingly asserts that he should never have been sen-
`tenced to death, and intends to seek vacatur of his death
`sentence
`in a state habeas petition.
` See Art.
`11.071(5)(a)(3).
` Since 2010, Gutierrez has sought DNA testing of crime-
`scene evidence, including Harrison’s nail scrapings, a loose
`hair, and various blood samples, to help him prove it was
`his accomplices, not Gutierrez, in Harrison’s home on the
`night of her murder. He maintains that Texas’s Article 64
`entitles him to such DNA testing. Art. 64.01(a)(1). That
`law provides for DNA testing where a “convicted person es-
`tablishes by a preponderance of the evidence” that he
`“would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had
`been obtained through DNA testing” and that the request
`was “not made to unreasonably delay the execution of sen-
`tence or administration of justice.” Art. 64.03(a)(2)(B). To
`grant a motion for DNA testing under Article 64, the state
`court must also find, among other things, that the evidence
`“is in a condition making DNA testing possible” and that
`“identity was or is an issue in the case.” Art. 64.03(a)(1).
` Invoking Article 64, Gutierrez twice moved in state court
`for an order requiring the local district attorney to turn over
`the untested crime scene evidence for DNA testing. The
`trial court denied his first request in 2010, and the Texas
`Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) affirmed. Ex parte
`
`

`

`4
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`GUTIERREZ v. SAENZ
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Gutierrez, 337 S. W. 3d 883, 886 (2011). The TCCA rea-
`soned that, even if Gutierrez’s DNA was not present on the
`tested items, that would not establish his innocence of
`Texas capital murder. Id., at 899, 901. After all, even if he
`was not in the home, Gutierrez could still be a party to the
`robbery that eventually resulted in Harrison’s death. Id.,
`at 901. And, as the TCCA saw it, Gutierrez could not invoke
`Article 64 to establish that he had been wrongly sentenced
`to death unless he could also establish his innocence of the
`underlying crime. Ibid. Finally, the court added: “[E]ven if
`[Article] 64 did apply to evidence that might affect the pun-
`ishment stage as well as conviction,” Gutierrez “still would
`not be entitled to testing” because “the record facts” show
`that “he played a major role in the underlying robbery and
`that his acts showed a reckless indifference to human life.”
`Ibid.
` Gutierrez tried again in 2019, this time bolstered by new
`counsel and new evidence that, according to Gutierrez,
`would implicate Harrison’s nephew, Avel Cuellar, as one of
`the two people who stabbed Harrison to death. In the in-
`terim, Fermin Cuellar (Avel Cuellar’s nephew), had signed
`a sworn statement averring that his uncle Avel approached
`him in the summer of 1998 about stealing “ ‘a lot’ ” of money
`from Harrison. App. 701a. Fermin also averred that, after
`the murder, Avel boasted to Fermin that he had money bur-
`ied in the trailer park. Again, the Texas courts denied
`Gutierrez’s motion. On appeal, the TCCA reiterated that
`DNA testing was not available to show ineligibility for the
`death penalty and that, “even if it [were],” Gutierrez “still
`would not be entitled to testing.” Gutierrez v. State, 2020
`WL 918669, *7–*9 (Feb. 26, 2020) (per curiam).
`B
` Gutierrez next filed this federal action for declaratory
`and injunctive relief under 42 U. S. C. §1983. He sued re-
`spondent Luis Saenz, the district attorney who has custody
`
`

`

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`
`5
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`Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`of the evidence Gutierrez would like tested and whose office
`prosecuted Gutierrez. Gutierrez’s complaint alleges that,
`“[b]y refusing to release the biological evidence for testing,
`and thereby preventing [Gutierrez] from gaining access to
`exculpatory evidence that could have led to his acquittal
`[or] demonstrated that he is not death eligible,” the district
`attorney “deprived” him “of his liberty interests in utilizing
`state [postconviction] procedures . . . in violation of his right
`to due process of law.” App. 457a–458a.
` Gutierrez’s complaint pinpoints at least three features of
`Article 64 that prevented him from gaining access to the
`relevant evidence to which, he says, the Due Process Clause
`entitles him. First, Gutierrez says, the Texas courts inter-
`pret Article 64 to impose a virtually insurmountable barrier
`to obtaining DNA testing, deeming a prisoner ineligible as
`long as the record contains any evidence, no matter how mi-
`nor, that he committed the crime. Id., at 449a, 451a. Sec-
`ond, and relatedly, he asserts that it was unfair for the
`TCCA not to consider new evidence he had proffered since
`his trial: A fair procedure, he contends, would require con-
`sidering the effect exculpatory DNA evidence would have
`on a jury that also heard “new evidence casting doubt on
`[Gutierrez’s] statement” to the police. Id., at 452a, n. 8.
`Third, Gutierrez asserts that, as interpreted by the TCCA,
`Article 64 violates the Due Process Clause by forbidding
`DNA testing when its sole purpose is to establish that a de-
`fendant is ineligible for the death penalty. Id., at 456a.
` The District Court agreed with Gutierrez in part. 565 F.
`Supp. 3d 892 (SD Tex. 2021). It is fundamentally unfair,
`the court declared, that Texas gives prisoners the right to
`file a habeas petition challenging their death sentence, but
`precludes them from obtaining DNA testing to support that
`habeas petition unless they can establish innocence of the
`underlying crime. Id., at 911. That limitation renders the
`habeas right “illusory” because few people can make a clear
`showing that they were wrongly sentenced to death without
`
`

