`
`No. 25A319
`IN THE
`Supreme Court of the United States
`
`DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States, et al.,
`Applicants,
`v.
`ASHTON ORR, et al.,
`Respondents.
`
`On Emergency Application for Stay from the
`United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
`
`BRIEF OF INDIANA, 25 OTHER STATES, AND THE
`ARIZONA LEGISLATURE AS AMICI CURIAE
`IN SUPPORT OF APPLICANTS
`
`
`Office of the Attorney General
`IGC South, Fifth Floor
`302 W. Washington Street
`Indianapolis, IN 46204
`(317) 232-0709
`James.Barta@atg.in.gov
`
`October 3, 2025
` THEODORE E. ROKITA
` Attorney General of Indiana
` JAMES A. BARTA
` Solicitor General
` Counsel of Record
` JENNA M. LORENCE
` Deputy Solicitor General
` KATELYN E. DOERING
` Deputy Attorney General
`Counsel for State of Indiana
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................... ii
`INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................................................................... 1
`SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .............................................................................. 1
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 2
`I. The Constitution permits the government to issue papers that record
`sex rather than subjective identities .................................................................. 2
`
`II. Recording only sex on passports is a legitimate and rational choice ................ 7
`
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 10
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`CASES
`Corbitt v. Sec’y of the Ala. L. Enf’t Agency,
`115 F.4th 1335 (11th Cir. 2024) ............................................................................... 8
`Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Paxton,
`145 S. Ct. 2291 (2025) .......................................................................................... 2, 3
`Frontiero v. Richardson,
`411 U.S. 677 (1973) .................................................................................................. 4
`Gore v. Lee,
`107 F.4th 548 (6th Cir. 2024) ................................................................... 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
`Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Simmons,
`233 N.E.3d 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) .................................................................. 8, 9
`K.C. v. Individual Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of Ind.,
`121 F.4th 604 (7th Cir. 2024) ................................................................................... 6
`L.A. v. Braun,
`No. 1:25-cv-596-MPB-TAB, Dkt. 103 (S.D. Ind. Sep. 26, 2025) .............................. 5
`Lange v. Houston Cnty.,
`--- F.4th ---, No. 22-13626, 2025 WL 2602633 (11th Cir. Sep. 9,
`2025) (en banc).......................................................................................................... 6
`Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cnty.,
`450 U.S. 464 (1981) .................................................................................................. 4
`Reed v. Reed,
`404 U.S. 71 (1971) .................................................................................................... 4
`Sessions v. Morales-Santana,
`582 U.S. 47 (2017) ................................................................................................ 3, 4
`Shurtleff v. City of Boston,
`596 U.S. 243 (2022) .................................................................................................. 4
`United States v. Skrmetti,
`145 S. Ct. 1816 (2025) ...................................................................................... 3, 6, 7
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`CASES [CONT’D]
`United States v. Virginia,
`518 U.S. 515 (1996) .................................................................................................. 4
`STATUTES
`Act of Mar. 1, 1790, 1 Stat. 101 ..................................................................................... 5
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`Shaziya Allarakha, What are the 72 Other Genders, MedicineNet (Feb.
`9, 2024), https://www.medicinenet.com/
`what_are_the_72_other_genders/article.htm; ......................................................... 9
`Sex, American Heritage Dictionary (online ed.) ............................................................ 3
`A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles (Sir James A. H.
`Murray et al. eds., Oxford at the Clarendon Press 1914) ....................................... 3
`Aditi Bhargava et al., Considering Sex as a Biological Variable in
`Basic and Clinical Studies, 42 Endocrine Reviews 219 (2021) .......................... 7, 8
`Sex, Black’s Law Dictionary (2d ed. 1910) .................................................................... 3
`Laura Blakeslee et al., Age and Sex Composition: 2020 Census Briefs
`(2023), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/
`2020/census-briefs/c2020br-06.pdf ........................................................................... 5
`Walter O. Bockting, Transgender Identity Development, in 1 Am.
