`
`No. ________________________
`
`In the
`Supreme Court of the United States
`
`
`STEVEN R. DEWITT,
`Petitioner,
`vs.
`
`CERESSA HANEY, TRENT SEXTON, AND MELANIE PRETTI
`Respondent.
`
`ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`
`
`E. Travis Ramey
` Counsel of Record
`Appellate Advocacy Clinic
`University of Alabama School of Law
`Box 870392
`101 Paul W. Bryant Drive, East
`Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35487
`(205) 348-4960
`
`
`Counsel for Petitioner Steven R. DeWitt
`
`
`
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`i
`QUESTIONS PRESENTED
`The judicially created doctrine of qualified immunity shields government offi-
`cials from liability for constitutional misconduct under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 so long as
`they do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
`every reasonable officer would have known. This doctrine contradicts the text of
`§ 1983, relying on policy concerns instead of the statutory text or the historical com-
`mon law immunities it allegedly incorporated. The courts of appeals have also splin-
`tered, disagreeing about when a right is “ clearly established.” Moreover, the typical
`immunity-first approach to judicial decisions impedes the development of “clearly es-
`tablished” rights altogether. All courts of appeals but the Eleventh Circuit, however,
`agree that a robust consensus of persuasive authority can render a right clearly es-
`tablished. The First, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits have held that
`there is a constitutional right, under the First Amendment, to record government
`officials’ activities in public places.
`The questions presented are:
`1. Should the Court abolish or substantially reform qualified immunity?
`2. If qualified immunity survives, what constitutes a clearly established right?
`3. If qualified immunity survives, is the right to record government officials on
`publicly accessible property clearly established?
`P
`ARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
`Petitioner is Steven R. DeWitt.
`Respondents are Ceressa Haney, Trent Sexton, and Melanie Pretti.
`
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`ii
`CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
`There are no corporate parties in this case.
`STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS
`This case arises from the following proceedings in the United States District
`Court for the Northern District of Florida and the United States Court of Appeals for
`the Eleventh Circuit:
`• DeWitt v. Haney, No. 4:21-cv-340-AW-MAF, 2023 WL 2731865 (N.D. Fla.
`Mar. 31, 2023).
`• DeWitt v. Person , No. 23-11203, 2025 WL 1368170 (11th Cir. May 12,
`2025). The court denied DeWitt’s petition for rehearing on July 8, 2025.
`(Pet. App. 12A–14A.)
`No other proceedings in state or federal trial or appellate courts, or in this
`Court, are directly related to this case.
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`iii
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Questions Presented ....................................................................................................... i
`Parties to the Proceeding ............................................................................................... i
`Corporate Disclosure ..................................................................................................... ii
`Statement of Related Proceedings ................................................................................ ii
`Table of Authorities ...................................................................................................... iv
`Opinions Below .............................................................................................................. x
`Jurisdiction .................................................................................................................... x
`Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ....................................................... x
`Introductory Statement ................................................................................................. 1
`Statement of the Case ................................................................................................... 4
`I. Qualified immunity lacks legal and historical justification, and the
`Court should abolish or substantially reform it. ..................................... 8
`II. This Court should resolve the open and acknowledged circuit split on
`how the law becomes clearly established. ............................................. 13
`A. The Eleventh Circuit’s approach to qualified immunity is out of
`step with other circuits. ............................................................... 13
`B. This case illustrates the division among the circuits about how
`the law becomes clearly established. .......................................... 17
`III. The Court should clarify that the right to record government officials
`on publicly accessible public property is clearly established for
`purposes of qualified immunity. ............................................................ 18
`A. A robust consensus of persuasive authority can render a right
`“clearly established.” ................................................................... 18
`B. There is a consensus that the First Amendment protects the
`right to record public officials in public spaces. ......................... 20
`IV. This case is an ideal vehicle to resolve important questions about
`qualified immunity. ................................................................................ 24
`V. Alternatively, this Court should grant, vacate, and remand to the
`Eleventh Circuit to reconsider DeWitt’s claim in light of Gilmore. ..... 27
`Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 28
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`
`iv
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`United States Supreme Court Decisions
`Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
`563 U.S. 731 (2011) ....................................................................................... 2, 19
`Branzburg v. Hayes,
`408 U.S. 655 (1972) ....................................................................................... 4, 25
`Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,
`454 U.S. 432 (1982) ........................................................................................... 22
`Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
`558 U.S. 310 (2010) ......................................................................................... 3, 4
`District of Columbia v. Wesby,
`583 U.S. 48 (2018) ............................................................................................. 18
`Fare v. Michael C.,
