`
`No. 24A
`
`
`In the Supreme Court of the United States
`
`
`───────────
`
`
`DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL., APPLICANTS
`
`v.
`
`STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL.
`
`
`───────────
`
`
`APPLICATION FOR A STAY OF THE INJUNCTION
`ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
`
`
`───────────
`
`
`SARAH M. HARRIS
` Acting Solicitor General
` Counsel of Record
` Department of Justice
` Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
` SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
` (202) 514-2217
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`Statement ....................................................................................................................... 4
`A.
`Legal background ..................................................................................... 4
`B.
`Trump v. State of Washington ............................................................... 10
`C.
`Trump v. CASA, Inc. .............................................................................. 12
`D.
`Trump v. State of New Jersey ................................................................ 13
`Argument ..................................................................................................................... 15
`A.
`The universal injunctions improperly grant relief to non-parties ....... 15
`B.
`The district courts’ injunctions improperly grant relief to States ........ 28
`C.
`The district courts’ injunctions improperly prevent the Executive
`Branch from developing implementation guidance .............................. 32
`The equities favor a stay ........................................................................ 35
`D.
`Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 39
`
`
`
`
`(i)
`
`

`

`ii
`
`PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
`Applicants (defendants-appellants below) are Donald J. Trump, President of
`the United States; U.S. Department of State; Marco Rubio, Secretary of State; U.S.
`Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services;
`Robert F. Kennedy, Secretary of Health and Human Services; Kristi Noem, Secretary
`of Homeland Security; U.S. Social Security Administration; Leland Dudek, Acting
`Commissioner of Social Security; and the United States of America.
`Respondents (plaintiffs-appellees below) are the State of New Jersey; Com-
`monwealth of Massachusetts; State of California; State of Colorado; State of Connect-
`icut; District of Columbia; State of Delaware; State of Hawaii; State of Maine; State
`of Maryland; State of Minnesota; State of Nevada; State of New Mexico; State of New
`York; State of North Carolina; State of Rhode Island; State of Vermont; State of Wis-
`consin; Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan; and City and County of San
`Francisco. The following individuals were plaintiffs in a case that the district court
`decided alongside the States’ case: O. Doe; Brazilian Worker Center, Inc.; and La
`Colaborativa.
`
`RELATED PROCEEDINGS
`United States District Court (W.D. Wash.):
`
`State of Washington v. Trump, No. 25-cv-127 (Feb. 6, 2025)
`Franco Aleman v. Trump, No. 25-cv-163 (Jan. 27, 2025)
`
`United States Court of Appeals (9th Cir.):
`
`State of Washington v. Trump, No. 25-807 (Feb. 19, 2025)
`State of Washington v. Trump, No. 25-674 (pending)
`
`
`
`

`

`iii
`
`United States District Court (D. Md.):
`
`CASA, Inc. v. Trump, No. 25-cv-201 (Feb. 18, 2025)
`
`United States Court of Appeals (4th Cir.):
`
`CASA, Inc. v. Trump, No. 25-1153 (Feb. 28, 2025)
`
`United States District Court (D. Mass.):
`
`State of New Jersey v. Trump, No. 25-cv-10139 (Feb. 6, 2025)
`
`United States Court of Appeals (1st Cir.):
`
`State of New Jersey v. Trump, No. 25-1158 (pending)
`State of New Jersey v. Trump, No. 25-1170 (Mar. 11, 2025)
`State of New Jersey v. Trump, No. 25-1200 (pending)
`
`United States Supreme Court:
`
`Trump v. State of Washington, No. 24A__ (pending)
`Trump v. CASA, Inc., No. 24A__ (pending)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`In the Supreme Court of the United States
`
`───────────
`
`No. 24A
`
`
`DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, APPLICANTS
`
`v.
`
`STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL.
`
`───────────
`
`APPLICATION FOR A STAY OF THE INJUNCTION
`ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
`
`───────────
`Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of this Court and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.
`1651, the Acting Solicitor General—on behalf of Donald J. Trump, President of the
`United States, et al.—respectfully applies for a stay of the nationwide preliminary
`injunction issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts (App.,
`infra, 106a-107a) pending the consideration and disposition of the government’s ap-
`peal to the United States Courts of Appeals for the First Circuit and pending any
`further review in this Court. The government is simultaneously filing similar appli-
`cations in cases arising from the Western District of Washington and District of Mar-
`yland. From the following paragraph onward, all three applications are identical.
`These cases—which involve challenges to the President’s January 20, 2025 Ex-
`ecutive Order concerning birthright citizenship—raise important constitutional ques-
`tions with major ramifications for securing the border. But at this stage, the govern-
`ment comes to this Court with a “modest” request: while the parties litigate weighty
`merits questions, the Court should “restrict the scope” of multiple preliminary injunc-
`tions that “purpor[t] to cover every person * * * in the country,” limiting those in-
`(1)
`
`

