`Nos. 25-243, 25-273, 25-274
`In the
`Supreme Court of the United States
`
`WES ALLEN, SEC’Y OF STATE, ET AL., Petitioners,
`v.
`
`MARCUS CASTER, ET AL., Respondents.
`
`WES ALLEN, SEC’Y OF STATE, ET AL., Appellants,
`v.
`
`BOBBY SINGLETON, ET AL., Appellees.
`
`
`WES ALLEN, SEC’Y OF STATE, ET AL., Appellants,
`v.
`
`EVAN MILLIGAN, ET AL., Appellees.
`
`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT
`TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH
`CIRCUIT AND ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
`COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
`
`BRIEF FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
`AND 15 OTHER STATES AS AMICI CURIAE
`SUPPORTING PETITIONERS
`
`
`ELIZABETH B. MURRILL
`Attorney General
`LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
`1885 N. Third St.
`Baton Rouge, LA 70802
`(225) 506-3746
`AguinagaB@ag.louisiana.gov
`J. BENJAMIN AGUIÑAGA
`Solicitor General
`Counsel of Record
`ZACHARY FAIRCLOTH
`Principal Deputy
`Solicitor General
`MORGAN BRUNGARD
`Deputy Solicitor General
`CAITLIN HUETTEMANN
`ELIZABETH BROWN
`Assistant Solicitors General
`Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of Louisiana
`
`(additional counsel listed after signature page)
`
`October 3, 2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................ ii
`
`INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE................................. 1
`
`INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF
`THE ARGUMENT ....................................................... 2
`
`ARGUMENT ................................................................ 4
`
`I. RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS ARE
` ANTITHETICAL TO EQUAL JUSTICE
` UNDER LAW. ....................................................... 4
`
`II. SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
` PROVIDES NO SHIELD FOR RACE-BASED
`REDISTRICTING. ................................................... 7
`
`III. AN ENDURING REJECTION OF RACE-BASED
`REDISTRICTING REQUIRES ZERO TOLERANCE
` FOR ANY CONSIDERATION OF RACE. .................. 14
`
`CONCLUSION .......................................................... 15
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`Cases Page(s)
`
`Abbott v. Perez,
`585 U.S. 579 (2018) .................................. 1, 2, 6, 13
`
`Alexander v. S.C. NAACP,
`602 U.S. 1 (2024) .................................................... 2
`
`Allen v. Milligan,
`599 U.S. 1 (2023) .................................. 9, 10, 14, 15
`
`Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of
`Elections,
`580 U.S. 178 (2017) .............................................. 13
`
`Brown v. Board of Education,
`347 U.S. 483 (1954) ................................................ 4
`
`City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
`488 U.S. 469 (1989) ................................................ 5
`
`Flowers v. Mississippi,
`588 U.S. 284 (2019) ............................................... 5
`
`In re Landry,
`83 F.4th 300 (5th Cir. 2023) .................................. 6
`
`Louisiana v. Callais,
`No. 24-109 (U.S. Aug. 27, 2025) ....................... 1, 11
`
`LULAC v. Perry,
`548 U.S. 399 (2006) ................................................ 3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`Merrill v. Milligan,
`142 S. Ct. 879 (2022) ............................................ 13
`
`Miller v. Johnson,
`515 U.S. 900 (1995) .................................... 2, 12, 15
`
`Nairne v. Ardoin,
`715 F. Supp. 3d 808 (M.D. La. 2024) ............. 11, 14
`
`Plessy v. Ferguson,
`163 U.S. 537 (1896) ................................................ 7
`
`Robinson v. Ardoin,
`605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022) ......... 6, 11, 14
`
`Rucho v. Common Cause,
`588 U.S. 684 (2019) ........................................ 10, 13
`
`Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II),
`517 U.S. 899 (1996) .............................................. 13
`
`Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I),
`509 U.S. 630 (1993) ................................ 3, 4, 5, 6, 9
`
`Shelby County v. Holder,
`570 U.S. 529 (2013) ................................................ 1
`
`Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v.
`President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.
`(SFFA),
`600 U.S. 181 (2023)
` ............................................... 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
`10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
`
`Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v.
`Thomas,
`588 U.S. 504 (2019) .............................................. 12
`
`Thornburg v. Gingles,
`478 U.S. 30 (1986) ............................................ 9, 15
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Hannah Hartig et al., 2.
