`(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2023
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`Syllabus
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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` TRUMP v. UNITED STATES
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
` No. 23–939. Argued April 25, 2024—Decided July 1, 2024
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`
`
`A federal grand jury indicted former President Donald J. Trump on four
`counts for conduct that occurred during his Presidency following the
`November 2020 election. The indictment alleged that after losing that
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`election, Trump conspired to overturn it by spreading knowingly false
`claims of election fraud to obstruct the collecting, counting, and certi-
`
`fying of the election results. Trump moved to dismiss the indictment
`
`based on Presidential immunity, arguing that a President has absolute
`immunity from criminal prosecution for actions performed within the
`outer perimeter of his official responsibilities, and that the indict-
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`ment’s allegations fell within the core of his official duties. The District
`Court denied Trump’s motion to dismiss, holding that former Presi-
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`dents do not possess federal criminal immunity for any acts. The D. C.
`
`Circuit affirmed. Both the District Court and the D. C. Circuit de-
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`clined to decide whether the indicted conduct involved official acts.
`Held: Under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature
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`of Presidential power entitles a former President to absolute immunity
`from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclu-
`sive constitutional authority. And he is entitled to at least presump-
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`tive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts. There is no
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`immunity for unofficial acts. Pp. 5–43.
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`(a) This case is the first criminal prosecution in our Nation’s history
`of a former President for actions taken during his Presidency. Deter-
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`mining whether and under what circumstances such a prosecution
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`
`may proceed requires careful assessment of the scope of Presidential
`power under the Constitution. The nature of that power requires that
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`a former President have some immunity from criminal prosecution for
`official acts during his tenure in office. At least with respect to the
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`TRUMP v. UNITED STATES
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`Syllabus
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`President’s exercise of his core constitutional powers, this immunity
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`must be absolute. As for his remaining official actions, he is entitled
`to at least presumptive immunity. Pp. 5–15.
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`(1) Article II of the Constitution vests “executive Power” in “a
`President of the United States of America.” §1, cl. 1. The President
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`has duties of “unrivaled gravity and breadth.” Trump v. Vance, 591
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`U. S. 786, 800. His authority to act necessarily “stem[s] either from an
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`act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.” Youngstown Sheet &
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`Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 585. In the latter case, the Presi-
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`dent’s authority is sometimes “conclusive and preclusive.” Id., at 638
`(Jackson, J., concurring). When the President exercises such author-
`
`ity, Congress cannot act on, and courts cannot examine, the Presi-
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`dent’s actions. It follows that an Act of Congress—either a specific one
`targeted at the President or a generally applicable one—may not crim-
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`inalize the President’s actions within his exclusive constitutional
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`power. Neither may the courts adjudicate a criminal prosecution that
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`
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`examines such Presidential actions. The Court thus concludes that
`the President is absolutely immune from criminal prosecution for con-
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`duct within his exclusive sphere of constitutional authority. Pp. 6–9.
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`(2) Not all of the President’s official acts fall within his “conclusive
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`and preclusive” authority. The reasons that justify the President’s ab-
`solute immunity from criminal prosecution for acts within the scope of
`his exclusive constitutional authority do not extend to conduct in areas
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`where his authority is shared with Congress. To determine the Presi-
`dent’s immunity in this context, the Court looks primarily to the Fram-
`ers’ design of the Presidency within the separation of powers, prece-
`
`dent on Presidential immunity in the civil context, and criminal cases
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`where a President resisted prosecutorial demands for documents. P.
`9.
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`(i) The Framers designed the Presidency to provide for a “vigor-
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`ous” and “energetic” Executive. The Federalist No. 70, pp. 471–472 (J.
`Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). They vested the President with “su-
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`pervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitiv-
`ity.” Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 750. Appreciating the “unique
`risks” that arise when the President’s energies are diverted by pro-
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`ceedings that might render him “unduly cautious in the discharge of
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`his official duties,” the Court has recognized Presidential immunities
`
`and privileges “rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation
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`of powers and supported by our history.” Id., at 749, 751, 752, n. 32.
`In Fitzgerald, for instance, the Court concluded that a former Presi-
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`dent is entitled to absolute immunity from “damages liability for acts
`
`within the ‘outer perimeter’ of his official responsibility.” Id., at 756.
`The Court’s “dominant concern” was to avoid “diversion of the Presi-
`dent’s attention during the decisionmaking process caused by needless
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`Syllabus
`worry as to the possibility of damages actions stemming from any par-
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`ticular official decision.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 694, n. 19.