`

`2
`junctions to parties actually within the courts’ power. App., infra, 71a-72a (Nie-
`meyer, J., dissenting). Three district courts in Maryland, Massachusetts, and Wash-
`ington have issued overlapping nationwide injunctions at the behest of 22 States, two
`organizations, and seven individuals. Those universal injunctions prohibit a Day 1
`Executive Order from being enforced anywhere in the country, as to “hundreds of
`thousands” of unspecified individuals who are “not before the court nor identified by
`the court.” Ibid. And these overlapping injunctions prohibit federal agencies from
`even developing guidance about how they would implement the Order. Yet three
`courts of appeals refused to limit that sweeping interim relief to the parties actually
`before the courts. See id. at 18a, 65a-70a, 111a-142a.
`This is hardly the first time that individual district judges have entered in-
`junctions to “govern * * * the whole Nation from their courtrooms.” Labrador v. Poe,
`144 S. Ct. 921, 926 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Such universal injunctions,
`though “a relatively new phenomenon,” have become ubiquitous, posing “a question
`of great significance that has been in need of the Court’s attention for some time.” Id.
`at 925-926. The reasons are familiar: universal injunctions are “legally and histori-
`cally dubious,” Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 687, 721 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring),
`and “patently unworkable,” DHS v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (Gorsuch,
`J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring). Universal injunctions transgress constitutional
`limits on courts’ powers, which extend only to “render[ing] a judgment or decree upon
`the rights of the litigants.” United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 693 (2023) (Gorsuch,
`J., joined by Thomas and Barrett, J.J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
`Universal injunctions are also incompatible with “ ‘foundational’ limits on equitable
`jurisdiction.” Department of State v. AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition, No. 24A831,
`slip op. 7 (2025) (Alito, J., joined by Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, J.J., dissent-
`
`
`
`

`

`3
`ing) (citation omitted). “[N]ationwide injunctions have not been good for the rule of
`law,” Arizona v. Biden, 40 F.4th 375, 398 (6th Cir. 2022) (Sutton, C.J., concurring),
`and “ris[k] the perception of the federal courts as an apolitical branch,” CASA de
`Maryland, Inc. v. Trump, 971 F.3d 220, 261 (4th Cir.) (Wilkinson, J.), reh’g en banc
`granted, 981 F.3d 311 (2020). And universal injunctions compromise the Executive
`Branch’s ability to carry out its functions, as administrations of both parties have
`explained.1
`Universal injunctions have reached epidemic proportions since the start of the
`current Administration. Courts have graduated from universal preliminary injunc-
`tions to universal temporary restraining orders, from universal equitable relief to
`universal monetary remedies, and from governing the whole Nation to governing the
`whole world. District courts have issued more universal injunctions and TROs during
`February 2025 alone than through the first three years of the Biden Administration.
`That sharp rise in universal injunctions stops the Executive Branch from performing
`its constitutional functions before any courts fully examine the merits of those ac-
`tions, and threatens to swamp this Court’s emergency docket.
`Even measured against other universal injunctions, those at issue here stand
`out. The universal injunctions here extend to all 50 States and to millions of aliens
`across the country—even though tailored interim relief for the plaintiffs to these suits
`would fully redress their alleged harms. The courts granted these universal injunc-
`tions to States who plainly lacked standing to raise Citizenship Clause claims—defy-
`ing the bedrock principle that States (like other litigants) may assert only their own
`rights, not the rights of third parties. See, e.g., Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255,
`
`1 See, e.g., Appl. at 36-38, McHenry v. Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 1
`(2025) (No. 24A653) (Biden Administration); Gov’t Br. at 72-76, Hawaii, supra (No.
`17-965) (first Trump Administration).
`
`
`