` Voting patterns in the 2024 election,
` Pew Res. Ctr. (June 26, 2025),
`tinyurl.com/2umdx5wb .......................................... 9
`
`Supp. Br. for Appellants on Reargument
`in Nos. 1, 2, and 4, and for Respond-
`ents in No. 10, in Brown v. Bd. of
`Educ., O.T. 1953 ..................................................... 7
`
`Supp. Br. for Appellant in Louisiana v.
`Callais, No. 24-109 (U.S. Aug. 27,
`2025) ....................................................................... 1
`
`Br. of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae in
`Louisiana v. Callais, No. 24-109
`(U.S. Sept. 24, 2025) ............................................... 1
`
`Sup. Ct. R. 37.2 ............................................................ 1
`
`U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 .................................... 4, 7
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
`The States of Louisiana, Alaska, Arkansas, Flor-
`ida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missis-
`sippi, Missouri, Nebraska, South Carolina, Tennessee,
`Texas, and West Virginia respectfully submit this
`brief as amici curiae in support of Petitioners.1
`Like the State of Alabama, the amici States
`“want[] out of this abhorrent system of racial discrim-
`ination.” Supp. Br. for Appellant in Louisiana v. Cal-
`lais, No. 24 -109, at 47 (U.S. Aug. 27, 2025). “[R]ace-
`based state action” should be forbidden “except in the
`most extraordinary case.” Students for Fair Admis-
`sions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.
`(SFFA), 600 U.S. 181, 208 (2023). In 1965, the Nation
`faced an “extraordinary problem. ” Shelby County v.
`Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 534 (2013). But “[t]hanks in part
`to” the Voting Rights Act , “2025 is not 1965.” Br. of
`Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae in Louisiana v. Cal-
`lais, No. 24-109 at 1 (U.S. Sept. 24, 2025) (citing Nw.
`Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder , 557 U.S.
`193, 202 (2009)).
`Today, however, Section 2’s race-based command
`that States intentionally create majority-minority dis-
`tricts—often at the behest of a federal judge—violates
`the Constitution. “Redistricting is never easy.” Abbott
`v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 585 (2018). But Section 2’s man-
`date makes it virtually impossible for the States. Just
`ask Washington, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
`
`1 Pursuant to Rule 37.2, on September 23, 2025, counsel for
`amicus State of Louisiana provided the parties’ counsel with no-
`tice of its intention to file this brief.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`and Georgia, all of which have lost their maps to Sec-
`tion 2 in this redistricting cycle alone. And it has “no
`end … in sight.” SFFA, 600 U.S. at 213.
`When a State is compelled to sort its people by race
`under the thumb of a federal court, the State loses, its
`citizens lose, the judiciary loses, and the Nation’s
`founding principle s lose force . It is time to end this
`perpetual “lose-lose situation .” Alexander v. S.C.
`NAACP, 602 U.S. 1, 65 (2024) (Thomas, J., concur-
`ring). For the sake of the States, our citizens, the
`courts, and this Nation, this Court should bring it to
`an end now.
`INTRODUCTION AND
`SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
`This Court has dismantled government discrimi-
`nation on the basis of race in every corner of American
`life over the last 75 years. See SFFA, 600 U.S. at 204–
`05. Yet in 2025, Section 2 of the VRA still “insists that
`districts be created precisely because of race.” Abbott,
`585 U.S. at 586. That government -mandated racial
`discrimination cannot be squared with the core of the
`Equal Protection Clause: that government “may never
`use race as a stereotype or negative.” SFFA, 600 U.S.
`at 213.
`Race-based redistricting is antithetical to “the Con-
`stitution’s pledge of racial equality.” Id. at 205. It rests
`on “the offensive and demeaning assumption that vot-
`ers of a particular race, because of their race, ‘think
`alike, share the same political interests, and will pre-
`fer the same candidates at the polls. ’” Miller v. John-
`son, 515 U.S. 900, 9 12 (1995). It uses race as a nega-
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`tive in this zero-sum context by advantaging some peo-
`ple at the expense of others based on their skin color .
`See SFFA , 600 U.S. at 212. And i f that “were not
`enough,” race-based redistricting under Section 2 also
`“lack[s] a ‘logical end point.’” Id. at 221.