`
`By contrast, when prosecutors have sought evidence from the Pres-
`ident, the Court has consistently rejected Presidential claims of abso-
`lute immunity. During the treason trial of former Vice President Aa-
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`ron Burr, for instance, Chief Justice Marshall rejected President
`
`Thomas Jefferson’s claim that the President could not be subjected to
`a subpoena. Marshall simultaneously recognized, however, the exist-
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`ence of a “privilege” to withhold certain “official paper[s].” United
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`States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (No. 14,694) (CC Va.). And when a
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`subpoena issued to President Richard Nixon, the Court rejected his
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`claim of “absolute privilege.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683,
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`703. But recognizing “the public interest in candid, objective, and even
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`blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decisionmaking,” it held that a
`“presumptive privilege” protects Presidential communications. Id., at
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`708. Because that privilege “relates to the effective discharge of a
`President’s powers,” id., at 711, the Court deemed it “fundamental to
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`the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation
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`of powers under the Constitution.” Id., at 708. Pp. 9–12.
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`(ii) Criminally prosecuting a President for official conduct un-
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`doubtedly poses a far greater threat of intrusion on the authority and
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`functions of the Executive Branch than simply seeking evidence in his
`possession. The danger is greater than what led the Court to recognize
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`absolute Presidential immunity from civil damages liability—that the
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`President would be chilled from taking the “bold and unhesitating ac-
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`tion” required of an independent Executive. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at
`745. Although the President might be exposed to fewer criminal pros-
`ecutions than civil damages suits, the threat of trial, judgment, and
`imprisonment is a far greater deterrent and plainly more likely to dis-
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`tort Presidential decisionmaking than the potential payment of civil
`damages. The hesitation to execute the duties of his office fearlessly
`and fairly that might result when a President is making decisions un-
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`der “a pall of potential prosecution,” McDonnell v. United States, 579
`U. S. 550, 575, raises “unique risks to the effective functioning of gov-
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`ernment,” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 751. But there is also a compelling
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`“public interest in fair and effective law enforcement.” Vance, 591
`U. S., at 808.
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`Taking into account these competing considerations, the Court con-
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`cludes that the separation of powers principles explicated in the
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`Court’s precedent necessitate at least a presumptive immunity from
`criminal prosecution for a President’s acts within the outer perimeter
`of his official responsibility. Such an immunity is required to safe-
`guard the independence and effective functioning of the Executive
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`TRUMP v. UNITED STATES
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`Syllabus
`Branch, and to enable the President to carry out his constitutional du-
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`ties without undue caution. At a minimum, the President must be
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`immune from prosecution for an official act unless the Government can
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`show that applying a criminal prohibition to that act would pose no
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`“dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive
`Branch.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 754. Pp. 12–15.
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`(3) As for a President’s unofficial acts, there is no immunity. Alt-
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`hough Presidential immunity is required for official actions to ensure
`that the President’s decisionmaking is not distorted by the threat of
`future litigation stemming from those actions, that concern does not
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`
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`support immunity for unofficial conduct. Clinton, 520 U. S., at 694,
`and n. 19. The separation of powers does not bar a prosecution predi-
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`cated on the President’s unofficial acts. P. 15.
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`(b) The first step in deciding whether a former President is entitled
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`to immunity from a particular prosecution is to distinguish his official
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`from unofficial actions. In this case, no court thus far has drawn that
`distinction, in general or with respect to the conduct alleged in partic-
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`ular. It is therefore incumbent upon the Court to be mindful that it is
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`“a court of final review and not first view.” Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566
`
`U. S. 189, 201. Critical threshold issues in this case are how to differ-
`entiate between a President’s official and unofficial actions, and how
`to do so with respect to the indictment’s extensive and detailed allega-
`tions covering a broad range of conduct. The Court offers guidance on
`those issues. Pp. 16–32.
`(1) When the President acts pursuant to “constitutional and stat-
`utory authority,” he takes official action to perform the functions of his
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`office. Fitzgerald, 456 U. S., at 757. Determining whether an action
`is covered by immunity thus begins with assessing the President’s au-
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`thority to take that action. But the breadth of the President’s “discre-
`tionary responsibilities” under the Constitution and laws of the United
`States frequently makes it “difficult to determine which of [his] innu-
`
`merable ‘functions’ encompassed a particular action.” Id., at 756. The
`immunity the Court has recognized therefore extends to the “outer pe-
`rimeter” of the President’s official responsibilities, covering actions so
`long as they are “not manifestly or palpably beyond [his] authority.”