`442 U.S. 707 (1979) ........................................................................................... 22
`Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right To Life, Inc.,
`551 U.S. 449 (2007) ........................................................................................... 23
`Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.,
`560 U.S. 242 (2010) ............................................................................................. 9
`Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
`457 U.S. 800 (1982) ............................................................................................. 1
`Hoggard v. Rhodes,
`141 S. Ct. 2421 (2021) ....................................................................................... 11
`Hope v. Pelzer,
`536 U.S. 730 (2002) ..................................................................................... 18, 21
`Johnson v. United States,
`576 U.S. 591 (2015) ............................................................................................. 9
`Little v. Barreme,
`6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) ............................................................................. 10
`Mills v. Alabama,
`384 U.S. 214 (1966) ........................................................................................... 20
`Myers v. Anderson,
`238 U.S. 368 (1915) ............................................................................................. 9
`
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`
`
`v
`N.Y. Times Co. v. United States,
`403 U.S. 713 (1971) ............................................................................................. 4
`Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta,
`597 U.S. 629 (2022) ............................................................................................. 9
`Pearson v. Callahan,
`555 U.S. 223 (2009) ................................................................................. 3, 12, 19
`Pierson v. Ray,
`388 U.S. 547 (1967) ................................................................................. 1, 10, 11
`Reichle v. Howards,
`566 U.S. 658 (2012) ........................................................................................... 22
`Scheuer v. Rhodes,
`416 U.S. 232 (1974) ........................................................................................... 22
`Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,
`94 U.S. 147 (1969) ............................................................................................. 23
`Wilson v. Layne,
`526 U.S. 603 (1999) ........................................................................................... 19
`Ziglar v. Abbasi,
`582 U.S. 120 (2017) ....................................................................................... 2, 10
`United States Court of Appeals Decisions
`Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty.,
`705 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2013) ............................................................................. 15
`Am. Civ. Lib. Union v. Alvarez,
`679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012) ................................................................. 17, 20, 21
`Askins v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
`899 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2018) ....................................................................... 2, 19
`Bame v. Dillard,
`637 F.3d 380 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ........................................................................... 15
`Barna v. Bd. Sch. Dirs. Panther Valley Sch. Dist.,
`877 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2007) .............................................................................. 15
`Crocker v. Beatty,
`995 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2021) ..................................................................... 7, 14
`Daugherty v. Campbell,
`935 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1991) ............................................................................. 19
`
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`
`vi
`DeFrancesco v. Robbins,
`136 F.4th 993 (9th Cir. 2025) ........................................................................... 15
`DeWitt v. Person,
`2025 WL 1368170, No. 23-11203 (11th Cir. May 12, 2025) ........................... ii, x
`Fields v. Philadelphia,
`862 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2017) ............................................................ 17, 20, 21, 23
`Figgs v. Dawson,
`829 F.3d 895 (11th Cir. 2016) ........................................................................... 19
`Glik v. Cunniffe,
`655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011) ................................................................... 17, 20, 21
`Gilmore v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr.,
`144 F.4th 1246 (11th Cir. 2025) ..................................................... 14, 16, 19, 27
`Gonzalez v. Trevino,
`42 F.4th 487 (5th Cir. 2022) ............................................................................. 11
`Hayes v. Long,
`72 F.3d 70 (8th Cir. 1995) ................................................................................. 19
`Irizarry v. Yehia,
`38 F.4th 1282 (10th Cir. 2022) ....................................................... 17, 19, 20, 21
`Johnson v. Halstead,
`916 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2019) ............................................................................. 19
`Khoury v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
`4 F.4th 1118 (11th Cir. 2021) ........................................................................... 21
`Maldonado v. Fontanes,
`568 F.3d 262 (1st Cir. 2009) ............................................................................. 19
`McClendon v. City of Columbia,
`305 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2018) ............................................................................. 15
`Moldowan v. City of Warren,
`578 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 2009) ............................................................................ 16
`Novak v. City of Parma,
`33 F.4th 296 (6th Cir. 2022) ............................................................................ 11
`Perry v. Adams,
`993 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2021) ............................................................................. 15
`Sharpe v. Wintersville Police Dep’t,
`59 F.4th 674 (4th Cir. 2023) ............................................................................. 17
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`vii
`Smith v. City of Cumming,
`212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000) ..................................................................... 6, 21