`

`4
`294-295 (2023). The courts granted universal injunctions to bar federal agencies from
`even developing and issuing guidance regarding the implementation of the Citizen-
`ship Order—contravening the foundational rule that courts cannot restrain the Ex-
`ecutive Branch’s internal workings by preventing agencies from formulating or issu-
`ing policies in the first place. And individual district courts layered their universal
`injunctions on top of each other, creating a “jurisdictionally messy” scenario where
`the government must run the table over months of litigation in multiple courts of
`appeals to have any chance of implementing the Order anywhere. App., infra, 73a
`(Niemeyer, J., dissenting). As Judge Niemeyer put it, these overlapping nationwide
`injunctions exemplify the “unseemliness of such a broad extension of judicial power.”
`Ibid. And these particular injunctions also exacerbate the existing circuit split over
`the permissibility of universal injunctions. See pp. 25-26, infra.
`This Court should declare that enough is enough before district courts’ bur-
`geoning reliance on universal injunctions becomes further entrenched. The Court
`should stay the district courts’ preliminary injunctions except as to the individual
`plaintiffs and the identified members of the organizational plaintiffs (and, if the
`Court concludes that States are proper litigants, as to individuals who are born or
`reside in those States). At a minimum, the Court should stay the injunctions to the
`extent they prohibit agencies from developing and issuing public guidance regarding
`the implementation of the Order. Only this Court’s intervention can prevent univer-
`sal injunctions from becoming universally acceptable.
`
`STATEMENT
`
`Legal Background
`A.
`On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order re-
`1.
`garding birthright citizenship. See Protecting the Meaning and Value of American
`
`
`
`

`

`5
`Citizenship, Exec. Order No. 14,160, 90 Fed. Reg. 8449 (Jan. 29, 2025) (Citizenship
`Order or Order). That Order is part of the Administration’s broader effort to repair
`the Nation’s immigration system, resolve the border crisis, and address the “signifi-
`cant threats to national security and public safety” posed by illegal immigration. Pro-
`tecting the American People Against Invasion § 1, Exec. Order No. 14,159, 90 Fed.
`Reg. 8443 (Jan. 29, 2025) (Invasion Order); see, e.g., Securing Our Borders, Exec.
`Order No. 14,165, 90 Fed. Reg. 8467 (Jan. 30, 2025); Declaring a National Emergency
`at the Southern Border of the United States, Proclamation No. 10,886, 90 Fed. Reg.
`8327 (Jan. 29, 2025).
`Section 1 of the Order recognizes that the Constitution and the Immigration
`and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., confer citizenship upon all persons
`born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof. See Citizenship
`Order § 1. Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides
`that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
`diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”
`U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. That provision, known as the Citizenship Clause, re-
`pudiated Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), which infamously misinter-
`preted the Constitution to deny U.S. citizenship to people of African descent based
`solely on their race. Congress has reaffirmed the Citizenship Clause in the INA,
`which provides that “a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
`tion thereof,” is a citizen of the United States. 8 U.S.C. 1401(a).
`Section 1 of the Order identifies two circumstances in which a person born in
`the United States is not subject to its jurisdiction: “(1) when that person’s mother was
`unlawfully present in the United States and the father was not a United States citi-
`zen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth, or (2) when that
`
`
`
`