`Psych. Ass’n, APA Handbook of Sexuality and Psychology
`(D.L. Tolman & L.M. Diamond eds., 2014) ............................................................. 8
`H.L. Brumberg et al., History of the Birth Certificate: From Inception to
`the Future of Electronic Data, 32 J. of Perinatology 407 (2012) ............................. 5
`California is the first state to allow gender neutral birth certificates,
`WTHR (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.wthr.com/article/news/trending-
`viral/california-is-the-first-state-to-allow-gender-neutral-birth-
`certificates/531-bd724a01-10f7-4545-8cfe-d0388abb81ac ....................................... 6
`Sex, Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English
`Language (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1960) ..................................................... 3
`Alice M. Hetzel, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., U.S. Vital Statis-
`tics System: Major Activities & Developments, 1950–95 (1997) .............................. 5
`
`
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`
`
`iv
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES [CONT’D]
`Minesh Khatri, What Is Fluid?, WebMD (Aug. 10, 2025), https://www
`www.webmd.com/sex/whatsex/what-is-fluid ........................................................... 8
`Michael K. Laidlaw et al., Letter to the Editor, “Endocrine Treatment of
`Gender-Dysphoric/Gender-Incongruent Persons: An Endocrine
`Society Clinical Practice Guideline”, 104 J. Clinical Endocrinology
`& Metabolism 686 (2019) ..................................................................................... 7, 8
`Ian C. Langree, How Many Genders Are There? List of Gender
`Identities (updated June 11, 2025), https://www.disabled-world.com/
`disability/sexuality/lgbt/genders.php....................................................................... 9
`Lisa Littman et al., Detransition and Desistance Among Previously
`Trans-Identified Young Adults, 53 Archives of Sexual Behavior 57
`(2024) ........................................................................................................................ 8
`Sex, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary (online ed.) ............................................................ 3
`Katy Steinmetz, M, F, or X: Oregon Becomes First State to Allow Non-
`Binary Gender Marker on Drivers Licenses, Time (June 15, 2017),
`https://time.com/4820930/nonbinary-gender-marker-oregon-drivers-
`license/ ...................................................................................................................... 6
`The Federalist No. 44 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison) ........................................... 2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
` This case asks this Court to decide whe ther the Constitution and federal
`statutes give passport applicants the right to self -define their “sex.” The answer to
`that question is of significant interest to amici States. All of them keep a variety of
`state records that list sex and issue state papers, such as birth certificates and
`driver’s licenses, that record persons’ sex. For sex to be a useful category of
`information, States must be able to adopt some consistent definition of the term
`rather than let individuals be definitions unto themselves . Under respondents’
`theory, however, the federal government (and presumably States) cannot employ a
`traditional understanding of sex without violating the Constitution. This Court
`should grant the stay and clarify that no constitutional principle requires
`government-issued papers to serve as canvases for self-expression.
`SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
` In requiring U.S. passports to reflect a traditional understanding of sex, the
`federal government violated no constitutional principle. To list sex on passports—an
`action no one disputes the government can take—the government must be able to say
`what sex is. Understanding sex as the characteristic of being biologically male or fe-
`male accords with common usage , this Court’s precedent, and historical practice .
`Passport applicants have no right to decide how government-issued documents,
`which are property of the federal government, describe applicants’ sex.
` Respondents wrongly argue that the challenged policy discriminates on the
`basis of sex or transgender identification. Under the policy, no person can request
`that a passport record a trait other than the person’s sex. What respondents demand
`
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`
`2
`
`is not equal, but preferential, treatment . The Constitution does not require the gov-
`ernment to accommodate respondents’ desire for passports to record their current
`identities rather than the historical and biological fact of their sex.
` There are, moreover, good reasons to record sex on passports and other papers
`rather than unverifiable and changeable senses of gender. Directing that all pass-
`ports reflect sex promotes consistent records and provides an objective trait that can
`be used for identification purposes while avoiding difficulties that would accompany
`recording a subjective trait that can change and be expressed in innumerable ways.
`ARGUMENT
`I. The Constitution permits the government to issue papers that record
`sex rather than subjective identities
`
`Respondents do not challenge the federal government’s decades-old practice of
`issuing passports that record the bearer’s sex. Instead, their quarrel is with how the
`government understands sex. Respondents want a policy of “full self-selection” under
`which every passport applicant decides what “sex” means, arguing that it is uncon-
`stitutional to treat “sex” as referring to a binary, biological trait. Orr C.A. Stay Resp.
`3–4, 10–11; see D. Ct. Dkt. 30 at 26 –27. But it cannot be that the Constitution em-
`powers the government to issue passports recording applicants’ sex, yet withholds the
`power to define the term. “‘No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason,
`than that . . . wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power
`necessary for doing it is included.’” Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Paxton, 145 S. Ct. 2291,
`2306 (2025) (quoting The Federalist No. 44, p. 285 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison)).
`
`
`
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`
`
`3
`
`It thus follows that the government can determine what sex means, including by em-
`ploying a biological understanding of sex.
`In understanding sex biologically, the federal government adopted the “ ‘ordi-
`nary and appropriate means ’” of determining sex. Free Speech Coal. , 145 S. Ct. at
`2306–07. Evidence that “sex” ordinarily refers to a biological trait—not an unverifia-
`ble internal identity—abounds. See United States v. Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. 1816, 1856
`(2025) (Alito, J., concurring). Dictionaries, both old and new, speak of “sex” as refer-
`ring primarily to “the two major forms of individuals that occur in many species and
`that are distinguished respectively as female or male especially on the basis of their
`reproductive organs and structures.” Sex, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary (online ed.);
`see, e.g., Sex, American Heritage Dictionary (online ed.); Sex , 8 A New English Dic-
`tionary on Historical Principles 577 (Sir James A. H. Murray et al. eds., Oxford at the
`Clarendon Press 1914) (“[e]ither of the two divisions of organic beings distinguished
`as male and female respectively; the males or the females (of a species, etc., esp. of
`the human race) viewed collectively”)); Sex, 2 Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dic-
`tionary of the English Language 1152–53 (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1960)
`(“[e]ither of two divisions, male and female, by which organisms are distinguished
`with reference to the reproductive functions”); Sex , Black’s Law Dictionary 1081 (2d
`ed. 1910) (‘[t]he distinction between male and female; or the property or character by
`which an animal is male or female”).
`This Court’s decisions also leave no doubt that sex ordinarily refers to being
`biologically male or female. See, e.g., Sessions v. Morales- Santana, 582 U.S. 47, 58
`
`
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`
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`
`
`4
`
`(2017) (using “sex” in discussing legislation distinguishing between “mothers” and
`“fathers”); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996) (using “sex” to dis-
`cuss “enduring” “[p]hysical differences between men and women”); Michael M. v. Su-
`per. Ct. of Sonoma Cnty. , 450 U.S. 464, 469– 70 (1981) (acknowledging differences
`between “the sexes” when it comes to the “consequences of sexual activity,” such as
`pregnancy); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686, 688 (1973) (describing “sex”
`as an “immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth”); Reed v.
`Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (describing how a “sex” classification gives a “preference
`to members of either sex over members of the other”). It cannot be that the Constitu-
`tion bars the federal government from employing the same understanding of sex as
`this Court.
`Any argument that the “Constitution requires [the government] to use ‘sex’ to
`refer to gender identity” on government documents runs into a host of difficulties.
`Gore v. Lee, 107 F.4th 548, 557 (6th Cir. 2024). For one, there is no deeply rooted ,
`historically established fundamental right to require the government to adopt a par-
`ticular terminology in keeping records and issuing papers. See id. The government
`must be able to decide “what to say and what not to say” in its own records “for gov-
`ernment to work.” Shurtleff v. City of Boston, 596 U.S. 243, 251 (2022). “How . . . could
`a government keep uniform records of any sort if the disparate views of its citizens
`about shifting norms in society controlled the government’s choices of language and
`of what information” to put on government-issued papers? Gore, 107 F.4th at 557.