`Respectfully, it is “remarkably wrong” for courts—
`or States coerced by courts —to be “pick[ing] winners
`and losers based on the color of their skin.” Id. at 229–
`30. Racial classifications “are by their very nature odi-
`ous to a free people whose institutions are founded
`upon the doctrine of equality.” Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I),
`509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (quoting Hirabayashi v.
`United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)). And the use of
`race in race -based admissions programs is odious
`“[j]ust like” the “drawing [of] district lines” to create
`majority-minority districts under Section 2. SFFA,
`600 U.S at 361 n.34 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
`“Eliminating racial discrimination means elimi-
`nating all of it.” Id. at 206 (maj. op.). Now is the time
`to bring this “sordid business” to an end . LULAC v.
`Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concur-
`ring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
`dissenting in part). The Court should grant certiorari
`and make plain that the Constitution does not tolerate
`government-mandated line drawing on the basis of
`race. That is the only way to become “a society that is
`no longer fixated on race.” Id. at 434 (maj. op.).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`ARGUMENT
`I. RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS ARE ANTITHETICAL TO
`EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW.
`The E qual Protection Clause provides that “[n]o
`State shall … deny to any person within its jurisdic-
`tion the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.
`amend. XIV, § 1. “Its central purpose is to prevent
`States from purposefully discriminating between indi-
`viduals on the basis of race.” Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 642.
`“Laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals
`on racial grounds fall within the core of that prohibi-
`tion” and are therefore “presumptively invalid[.]” Id.
`at 642 –43 (quoting Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v.
`Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
`For nearly 75 years, this Court has expelled race -
`based government action from American life on that
`presumption. After Brown v. Board of Education, 347
`U.S. 483 (1954), the Court invalidated racial segrega-
`tion in schools, juries, neighborhoods, parks, buses,
`and beyond—holding fast to “the Constitution’s pledge
`of racial equality.” SFFA, 600 U.S. at 204–05. Most re-
`cently in SFFA, the Co urt applied th e same rule to
`elite universities’ race-conscious admissions:
`“‘[O]utright racial balancing’ is ‘patently un constitu-
`tional,’” id. at 223 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex . at
`Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 3 11 (2013)), so admissions pro-
`grams that “effectively assure[d] that race will always
`be relevant” could not stand, id. at 224 (quoting City
`of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. , 488 U.S. 469, 495
`(1989) (plurality op.)).
`In our Nation, “the individual is important, not his
`race, his creed, or his color.” Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 648
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`(quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66 (1964)
`(Douglas, J., dissenting)). Government classifications
`by race “demean[] the dignity and worth of a person to
`be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own
`merit and essential qualities.” SFFA, 600 U.S. at 220
`(quoting Rice v. Cayetano , 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000)).
`They also “reinforce the belief ... that individuals
`should be judged by the color of their skin,” Shaw I,
`509 U.S. at 657, and thus provoke “a politics of racial
`hostility,” Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality op.). Such
`stereotyping inflicts “continued hurt and injury” on in-
`dividuals and society alike “contrary as it is to the ‘core
`purpose’ of the Equal Protection Clause[.]” SFFA, 600
`U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). Put otherwise, govern-
`ment-mandated racial classifications are irreconcila-
`ble with equal justice under law.
`This Court has therefore rightly described racial
`classifications as “odious to a free people whose insti-
`tutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”
`Shaw I , 509 U.S. at 643 (quoting Hirabayashi, 320
`U.S. at 100). Uniquely odious—even “danger[ous]”—
`are “ [r]acial classifications with respect to voting[.]”
`Id. at 657. When governments draw districts by race,
`it reinforces “impermissible racial stereotypes” by per-
`petuating “the assumption that members of the same
`racial group—regardless of their age, education, eco-
`nomic status, or the community in which they live —
`think alike[.]” SFFA, 600 U.S. at 220 (quoting Schuette
`v. BAMN , 572 U.S. 291, 308 (2014) (plurality op.)).
`Mandating such racial classification s, as the Court
`has warned, “may balkanize us into compet ing racial
`factions” and “threaten[s] to carry us further from the
`goal of a political system in which race no longer mat-
`ters—a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`Amendments embody, and to which the Nation contin-
`ues to aspire.” Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 657.