`

`6
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`GUTIERREZ v. SAENZ
`
`Opinion of the Court
`DNA evidence. Id., at 910–911. “Due process,” the court
`explained, “does not countenance procedural sleight of hand
`whereby a state extends a right with one hand and then
`takes it away with another.” Id., at 911.
` On appeal, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit vacated
`the District Court’s declaratory judgment, reasoning that
`Gutierrez’s claimed injury was not redressable because the
`declaratory judgment would be unlikely to cause the prose-
`cutor to “reverse course and allow testing.” 93 F. 4th 267,
`272 (2024). The court recognized that, just two years ago,
`this Court rejected a nearly identical argument in Reed, 598
`U. S. 230. See 93 F. 4th, at 273–274, n. 3. Yet the Fifth
`Circuit purported to distinguish Reed because,
`in
`Gutierrez’s case, the TCCA “effectively anticipated an un-
`favorable federal court ruling” when it held that, even if Ar-
`ticle 64 applied to claims affecting death eligibility, the
`facts in the trial record would still not entitle Gutierrez to
`DNA testing. 93 F. 4th, at 275. Judge Higginson dissented,
`noting that he saw no “meaningful distinction” between this
`case and Reed. 93 F. 4th, at 275.
` While Gutierrez’s request for rehearing was pending in
`the Fifth Circuit, Texas scheduled his execution. This
`Court stayed his execution and granted certiorari to con-
`sider Gutierrez’s standing to bring his §1983 claim. 603
`U. S. ___ (2024). Because Reed plainly establishes that he
`does, the Court now reverses.
`II
`A
` Individuals convicted of crimes in state court “have a lib-
`erty interest in demonstrating [their] innocence with new
`evidence under state law.” District Attorney’s Office for
`Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U. S. 52, 68 (2009). For
`that reason, a state-created right to postconviction proce-
`dures can, “ ‘in some circumstances, beget yet other rights
`to procedures essential to the realization of the parent
`
`

`

`
`
`7
`
`Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`right.’ ” Ibid.1 To that end, this Court held in Skinner v.
`Switzer, 562 U. S. 521 (2011), that a Texas prisoner could
`file a due process claim under §1983 against a prosecutor
`who refused “ ‘to release . . . biological evidence for testing.’ ”
`Id., at 530. In that case, Skinner had alleged that the pros-
`ecutor’s refusal to turn over evidence deprived him of “ ‘his
`liberty interests in utilizing state procedures to obtain re-
`versal of his conviction and/or to obtain a pardon or reduc-
`tion of his sentence.’ ” Ibid. This Court reasoned that, while
`Skinner could not challenge in federal court the TCCA de-
`cisions denying his Article 64 motions, he could allege in a
`§1983 action that Article 64 unconstitutionally prevented
`him from obtaining such testing. Id., at 532.
` Skinner did not explicitly address a state prisoner’s
`standing to bring a due process claim against the custodian
`of his evidence. That question was first raised in Reed,
`where this Court confronted another claim that Texas’s
`postconviction DNA testing law failed to guarantee proce-
`dural due process. 598 U. S., at 233. Rodney Reed alleged,
`among other things, that Article 64’s “stringent chain-of-
`custody requirement was unconstitutional and in effect
`foreclosed DNA testing for individuals convicted before
`‘rules governing the State’s handling and storage of evi-
`dence were put in place.’ ” Ibid. Before this Court, the local
`prosecutor argued that Reed lacked Article III standing.
`Specifically, the prosecutor asserted that a favorable court
`
`——————
`1 One of the dissents contends that this Court “ha[d] no business inter-
`vening in this case in the first place” because “Gutierrez’s suit rests on
`the premise that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause gives
`him a ‘liberty interest’ in Texas’s voluntarily created procedures.” Post,
`at 1–2 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Even if the merits of Gutierrez’s due pro-
`cess claim were relevant to the standing question at issue here (they are
`not), Osborne squarely forecloses JUSTICE THOMAS’s view of that claim.
`See 557 U. S., at 68; see also, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 558
`(1974) (“[L]iberty,” like property, is protected by the Constitution, “even
`when the liberty itself is a statutory creation of the State”).
`
`