`
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`5
`
`For another, the federal government and States have used the challenged pol-
`icy’s understanding of “sex” ever since the Constitution was adopted. In 1790, for ex-
`ample, the first Congress commissioned a census and directed census takers to
`“distinguish[]” between “the sexes.” Act of Mar. 1, 1790, 1 Stat. 101, 101. Every U.S.
`census since has l ikewise collected information about “sex ”—meaning whether “an
`individual [i]s male or female ”—not “gender.” Laura Blakeslee et al., Age and Sex
`Composition: 2020 Census Briefs (2023), https://www2.census.gov/library/publica-
`tions/decennial/2020/census-briefs/c2020br-06.pdf; see Alice M. Hetzel, U.S. Dep’t of
`Health & Hum. Servs., U.S. Vital Statistics System: Major Activities & Developments,
`1950–95 at 28 tbl. 1 (1997).
`States, too, have “consistently” kept birth certificates and other records that
`reflect sex is a biological concept . Gore, 107 F.4th at 555–56. Massachusetts started
`the practice of recording newborns’ sex in 1842, and with federal encouragement, all
`other States eventually followed. See id. at 551–52, 555–56; H.L. Brumberg et al. ,
`History of the Birth Certificate: From Inception to the Future of Electronic Data, 32 J.
`of Perinatology 407, 408–09 (2012). “Since 1907,” for example, “Indiana has deliber-
`ately chosen to record sex—not gender identity—on birth certificates.” L.A. v. Braun,
`No. 1:25-cv-596-MPB-TAB, Dkt. 103 at 15 (S.D. Ind. Sep. 26, 2025).
`Only in the last few years have some authorities began allowing persons to
`self-define “sex” on government-issued papers. Before 2017, no State allowed persons
`to request changes to the sex recorded on birth certificates “based on self-designation
`alone” or offer ed “X” as an option for sex on government -issued papers. Gore, 107
`
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`6
`
`F.4th at 552; see Katy Steinmetz, M, F, or X: Oregon Becomes First State to Allow
`Non-Binary Gender Marker on Drivers Licenses, Time (June 15, 2017), https://
`time.com/4820930/nonbinary-gender-marker-oregon-drivers-license/; California is
`the first state to allow gender neutral birth certificates, WTHR (Oct. 19, 2017), https://
`www.wthr.com/article/news/trending-viral/california-is-the-first-state-to-allow-gen-
`der-neutral-birth-certificates/531-bd724a01-10f7-4545-8cfe-d0388abb81ac. And the
`federal government only began allowing passport applicants to self -define sex in
`2021. See Stay App. 8a. The notion that the Constitution requires the government to
`continue a policy adopted just four years ago finds no support.
`Examining the matter through United States v. Skrmetti , 145 S. Ct. 1816
`(2025), does not alter the analysis. Again, respondents do not claim there is a problem
`with recording sex on passports or issuing the sexes passports with different sex
`markers. Instead, respondents take issue with the decision to issue passports that
`“‘reflect[] only [applicants’] sex.’” Orr C.A. Stay Resp. 10. But the decision to record
`sex rather than gender identity does not violate equal protection. As Skrmetti ex-
`plains, a policy discriminates based on sex only where it “prohibit[s] conduct for one
`sex that it permits for the other” or confers a benefit on one sex that it withholds from
`the other. Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. at 1831; accord Lange v. Houston Cnty. , --- F.4th ---,
`No. 22-13626, 2025 WL 2602633, at *3 (11th Cir. Sep. 9, 2025) (en banc); K.C. v. In-
`dividual Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of Ind. , 121 F.4th 604, 616 (7th Cir. 2024);
`Gore, 107 F.4th at 556. A policy that requires all passports to record sex does not
`“ascribe different benefits and burdens to the sexes.” Gore, 107 F.4th at 556.
