`ESTTA378419
`ESTTA Tracking number:
`11/13/2010
`
`Filing date:
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`91167828
`Plaintiff
`Judith Mendez
`SEAN M NOVAK
`NOVAK & BEN-COHEN LLP
`8383 WILSHIRE BLVD, PH 1004
`BEVERLY HILLS, CA 90211
`UNITED STATES
`bgarner@gmail.com
`Rebuttal Brief
`Sean M. Novak, Esq.
`smn@nobelaw.com
`/Sean M. Novak/
`11/13/2010
`Opposer's Reply Trial Brief.pdf ( 26 pages )(1045772 bytes )
`Declaration of SMN Re Opposer's Reply Trial Brief.pdf ( 15 pages )(503258
`bytes )
`
`Proceeding
`Party
`
`Correspondence
`Address
`
`Submission
`Filer's Name
`Filer's e-mail
`Signature
`Date
`Attachments
`
`
`
`JUDITH MENDEZ
`Artistically Known As
`DITA & DITA DE LEON
`269 S. Beverly Dr., #1026
`Beverly Hills, CA 90212
`Opposer
`
`SEAN M. NOVAK, ESQ. (BAR NO. 198307)
`NOVAK & BEN—COHEN, LLP
`8383 Wilshire Blvd., PH 1004
`Beverly Hills, California 90211
`Tel: (323) 651-4222
`Fax: (323) 651-4221
`
`Attorney for Opposer
`JUDITI-I MENDEZ
`Artistically Known As DITA and/or DITA DE LEON
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE
`
`TRADEMARK APPEAL BOARD
`
`) Opposition No.1 91 167828 (consolidated with
`) Opposition No. 91 170265)
`
`Applicant Serial No.: 78507802
`
`) %
`
`) )
`
`OPPOSER’S REPLY TRIAL BRIEF;
`% DECLARATION OF SEAN M. NOVAK
`g
`
`% )
`
`JUDITH MENDEZ,
`Artistically Known As DITA and/or
`DITA DE LEON
`
`vs.
`DITA, INC.
`
`Opposer,
`
`Applicant.
`
`TO THE TRADEMARK APPEAL BOARD, ALL PARTIES AND THEIR
`
`»—....a
`
`'—‘$\DOO'-—'lO\LI!-hL2Jl\.)
`
`123}----‘
`
`i— I\)
`
`>—- DJ
`
`-13-
`
`i-------» LI‘!
`
`.—a O\
`
`'-—-J
`
`r—-- 00
`
`>—- \D
`
`I\.) C‘)
`
`Ix) l—A
`
`IN.) l\.)
`
`www.nobeIaw.com
`
`I‘-J La)
`
`COUNSEL OF RECORD:
`
`Ex) -I3
`
`[0 U1
`
`COMES NOW Opposer JUDITH MENDEZ Artistically Known As DITA and/or
`
`DITA DE LEON (hereinafter referred to as “Opposer”) submitting her Reply Brief for Trial
`
`I‘-J ON
`
`in this matter.
`
`l\-J ‘~11
`
`[M3 00
`
`-1-
`
`OPPOSER JUDITH MENDEZ’S REPLY TRIAL BRIEF
`
`
`
`NOVAK3:BEN-COHEN,LLP
`
`LAWYERS
`
`
`
`8383WilshireBoulevard,Suite1004
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BeverlyHills,California90211
`
`
`
`
`
`Telephone:(323)651-4222Facsimile:(323)651-4221
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`p...
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I. INTRODUCTION .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`2
`
`3
`
`Page Nos.
`
`
`
`NOVAK8;BEN-COHEN,LLP
`
`LAWYERS
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`8383WiishireBoulevard,Suite1004
`
`
`
`
`
`BeverlyHills,California90211
`
`
`
`
`
`Telephone:(323)651-4222Facsimile:(323)651-4221
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`www.noheIaw.com
`
`C’_D|\OOO'-..30\'1J:-I-\-Udlx)
`
`g_n
`
`;_n
`
`--A i\J
`
`u—I DJ
`
`>-— 43-
`
`I--1 LI‘:
`
`I— O'\
`
`>—-
`
`'---J
`
`v---I O0
`
`I—I KO
`
`ix) G
`
`ix) ----A
`
`IN.) l\J
`
`ix.) Lo.)