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`Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F. 4th 1, 13 (CADC).
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`In dividing official from unofficial conduct, courts may not inquire
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`into the President’s motives. Such a “highly intrusive” inquiry would
`risk exposing even the most obvious instances of official conduct to ju-
`dicial examination on the mere allegation of improper purpose. Fitz-
`gerald, 457 U. S., at 756. Nor may courts deem an action unofficial
`merely because it allegedly violates a generally applicable law. Oth-
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`erwise, Presidents would be subject to trial on “every allegation that
`an action was unlawful,” depriving immunity of its intended effect.
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`5
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`Ibid. Pp. 17–19.
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`(2) With the above principles in mind, the Court turns to the con-
`duct alleged in the indictment. Certain allegations—such as those in-
`volving Trump’s discussions with the Acting Attorney General—are
`readily categorized in light of the nature of the President’s official re-
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`lationship to the office held by that individual. Other allegations—
`such as those involving Trump’s interactions with the Vice President,
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`state officials, and certain private parties, and his comments to the
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`general public—present more difficult questions. Pp. 19–30.
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`(i) The indictment alleges that as part of their conspiracy to
`overturn the legitimate results of the 2020 presidential election,
`Trump and his co-conspirators attempted to leverage the Justice De-
`partment’s power and authority to convince certain States to replace
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`their legitimate electors with Trump’s fraudulent slates of electors.
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`According to the indictment, Trump met with the Acting Attorney
`General and other senior Justice Department and White House offi-
`cials to discuss investigating purported election fraud and sending a
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`letter from the Department to those States regarding such fraud. The
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`indictment further alleges that after the Acting Attorney General re-
`sisted Trump’s requests, Trump repeatedly threatened to replace him.
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`The Government does not dispute that the indictment’s allegations
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`regarding the Justice Department involve Trump’s use of official
`power. The allegations in fact plainly implicate Trump’s “conclusive
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`and preclusive” authority. The Executive Branch has “exclusive au-
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`thority and absolute discretion” to decide which crimes to investigate
`and prosecute, including with respect to allegations of election crime.
`Nixon, 418 U. S., at 693. And the President’s “management of the Ex-
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`ecutive Branch” requires him to have “unrestricted power to remove
`the most important of his subordinates”—such as the Attorney Gen-
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`eral—“in their most important duties.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 750.
`
`The indictment’s allegations that the requested investigations were
`shams or proposed for an improper purpose do not divest the President
`of exclusive authority over the investigative and prosecutorial func-
`tions of the Justice Department and its officials. Because the Presi-
`dent cannot be prosecuted for conduct within his exclusive constitu-
`tional authority, Trump is absolutely immune from prosecution for the
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`alleged conduct involving his discussions with Justice Department of-
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`ficials. Pp. 19–21.
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`(ii) The indictment next alleges that Trump and his co-conspira-
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`tors “attempted to enlist the Vice President to use his ceremonial role
`at the January 6 certification proceeding to fraudulently alter the elec-
`tion results.” App. 187, Indictment ¶10(d). In particular, the indict-
`ment alleges several conversations in which Trump pressured the Vice
`President to reject States’ legitimate electoral votes or send them back
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`TRUMP v. UNITED STATES
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`Syllabus
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`to state legislatures for review.
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`Whenever the President and Vice President discuss their official re-
`sponsibilities, they engage in official conduct. Presiding over the Jan-
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`uary 6 certification proceeding at which Members of Congress count
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`the electoral votes is a constitutional and statutory duty of the Vice
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`President. Art. II, §1, cl. 3; Amdt. 12; 3 U. S. C. §15. The indictment’s
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`allegations that Trump attempted to pressure the Vice President to
`take particular acts in connection with his role at the certification pro-
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`ceeding thus involve official conduct, and Trump is at least presump-
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`tively immune from prosecution for such conduct.
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`The question then becomes whether that presumption of immunity
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`is rebutted under the circumstances. It is the Government’s burden to
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`rebut the presumption of immunity. The Court therefore remands to
`the District Court to assess in the first instance whether a prosecution
`involving Trump’s alleged attempts to influence the Vice President’s
`oversight of the certification proceeding would pose any dangers of in-
`trusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch. Pp.
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`21–24.