`

`8
`
`
`GUTIERREZ v. SAENZ
`
`Opinion of the Court
`decision would not redress Reed’s injury. That was be-
`cause, in the prosecutor’s view, a federal court’s “declara-
`tion that the statutory provision [he] attack[s] is unconsti-
`tutional” would not “likely” cause the district attorney to
`turn over the physical evidence in his possession. Brief for
`Respondents 38–39; Reed, 598 U. S. 230; California v.
`Texas, 593 U. S. 659, 673 (2021).
` This Court disagreed and held that Reed had established
`standing to pursue the declaratory judgment action. First,
`the Court explained, “Reed sufficiently alleged an injury in
`fact: denial of access to the requested evidence.” 598 U. S.,
`at 234. Second, “[t]he state prosecutor, who is the named
`defendant, denied access to the evidence and thereby
`caused Reed’s injury.” Ibid. Finally, the Court reasoned,
`“if a federal court concludes that Texas’s post-conviction
`DNA testing procedures violate due process, that court or-
`der would eliminate the state prosecutor’s justification for
`denying DNA testing” and thereby remove the barrier be-
`tween Reed and the requested DNA testing. Ibid.
` The same is true of Gutierrez’s suit. Like Reed and Skin-
`ner, Gutierrez alleges that the local prosecutor’s denial of
`his request for DNA testing deprived him of “his liberty in-
`terests in utilizing state procedures to obtain an acquittal
`and/or reduction of his sentence, in violation of his right to
`due process of law.” App. 458a. As in Reed, moreover, the
`declaratory judgment Gutierrez seeks would redress that
`injury by “ ‘order[ing] a change in [the] legal status’ ” of the
`parties and “eliminat[ing]” the state prosecutor’s allegedly
`unlawful “justification for denying DNA testing.” 598 U. S.,
`at 234. That is sufficient to resolve this case.
`B
`1
` The Fifth Circuit recognized the clear parallels between
`this case and Reed. See 93 F. 4th, at 272, 274, n. 3. Never-
`theless, the court thought that, unlike in Reed, the local
`
`

`

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`9
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`Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`prosecutor here was unlikely to allow testing even if a fed-
`eral court “declare[d] Texas may not deny DNA testing that
`would affect only the punishment stage.” 93 F. 4th, at 272.
`Because the TCCA already concluded Gutierrez would not
`be entitled to DNA testing even if Article 64 did apply to
`evidence affecting only the punishment stage, the Fifth Cir-
`cuit reasoned that the district attorney would “quite likely”
`rely on that holding to deny testing again. Id., at 274. Re-
`spondents, joined by the principal dissent, similarly urge
`that Gutierrez lacks standing because the District Court’s
`reason for declaring part of Article 64 unconstitutional “was
`only one of several independent state-law grounds support-
`ing District Attorney Saenz’s decision to deny access to the
`requested evidence.” Brief for Respondents 24; see also
`post, at 11–12 (opinion of ALITO, J.).
` This attempt to distinguish Reed is wrong twice over.
`First, both respondents and the Fifth Circuit gloss over the
`substance of Gutierrez’s complaint, which is the proper fo-
`cus of the standing inquiry here. See Davis v. Federal Elec-
`tion Comm’n, 554 U. S. 724, 734 (2008). Gutierrez’s com-
`plaint takes issue not just with Article 64’s limitation to
`actual innocence claims, but with the barrier Article 64
`erects between Gutierrez and DNA testing. At bottom,
`Gutierrez asserts that, to the extent Texas law precludes
`him from obtaining the requested evidence, it violates his
`rights under the Due Process Clause. App. 457a–458a.
`That is why his complaint alleges, among other things, that
`Article 64 poses a “virtually impossible [standard] for any-
`one convicted under the law of parties to obtain DNA test-
`ing,” id., at 453a, and why he takes issue with the TCCA’s
`refusal to consider “newly proffered evidence” in assessing
`claims like his own, id., at 452a, n. 8.2 To the extent the
`
`——————
`2 The principal dissent highlights the TCCA’s rule “that only evidence
`
`
`
`
`