`

`6
`person’s mother’s presence in the United States at the time of said person’s birth was
`lawful but temporary (such as, but not limited to, visiting the United States under
`the auspices of the Visa Waiver Program or visiting on a student, work, or tourist
`visa) and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at
`the time of said person’s birth.” Citizenship Order § 1.
`Section 2 of the Order directs the Executive Branch (1) not to issue documents
`recognizing U.S. citizenship to the persons identified in Section 1 and (2) not to accept
`documents issued by state, local, or other governments purporting to recognize the
`U.S. citizenship of such persons. See Citizenship Order § 2(a). Section 2 specifies
`that those directives “apply only to persons who are born within the United States
`after 30 days from the date of this order,” i.e., after February 19. Id. § 2(b). Section
`2 also makes clear that the Order does not “affect the entitlement of other individuals,
`including children of lawful permanent residents, to obtain documentation of their
`United States citizenship.” Citizenship Order § 2(c).
`Section 3 of the Order directs the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Secre-
`tary of Homeland Security, and Commissioner of Social Security to take “all appro-
`priate measures to ensure that the regulations and policies of their respective depart-
`ments and agencies are consistent with this order.” Citizenship Order § 3(a). It also
`directs the “heads of all executive agencies and departments” to “issue public guid-
`ance” within 30 days (i.e., by February 19) “regarding th[e] order’s implementation
`with respect to their operations and activities.” Id. § 3(b).
`2. The Order reflects that the Citizenship Clause does not extend citizenship
`universally to everyone born in the United States. Rather, the Clause expressly ex-
`cludes from birthright citizenship persons who are born in the United States but who
`are not “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. The original
`
`
`
`

`

`7
`public meaning of the term “jurisdiction” refers “political jurisdiction” (which turns
`on whether a person owes allegiance to, and is entitled to protection from, the United
`States), not regulatory jurisdiction (which turns on whether a person must follow U.S.
`law). Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1884). A person born in the United States is
`subject to its political jurisdiction only if, under background legal principles as un-
`derstood at the time of ratification, he owes primary allegiance to the United States
`rather than to an “alien power.” Id. at 101-102; see Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
`572 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (“What do we mean by ‘subject to the juris-
`diction of the United States?’ Not owing allegiance to anybody else. That is what it
`means.”).
`Applying that test, this Court has identified multiple categories of people born
`in the United States who nonetheless lack a constitutional right to U.S. citizenship.
`Children of foreign diplomats, children of alien enemies, and children born on foreign
`public ships in U.S. waters fall in that category because they owe primary allegiance
`to foreign nations. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898). The
`Court has also held that children of tribal Indians lack a constitutional right to citi-
`zenship because they owe “immediate allegiance to their several tribes.” Elk, 112
`U.S. at 99; see Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (statutory exten-
`sion of U.S. citizenship to Indians born in the United States).
`A substantial body of historical evidence shows that the children of temporarily
`present aliens or of illegal aliens similarly are not subject to the political jurisdiction
`of the United States. Emerich de Vattel, the founding era’s leading expert on the law
`of nations, wrote that citizenship by virtue of birth in a country extends to children
`of “citizens” or of “perpetual inhabitants,” but not to children of foreigners who lack
`“the right of perpetual residence.” Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations §§ 212-
`
`
`
`

`

`8
`213, at 101-102 (1797 ed.) (emphasis omitted). And Justice Story recognized a “rea-
`sonable qualification” to birthright citizenship for “the children of parents, who were
`in itinere in the country, or abiding there for temporary purposes, as for health, or
`occasional business.” Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws § 48, at 48
`(1834).
`Members of Congress expressed a similar understanding during debates over
`the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27,
`which served as the Amendment’s “initial blueprint,” General Building Contractors
`Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389 (1982). For instance, Senator Lyman Trum-
`bull explained in a letter to President Andrew Johnson that birthright citizenship
`would extend only to persons “born of parents domiciled in the United States.” Mark
`Shawhan, Comment, The Significance of Parental Domicile in Lyman Trumbull’s
`Conception of Citizenship, 119 Yale L.J. 1351, 1352-1353 (2010) (citation omitted).
`Another Senator observed that “persons may be born in the United States yet not be
`citizens,” giving the example of a person who is “born here of parents from abroad
`temporarily in this country.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2769 (1866). And a
`Representative stated that, under “the general law relating to subjects and citizens
`recognized by all nations,” birthright citizenship did not extend to “children born on
`our soil to temporary sojourners.” Id. at 1117.
`Post-ratification practice points in the same direction. The Secretary of State
`issued an opinion in 1885 concluding that a child “born of [foreign] subjects, tempo-
`rarily in the United States,” had “no right of citizenship.” 2 A Digest of the Interna-
`tional Law of the United States § 183, at 397-398 (Francis Wharton ed., 2d ed. 1887).
`A state supreme court determined that the jurisdictional element of the Citizenship
`Clause excludes “those born in this country of foreign parents who are temporarily
`
`
`
`

