throbber
From: Shih, Sally
`
`Sent: 10/26/2010 4:38:38 PM
`
`To: TTAB EFiling
`
`CC:
`
`Subject: U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 77709903 - EZ GRO - GRH.T1800 -
`EXAMINER BRIEF
`
`
`
`*************************************************
`Attachment Information:
`Count: 1
`Files: 77709903.doc
`
`

`
`
` SERIAL NO:
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`77709903
`
`
`
`
`
`
`*77709903*
`
`
`GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION:
`http://www.uspto.gov/main/trademarks.htm
`
`TTAB INFORMATION:
`http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/ttab/index.html
`
`
`
`
`
` MARK: EZ GRO
`
`
`
` Gardenlife, Inc.
`
`
`
`
` CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS:
`
` SALVATORE A. SIDOTI
`
` CURATOLO SIDOTI CO LPA
` 24500 CENTER RIDGE ROAD, SUITE 280
` CLEVELAND, OH 44145-5681
`
`
`
` APPLICANT:
`
` CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO:
` GRH.T1800
` CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS:
` docket@patentandtm.com
`
`EXAMINING ATTORNEY'S APPEAL BRIEF
`
`
`
`
`
`I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
`
`
`The applicant has appealed the final refusal to register the proposed mark, EZ GRO, in
`
`standard character form, for use on or in connection with “living flowers and plants;
`
`flower and plant seeds.” Registration was refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark
`
`Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d), on the ground that the proposed mark is likely to be
`
`confused with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 2053995, EEZY-GRO, in typed form,
`
`for use on or in connection with “flower pots and planters.” In addition, a requirement for
`
`a disclaimer of the merely descriptive word GRO under Trademark Act Section 6, 15
`
`U.S.C. §1056, has been made final. It is respectfully requested that the Trademark Act
`
`Section 2(d) refusal and disclaimer requirement be affirmed.
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`II. FACTS
`
`On April 8, 2009, the applicant filed the instant application seeking registration on the
`
`Principal Register of the proposed mark, EZ GRO, in standard character form, for “living
`
`flowers and plants; flower and plant seeds.” In the first Office action, mailed June 26,
`
`2009, registration was refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), on
`
`the ground that the proposed mark was likely to cause confusion with the mark depicted
`
`in U.S. Registration No. 2053995. In addition, a requirement that the applicant disclaim
`
`the merely descriptive word GRO and a requirement to correct the spelling for the term
`
`“plant” in the identification of goods were issued.
`
`
`
`The applicant filed a response to the refusal on December 26, 2009, submitting
`
`arguments against a likelihood of confusion with the cited mark and disputing the
`
`requirement for a disclaimer of the word GRO. The applicant also amended the term
`
`“pants” to “plants” in the identification of goods.
`
`
`
`In an Office action mailed January 14, 2010, the Section 2(d) refusal citing U.S.
`
`Registration No. 2053995 and the requirement for a disclaimer of GRO were maintained
`
`and made final. The applicant subsequently filed the instant appeal.
`
`
`
`III. ARGUMENT
`
`A. THE PROPOSED MARK IS NOT ENTITLED TO REGISTRATION
`BECAUSE A LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION EXISTS WITH THE CITED
`REGISTERED MARK
`
`

`
`
`Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a
`
`registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused or mistaken
`
`or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.
`
`See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). The court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d
`
`1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) listed the principal factors to be considered when
`
`determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See TMEP
`
`§1207.01. However, not all of the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and
`
`any one factor may be dominant in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.
`
`In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2003); see In re E. I. du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
`
`
`
`In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks,
`
`similarity of the goods, and similarity of trade channels of the goods. See In re Opus
`
`One, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 2001); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d
`
`1593 (TTAB 1999); In re Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1209 (TTAB 1999);
`
`TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
`
`
`
`The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the
`
`goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a
`
`similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d
`
`1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion
`
`determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-
`
`Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed.
`
`

`
`Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025,
`
`1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
`
`
`
`1. The Marks Are Confusingly Similar
`
`
`
`In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks are compared for similarities in
`
`their appearance, sound, meaning or connotation and commercial impression. In re E. I.
`
`du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973);
`
`TMEP §1207.01(b). Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find a
`
`likelihood of confusion. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); In
`
`re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); see TMEP §1207.01(b).
`
`
`
`The question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will
`
`confuse people into believing that the goods they identify come from the same source. In
`
`re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 201, 175 USPQ 558, 558-59 (C.C.P.A.
`
`1972); TMEP §1207.01(b). For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not
`
`whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison.
`
`The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression. See Recot, Inc. v.
`
`M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329-30, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1899 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Visual
`
`Info. Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179, 189 (TTAB 1980). The focus is on
`
`the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than
`
`specific impression of trademarks. Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co.,
`
`