`

`10
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`
`GUTIERREZ v. SAENZ
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Fifth Circuit based its assessment of redressability on the
`declaratory judgment the District Court later issued, rather
`than Gutierrez’s complaint, it turned the Article III stand-
`ing inquiry on its head. Gutierrez’s “standing to bring this
`suit,” 93 F. 4th, at 271, does not depend on the relief the
`District Court granted on the merits.
` The principal dissent does not dispute that Gutierrez
`challenged, in his complaint, each of the roadblocks Article
`64 placed between himself and DNA testing. Post, at 13
`(opinion of ALITO, J.). Instead, the dissent repeats the Fifth
`Circuit’s error, urging that Gutierrez can now obtain only
`“reinstatement of the District Court’s declaratory judg-
`ment.” Post, at 11. But rather than assert that the scope
`of the declaratory judgment retroactively deprived the Dis-
`trict Court of jurisdiction over Gutierrez’s complaint, as the
`Fifth Circuit erroneously held, the principal dissent sug-
`gests instead that “affirmance of the District Court’s declar-
`atory judgment” would not help Gutierrez moving forward.
`Post, at 13. That argument, however, does nothing to sup-
`port the Fifth Circuit’s holding, which the principal dissent
`defends, that Gutierrez lacked “standing to bring this suit.”
`93 F. 4th, at 271.3
`
`——————
` in the trial record may be considered in determining whether post-con-
`viction DNA testing is allowed.” Post, at 17 (opinion of ALITO, J.). That
`construction of Texas law is, of course, what Gutierrez has challenged
`under the Due Process Clause. See supra, at 5. In Gutierrez’s view, that
`new evidence, together with the DNA testing, will help him establish
`that he did not in fact “anticipat[e] that a human life would be taken,”
`Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071(2)(b)(2), and that his death sen-
`tence must therefore be vacated. Contra, post, at 17 (ALITO, J., dissent-
`ing) (insisting that “a favorable decision on Gutierrez’s constitutional ar-
`gument would not bolster his challenge to his sentence”). That the
`principal dissent is skeptical about the merits of Gutierrez’s due process
`challenge is not pertinent because the Court only granted certiorari to
`consider Gutierrez’s Article III standing to bring his suit. See post, at
`18.
`3 As the principal dissent sees it, the Fifth Circuit held only that
`
`

`

`
`
`11
`
`Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`2
` Second, and more fundamentally, the Fifth Circuit erred
`in transforming the redressability inquiry into a guess as to
`whether a favorable court decision will in fact ultimately
`cause the prosecutor to turn over the evidence. Id., at 274.
`In Reed, just like in this case, the Texas courts had prof-
`fered multiple reasons for denying Reed’s Article 64 motion,
`including that “Reed did not demonstrate that he would
`have been acquitted if the DNA results were exculpatory,”
`598 U. S., at 233, and that Reed “failed to establish that his
`request [was] not made to unreasonably delay the execution
`of his sentence,” Reed v. State, 541 S. W. 3d 759, 778 (Tex.
`Crim. App. 2017). The principal dissent claims that, for
`Reed, “striking down the chain-of-custody rule” would have
`“critically undermined the TCCA’s holding” as to “[t]wenty-
`one additional items,” which “could have been considered”
`if the declaratory judgment issued in his favor. Post, at 15–
`16. Yet even absent the chain-of-custody rule, Reed still
`faced the TCCA’s assessment that his DNA testing request
`was “untimely,” 541 S. W. 3d, at 778, and the trial court’s
`determination that “exculpatory results from DNA testing
`of all the evidence he requested to be tested” would not es-
`tablish his innocence, id., at 773. This Court nevertheless
`——————
`Gutierrez lacked standing to press one of his arguments in favor of Arti-
`cle 64’s unconstitutionality: that “ ‘the state violates due process by . . .
`preventing testing if resulting evidence would be relevant only to the
`sentence.’ ” Post, at 11, n. 7 (quoting 93 F. 4th, at 271). Even if that
`particular argument about Article 64’s unlawfulness could be disentan-
`gled from the rest of Gutierrez’s due process claim, see