`The harms to States are equally grave. A legisla-
`ture compelled to sort its citizens based on “the color
`of their skin” “bears an uncomfortable resemblance to
`political apartheid.” Id. at 647. But if the State refuses
`to sort its citizens by race, it is accused of bigoted “ra-
`cial voter suppression.” See, e.g. , Fifth Circuit Sides
`with Black Louisianans, Strikes Down Racially Dis-
`criminatory State Map, Legal Defense Fund (Aug. 14,
`2025), tinyurl.com/4ja89emh. Either way, States face
`endless litigation, astrono mical expense, and erosion
`of their sovereign responsibility to draw districts. See
`Abbott, 585 U.S. at 608, 611.
`Race-based redistricting also corrodes the federal
`judiciary into “pick[ing] winners and losers b ased on
`the color of their skin.” SFFA, 600 U.S. at 229. Louisi-
`ana’s recent experience illustrates the problem: The
`Middle District declared that the State must create an
`additional majority-Black district. Robinson v. Ardoin,
`605 F. Supp. 3d 759, 766 (M.D. La. 2022). Then, only
`extraordinary mandamus relief from the Fifth Circuit
`prevented the court from imposing its own map within
`five legislative days when the legislature did not com-
`ply. In re Landry , 83 F.4t h 300, 304 (5th Cir. 2023).
`Through it all, the court’s message was clear: By not
`creating a second majority -Black district, Louisiana
`had failed to “pick[] the right race[] to benefit,” so the
`Middle District would pick instead. Cf. SFFA, 600 U.S.
`at 229. That “remarkably wrong” exercise of the judi-
`cial power, id. at 230, now repeats across the country
`each redistricting cycle—ensuring that federal judges
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`are the arbiters of who wins and who loses based on
`skin color.
`Race-based redistricting also strikes at the heart of
`the Nation’s founding commitments. Among the
`truths we declared self-evident was that “all men are
`created equal.” Declaration of Independence ¶ 2. The
`Fourteenth Amendment ensured that “no State shall
`… deny to any person … the equal protection of the
`laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. And etched in mar-
`ble on the Supreme Court building: “Equal Justice Un-
`der Law.” Those promises are hollow so long as gov-
`ernment compels racial discrimination by the States.
`The invidious classifications underlying race-based
`redistricting present the last significant battle in de-
`fense of our “color blind” Constitution. Supp. Br. for
`Appellants on Reargument in Nos. 1, 2, and 4, and for
`Respondents in No. 10, in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., O.T.
`1953, p. 65; Plessy v. Ferguson , 163 U.S. 537, 559
`(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see SFFA, 600 U.S. at
`207 (identifying the only two narrow circumstances
`“permit[ting] resort to race -based government ac-
`tion”). But this battle is easy. For “[e]liminating racial
`discrimination means eliminati ng all of it ”—that in-
`cludes race-based redistricting. SFFA, 600 U.S. at
`206.
`II. SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT PROVIDES
`NO SHIELD FOR RACE-BASED REDISTRICTING.
`Because racial classifications are presumptively
`invalid, the only question is whether Section 2 of the
`VRA displaces that presumption. It does not. This
`Court has assumed —but never decided —that race -
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`based redistricting in the name of Section 2 is consti-
`tutional. It is not, f or two independent reasons: (A) it
`violates fundamental equal-protection principles, and
`(B) it fails strict scrutiny.
`A. Race-based redistricting is unconstitutional for
`the same reasons that doomed the race -conscious ad-
`missions programs in SFFA. It rests on stereotypes, it
`employs race as a negative, and it lacks any logical
`endpoint. 600 U.S. at 231; see id. at 314 (Kavanaugh,
`J., concurring). That is unsurprising—because the use
`of race in admissions was “[j]ust like drawing district
`lines” to create majority-minority districts under Sec-
`tion 2. Id. at 361 n.34 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
`Race-based redistricting rests on categorically un-
`constitutional stereotypes. The first of “the twin com-
`mands of the Equal Protection Clause” is that govern-
`ment “may never use race as a stereotype.” Id. at 213,
`218 (maj. op.). “[T]his Court has rejected the assump-
`tion that members of the same racial group —regard-
`less of their age, education, economic status, or the
`community in which they live —think alike[.]” Id. at
`220 (quoting Schuette, 572 U.S. at 308) (quotation
`marks omitted). To that end, the Court has repudiated
`“the notion that government actors may intentionally
`allocate preference to those ‘who may have little in
`common with one another but the color of their skin.’”