`
`203 USPQ 537, 540-41 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ
`
`106, 108 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).
`
`
`
`In response to the refusal, the applicant argues that the marks are dissimilar in appearance
`
`because of the “non-common components of the respective marks (“EZ” from
`
`Applicant’s mark and “EEZY” from the Registrant mark).”
`
`
`
`Slight differences in the sound of similar marks will not avoid a likelihood of confusion.
`
`In re Energy Telecomm. & Elec. Ass’n, 222 USPQ 350, 351 (TTAB 1983).
`
`
`
`There is no correct pronunciation of a mark because it is impossible to predict how the
`
`public will pronounce a particular mark. In re Great Lakes Canning, Inc., 227 USPQ
`
`483, 484 (TTAB 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv); see In re Energy Telecomm. & Elec.
`
`Ass’n, 222 USPQ 350, 351 (TTAB 1983). The marks in question could clearly be
`
`pronounced the same; such similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a
`
`finding of likelihood of confusion. See RE/MAX of Am., Inc. v. Realty Mart, Inc., 207
`
`USPQ 960, 964 (TTAB 1980); Molenaar, Inc. v. Happy Toys Inc., 188 USPQ 469, 471
`
`(TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).
`
`
`
`The marks, EZ GRO and EEZY-GRO, are essentially phonetic equivalents and thus
`
`sound similar. Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding of
`
`likelihood of confusion. RE/MAX of Am., Inc. v. Realty Mart, Inc., 207 USPQ 960, 964
`
`

`
`(TTAB 1980); Molenaar, Inc. v. Happy Toys Inc., 188 USPQ 469, 471 (TTAB 1975); see
`
`TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).
`
`Accordingly, the proposed mark and the registered mark are confusingly similar.
`
`
`
`2. The Goods Are Related
`
`
`The goods of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood
`
`of confusion. See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186
`
`USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). Rather, it is sufficient that the
`
`goods are related in some manner and/or the conditions surrounding their marketing are
`
`such that they would be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that
`
`would give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods and/or services come from a
`
`common source. In re Total Quality Group, Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1476 (TTAB 1999);
`
`TMEP §1207.01(a)(i); see, e.g., On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080,
`
`1086-87, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475-76 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry
`
`Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1566-68, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
`
`
`
`The applicant argues that “Registrant specializes in goods that are merely inanimate
`
`objects designed and utilized to retain various articles (See Exhibit q attached hereto).” It
`
`is true that the goods offered by Registrant, namely, flower pots and planters, are
`
`inanimate objects. However, they are commonly used in connection with Applicant’s
`
`goods, namely, living flowers and plants; and flower and pant seeds. Living flowers and
`
`plants are potted in pots and planters and seeds are planted in flower pots and planters.
`
`
`
`

`
`The fact that the goods of the parties differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of
`
`confusion. The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular goods, but
`
`likelihood of confusion as to the source of those goods. In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d
`
`1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01; see Safety-Kleen
`
`Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
`
`
`
`As evidence in support of the determination that the goods of the parties are closely
`
`related, the examining attorney refers to third party registrations submitted with the final
`
`Office action mailed on January 14, 2010. This evidence demonstrates that seeds, plants,
`
`pots and planters are related goods.
`
`
`
`By way of example, the examining attorney refers to U.S. Registration No. 1859361 for
`
`the mark CHIA, registered for use on planters and seeds; U.S. Registration No. 2832702
`
`for the mark PUNCH ‘N GRO, registered for use on living plants, seeds and plant trays
`
`and containers; and U.S. Registration No. 3702981 for the mark AHA! MODERN
`
`LIVING, registered for use on retail store featuring seeds and planters. Third-party
`
`registrations have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the goods
`
`listed therein, namely living plants, plant seeds, pots and planters, are of a kind that may
`
`emanate from a single source. In re Infinity Broad. Corp. of Dallas, 60 USPQ2d 1214,
`
`1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86
`
`(TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988);
`
`TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).
`
`
`
`

`
`Finally, the applicant argued that “the divergent classification of the Applicant’s and
`
`Registrant’s goods supports a finding that the goods are not related.” The fact that the
`
`Office classifies goods or services in different classes does not establish that the goods
`
`and services are unrelated under Trademark Act Section 2(d). See TMEP
`
`§1207.01(d)(v). The determination concerning the proper classification of goods or
`
`services is a purely administrative determination unrelated to the determination of
`
`likelihood of confusion. Jean Patou, Inc. v. Theon, Inc., 9 F.3d 971, 975, 29 USPQ2d
`
`1771, 1774 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Nat’l Football League v. Jasper Alliance Corp., 16 USPQ2d
`
`1212, 1216 n.5 (TTAB 1990).
`
`
`
`Accordingly, the goods offered by the applicant and the registrant are related.
`
`B. THE TERM “GRO” MUST BE DISCLAIMED BECAUSE IT IS MERELY
`DESCRIPTIVE OF A CHARACTERISTIC OF THE SEEDS AND LIVING
`PLANTS
`
`
`Applicant must disclaim the descriptive wording “GRO” apart from the mark as shown
`
`because it merely describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature,
`
`purpose or use of applicant’s goods. See 15 U.S.C. §§1052(e)(1), 1056(a); In re
`
`Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re
`
`Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 1217-18, 3 USPQ2d 1009, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1987); TMEP §§1213,
`
`1213.03(a).
`
`
`
`