`Terebesi v. Torreso,
`764 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2014) .............................................................................. 15
`Toole v. City of Atlanta,
`798 F. App’x 381 (11th Cir. 2019) ............................................................... 14, 21
`Turner v. Driver,
`848 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2017) ....................................................................... 17, 21
`Tuuamalemalo v. Greene,
`946 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2019) ............................................................................. 19
`Ullery v. Bradley,
`949 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2020) ......................................................................... 15
`Varrone v. Biotti,
`123 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1997) ................................................................................ 19
`Wadsworth v. Nguyen,
`129 F.4th 38 (1st Cir. 2025) .............................................................................. 15
`West v. City of Caldwell,
`931 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2019) ............................................................................. 11
`Williams v. Bitner,
`455 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2006) .............................................................................. 19
`Williamson v. Stirling,
`912 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2018) ............................................................................. 19
`Zadeh v. Robinson,
`928 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2019) ............................................................... 2, 3, 12, 16
`U.S. District Court Decisions
`DeWitt v. Haney,
`No. 4:21-CV-340-AW-MAF,
`2023 WL 2731865 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2023) ..................................................... ii
`Federal Statutes
`28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ........................................................................................................ 2
`42 U.S.C. § 1983 .......................................................................................................... i, 1
`Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) ............................................... 9
`
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`viii
`Executive Orders
`Exec. Order No. 14290, 90 Fed. Reg. 19415 (May 1, 2025) ............................................
`Other Authorities
`Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?,
`7 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 463 (2010) ...................................................................... 11
`William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?,
`106 Calif. L. Rev. 45 (2018) ............................................................................ 1, 9
`Anna T. Beavers, First Amendment Audits: A Socio-Political Movement,
`93 Miss. L. J. 527 (2023) ..................................................................................... 5
`Cheyanne M. Daniels, Major Media Outlets, Including Hegseth’s Former Employer
`Fox News, Decline to Sign New Pentagon Reporting Rules,
`Politico (Oct. 14, 2025, 4:55 PM) ...................................................................... 26
`John C. Jeffries, What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?,
`62 Fla. L. Rev. 851 (2010) ................................................................................. 12
`Compl., Nat’l Pub. Radio Inc. v. Trump,
`No. 1:25-cv-01674 (D.D.C. filed May 27, 2025) ................................................ 26
`Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity,
`89 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2015) ................................................................................. 25
`Scott Nover, Pentagon Demands Journalists Pledge to Not Obtain Unauthorized
`Material, Wash. Post (Sept. 19, 2025) ......................................................................... 26
`James E. Pfander, Constitutional Torts and the War on Terror (1st ed. 2017) .......... 9
`James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnifi-
`cation and Government Accountability in the Early Republic,
`85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1862 (2010) .......................................................................... 10
`Judith Resnik, Tiers,
`57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 837 (1984) ............................................................................. 16
`Alexander A. Reinert, Qualified Immunity’s Flawed Foundation,
`111 Calif. L. Rev. 201 (2023)............................................................................. 10
`Alexander A. Reinert, Unpacking a Decade of Appellate Decisions on Qualified Im-
`munity, Lawfare (March 18, 2021, at 10:46 AM) ....................................................... 18
`Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity,
`93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1797 (2018) ................................................................. 12
`
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`
`ix
`Shreya H. Shah, Should Technology be Trusted? The Detrimental Role of Video Foot-
`age in a Qualified Immunity Analysis,
`73 Mercer L. Rev. 977 (2021) .................................................................... 3, 4, 25
`Jason Tiezzi, et al., Unaccountable, Inst. for J., (Feb. 2024) ........................... 2, 13, 24
`Matthew Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change,
`82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 901 (2015) ............................................................................ 12
`Erik Wemple, Pentagon Relaxes Press Access Rules,
`N.Y. Times (Oct. 6, 2025) .................................................................................. 26
`John Fabian Witt, Introduction: Constraint, Authority, and the Rule of Law in a Fed-
`eral Circuit Court of Appeals,
`85 Fordham L. Rev. 3 (2016) ............................................................................ 16
`
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`x
`PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`Petitioner Steven R. DeWitt respectfully requests a writ of certiorari to review
`the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
`OPINIONS BELOW
`Adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the United
`States District Court for the Northern District of Florida granted the defendant-ap-
`pellee’s motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. DeWitt v. Haney, No. 4:21-
`cv-340-AW-MAF, 2023 WL 2731865 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2023) (Pet. App. 18A –51A.)