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`(iii) The indictment’s remaining allegations involve Trump’s in-
`teractions with persons outside the Executive Branch: state officials,
`private parties, and the general public. In particular, the indictment
`alleges that Trump and his co-conspirators attempted to convince cer-
`tain state officials that election fraud had tainted the popular vote
`count in their States, and thus electoral votes for Trump’s opponent
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`needed to be changed to electoral votes for Trump. After Trump failed
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`to convince those officials to alter their state processes, he and his co-
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`conspirators allegedly developed and effectuated a plan to submit
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`fraudulent slates of Presidential electors to obstruct the certification
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`proceeding. On Trump’s view, the alleged conduct qualifies as official
`because it was undertaken to ensure the integrity and proper admin-
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`istration of the federal election. As the Government sees it, however,
`Trump can point to no plausible source of authority enabling the Pres-
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`ident to take such actions. Determining whose characterization may
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`be correct, and with respect to which conduct, requires a fact-specific
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`analysis of the indictment’s extensive and interrelated allegations.
`The Court accordingly remands to the District Court to determine in
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`the first instance whether Trump’s conduct in this area qualifies as
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`official or unofficial. Pp. 24–28.
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`(iv) The indictment also contains various allegations regarding
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`Trump’s conduct in connection with the events of January 6 itself. The
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`alleged conduct largely consists of Trump’s communications in the
`form of Tweets and a public address. The President possesses “ex-
`traordinary power to speak to his fellow citizens and on their behalf.”
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`Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. 667, 701. So most of a President’s public
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`communications are likely to fall comfortably within the outer perim-
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`eter of his official responsibilities. There may, however, be contexts in
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`which the President speaks in an unofficial capacity—perhaps as a
`candidate for office or party leader. To the extent that may be the case,
`objective analysis of “content, form, and context” will necessarily in-
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`form the inquiry. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U. S. 443, 453. Whether the
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`communications alleged in the indictment involve official conduct may
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`depend on the content and context of each. This necessarily factbound
`analysis is best performed initially by the District Court. The Court
`therefore remands to the District Court to determine in the first in-
`stance whether this alleged conduct is official or unofficial. Pp. 28–30.
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`(3) Presidents cannot be indicted based on conduct for which they
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`are immune from prosecution. On remand, the District Court must
`carefully analyze the indictment’s remaining allegations to determine
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`whether they too involve conduct for which a President must be im-
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`mune from prosecution. And the parties and the District Court must
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`ensure that sufficient allegations support the indictment’s charges
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`without such conduct. Testimony or private records of the President
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`or his advisers probing such conduct may not be admitted as evidence
`at trial. Pp. 30–32.
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`(c) Trump asserts a far broader immunity than the limited one the
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`Court recognizes, contending that the indictment must be dismissed
`because the Impeachment Judgment Clause requires that impeach-
`ment and Senate conviction precede a President’s criminal prosecu-
`tion. But the text of the Clause does not address whether and on what
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`conduct a President may be prosecuted if he was never impeached and
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`convicted. See Art. I, §3, cl. 7. Historical evidence likewise lends little
`support to Trump’s position. The Federalist Papers on which Trump
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`relies concerned the checks available against a sitting President; they
`did not endorse or even consider whether the Impeachment Judgment
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`Clause immunizes a former President from prosecution. Transforming
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`the political process of impeachment into a necessary step in the en-
`forcement of criminal law finds little support in the text of the Consti-
`tution or the structure of the Nation’s Government. Pp. 32–34.
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`(d) The Government takes a similarly broad view, contending that
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`the President enjoys no immunity from criminal prosecution for any
`action. On its view, as-applied challenges in the course of the trial
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`suffice to protect Article II interests, and review of a district court’s
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`decisions on such challenges should be deferred until after trial. But
`questions about whether the President may be held liable for particu-
`lar actions, consistent with the separation of powers, must be ad-
`dressed at the outset of a proceeding. Even if the President were ulti-
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`mately not found liable for certain official actions, the possibility of an
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`extended proceeding alone may render him “unduly cautious in the
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`8
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` TRUMP v. UNITED STATES
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`Syllabus
`discharge of his official duties.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 752, n. 32.
`The Constitution does not tolerate such impediments to “the effective
`
`
` functioning of government.” Id., at 751. Pp. 34–37.