`
`In the case at hand, a disclaimer of the word “GRO” is warranted because this word in the
`
`proposed mark it is merely descriptive for a characteristic of the living plants, flowers
`
`and seeds. Unlike artificial plants, living plants and seeds do grow.
`
`
`
`It appears that the applicant does not dispute the descriptiveness of the term GRO.
`
`Instead, the applicant argued that the proposed mark EZ GRO is unitary. A term or
`
`phrase is unitary if it consists of elements that create a single commercial impression or
`
`that have a distinct meaning independent of the constituent elements. TMEP §1213.05,
`
`1213.05(g)(iv). However, if these elements can be regarded as separable elements, the
`
`matter is not unitary. See, e.g., In re Ginc UK Ltd., 90 USPQ2d 1472 (TTAB 2007)
`
`(finding ZOGGS TOGGS for clothing not unitary; affirming requirement for disclaimer
`
`of “TOGGS”); In re Brown-Forman Corp., 81 USPQ2d 1284 (TTAB 2006) (finding
`
`GALA ROUGE for wine not unitary; affirming requirement for disclaimer of “ROUGE);
`
`TMEP §1213.05, 1213.05(g), (g)(i).
`
`
`
`In the present instance, the terms EZ and GRO can be regarded as separated elements and
`
`the combination of the terms does not have a distinct meaning independent of the
`
`constituent elements. Thus, the terms EZ and GRO are not unitary.
`
`
`
`The applicant cited third party registrations that include the term “GRO” without a
`
`disclaimer for the term “GRO.” However, the cited registered marks are distinguishable
`
`from the proposed mark because the registered marks appear in one single word with the
`
`

`
`term GRO as part of the mark. These marks are unitary because the term GRO is an
`
`integral part of the mark and cannot be regarded as a separated element.
`
`
`
`The wording “GRO” is intentionally misspelled in the mark; however, this wording must
`
`appear in its correct spelling – i.e., “GROW” – in the disclaimer. See In re Omaha Nat’l
`
`Corp., 819 F.2d 1117, 2 USPQ2d 1859 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re Carlson, 91 USPQ2d
`
`1198, 1203 (TTAB 2009); TMEP §1213.08(c).
`
`
`
`Accordingly, the term GRO is merely descriptive of a characteristic of the goods offered
`
`and must be disclaimed.
`
`
`
`C. RECORD MUST BE COMPLETE PRIOR TO FILING APPEAL – EVIDENCE
`
`SUBMITTED AFTER APPEAL
`
`
`
`The record in an application must be complete prior to the filing of an appeal; however,
`
`applicant has submitted additional evidence with its appeal brief. Because the proposed
`
`evidence was untimely submitted, this evidence should not be considered. 37 C.F.R.
`
`§2.142(d); In re Fitch IBCA Inc., 64 USPQ2d 1058, 1059 n.2 (TTAB 2002); In re Trans
`
`Cont’l Records Inc., 62 USPQ2d 1541, 1541 n.2 (TTAB 2002); TBMP §§1203.02(e),
`
`1207.01; TMEP §710.01(c).
`
`
`
`

`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`Consumers encountering the proposed mark, EZ GRO, in standard character form, for
`
`“living flowers and plants; flower and plant seeds,” used simultaneously with the cited
`
`mark, EEZY-GRO, in typed form, for “flower pots and planters,” are likely to mistakenly
`
`conclude that the goods are related and originate from a common source. In addition, the
`
`evidence of record establishes that the word GRO in the proposed mark is merely
`
`descriptive for the living plants, flowers and seeds. Accordingly, it is respectfully
`
`requested that the refusal to register under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C.
`
`Section 1052(d), and the requirement for a disclaimer of GRO under Trademark Act
`
`Section 6, 15 U.S.C. §1056, be affirmed.
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/Sally Shih/
`Sally Shih
`Trademark Examining Attorney
`Law Office 106
`USPTO
`(tel) 571-272-9712
`(fax) 571-273-9106
`
`Mary I. Sparrow
`Managing Attorney
`Law Office - 106

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket