No. 25A___
`IN THE
`Supreme Court of the United States
`GOOGLE LLC, et al.,
`Applicants,
`v.
`EPIC GAMES, INC.,
`Respondent.
`APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY OF PERMANENT INJUNCTION
`PENDING DISPOSITION OF PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`JESSICA L. ELLSWORTH
`REEDY C. SWANSON
`NATALIE SALMANOWITZ
`HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
`555 Thirteenth Street, NW
`Washington, D.C. 20004
`(202) 637-5600
`JOHANNAH CASSEL-WALKER
`HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
`4 Embarcadero Center
`Suite 3500
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`(415) 374-2334
`NEAL KUMAR KATYAL
`Counsel of Record
`SAMANTHA K. ILAGAN
`MILBANK LLP
`1101 New York Avenue, NW
`Washington, D.C. 20005
`(202) 835-7505
`nkatyal@milbank.com
`KATHERINE B. WELLINGTON
`HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
`125 High Street, Suite 2010
`Boston, MA 02110
`(617) 371-1000
`Counsel for Applicants
`September 24, 2025
`(Additional Counsel Listed on Inside Cover)
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`Additional Counsel:
`BRIAN C. ROCCA
`SUJAL J. SHAH
`MICHELLE PARK CHIU
`LEIGHA BECKMAN
`MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
`One Market, Spear Street Tower
`San Francisco, CA 94105
`(415) 442-1000
`JONATHAN I. KRAVIS
`MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
`601 Massachusetts Avenue NW
`Suite 500E
`Washington, D.C. 20001
`(202) 220-1100
`GLENN D. POMERANTZ
`KURUVILLA OLASA
`MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
`350 South Grand Avenue
`Fiftieth Floor
`Los Angeles, California 90071
`(213) 683-9100
`JUSTIN P. RAPHAEL
`DANE P. SHIKMAN
`MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
`560 Mission Street
`Twenty Seventh Floor
`San Francisco, California 94105
`(415) 512-4000
`Counsel for Applicants
`
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`i
`RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
`Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6, the undersigned counsel certifies the
`following:
`Google LLC is a subsidiary of XXVI Holdings Inc., which is a subsidiary of
`Alphabet Inc., a publicly traded company; no publicly traded company holds more
`than 10% of Alphabet Inc.’s stock.
`Google Payment Corp. is a subsidiary of Google LLC. Google LLC is a
`subsidiary of XXVI Holdings Inc., which is a subsidiary of Alphabet Inc., a publicly
`traded company; no publicly traded company holds more than 10% of Alphabet Inc.’s
`stock.
`Google Commerce Ltd. is an indirect subsidiary of Google LLC. Google LLC is
`a subsidiary of XXVI Holdings Inc., which is a subsidiary of Alphabet Inc., a publicly
`traded company; no publicly traded company owns more than 10% of Alphabet Inc.’s
`stock.
`Google Ireland Ltd. is an indirect subsidiary of Google LLC. Google LLC is a
`subsidiary of XXVI Holdings Inc., which is a subsidiary of Alphabet Inc., a publicly
`traded company; no publicly traded company owns more than 10% of Alphabet Inc.’s
`stock.
`Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd. is an indirect subsidiary of Google LLC. Google
`LLC is a subsidiary of XXVI Holdings Inc., which is a subsidiary of Alphabet Inc., a
`publicly traded company; no publicly traded company owns more than 10% of
`Alphabet Inc.’s stock.
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`ii
`PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
`Applicants are Google LLC, Google Payment Corp., Google Commerce Ltd.,
`Google Ireland Ltd., and Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd. (collectively, “Google”).
`Respondent is Epic Games, Inc. (“Epic”).