`(e) This case poses a question of lasting significance: When may a
`
`
` former President be prosecuted for official acts taken during his Pres-
`idency? In answering that question, unlike the political branches and
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` the public at large, the Court cannot afford to fixate exclusively, or
`even primarily, on present exigencies. Enduring separation of powers
`principles guide our decision in this case. The President enjoys no im-
`
` munity for his unofficial acts, and not everything the President does is
`official. The President is not above the law. But under our system of
` separated powers, the President may not be prosecuted for exercising
`
`his core constitutional powers, and he is entitled to at least presump-
`
`tive immunity from prosecution for his official acts. That immunity
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`applies equally to all occupants of the Oval Office. Pp. 41–43.
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`91 F. 4th 1173, vacated and remanded.
`ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,
`
`ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined in full, and in which BAR-
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` RETT, J., joined except as to Part III–C. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring
`
`opinion. BARRETT, J., filed an opinion concurring in part. SOTOMAYOR,
`J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
`JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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`Opinion of the Court
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
` Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
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` pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
`_________________
`
` No. 23–939
`_________________
` DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v.
`
` UNITED STATES
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
`[July 1, 2024]
`
` CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
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`Court.
`
`
`This case concerns the federal indictment of a former
`President of the United States for conduct alleged to involve
`official acts during his tenure in office. We consider the
`scope of a President’s immunity from criminal prosecution.
`I
`
`From January 2017 until January 2021, Donald J.
`Trump served as President of the United States. On Au-
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`gust 1, 2023, a federal grand jury indicted him on four
`counts for conduct that occurred during his Presidency fol-
`lowing the November 2020 election. The indictment alleged
`that after losing that election, Trump conspired to overturn
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`it by spreading knowingly false claims of election fraud to
`obstruct the collecting, counting, and certifying of the elec-
`tion results.
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`According to the indictment, Trump advanced his goal
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`through five primary means. First, he and his co-conspirators
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`“used knowingly false claims of election fraud to get state
`legislators and election officials to . . . change electoral
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`Opinion of the Court
`votes for [Trump’s] opponent, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., to elec-
`toral votes for [Trump].” App. 185, Indictment ¶10(a). Sec-
`ond, Trump and his co-conspirators “organized fraudulent
`slates of electors in seven targeted states” and “caused
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`these fraudulent electors to transmit their false certificates
`to the Vice President and other government officials to be
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`counted at the certification proceeding on January 6.” Id.,
`at 186, ¶10(b). Third, Trump and his co-conspirators at-
`tempted to use the Justice Department “to conduct sham
`election crime investigations and to send a letter to the tar-
`geted states that falsely claimed that the Justice Depart-
`ment had identified significant concerns that may have im-
`pacted the election outcome.”
`Id., at 186–187, ¶10(c).
`Fourth, Trump and his co-conspirators attempted to per-
`
`suade “the Vice President to use his ceremonial role at the
`January 6 certification proceeding to fraudulently alter the
`election results.” Id., at 187, ¶10(d). And when that failed,
`on the morning of January 6, they “repeated knowingly
`false claims of election fraud to gathered supporters, falsely
`told them that the Vice President had the authority to and
`might alter the election results, and directed them to the
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`Capitol to obstruct the certification proceeding.” Ibid.
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`Fifth, when “a large and angry crowd . . . violently attacked
`the Capitol and halted the proceeding,” Trump and his co-
`conspirators “exploited the disruption by redoubling efforts
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`to levy false claims of election fraud and convince Members
`of Congress to further delay the certification.” Id., at 187–
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`188, ¶10(e).
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`
`Based on this alleged conduct, the indictment charged
`Trump with (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States in
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`violation of 18 U. S. C. §371, (2) conspiracy to obstruct an
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`official proceeding in violation of §1512(k), (3) obstruction
`of and attempt to obstruct an official proceeding in violation
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`of §1512(c)(2), §2, and (4) conspiracy against rights in vio-
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`lation of §241.1
`
`Trump moved to dismiss the indictment based on Presi-
`dential immunity. In his view, the conduct alleged in the
`indictment, properly characterized, was that while he was
`President he (1) “made public statements about the admin-
`
`istration of the federal election”; (2) communicated with
`senior Justice Department officials “about investigating
`election fraud and about choosing the leadership” of the De-
`
`partment; (3) “communicated with state officials about the
`
`administration of the federal election and their exercise of
`
`official duties with respect to it”; (4) “communicated with
`
`the Vice President” and with “Members of Congress about
`the exercise of their official duties regarding the election
`certification”; and (5) “authorized or directed others to or-
`ganize contingent slates of electors in furtherance of his at-
`tempts to convince the Vice President to exercise his official
`
`authority in a manner advocated for by President Trump.”