`Id. (quoting Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647). Those stereo-
`types proved fatal in SFFA. E.g., id. at 220 (Harvard
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`“rest[ed] on the pernicious stereotype that ‘a black stu-
`dent can usually bring something that a white person
`cannot offer.’” (citation omitted)). So too here.
`Race-based redistricting’s stereotypes are more
`pernicious. Baked into any analysis under Thornburg
`v. Gingles , 478 U.S. 30 (1986), is the offensive (and
`wrong) assumption “that members of the same racial
`group—regardless of their age, education, economic
`status, or th e community in which they live —think
`alike, share the same political interests, and will pre-
`fer the same candidates at the polls.” Shaw I, 509 U.S.
`at 647; but see Hannah Hartig et al., 2. Voting patterns
`in the 2024 election, Pew Res. Ctr. (June 26, 2025), ti-
`nyurl.com/2umdx5wb. More fundamentally, “[t] he
`whole point” is to draw districts “with an express tar-
`get in mind”: That minority voters must form a 50%+
`majority and non -minority voters form a less -than-
`50% minority. Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 33 (2023).
`It pays zero regard for which individuals meet that ra-
`cial quota—just “race for race’s sake.” SFFA, 600 U.S.
`at 220. That cannot be squared with “[t]he core guar-
`antee of equal protection[.]” Flowers v. Mississippi ,
`588 U.S. 284, 299 (2019). Race-based redistricting is
`directly contrary to the central “command [] of the
`Equal Protection Clause”—that the government “may
`never use race as a stereotype.” SFFA, 600 U.S. at 213,
`218.
`Race-based redistricting also violates the second
`twin command of equal protection: that “government
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`may never use race as a … ne gative.” Id. at 213. Uni-
`versities in SFFA resisted that charge by claiming
`they simply preferred some races, without punishment
`to others. Id. at 218. But the Court found that “hard to
`take seriously”: “How else but ‘negative’ can race be
`described if, in its absence, members of some racial
`groups would be admitted in greater numbers than
`they otherwise would have been?” Id. at 218–19.
`The same question lingers for race -based redis-
`tricting. Redistricting is “zero-sum,” id. at 219, for un-
`der one-person-one-vote, there are a finite number of
`citizens who may be assigned to any given district, see
`Allen, 599 U.S. at 99 (Alito, J., dissenting); Rucho v.
`Common Cause, 588 U.S. 684, 706 (2019) (creating a
`safe district for one party “comes at the expense ... of
`individuals in [that district who are m embers of] the
`opposing party”). In other words, “[a] benefit provided
`to some [voters] but not to others necessarily ad-
`vantages the former group at the expense of the lat-
`ter.” SFFA, 600 U.S. at 218–19. Race-based redistrict-
`ing is thus the very definition of race as a negative.
`“If all this were not enough,” race-based redistrict-
`ing is unlawful because it “lack[s] a ‘logical end point.’”
`Id. at 221 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
`342 (2003)). “[A] ‘deviation from the norm of equal
`treatment of all racial and ethnic groups’ must be ‘a
`temporary matter’—or stated otherwise, must be ‘lim-
`ited in time. ’” Id. at 311 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`(quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (plurality op.)). Un-
`der no circumstance may “racial classifications … con-
`tinue indefinitely.” Id. at 314.
`There can be no dispute that Section 2’s race-based
`redistricting mandate is neither “‘a temporary mat-
`ter’” nor “‘limited in time.’” Id. at 311 (quoting Croson,
`488 U.S. at 510). That mandate has existed for more
`than four decades—and there is no end in sight. In the
`current cycle alone, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
`Georgia, and Washington have lost cases requiring
`new majority-minority districts. See Supp. Br. for Ap-
`pellant in Louisiana v. Callais , No. 24 -109, at 26 –27
`(U.S. Aug. 27, 2025) (collecting citations). And the
`length courts have taken to strike down those maps
`are as strained as the “subliminal message” of a regis-
`trar’s office sharing a floor with a sherif f’s office,
`Nairne v. Ardoin, 715 F. Supp. 3d 808, 874 n.461 (M.D.