`

`9
`traveling here.” Benny v. O’Brien, 32 A. 696, 698 (N.J. 1895). And legal scholars
`explained that “[t]he words ‘subject to the jurisdiction thereof ’ exclude the children
`of foreigners transiently within the United States.” Alexander Porter Morse, A Trea-
`tise on Citizenship 248 (1881) (citation omitted).
`This Court in Wong Kim Ark then addressed, as the “question presented” in
`that case, “whether a child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent,
`who, at the time of his birth, are subjects of the Emperor of China, but have a perma-
`nent domicil and residence in the United States, * * * becomes at the time of his birth
`a citizen of the United States.” 169 U.S. at 653 (emphasis added). After analyzing
`that question, the Court concluded that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment affirms the
`ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the alle-
`giance and under the protection of the country, including all children here born of
`resident aliens.” Id. at 693 (emphasis added). The Court then summed up its holding
`as follows: “[A] child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent, who,
`at the time of his birth, are subjects of the Emperor of China, but have a permanent
`domicil and residence in the United States, * * * becomes at the time of his birth a
`citizen of the United States.” Id. at 705 (emphasis added).
`This Court has since recognized that Wong Kim Ark addressed only the chil-
`dren of foreign parents who were “permanently domiciled in the United States.”
`Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 457 (1920); see Chin Bak Kan v. United States,
`186 U.S. 193, 200 (1902). The Department of Justice, too, noted that Wong Kim Ark
`“goes no further” than addressing the children of foreigners “domiciled in the United
`States.” Spanish Treaty Claims Comm’n, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Final Report of Wil-
`liam Wallace Brown, Assistant Attorney-General 121 (1910). “[I]t has never been
`held,” the Department continued, “and it is very doubtful whether it will ever be held,
`
`
`
`

`

`10
`that the mere act of birth of a child on American soil, to parents who are accidentally
`or temporarily in the United States, operates to invest such child with all the rights
`of American citizenship.” Id. at 124.
`3.
`During the 20th century, however, the Executive Branch adopted the
`incorrect position that the Citizenship Clause extended birthright citizenship to al-
`most everyone born in the United States—even children of illegal aliens or temporar-
`ily present aliens. See, e.g., Legislation Denying Citizenship at Birth to Certain Chil-
`dren Born in the United States, 19 Op. O.L.C. 340 (1995). That policy of near-univer-
`sal birthright citizenship has created strong incentives for illegal immigration. It has
`led to “birth tourism,” the practice by which expecting mothers travel to the United
`States to give birth and secure U.S. citizenship for their children. See Minority Staff
`Report, Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Birth Tour-
`ism in the United States (Dec. 21, 2022). And it has raised national-security concerns
`by extending U.S. citizenship to persons who lack meaningful ties to the country. See,
`e.g., Amy Swearer, Subject to the [Complete] Jurisdiction Thereof, 24 Tex. Rev. L. &
`Politics 135, 201 (2000) (discussing person who was born in Louisiana to temporarily
`present aliens from Saudi Arabia, who returned to Saudi Arabia as a toddler, and
`who joined the Taliban and waged war against the United States). Immediately upon
`taking office on January 20, 2025, President Trump accordingly issued the Citizen-
`ship Order and directed relevant agencies to start taking steps to change course.
`
`Trump v. State of Washington
`B.
`The first nationwide remedy issued from Washington at the behest of
`1.
`four States and two individuals. One day after the issuance of the Citizenship Order,
`the State of Washington and three other States (the Washington state respondents)
`sued the federal government in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
`
`
`
`