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`iii
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`Page
`RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ..................................................................... i
`PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING .............................................................................. ii
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... iv
`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1
`STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................................... 6
`A. Legal Background ............................................................................... 6
`B. Factual Background ............................................................................ 8
`STANDARD OF REVIEW ........................................................................................... 16
`ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................ 17
`I. THIS COURT IS LIKELY TO GRANT CERTIORARI AND
`REVERSE .................................................................................................... 17
`A. The Ninth Circuit’s Approach To The Rule Of Reason
`Conflicts With This Court’s Precedents And Exacerbates
`An Existing Circuit Split .................................................................. 17
`B. The Duty-To-Deal Remedies Create A Circuit Split And
`Violate This Court’s Precedents ....................................................... 23
`C. The Ninth Circuit’s Refusal To Assess Epic’s Standing To
`Seek Nationwide Relief Contravenes This Court’s
`Precedents And Entrenches A Circuit Split .................................... 30
`II. ABSENT A STAY, GOOGLE AND THE ANDROID
`ECOSYSTEM WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM ............................ 35
`A. The Injunction Exposes Users And Developers To
`Substantial New Security Risks ....................................................... 36
`B. The Injunction Will Inflict Irreparable Harm On Google ............... 40
`III. THE REMAINING EQUITABLE FACTORS FAVOR A STAY ................. 42
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 43
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`iv
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`Page(s)
`CASES:
`1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. FTC,
`1 F.4th 102 (2d Cir. 2021) ...................................................................................... 19
`Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. DHHS,
`594 U.S. 758 (2021) ................................................................................................ 40
`Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States,
`246 U.S. 231 (1918) ................................................................................................ 22
`Buccaneer Energy (USA) Inc. v. Gunnison Energy Corp.,
`846 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 2017) ........................................................................ 19, 20
`Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC,
`526 U.S. 756 (1999) ................................................................................................ 21
`Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc.,
`582 U.S. 497 (2017) ................................................................................................ 43
`Care Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc.,
`427 F.3d 1008 (6th Cir. 2005) ................................................................................ 20
`Carney v. Adams,
`592 U.S. 53 (2020) .................................................................................................. 35
`Carter v. Local 556, Transp. Workers Union of Am.,
`138 F.4th 164 (5th Cir. 2025) ................................................................................. 33
`City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
`461 U.S. 95 (1983) .................................................................................................. 15
`Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
`568 U.S. 398 (2013) ................................................................................................ 30
`DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
`547 U.S. 332 (2006) .......................................................................................... 32, 33
`Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc.,
`504 U.S. 451 (1992) ................................................................................................ 22
`Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`559 F. Supp. 3d 898 (N.D. Cal. 2021) .................................................................... 11
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
`Page(s)
`v
`Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`67 F.4th 946 (9th Cir. 2023) ................................................... 3, 4, 11, 13, 15, 18, 21
`Expert Masonry, Inc. v. Boone County,
`440 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 2006) ............................................................................ 19, 20
`Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
`528 U.S. 167 (2000) ................................................................................................ 31
`FTC v. Qualcomm Inc.,
`969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020) ............................................................................ 17, 18
`Gill v. Whitford,
`585 U.S. 48 (2018) ............................................................................................ 32, 33
`Gregory v. Fort Bridger Rendezvous Ass’n,
`448 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2006) .............................................................................. 20
`Hollingsworth v. Perry,
`558 U.S. 183 (2010) .......................................................................................... 17, 35
`Impax Labs., Inc. v. FTC,
`994 F.3d 484 (5th Cir. 2021) .................................................................................. 19
`Int’l Salt Co. v. United States,
`332 U.S. 392 (1947) ................................................................................................ 27
`Kentucky v. Yellen,
`54 F.4th 325 (6th Cir. 2022) ................................................................................... 33
`Kirola v. City & County of San Francisco,
`860 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2017) ................................................................................ 31
`Law v. NCAA,
`134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998) .............................................................................. 20
`Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
`551 U.S. 877 (2007) .................................................................................................. 6
`Lewis v. Casey,
`518 U.S. 343 (1996) ................................................................................................ 31
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
`Page(s)
`vi
`Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
`504 U.S. 555 (1992) ................................................................................................ 31
`Maryland v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,
`--- F.4th. ---, No. 25-1248, 2025 WL 2586795 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2025) ............ 32, 33
`Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp.,
`373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (en banc) ............................................. 24, 25, 27, 29
`McWane, Inc. v. FTC,