`La. 2024)—or worse, the abject falsehood that “David
`Duke … won three statewide elections” in Louisiana.
`Robinson, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 849. It seems the States
`can never shed “the burdens of history,” SFFA, 600
`U.S. at 404 (Jackson, J., dissenting), as plaintiffs con-
`tinue a boundless crusade to find racism in the n ame
`of race-based redistricting, “‘effectively assur[ing] that
`race will always be relevant ... and that the ultimate
`goal of eliminating’ race as a criterion ‘will never be
`achieved.’” Id. at 224 (maj. op.) (quoting Croson, 488
`U.S. at 495) . What may have begun as a temporary
`race-based remediation has become immortal. That,
`our Constitution does not permit.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`12
`
`B. Race-based redistricting under Section 2 also
`fails strict scrutiny. “‘[R]acial classifications are
`simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact
`connection between justification and classification. ’”
`SFFA, 600 U.S. at 217 (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
`U.S. 244, 270 (2003)). To that end, the Court has re-
`quired “an exceedingly persuasive justification that is
`measurable and concrete enough to permit judicial re-
`view.” Id. Race-based redistricting fails that test for at
`least four independent reasons.
`First, Section 2 cannot shield otherwise unconsti-
`tutional state action . This Court has worried that
`“command[ing] that States engage in presumptively
`unconstitutional race -based districting” brings the
`VRA “into tension with the Fourteenth Amendment.”
`Miller, 515 U.S. at 927 (citation omitted). That worry
`is well found ed: Viewing Congress’ authority under
`the subsequently enacted Fifteenth Amendment “as
`one part of a unified constitutional scheme,” Tenn.
`Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas , 588 U.S.
`504, 519–20 (2019), it blinks reality to think that Con-
`gress could cite the Fifteenth Amendment in “de-
`mand[ing] the very racial stereotyping the Fourteenth
`Amendment forbids,” Miller, 515 U.S. at 928.
`Second, Section 2 compliance is unlike the two nar-
`row compelling inte rests that permit race -based gov-
`ernment action. This Court has allowed race-based ac-
`tion only in two contexts: (1) “remediating specific,
`identified instances of past discrimination”; and
`(2) “avoiding imminent and serious risks to human
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`13
`
`safety in prisons, such as a race riot.” SFFA, 600 U.S.
`at 207. Both turn on specific harm and permit only a
`corresponding narrow, temporary remedy. But race -
`based redistricting pursuant to Section 2 does neither.
`In its heartland vote -dilution application, it depends
`only on “[a] generalized asserti on of past discrimina-
`tion,” Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II) , 517 U.S. 899, 909
`(1996), which cannot be “the basis for [the] rigid racial
`preferences” inherent in race -based redistricting,
`SFFA, 600 U.S. at 226.
`Third, Section 2 is too amorph ous to be judicially
`reviewable. A classification “based on [] race ‘requires
`more than ... an amorphous end to justify it. ’” Id. at
`214 (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle
`Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 735 (2007)). This Court
`has described the States’ predicament well: “Since the
`Equal Protection Clause restricts consideration of race
`and the VRA demands consideration of race, a legisla-
`ture attempting to produce a lawful districting plan is
`vulnerable to competing hazards of liability.” Abbott,
`585 U.S. at 587 (quotation marks and citation omit-
`ted). All the while, the Court “has struggled without
`success over the past several decades to discern judi-
`cially manageable standards for deciding [these]
`claims.” Rucho, 588 U.S. at 691. States are left t o liti-
`gate on standards “notoriously unclear and confus-
`ing,” Merrill v. Milligan , 142 S. Ct. 879, 881 (2022)
`(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of applications for
`stays), suffocating whatever “breathing room” state
`legislatures once enjoyed, Bethune-Hill v. Va. State
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`14
`
`Bd. of Elections , 580 U.S. 178, 196 (2017). Four dec-
`ades of uncertainty is enough to know that neither
`race-based redistricting under Section 2 nor any in-
`jury it purports to remedy “is measurable and concrete
`enough to permit judicial review.” SFFA, 600 U.S. at
`217.