`
`l\) -B
`
`l\J U’!
`
`ix) O\
`
`Ix) -~.‘l
`
`I\J 00
`
`II. ARGUMENT .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`A.
`
`THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHES A
`PRIMA FACIE CASE THAT APPLICANT HAS LEGALLY
`ABANDONED ANY USE OF THE “DITA” MARK IN
`THE DISPUTED CATEGORIES .
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`5
`
`Applicant’s Own “Evidence” It Has
`Submitted For Consideration at Trial In
`This Matter Conclusively Establishes That
`Appiicant Abandoned Use of The Mark In
`The Disputed Categories In 2003 .
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`
`.
`
`8
`
`Applicant Does Not Sell Clothing,
`invalidating Its Application for Registration
`of The Mark in This Category .
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`
`A licant Does Not Sell Leather Goods
`Invalidating Its Application for Registration
`of the Mark In This Category.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`
`10
`
`12
`
`A licant Does Not Sell J ewelr =
`Invalidating Its Application for Registration
`of the Mark In This Category.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`. 12
`
`The Evidence Establishes That Applicant
`Had Abandoned Use Of The “DITA” Mark
`In The Disputed Categories BEFORE It
`Filed Its A iications to Re ister The Mark
`Justifying Denial Of The Application. .
`.
`
`13
`
`A iicant’s Claim Of Intent To Resume
`Sales Of Items In The Disputed Categories
`Does Not Rebut The Clear Abandonment. .
`
`.
`
`13
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`6.
`
`7.
`
`In Contrast to It’s Self-A randizin the
`Public Record And All Evidence Establishes
`That Applicant Is Not A Successful
`Company .
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`OPPOSER WILL SUFFER SUBSTANTIAL HARM IF
`APPLICANT’S APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF
`THE “DITA” MARK IN THE DISPUTED CATEGORIES IS
`GRANTED IN THE DISPUTED CATEGORIES .
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`
`1.
`
`Opposer Relies Upon Use of the “Dita” Mark In
`The Disputed Categories To Promote Her
`Celebrity Image.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`E4
`
`14
`
`E6
`
`
`
`......a
`
`5\Q0O*--3C\(J'i-3-5-t-*3!‘-)
`
`p__a
`
`.—i
`
`>--------- l\.)
`
`-—t
`
`(.3-3
`
`A licant Concedes That 0 oser Has
` __:
`Consistently Offered Goods for Sale In The
`Disputed Categories .
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`Applicant is Judicialiy Estopped From Denying
`That Opposer is Currently In Use of the “Dita”
`Mark .
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`
`.
`
`Opposer Is At Risk of Substantial Harm Due To
`Confusion B The Public If A licant Is Granted
`__{,mXM_
`Registration of the “Dita” Mark In The Disputed
`Categories .
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`
`Applicant Incorrectly Maintains That Opposer
`Has An Obligation To Prove That Her Use of The
`Mark Has “Created A Substantial Impact On The
`Purchasing Public” .
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`
`17
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`Applicant Falsely Contends That Opposer Does
`Not Create Anv Products .
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 20
`
`APPLICANT’S OBJECTIONS TO OPPOSER’S EXHIBITS
`Nos. 12 AND 13 ARE NOT LEGALLY PROPER .
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`
`.
`
`. 20
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. ..
`
`21
`
`
`
`NOVAK&BEN-COHEN,LLP LAWYERS
`
`
`
`8383WilshireBoulevard,Suite10045
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BeverlyHills,California90211
`
`
`
`
`
`Telephone:(323)651-4222Facsimile:(323)551-4221
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`III. CONCLUSION .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`www.nobelaw.com
`
`r--- -I3
`
`r-- U]
`
`O\
`
`L— ---J
`
`F-—l O0
`
`u--A KO
`
`Ex) CD
`
`l\.) —-
`
`l\.J l\.)