`783 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2015) ................................................................................ 19
`Merrill v. People First of Alabama,
`141 S. Ct. 25 (2020) .......................................................................................... 16, 17
`Murthy v. Missouri,
`603 U.S. 43 (2024) ................................................................................ 15, 32, 34, 35
`Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co.,
`838 F.3d 421 (3rd Cir. 2016) .................................................................................. 19
`Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston,
`594 U.S. 69 (2021) ........................................................... 1, 4, 7, 8, 17, 18, 20-22, 28
`Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club,
`325 F.3d 712 (6th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................. 20
`Nat’l Insts. of Health v. Am. Pub. Health Ass’n,
`606 U.S. ---, 2025 WL 2415669 (2025) ................................................................... 40
`Nat’l Soc. of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States,
`435 U.S. 679 (1978) ............................................................................................ 7, 27
`Nilavar v. Mercy Health Sys.,
`244 F. App’x 690 (6th Cir. 2007) ............................................................................ 20
`Ohio v. Am. Express Co.,
`585 U.S. 529 (2018) ............................................................................ 4, 7, 17, 18, 27
`OJ Com., LLC v. KidKraft, Inc.,
`34 F.4th 1232 (11th Cir. 2022) ......................................................................... 19, 20
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
`Page(s)
`vii
`Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Comm’ns, Inc.,
`555 U.S. 438 (2009) ............................................................................................ 6, 28
`Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Scott,
`561 U.S. 1301 (2010) .............................................................................................. 41
`Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
`463 U.S. 1315 (1983) .............................................................................................. 36
`Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC,
`402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005) .............................................................................. 19
`Seattle Pac. Univ. v. Ferguson,
`104 F.4th 50 (9th Cir. 2024) ............................................................................. 31, 34
`Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan,
`506 U.S. 447 (1993) ................................................................................................ 23
`State Oil v. Khan,
`522 U.S. 3 (1997) .................................................................................................... 21
`Tennessee Conf. of NAACP v. Lee,
`139 F.4th 557 (6th Cir. 2025) ................................................................................. 33
`TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,
`594 U.S. 413 (2021) ................................................................................................ 35
`Trump v. Wilcox,
`145 S. Ct. 1415 (2025) ............................................................................................ 16
`United States v. Am. Airlines Grp. Inc.,
`121 F.4th 209 (1st Cir. 2024) ................................................................................. 19
`United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
`366 U.S. 316 (1961) ................................................................................................ 29
`United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
`253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) ............................................................. 18, 24
`Universal Life Church Monastery Storehouse v. Nabors,
`35 F.4th 1021 (6th Cir. 2022) ................................................................................. 33
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
`Page(s)
`viii
`Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski,
`592 U.S. 279 (2021) ................................................................................................ 31
`Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP,
`540 U.S. 398 (2004) ............................................................................ 4, 8, 22, 27, 28
`Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp.,
`951 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 2020) .................................................................................. 19
`Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC,
`257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001) .................................................................................... 20
`STATUTES:
`15 U.S.C. § 1 ................................................................................................................... 6
`15 U.S.C. § 2 ................................................................................................................... 6
`28 U.S.C. § 1651 ........................................................................................................... 16
`OTHER AUTHORITY:
`3 Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 650a ......................................................... 24
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`1
`TO THE HONORABLE ELENA KAGAN, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
`SUPREME COURT AND CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT:
`INTRODUCTION
`This case asks the Court to evaluate the lawfulness of an unprecedented
`antitrust injunction awarded at the request of a single, private plaintiff that will
`restructure the entire Android ecosystem, relied on by over 100 million U.S. users
`and over 500,000 app developers. As multiple amici confirm, the injunction exposes
`these users and developers to substantial new safety and security risks and compels
`Google to act as both supplier and distributor for its direct competitors. The Ninth
`Circuit’s decision affirming this injunction is on the wrong side of three different
`circuit splits and violates this Court’s twin commands that antitrust injunctions must
`avoid “mistaken condemnations of legitimate business arrangements” and that
`antitrust courts “make for poor central planners and should never aspire to the role.”
`Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69, 99, 103 (2021) (quotation marks
`omitted). Google seeks a stay of the provisions of the injunction that are the most
`intrusive and raise the greatest security concerns while this Court evaluates the
`substantial legal questions presented by this sweeping, nationwide injunction.
`This case concerns the multibillion-dollar markets for mobile devices,
`operating systems, applications (“apps”), and purchases within apps. For nearly two
`decades, Google has been locked in fierce competition with Apple within these
`markets. Google and Apple have taken fundamentally different approaches. Apple
`operates as a closed “walled garden”—it manufactures all its own devices for which
`the only source of apps is Apple’s proprietary App Store. Google takes the opposite
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`(and more open) approach: It makes its operating system, Android, available for free
`to any device manufacturer, allows anyone to operate an Android app store, and
`allows users many ways to download apps, including directly from the Internet.