`The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
`court’s judgment in an unpublished opinion, DeWitt v. Person, No. 23-11203, 2025 WL
`1368170 (11th Cir. May 12, 2025) (Pet. App. 1A–9A.) The court denied DeWitt’s peti-
`tion for rehearing en banc. (Pet. App. 12A–14A.)
`JURISDICTION
`The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued final judg-
`ment on May 12, 2025. (Pet. App. 10A.) The Eleventh Circuit denied DeWitt’s petition
`for rehearing en banc on July 8, 2025 . (Id. 12A.) This Court granted DeWitt’s Appli-
`cation for an Extension of Time Within Which to File a Petition for a Writ of Certio-
`rari on October 7, 2025. No. 25A401. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
`§ 1254(1).
`CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
`U.S. Const. amend. I, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are repro-
`duced in the Appendix to this petition. (Pet. App. 52A–54A.)
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`1
`INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
`Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in 1871 to provide a broad cause of action
`against any state official who deprives a person of their constitutional rights. The
`statute’s text is unequivocal: “Every person” who violates federal rights while acting
`under color of law “shall be liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis
`added). Nothing in § 1983’s language provides any exception or immunity for public
`officials. Curiously, the broad shield that Congress enacted to defend Americans from
`government intrusion on the ir constitutional rights has given rise to its very oppo-
`site—qualified immunity. Qualified immunity has become a nigh impenetrable shield
`that protects government officials, instead of the public, from liability for constitu-
`tional misconduct.
`The forging of public officials ’ shield began nearly a century after Congress
`enacted § 1983, when the Court began reading common-law immunities into the stat-
`ute. In Pierson v. Ray , 386 U.S. 547 (1967), this Court first suggested that officers
`could invoke a good -faith defense to § 1983 liability, even though “ lawsuits against
`officials for constitutional violations did not generally permit a good -faith defense
`during the early years of the Republic .” William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Un-
`lawful?, 106 Calif. L. Rev. 45, 55 (2018). Under the modern formulation first outlined
`in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, qualified immunity became unmoored from any common-law
`tether. Now, officials performing discretionary functions “generally are shielded from
`liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
`statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ”
`Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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`2
`This “clearly established” standard typically demands precedent (usually bind-
`ing precedent) that has already placed the constitutional question “ beyond debate”
`such that “every” reasonable official would understand the conduct to be unlawful.
`See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). In practice, plaintiffs must identify
`existing case law with nearly identical facts . Thus, “merely proving a constitutional
`deprivation doesn ’t cut it; plaintiffs must cite functionally identical precedent” to
`overcome immunity. Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 479 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willett,
`J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This allows officials to “duck conse-
`quences for bad behavior —no matter how palpably unreasonable —as long as they
`were the first to behave badly.” Id.
`The “clearly established” requirement has come under increasing criticism for
`its atextual ism and unworkability. Justice Thomas has noted that the Court “ di-
`verged from the historical inquiry mandated by the statute ” and “completely refor-
`mulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common law.”
`Ziglar v. Abbasi , 582 U.S. 120, 158– 59 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) . Instead of
`focusing on fidelity to the text of § 1983 or the common law, qualified immunity is
`predominately based in policy concerns. See id. Yet quantitative studies reveal that
`qualified immunity has failed to achieve its policy goals—confusing instead of clari-
`fying and shielding too broad a swath of government officials. See Jason Tiezzi et. al,
`Unaccountable, Inst. for J., 18, 26–27 (Feb. 2024), https://tinyurl.com/49y8e5ye (find-
`ing that courts ’ rationales for granting qualified immunity were ambiguous in one
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`3
`out of every four decisions and that 18% of all appeals encompassed First Amendment
`violations, most of which were premeditated).
`The “clearly established” requirement has also produced something of a con-
`stitutional Catch-22. Plaintiffs must produce prior decisions on point even as courts,
`allowed to skip directly to the “ clearly established” question, increasingly decline to
`issue any precedential decisions on the merits . Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223,
`236–37 (2009). The result is a pernicious cycle of “constitutional stagnation” in which
`“important constitutional questions go unanswered precisely because those questions
`are yet unanswered.” Zadeh, 928 F.3d at 479 (Willett, J., concurring in part and dis-
`senting in part). The current qualified immunity regime is , therefore, not only not
`tied to the text of § 1983 or to the common law, it is also fostering a permissive stag-
`nation of constitutional jurisprudence.
`This stagnation is particularly pernicious where, as here, it affects core consti-
`tutional rights that respond to developments in technology—those the First Amend-
`ment protects. This Court has recognized that “[t]he Framers may have been una-
`ware of certain speakers or forms of communication, but that does not mean those
`speakers and media are entitled to less First Amendment protection.” Citizens United
`v. Fed. Election Comm ’n, 558 U.S. 310, 353 (2010). Yet under qualified immunity,
`technology complicates a plaintiff’s ability to show clearly established rights. Evolv-
`ing forms of communication drive a wedge between any “clearly established” and the
`reality of modern -day communication. See Shreya H. Shah, Should Technology be
`Trusted? The Detrimental Role of Video Footage in a Qualified Immunity Analysis, 73
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`4
`Mercer L. Rev. 977, 989–90 (2021). As technology develops, plaintiffs will be increas-
`ingly unable to find factually similar cases and will struggle to show the law applies
`with obvious clarity. See id. at 990.
`As a result, qualified immunity places the freedom of the press in a precarious
`position. The maintenance of a free press is a foundational tenet of the American
`system of governance. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971).
`The First Amendment secures this right for all individuals who engage in newsgath-
`ering activities, making no distinction between professional reporters and citizen ob-
`servers; both rely on the same protections provided for the free press. Citizens United,
`558 U.S. at 352. So when a public official threatens to detain or arrest an individual
`engaged in newsgathering, qualified immunity acts as an atextual shield from liabil-
`ity for violating a fundamental right . This Court recognizes that the freedom of the
`press would be “eviscerated” without a degree of protection for seeking out the news.
`Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972). Weakening that right for citizen ob-
`servers inevitably undermines the constitutional foundation that protects institu-
`tional journalism as well.
`S
`TATEMENT OF THE CASE
`This case arises from a peaceful attempt by petitioner Steven R. DeWitt to
`gather news and conduct an interview with a public official in a publicly accessible
`government office lobby. (ECF No. 45 at 5.) In August 2021, DeWitt entered the lobby
`of a Florida state probation office in Tallahassee to gather information for a news
`story he was preparing. (Id.) DeWitt intended to interview Virginia Jackson, a pro-
`bation office employee and conduct a First Amendment audit––that is, to test
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`5
`whether public officials would honor his constitutional right to gather news in public
`places. (Id. at 7.); see also Anna T. Beavers, First Amendment Audits: A Socio-Political
`Movement, 93 Miss. L. J. 527, 528 (2023). The probation office lobby was open to the
`public, and DeWitt remained in the common area without disruption. (ECF No. 45 at
`5–6) Upon noticing DeWitt ’s camera, respondent Ceressa Haney, a state probation
`supervisor, confronted him. (Id. at 7.) Haney stated that DeWitt was not permitted
`to record inside the lobby without staff permission and threatened to call the police if
`he did not leave. (Id.) DeWitt explained to Haney that he was there to interview Jack-
`son, and that Anthony Washington, another probatio n officer, had told DeWitt that
`he was well within his right to wait and record in the public lobby. (Id.) DeWitt stayed
`in the public lobby, and Haney dialed 911. ( Id.) Officers Trent Sexton and Melanie
`Pretti of the Tallahassee Police Department responded to the scene at Haney ’s re-
`quest. (Id. at 8, 10.)