`
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`7
`
`For similar reasons, the challenged policy does not discriminate based on
`transgender identification—which is not a suspect or quasi -suspect class in any
`event, see Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. at 1851 (Barrett, J., concurring); id. at 1866 (Alito, J.,
`concurring). The government’s policy does not create two groups of people, with
`transgender- and nonbinary -identifying passport applicants in one group and all
`other applicants in the other. Under the policy, “no” applicant can obtain a passport
`that records a sex different from the applicant’s sex. See id. at 1831 (majority op.). A
`female applicant who identifies as female but wishes for her passport to describe her
`sex as “X” to express disdain for traditional views of ge nder can no more obtain a
`passport with an “X” than a female applicant who identifies as non -binary. In short,
`the challenged policy does not single out either sex or any gender identity for less
`favorable or more beneficial treatment. It establishes a single rule that applies to
`everyone.
`II. Recording only sex on passports is a legitimate and rational choice
`
`Respondents resort to accusations of animus . Orr C.A. Stay Resp. 8 . Surely,
`however, it is not wholly irrational for the federal government to use the same “con-
`sistent, historical, and biologically based definition of sex” that many States use .
`Gore, 107 F.4th at 561. Sex can be objectively verified . See Aditi Bhargava et al.,
`Considering Sex as a Biological Variable in Basic and Clinical Studies, 42 Endocrine
`Reviews 219, 220–21 (2021). An inner identity cannot. See Michael K. Laidlaw et al.,
`Letter to the Editor, “Endocrine Treatment of Gender-Dysphoric/Gender-Incongruent
`Persons: An Endocrine Society Clinical Practice Guideline” , 104 J. Clinical
`
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`
`
`
`8
`
`Endocrinology & Metabolism 686, 686 (2019). Sex is also stable. Bhargava et al., su-
`pra, at 220–21. Identities can—and do—change. See Walter O. Bockting, Transgender
`Identity Development, in 1 Am. Psych. Ass’n, APA Handbook of Sexuality and Psy-
`chology 739, 744 (D.L. Tolman & L.M. Diamond eds., 2014); Lisa Littman et al., De-
`transition and Desistance Among Previously Trans -Identified Young Adults , 53
`Archives of Sexual Behavior 57, 57 (2024). Indeed, some go so far as to describe their
`identities as “fluid.” Minesh Khatri, What Is Fluid?, WebMD (Aug. 10, 2025),
`https://wwwwww.webmd.com/sex/whatsex/what-is-fluid. That renders it “rational []”
`for the government to conclude that “recording . . . [the] objective characteristic of sex
`better advances the [government’s] interest in accurate identification than would re-
`cording a person’s subjective . . . identity.” Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Simmons,
`233 N.E.3d 1016, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 248 N.E.3d 1196 (Ind. 2024); see
`Corbitt v. Sec’y of the Ala. L. Enf’t Agency, 115 F.4th 1335, 1349–50 (11th Cir. 2024).
`Respondents’ proffered alternative —treating sex as a self- defined trait —
`demonstrates the rationality of the challenged policy. If respondents had their way,
`some U.S. passports “would show biological sex, others gender identity.” Gore, 107
`F.4th at 561. That would perpetuate internally inconsistent recordkeeping. Given
`that gender identities can change —even “daily,” Khatri, supra—respondents’ ap-
`proach would create situations in which the information printed in passports does
`not match the passport holders’ current perceptions of themselves. That makes the
`information recorded less valuable and creates potential logistical complications for
`the government, which must decide what to do about the inconsistency.
`
`
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`
`9
`
`Then there is the problem of manageable limits. While there are two sexes,
`gender identity is no t so limited. Gender identity is a subjective inner perception,
`which means there can be as many possible identities as people have perceptions of
`themselves. Some sources say there are dozens of identities, see Shaziya Allarakha,
`What are the 72 Other Genders, MedicineNet (Feb. 9, 2024), https://www.medi-
`cinenet.com/what_are_the_72_other_genders/article.htm; others many more, see Ian
`C. Langree, How Many Genders Are There? List of Gender Identities ( updated June
`11, 2025), https:// www.disabled-world.com/disability/sexuality/lgbt/genders.php.