`Google also offers its own app store, called the Play store, which offers
`enhanced security screening for apps, tools for app developers, software update
`management services, and much more. For the 97% of developers who offer only free
`apps on the Play store, Google makes these services available for free. It sustains
`this business model by charging a service fee when developers charge users for app
`downloads or in-app digital goods.
`Google’s open system for Android offers consumers the massive advantage of
`choice, but it means Google must work harder to maintain security in the Android
`ecosystem and to provide users with the kind of seamless, out-of-the-box experience
`that they expect. To that end, Google has entered into contracts with device
`manufacturers, mobile carriers, and others to help ensure that Android devices are
`equipped with Play and other baseline apps, to make sure developers are willing to
`make the investments necessary to offer their apps on Android, and to incentivize
`business partners to stay up to date with the latest security and other software
`updates.
`The plaintiff here, the multibillion-dollar gaming company Epic Games, sought
`to compel Google and Apple to allow Epic to distribute its apps through their stores
`without compensating Google and Apple for their services. Epic lost its antitrust
`claims against Apple, after the Ninth Circuit affirmed findings that Apple’s “walled
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`garden” approach was a form of lawful competition against Google and other Android
`app stores. Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 67 F.4th 946 (9th Cir. 2023). In this case,
`however, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict holding Google liable under the
`Sherman Act for the very policies designed to allow Google to effectively compete with
`Apple. The court then affirmed a sweeping injunction completely overhauling the
`Play store—not just as to Epic, but as to all users, developers, and Android business
`partners across the United States.
`Most notably, the injunction compels Google to deal directly with its competitor
`app stores in two different ways. First, Google must act as a supplier for those stores
`by making Play’s catalog of two-million-plus apps available on demand through
`competitors’ app stores. Google must then act as a distributor for its competitors by
`allowing competitor stores to be available for Play’s users to download directly from
`Play. Google must also permit app developers to include external links (“linkouts”)
`in their apps on Play that send users to unknown and potentially untrustworthy sites
`to complete purchases or download apps.1
`As Google’s forthcoming certiorari petition will explain, three aspects of the
`Ninth Circuit’s decision affirming this injunction warrant this Court’s review:
`First, the Ninth Circuit’s precedent permitted Google to be held liable under
`the Sherman Act’s Rule of Reason without requiring the jury to find that Google could
`1 These obligations arise from ¶¶ 9-12 of the injunction. App. 69a-70a. The injunction also
`requires Google to modify its contracting practices with business partners in various ways and to allow
`developers to offer payment processing systems other than Google Play Billing (in ¶¶ 4-10). App. 68a-
`69a. Google does not seek to stay those provisions of the injunction. Google also does not seek a stay
`of ¶¶ 9-10 to the extent they require Google to permit developers to “communicate” with users about
`off-Play payment options that do not involve linkouts.
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`achieve its procompetitive goals by less restrictive means. The Ninth Circuit itself
`previously stated that it is “skeptical of the wisdom” of its precedent, Apple, 67 F.4th
`at 994, and there is a worsening circuit split as to whether plaintiffs must prove less
`restrictive alternatives under the Rule of Reason, with three circuits siding against
`the Ninth Circuit to hold that such proof is mandatory and five other circuits taking
`the Ninth Circuit’s side. The Ninth Circuit’s approach is incompatible with this
`Court’s precedents, see, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co. , 585 U.S. 529, 541-542 (2018)
`(Amex), and its erroneous approach went to the heart of this case by allowing the jury
`to find Google liable even if it concluded there was no less restrictive way for Google
`to effectively compete with Apple.
`Second, the Ninth Circuit held that the District Court could impose on Google
`duties to deal with Play competitors in order to diminish Google’s competitive
`advantages even if Play’s advantages were not a “consequence” of Google’s
`anticompetitive conduct. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit broke from the D.C.
`Circuit’s pathmarking precedent in the Microsoft antitrust litigation and
`circumvented this Court’s precedents constraining the role of antitrust law in
`imposing duties to deal directly with competitors. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v.
`Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP , 540 U.S. 398 (2004). The Ninth Circuit’s
`approach improperly allows courts to appoint themselves as “central planners.”