`

`11
`Washington, claiming that the Citizenship Order violates the Citizenship Clause and
`the INA. See App., infra, 6a. Three individuals filed a separate challenge in the same
`court. See id. at 7a. The court consolidated the cases, see ibid., and one of the indi-
`viduals withdrew from the litigation, see 25-cv-127 Am. Compl. 1-2 n.2 (W.D. Wash.)
`(Washington Am. Compl.). The remaining two individual plaintiffs (the Washington
`individual respondents) sought to represent a class of “pregnant persons residing in
`Washington State” and “children residing in Washington State” affected by the Citi-
`zenship Order, id. ¶ 141, but the court has not acted on their request for class certi-
`fication.
`Three days after the issuance of the Citizenship Order, the district court
`granted the state respondents a universal temporary restraining order enjoining the
`government from enforcing or implementing Sections 2(a) and 3 of the Order. See
`App., infra, 1a-4a. At the TRO hearing, the government asked the district court to
`limit any relief to the parties and to “allow the agencies to continue doing things be-
`hind the scenes to prepare to implement [the Citizenship Order] to the extent an in-
`junctive order is lifted at some point.” 25-cv-127 1/23/25 D. Ct. H’rg Tr. 18 (W.D.
`Wash.); see id. at 17-18. The court refused, issuing a TRO that extended nationwide
`and that prevented executive agencies from “implementing” as well as “[e]nforcing”
`the Order. App., infra, 3a.
`Two weeks later, the district court granted the state respondents’ request “to
`enjoin the Order’s implementation and enforcement on a nationwide basis.” App.,
`infra, 15a-16a; see id. at 16a n.9 (noting that the individual respondents sought “only
`to enjoin the implementation and enforcement of the Order as it relates to them-
`selves”). The court stated a “geographically limited injunction” would be “ineffective”
`and “unworkable.” App., infra, 16a-17a. The court also concluded the state respond-
`
`
`
`

`

`12
`ents have Article III standing because they face the “loss of federal funds” and must
`“ ‘navigate the chaos and uncertainty the Order creates,’ ” but did not address the gov-
`ernment’s argument that States lack standing to assert the citizenship rights of indi-
`viduals. Id. at 8a (brackets and citation omitted).
`2.
`The government appealed, moved that the injunction be stayed except
`as to the individual respondents, and renewed its objection to the part of the injunc-
`tion prohibiting implementation of the Citizenship Order. See D. Ct. Doc. 122 (Feb.
`7, 2025). The district court took no action on the motion.
`A motions panel of the Ninth Circuit denied the government a stay pending
`appeal. See App., infra, 18a-24a. In an order joined by two judges, the panel stated
`that the government had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. See id. at
`18a. In a concurring opinion, Judge Forrest expressed no view on the merits but
`concluded that the government had failed to show that “emergency relief is truly nec-
`essary to prevent irreparable harm.” Id. at 24a.
`
`Trump v. CASA, Inc.
`C.
`The next nationwide order issued from Maryland on behalf of two non-
`1.
`profit organizations with alien members (the CASA organizational respondents) and
`five individuals (the CASA individual respondents). Those plaintiffs filed a separate
`suit challenging the Citizenship Order in the U.S. District Court for the District of
`Maryland. See App., infra, 25a-26a. That court, too, concluded that a “nationwide
`injunction is appropriate.” App., infra, 56a. It determined that “[o]nly a nationwide
`injunction will provide complete relief to the plaintiffs” because one of the organiza-
`tional respondents, the Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project, has members “in every
`state.” Ibid. The court also stated that, because the Citizenship Order “is a categor-
`ical policy,” a “nationwide injunction against the categorical policy * * * is appropri-
`
`
`
`