`
`[U L»)
`
`to -lb
`
`IN-J {J1
`
`l\J Ch
`
`i\) '----J
`
`Ex.) 00
`
`
`
`Page Nos.
`
`3 1
`
`3
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. ..
`
`. ..
`
`pj
`
`Statutes:
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`1.
`
`15U.S.C.§1112 .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`2.
`
`I5U.S.C.§ll19.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. ..
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`15 U.S.C.§1127(1) .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`28 U.S.C. §l746 .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. ..
`
`5,7,13
`
`20
`
`20
`
`5.
`
`F. R. Civ. P. 56(e) .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`©\DOO--..‘lG\<.J't-BU-iix.)
`
`bi
`
`7.
`
`8.
`
`37 C.F.R. §2.85(a) .
`
`37 C.F.R. §2.71(a) .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. ..
`
`. ..
`
`6.
`
`37 C.F.R. §2.81 .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`4 3 4 4 L
`
`QDJUJJE-.[>.
`
`www.nobe|aw.com
`
`—- -I3
`
`.—n U‘:
`
`>— ON
`
`»-----A --J
`
`o-...—\ 00
`
`>-—a \D
`
`t\.) CD
`
`I\—)
`
`u--.-A
`
`l\J Ex)
`
`[NJ U-‘v
`
`I‘-J -R
`
`l\-J U1
`
`l\-J ON
`
`[0 ‘--J
`
`[U DO
`
`US. Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP) §1403 .
`
`U.S. Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP) §1401.02(b).
`
`U.S. Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP) §140l .07 .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`12.
`
`13.
`
`14.
`
`QE
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`6.
`
`7.
`
`8.
`
`Abdul-jabbar V. Gen. Motors Com, 85 F.3d 407, 411 (9th Cir.l996)....
`
`
`Blue Bell Inc. V. Farah Manuf. Co. Inc., 508 F.2d 1260, 1267
`(5th Cir.1975) ...................................................................................... ..
`
`Brookfield Communications, Inc. V. West Coast Ente1tain1nentCorp.,
`174 F.3d 1036, 1047 (C.A.9 1999) ..................................................... ..
`
`California Spray—Chemical Com. V. Osmose Wood Preserving Co. of
`
`America Inc., 102 USPQ 321 (Co1r1m’r Pats. 1954) ......................... ..
`
`Casual Corner Assoc, Inc. V. Casual Stores of Nevada, Inc., 493
`F.2d 709, 712 (9th Cir.1974) .............................................................. ..
`
`Chance V. Pac—Tel Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2001).
`
`Den”: of Parks & Recreation Vs. Bazaar del Mundo, 1nc., 448 F.3d
`1118, 1124-26 (9th Cir.1999) ............................................................. ..
`
`eCash Technologies. Inc. V. Guag1iardo,127 F.Supp.2d 1069,1079
`(C.D.Ca1.,2000) ................................................................................... ..
`
`—iii—
`
`
`
`NOVAK&BEN-COHEN,LLP
`
`LAWYERS
`
`
`
`8383WilshireBoulevard,Suite1004
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BeverlyHiiis,California90211
`
`
`
`
`
`Telephone:(323)651-4222Facsimile:(323)651-4221
`
`
`
`
`
`;_n
`
`,_—4.
`
`'-—-A i\J
`
`i----A LJJ
`
`9.
`
`37 C.F.R. §2.88 .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`10.
`
`11.
`
`US. Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP) §1402.06 .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`U.S. Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP) §l402.07. .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`
`
`
`
`NOVAK8;BEN-COHEN,LLP
`
`LAWYERS
`
`
`
`8383WilshireBoulevard,Suite1004
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BeverlyHiils,California90211
`
`
`
`
`
`Telephone:(323)651-4222Facsimile:(323)651-4221
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`E. & J. Gallo Wine: V. Pasatienr os Gallo S.A., 905 F.Supp. 1403,
`
`
`1415 (E.D.Cal.1994 ........................................................................... ..