`Alston, 594 U.S. at 103.
`Third, the Ninth Circuit held that Epic bore no burden to establish Article III
`standing to seek remedies that applied to every developer and business partner
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`nationwide and that any questions about the scope of the injunction necessarily went
`to the District Court’s discretion on the merits rather than Article III’s limitations.
`That ruling violates bedrock limitations on the constitutional powers of federal
`courts, breaks from three other circuits, and threatens to turn every private antitrust
`plaintiff in the Nation’s largest circuit into a de facto marketwide regulator.
`Google seeks to stay only the portions of the injunction most likely to cause
`irreparable harm, including harm to millions of Android users and thousands of
`developers. Absent a stay, the injunction’s linkout provisions will take effect on
`Wednesday, October 22. As computer security experts, former national security
`officials, and industry experts have all warned in amicus curiae briefs below, the
`mandated linkouts make it more likely that malicious actors—including foreign
`adversaries, scammers, and blackmailers—will be able to deceive Android users into
`sharing highly sensitive information. These bad actors can use that information to
`inflict irreparable financial harm and invade the intimate details of users’ online
`lives. The linkouts requirement will also make it substantially easier for developers
`to avoid compensating Google for the many services Play offers other than payment
`processing. All this, in turn, makes it more difficult for Google to sustain the business
`model that has allowed it to provide those services for free to the vast majority of
`developers who offer their apps and digital content for free.
`The duty-to-deal provisions will also create enormous security and safety risks
`by enabling stores that stock malicious, deceptive, or pirated content to proliferate.
`Although those remedies will not take effect until next summer, Google must
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`immediately undertake substantial design and engineering resources to comply with
`that timeline. Those measures will come at an enormous cost in terms of lost time
`and expenditures at least in the tens of millions of dollars. A stay pending this Court’s
`review is therefore essential to ensure that any relief this Court affords will truly be
`effective, and to avoid unnecessary harm for the over 100 million non-party users and
`hundreds of thousands of non-party developers who will be affected by these
`remedies.
`Pending disposition of Google’s forthcoming petition for certiorari, Google
`respectfully requests that this Court stay Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the permanent
`injunction to the extent those provisions require Google to allow linkouts, and
`Paragraphs 11-12 of the injunction in full. Google has committed to filing its
`certiorari petition in half the allotted time, no later than October 27, 2025, which
`would allow this Court to consider this case on the merits during this Term. Because
`the linkouts requirement is scheduled to take effect on Wednesday, October 22, 2025,
`Google respectfully requests a ruling on this application no later than Friday, October
`17, 2025.
`STATEMENT OF THE CASE
`A. Legal Background
`Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act bar unreasonable restraints on trade and
`unlawful monopolization. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2; see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods.,
`Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (Section 1); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine
`Comm’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 447 (2009) (Section 2). Courts consider “the
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`7
`circumstances, details, and logic” of the challenged conduct “to ensure that it unduly
`harms competition before [the] court declares it unlawful.” Alston, 594 U.S. at 97.
`As this Court has explained, “antitrust courts must give wide berth to business
`judgments before finding liability.” Id. at 102. This reflects “[t]he heart of our
`national economic policy,” which has long maintained “faith in the value of
`competition.” Nat’l Soc. of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States , 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978)
`(NSPE) (quotation marks omitted).
`Congress “did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to delineate the full
`meaning of the statute or its application in concrete situations.” Id. at 688. Instead,
`courts frequently rely on the “Rule of Reason” to gauge the boundaries of antitrust
`liability. Id.; Alston, 594 U.S. at 88. The Rule of Reason framework provides a
`calibrated approach to assessing whether challenged conduct in fact promotes valid
`procompetitive objectives.
`This Court has specified that the Rule of Reason analysis involves a three-step,
`burden-shifting framework. First, a plaintiff must “prove that the challenged
`restraint has a substantial anticompetitive effect.” Amex, 585 U.S. at 541. If the
`plaintiff carries that burden, the “burden then shifts to the defendant to show a
`procompetitive rationale for the restraint.” Id. Finally, if the defendant makes this
`showing, the burden “shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
`procompetitive efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive
`means.” Id. at 542; accord Alston, 594 U.S. at 96-97 (explaining that applying the
`“substantially less restrictive alternative” test was a “straightforward application of
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`8
`the rule of reason”).