`Finally, race-based redistricting under Section 2
`cannot be a compelling interest because it exceeds
`Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment authority . Con-
`gress’s enforcement power is “remedial, rather than
`substantive.” Allen, 599 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., dis-
`senting). But race-based redistricting flunks any con-
`gruence-and-proportionality review because, as Jus-
`tice Thomas has explained, Congress never bothered
`to “‘identif[y] a history and pattern’ of actual constitu-
`tional violations that, for some reason, required ex-
`traordinary prophylactic remedies[.]” Id. at 82 (altera-
`tion added).
`III. AN ENDURING REJECTION OF RACE-BASED RE-
`DISTRICTING REQUIRES ZERO TOLERANCE FOR
`ANY CONSIDERATION OF RACE.
`Race-based redistricting will not truly be at its end
`unless this Court forecloses every avenue for race to
`creep back in. Without such clarity, the next cycle will
`look like the last four —experts insisting that race
`“was a consideration” but “did not predominate ,” Al-
`len, 599 U.S. at 31; courts crediting that testimony as
`“sincere,” Robinson, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 838, and “cred-
`ible,” Nairne, 715 F. Supp. 3d at 858; and States once
`again compelled to redistrict on the basis of race.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`15
`
`This Court’s precedent bar that result. If it was fa-
`tal that “race [was] determinative for at least some —
`if not many—of the [admitted] students” at Harvard,
`SFFA, 600 U.S. at 219, it is fatal where experts con-
`sider just a smidge of race, however sincerely. That ac-
`cords with this Court’s command that government ac-
`tion “may never use race as a stereotype or negative.”
`Id. at 213 (emphasis added). If the Court even need go
`further, it should amend or overrule its racial-predom-
`inance precedents—Miller and its p rogeny—to make
`clear that if “race in the creation of a new district … is
`‘non-negotiable[,]’ … then race is given a predominant
`role.” Allen, 599 U.S. at 102 (Alito, J., dissenting) (em-
`phasis added). And insofar as Gingles cannot be con-
`ducted constitutionally at all , but see id. at 64 –65
`(Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 99–100 (Alito, J., dis-
`senting), it too must be overruled.
`The States desperately need clarity that has been
`absent from this Court’s redistricting cases. Without
`that clarity, nothing will change in the endless waste
`of resources and millions of dollars that the States and
`the courts face after every redistricting cycle.
`CONCLUSION
`The petition s for writ of certiorari should be
`granted.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`16
`
` Respectfully submitted,
`
`ELIZABETH B. MURRILL
`Attorney General
`LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
`JUSTICE
`1885 N. Third St.
`Baton Rouge, LA 70802
`(225) 506-3746
`AguinagaB@ag.louisiana.gov
`J. BENJAMIN AGUIÑAGA
`Solicitor General
`Counsel of Record
`ZACHARY FAIRCLOTH
`Principal Deputy
`Solicitor General
`MORGAN BRUNGARD
`Deputy Solicitor General
`CAITLIN HUETTEMANN
`ELIZABETH BROWN
`Assistant Solicitors General
`
`Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of Louisiana
`
`(additional counsel listed below)
`
`October 3, 2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`17
`
`ADDITIONAL COUNSEL
`
`STEPHEN J. COX
`Attorney General
`State of Alaska
`
`TIM GRIFFIN
`Attorney General
`State of Arkansas
`
`JAMES UTHMEIER
`Attorney General
`State of Florida
`
`CHRISTOPHER M. CARR
`Attorney General
`State of Georgia
`
`RAÚL R. LABRADOR
`Attorney General
`State of Idaho
`
`THEODORE E. ROKITA
`Attorney General
`State of Indiana
`
`BRENNA BIRD
`Attorney General
`State of Iowa
`
`KRIS W. KOBACH
`Attorney General
`State of Kansas
`
`LYNN FITCH
`Attorney General
`State of Mississippi
`
`CATHERINE HANAWAY
`Attorney General
`State of Missouri
`
`MICHAEL T. HILGERS
`Attorney General
`State of Nebraska
`
`ALAN WILSON
`Attorney General
`State of South Carolina
`
`JONATHAN SKRMETTI
`Attorney General
`State of Tennessee
`
`KEN PAXTON
`Attorney General
`State of Texas
`
`JOHN B. MCCUSKEY
`Attorney General
`State of West Virginia
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`