`

`13
`ate.” Ibid. Finally, the court stated that nationwide relief “is necessary because the
`policy concerns citizenship—a national concern that demands a uniform policy.” Ibid.
`2.
`The government appealed and moved for a partial stay, but the district
`court denied that motion. See App., infra, 60a-64a. The court first denied the gov-
`ernment’s request to stay the injunction except as to the five individual respondents
`and the eleven other members of the organizational respondents who had been named
`in the complaint. See App., infra, 61a-63a. The court also denied the government’s
`request to limit the injunction to the enforcement (rather than the implementation)
`of the Citizenship Order, stating that “the government has no valid interest in taking
`internal, preparatory steps to formulate policies and guidance on an unconstitutional
`Executive Order.” Id. at 63a.
`A divided motions panel of the Fourth Circuit similarly denied relief. See App.,
`infra, 66a-70a. The court concluded that “this case falls within the parameters for
`universal injunctions” “outlined in [Fourth Circuit] precedent,” primarily because the
`case involves a “ ‘categorical policy.’ ” Id. at 68a. The court also concluded that the
`equities did not favor granting a stay. See id. at 68a-70a.
`Judge Niemeyer dissented, explaining that he would “grant the government’s
`modest motion, which seeks only to cabin the [injunction’s] inappropriate reach.”
`App., infra, 72a; see id. at 71a-74a. Judge Niemeyer expressed “grave concern” about
`“national injunctions,” highlighted the “unseemliness of such a broad extension of
`judicial power,” and described the preliminary injunction here as “presumptuous and
`jurisdictionally messy.” Id. at 73a.
`
`Trump v. State of New Jersey
`D.
`The third nationwide injunction—issued to the State of New Jersey, 17
`1.
`other States, the District of Columbia, and San Francisco (the New Jersey state re-
`
`
`
`

`

`14
`spondents)—came out of Massachusetts. Those plaintiffs challenged the Citizenship
`Order in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, see App., infra, 80a
`& n.4, which granted a nationwide preliminary injunction against the Order’s en-
`forcement and implementation. See id. at 75a-105a (opinion); id. at 106a-107a (or-
`der). The court determined that the state respondents had Article III standing with-
`out addressing the government’s argument that they could not assert the citizenship
`rights of third parties. See id. at 82a-85a.
`The district court acknowledged that nationwide injunctions raise “meaningful
`concerns about the appropriate scope of a single district judge’s equitable powers,”
`but nonetheless concluded that the state plaintiffs were entitled to nationwide relief.
`App., infra, 101a; see id. at 101a-104a. The court reasoned that “injunctive relief
`limited to the State plaintiffs is inadequate” because a pregnant woman living in one
`State could “give birth across the border” in another State, or because a family might
`move to the State “after welcoming a new baby.” Id. at 103a.
`In the same opinion addressing the state respondents’ suit, the district court
`addressed a separate suit brought by an individual and two organizations. See App.,
`infra, 79a-80a. There, the court granted a preliminary injunction to the individual
`and the organizations’ members, rejecting those plaintiffs’ request for universal re-
`lief. See id. at 102a. That order is not at issue here.
`2.
`The government appealed and moved for a partial stay. See App., infra,
`108a. The district court denied the motion, rejecting both the government’s request
`to narrow the injunction to the state respondents and its request to allow the govern-
`ment to take “internal steps” to implement the Citizenship Order. Id. at 109a.
`The court of appeals similarly denied a stay. The court reasoned, as relevant
`here, that the state respondents could properly assert individuals’ citizenship rights
`
`
`
`

`

`15
`because the Citizenship Order could be enforced “against the Plaintiff-States.” App.,
`infra, 131a. The court also refused to narrow the injunction’s nationwide scope be-
`cause the government was unlikely “to succeed in demonstrating * * * that the chal-
`lenged conduct is lawful.” Id. at 140a. The court did state, however, that it would
`not “read the plain terms of the District Court’s order to enjoin ‘internal operations’
`that are ‘preparatory operations that cannot impose any harm’ on the Plaintiff-
`States.” Id. at 142a.
`
`ARGUMENT
`This Court has frequently granted complete