`In general, antitrust law does not impose liability for a firm’s refusal to deal
`with its competitors. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408-409. As this Court has explained,
`exposing firms to antitrust liability for refusing to deal with their rivals is in “tension
`with the underlying purpose of antitrust law,” as it “may lessen the incentive for the
`monopolist, the rival, or both to invest.” Id. at 407-408. Forced sharing also stretches
`courts beyond “the practical limits of judicial administration: ‘An antitrust court is
`unlikely to be an effective day-to-day enforcer’ of a detailed decree, able to keep pace
`with changing market dynamics alongside a busy docket.” Alston, 594 U.S. at 102
`(quoting Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415). “Enforced sharing also requires antitrust courts to
`act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of
`dealing—a role for which they are ill suited.” Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408. Although the
`Court first articulated these principles in cases concerning antitrust liability, the
`Court has since clarified that “[s]imilar considerations apply when it comes to [a]
`remedy.” Alston, 594 U.S. at 102.
`B. Factual Background
`1. Google and Apple have long been locked in competition concerning all
`aspects of their mobile ecosystems, including mobile devices, operating systems, and
`apps. Apple launched its operating system, “iOS,” as a walled garden—a self-
`contained ecosystem where Apple retains control over its devices and ecosystem. 5-
`ER-1082-84; 5-ER-1154-55.2 To contrast with Apple’s approach, Google has created
`2 Citations to the “ER” are to the Excerpts of Record filed in the Ninth Circuit.
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`9
`and maintained an open ecosystem. 6-ER-1302. It designed its Android operating
`system to be publicly available and free for anyone to access, modify, and distribute.
`5-ER-1060. The competitive dynamic between Apple and Google ultimately benefits
`consumers: When either Google or Apple innovates, the other responds by modifying
`content, features, and pricing of its products, including for its app store and in-app
`payment solutions. 5-ER-1003-06; 5-ER-1022-23; 5-ER-1107-09; 6-ER-1313-18; 6-
`ER-1351-57; 6-ER-1411-12.
`The companies’ differing philosophies have direct consequences on how they
`compete. Android’s openness creates greater user choice in the competition over
`mobile devices. Because multiple original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) can use
`Android as the operating system for their devices, users can choose from a range of
`Android products, with a variety of features, at every price point. 5-ER-1064-66.
`Apple does not license iOS to anyone, which allows it to enjoy a price premium given
`that customers wanting an iOS phone have one choice: the iPhone.
`This competitive dynamic extends to the companies’ approaches to apps and
`app stores. Apple’s closed system means that there is no iOS app store besides Apple’s
`App Store. Apple exercises full control over user security: iOS users cannot access an
`app unless it is screened by Apple and made available through Apple’s App Store. 5-
`ER-1082-83; 6-ER-1369-71. Apple decides what apps are preloaded on every iPhone,
`allowing Apple to prioritize its ownapps and give every iOS user the same out-of-the-
`box experience. 5-ER-1073-74. And Apple controls how all iOS users make in-app
`purchases, making the process streamlined and secure. 6-ER-1274.
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`10
`By contrast, Android has an open ecosystem that is built on the foundation of
`Android’s open-source operating system. Android’s openness allows users to
`download apps from a variety of sources, including Google Play; hundreds of third-
`party app stores, like Samsung’s Galaxy store; and the Internet (via a web browser
`through a process known as “sideloading”). 2-ER-427-428; 5-ER-1009-10. As a result,
`investment, innovation, and strategic partnerships have been essential in allowing
`Google to offer an open ecosystem to compete with Apple without compromising safety
`and security. Google has negotiated with manufacturers to ensure that apps are
`compatible across all Android devices, that users promptly receive the latest security
`updates for the Android software, and that Android devices come equipped with a set
`of high-quality apps and at least one trustworthy app store (Google Play) for
`downloading additional apps. 5-ER-1054-55; 5-ER-1066-68; 5-ER-1071-73; 7-ER-
`1612-34. While users have the flexibility to download apps or app stores from the
`web, Google tells users about the risks of sideloading. 5-ER-1010-11; 5-ER-1139-40.
`To ensure that Android is competitive with Apple and to protect users and
`developers, Google has continually innovated to attract users and developers to Play
`by, among other things, investing heavily