`Whatever one makes of those sources, they illustrate the point: administrative con-
`siderations make it rational to record “an individual’s sex” instead of “reporting a
`subjective status with innumerable designations.” Simmons, 233 N.E.3d at 1028.
`Perhaps respondents will suggest that the government could offer a limited
`number of options (say, M, F, and X). But respondents’ theory admits no limiting
`principle. If, as respondents claim, it is a constitutional problem to say that “there
`are only ‘ two sexes, male and female, ’” Orr C.A. Stay Resp. 11, then it is equally a
`problem to say that there are only three genders. And if the Constitution requires
`that the government issue passports with an “M” to females who identify as male, id.
`at 10, logically the government should have to cater to other identities in the same
`way. Why should the government be able to issue passports with an impersonal “X”
`to those who feel that the letter does not accurately capture their senses of gender?
`The answer to that question —and respondents’ whole case —is that decisions about
`which traits to record on passports are the stuff of policy, not constitutional law.
`
`
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`
`
`10
`
`CONCLUSION
` The Court should grant a stay.
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
` THEODORE E. ROKITA
`Indiana Attorney General
`
`JAMES A. BARTA
`Solicitor General
`Counsel of Record
`
`JENNA M. LORENCE
`Deputy Solicitor General
`
`KATELYN E. DOERING
`Deputy Attorney General
`
`Office of the Indiana Attorney General
`302 W. Washington St.
`Indiana Government Center South,
`5th Floor
`Indianapolis, IN 46204-2770
`Phone: (317) 232-0709
`Fax: (317) 232-7979
`James.Barta@atg.in.gov
`
`Counsel for State of Indiana
`
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`ADDITIONAL SIGNATORIES
`
`STEVE MARSHALL
`Attorney General
`State of Alabama
`
`S
`TEPHEN J. COX
`Attorney General
`State of Alaska
`
`T
`IM GRIFFIN
`Attorney General
`State of Arkansas
`
`J
`AMES UTHMEIER
`Attorney General
`State of Florida
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`C
`HRISTOPHER M. CARR
`Attorney General
`State of Georgia
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`R
`AÚL LABRADOR
`Attorney General
`State of Idaho
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`BRENNA BIRD
`Attorney General
`State of Iowa
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`KRIS KOBACH
`Attorney General
`State of Kansas
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`R
`USSELL COLEMAN
`Attorney General
`State of Kentucky
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`L
`IZ MURRILL
`Attorney General
`State of Louisiana
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`L
`YNN FITCH
`Attorney General
`State of Mississippi
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`C
`ATHERINE HANAWAY
`Attorney General
`State of Missouri
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`A
`USTIN KNUDSEN
`Attorney General
`State of Montana
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`M
`ICHAEL T. HILGERS
`Attorney General
`State of Nebraska
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`D
`REW H. WRIGLEY
`Attorney General
`State of North Dakota
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`DAVID A. YOST
`Attorney General
`State of Ohio
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`GENTNER F. DRUMMOND
`Attorney General
`State of Oklahoma
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`DAVE SUNDAY
`Attorney General
`Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
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`A
`LAN WILSON
`Attorney General
`State of South Carolina
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`M
`ARTY JACKLEY
`Attorney General
`State of South Dakota
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`JONATHAN SKRMETTI
`Attorney General and Reporter
`State of Tennessee
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`KEN PAXTON
`Attorney General
`State of Texas
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`D
`EREK BROWN
`Attorney General
`State of Utah
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`JOHN B. MCCUSKEY
`Attorney General
`State of West Virginia
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`KEITH G. KAUTZ
`Attorney General
`State of Wyoming
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`S
`TEVE MONTENEGRO
`Speaker of the Arizona
`House of Representatives
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`W
`ARREN PETERSEN
`President of the
`Arizona State Senate
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