`What followed was a rapid escalation to threats of arrest. When Sexton arrived,
`he briefly conferred with Haney outside of DeWitt ’s hearing. (Id. at 8.) Sexton re-
`turned to the lobby and immediately ordered DeWitt to leave, incorrectly asserting
`that DeWitt was trespassing on private property . (Id. at 8–9.) Sexton threatened to
`arrest DeWitt for criminal trespass if DeWitt refused to leave. (Id. at 9–10.) Pretti
`then arrived and likewise threatened to arrest DeWitt if he did not immediately leave
`both the building and its surrounding area. (Id. at 10.) Notably, neither officer asked
`for DeWitt’s identity or his purpose for being at the probation office. T heir concern
`was that he was recording in a public lobby. (See generally ECF No. 45.) Under the
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`6
`explicit threat of being jailed, DeWitt felt he had no choice but to leave the probation
`office. (Id. at 9–10.) So he left the lobby “under threat of arrest,” though Sexton falsely
`claimed in an incident report that DeWitt departed “willingly.” (Id. at 10.)
`DeWitt, initially pro se, filed suit under § 1983 against Sexton, Pretti, and
`Haney, claiming that the defendants violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment
`rights by ejecting him from a public government lobby for recording. (See generally
`ECF No. 1.) The defendants moved to dismiss. (See generally ECF No. 51 and 55.) A
`magistrate judge issued a r eport and r ecommendation concluding that DeWitt had
`stated a valid First Amendment claim but nevertheless recommending dismissal be-
`cause the right to record in this context was not “clearly established” for purposes of
`qualified immunity. (ECF No. 62 at 18– 24.) The magistrate judge accordingly con-
`cluded that the defendants were immune from liability despite DeWitt’s valid consti-
`tutional claim. (Id.)
`In March 2023, the district court granted the motion to dismiss on qualified -
`immunity grounds. (ECF No. 71 at 5 –7.) (Pet. App. 18A– 51A.) The court “ agree[d]
`with the magistrate judge as to qualified immunity,” but it did “not reach the separate
`question of whether the complaint sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation.” (Id.
`at 2–3); (Pet. App. 44A–45A.) DeWitt timely appealed. (ECF No. 73 at 1.)
`A three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed . (Pet. App. 6A.) DeWitt
`relied on Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) , which
`stated that “ The First Amendment protects the right to gather information about
`what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters
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`of public interest ,” as binding precedent that clearly established his right to record
`public officials in a public lobby. Despite acknowledging Smith, the Eleventh Circuit
`decided that its principle was too general to clearly establish the law. Citing its deci-
`sion in Crocker v. Beatty, the court reasoned that Smith’s holding “came without much
`explanation” or factual context and thus did not clearly govern “other circumstances”
`beyond its own facts. (Pet. App. 6A.) In Crocker, the Eleventh Circuit refused to find
`a clearly established right to film police during a highway traffic accident, reasoning
`that “Smith’s general rule” did not apply with “obvious clarity” to that distinct situa-
`tion. Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1243 (11th Cir. 2021). Echoing its analysis in
`Crocker, the court here reasoned that Smith provided no “details or facts” that would
`alert a reasonable official that filming inside the lobby of a probation office was pro-
`tected activity. (Pet. App. 6A.) The panel emphasized that neither the Supreme Court
`nor the Eleventh Circuit had ever addressed recording inside a government office
`building specifically. (Id.)
`Therefore, it concluded, “neither Smith nor any case from the Supreme Court
`or this Court is sufficiently analogous to . . . make clear to any reasonable official in
`the defendants’ positions that preventing a person from filming inside the lobby of a
`probation office would violate that person ’s constitutional rights. ” (Id.) Lacking an
`earlier decision “on all fours” with the present facts, the court held that DeWitt “failed
`to allege the violation of a clearly established right,” entitling Haney and the officers
`to qualified immunity as a matter of law. ( Id.) The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
`dismissal of DeWitt’s claims, effectively ending the case without any determination
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`on the merits of the First Amendment question. (Id. 7A.) DeWitt then petitioned for
`rehearing, which the Eleventh Circuit denied. (Id. 12A–14A.)
`REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
`The Eleventh Circuit’s decision exemplifies not only an overly restri