`Motion To Dismiss Indictment Based on Presidential Im-
`
`munity in No. 1:23–cr–00257 (DC), ECF Doc. 74, p. 9.
`Trump argued that all of the indictment’s allegations fell
`
`within the core of his official duties. Id., at 27. And he con-
`tended that a President has absolute immunity from crimi-
`nal prosecution for actions performed within the outer pe-
`rimeter of his official responsibilities, to ensure that he can
`undertake the especially sensitive duties of his office with
`bold and unhesitating action. Id., at 14, 24.
`
`
`The District Court denied the motion to dismiss, holding
`
`
`
`——————
`1Trump contends that the indictment stretches Section 1512(c)(2) “far
`
`beyond its natural meaning.” Brief for Petitioner 39, n. 4. As we ex-
`
`
` plained in Fischer v. United States, Section 1512(c)(2) covers acts that
`impair “the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of
`
`records, documents, objects, or . . . other things used in the proceeding.”
`
`
`603 U. S. ___, ___ (2024) (slip op., at 16). If necessary, the District Court
`
` should determine in the first instance whether the Section 1512(c)(2)
`charges may proceed in light of our decision in Fischer.
`
`
`
`

`

`4
`
`
`
`
` TRUMP v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`that “former Presidents do not possess absolute federal
`
`criminal immunity for any acts committed while in office.”
`2023 WL 8359833, *15 (DC, Dec. 1, 2023). The District
`Court recognized that the President is immune from dam-
`ages liability in civil cases, to protect against the chilling
`effect such exposure might have on the carrying out of his
`responsibilities. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731,
`749–756 (1982). But it reasoned that “the possibility of vex-
`atious post-Presidency litigation is much reduced in the
`criminal context” in light of “[t]he robust procedural safe-
`guards attendant to federal criminal prosecutions.” 2023
`
`WL 8359833, *9–*10. The District Court declined to decide
`whether the indicted conduct involved official acts. See id.,
`at *15.
`
`The D. C. Circuit affirmed. 91 F. 4th 1173 (2024) (per cu-
`
`riam). Citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803),
`the court distinguished between two kinds of official acts:
`discretionary and ministerial. 91 F. 4th, at 1189–1190. It
`observed that “although discretionary acts are ‘only politi-
`cally examinable,’ the judiciary has the power to hear cases”
`involving ministerial acts that an officer is directed to per-
`
`form by the legislature. Ibid. (quoting Marbury, 1 Cranch,
`at 166). From this distinction, the D. C. Circuit concluded
`
`that the “separation of powers doctrine, as expounded in
`Marbury and its progeny, necessarily permits the Judiciary
`to oversee the federal criminal prosecution of a former Pres-
`ident for his official acts because the fact of the prosecution
`means that the former President has allegedly acted in de-
`fiance of the Congress’s laws.” 91 F. 4th, at 1191. In the
`court’s view, the fact that Trump’s actions “allegedly vio-
`lated generally applicable criminal laws” meant that those
`actions “were not properly within the scope of his lawful
`discretion.” Id., at 1192. The D. C. Circuit thus concluded
`that Trump had “no structural immunity from the charges
`
`in the Indictment.” Ibid. Like the District Court, the D. C.
`
`
`
`

`

`5
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Circuit declined to analyze the actions described in the in-
`dictment to determine whether they involved official acts.
`
`See id., at 1205, n. 14.
`
`We granted certiorari to consider the following question:
`
`“Whether and if so to what extent does a former President
`enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for
`
`conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in
`office.” 601 U. S. ___ (2024).
`
`II
`
`
`This case is the first criminal prosecution in our Nation’s
`
`history of a former President for actions taken during his
`Presidency. We are called upon to consider whether and
`under what circumstances such a prosecution may pro-
`
`ceed. Doing so requires careful assessment of the scope of
`Presidential power under the Constitution. We undertake
`
`that responsibility conscious that we must not confuse “the
`issue of a power’s validity with the cause it is invoked to
`promote,” but must instead focus on the “enduring conse-
`quences upon the balanced power structure of our Repub-
`lic.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579,
`634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
`
`The parties before us do not dispute that a former Presi-
`dent can be subject to criminal prosecution for unofficial
`
`
`acts committed while in office. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 28.
`They also agree that some of the conduct described in the
`indictment includes actions taken by Trump in his unoffi-
`cial capacity. See id., at 28–30, 36–37, 124.
`
`They disagree, however, about whether a former Presi-
`
`dent can be prosecuted for his official actions. Trump con-
`
`tends that