`
`
`
`Electro Source, LLC V. Brandess—Kalt-Aetna Group. Inc., 458 F .3d
`931, 939 (9‘ Cir. 2006) ....................................................................... ..
`
`Ex parte The A.C. Gilbert Co., 99 USPQ 344 (Con1m’r Pats. i953)...
`
`
`Garden of Life Inc. V. Letzer, 318 F.Supp.2d 946, 957 (C.D.Ca1.,2004)..
`
`Gear, Inc. V. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 670 F.Supp. 508, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
`1192 (S.D.N.Y.1987) ................................................................................ ..
`
`Hydro-Dynamics. Inc. V. George Putnam & Co., 811 F.2d 1470, 1472~74
`(Fed.Cir.1987) ........................................................................................... ..
`
`
`In re Cardinal Laboratories 1nc., 149 USPQ 709 (TTAB 1966) ...... ..
`
`in re M.V Et Associes, 21 USPQ 2d 1628 (Com1r1’r Pats. 1991) ....... ..
`
`In re Societe Generale des Eaux Minerales de Vittel S.A., 1 USPQ2d
`1296 (TTAB 1986) ........................................................................... ..
`
`In re Sunset Bay Associates, 944 F.2d 1503, 1509-10 (9th Cir.1991)....
`
`Jackson V. County of Los Angeles, 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 181 (1997).....
`
`Jockey Club, Inc. V. Jockey Ciub of Las Vegas, 595 F.2d 1167
`(9th Cir.1979) .......................................................................................... ..
`
`La Societe Anony_n1e des Parfuins Le Galion V. Jean Patou, Inc,
`495 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2nd Cir.1974) ................................................... ..
`
`Osh1nan's Sporting Goods, Inc. V. Highland Import Corp,
`16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1395, 1397 (T.T.A.B.1990) ........................................ ..
`
`Rissetto V. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597,
`605 (9th Cir.1996) ............................................................................... ..
`
`Sega Enterprises Ltd. V. MAPHIA, 857 F .Supp. 679, 688
`(N.D.Ca1.,1994) ................................................................................... ..
`
`Sengoku Works Ltd. Vs. RMC Int’l, Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1220
`(9th Cir.1996) ...................................................................................... ..
`
`Star—Kist Foods, Inc. V. 13.1. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393,
`1396 (9th Cir.l985) ............................................................................. ..
`
`The Procter & Gamble Co. V. Economics Laboratory, Inc, 175 USPQ
`505 (TTAB 1972) .............................................................................. ..
`
`17
`
`6,7
`
`3
`
`7
`
`13
`
`15
`
`3
`
`4
`
`3
`
`20
`
`17
`
`18
`
`7
`
`7,8
`
`17
`
`18
`
`6,7
`
`8
`
`3
`
`10.
`
`11.
`
`13.
`
`15.
`
`16.
`
`17.
`
`18.
`
`20.
`
`21.
`
`22.
`
`23.
`
`24.
`
`25.
`
`26.
`
`27.
`
`L
`
`S\DOO--3O\U1-I5-L.>Jl\..)
`
`p—n
`
`p—.
`
`ix.)
`
`—- L)-I
`
`>—~ -It
`
`>--A Li}
`
`—a O\
`
`>—-
`
`''----J
`
`._i 00
`
`\D
`
`Ix) CD
`
`Pd 1--
`
`I\J l\J
`
`I‘-J LN
`
`IO -1%
`
`l\J U1
`
`i\J ON
`
`E\J *-Cl
`
`l\J O0
`
`www.nohelaw.com
`
`_gV_
`
`
`
`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
`
`I.
`
`INTROBUCTION
`
`Applicant’s Trial Brief is utterly deficient, and fails to address the central issues in
`
`this matter.
`
`Instead, Applicant focuses all of its energy on the vain effoit to attack the
`
`Opposer on a personal level.
`
`In addition to the obvious impropriety of such conduct,
`
`Applicant has failed to advance any argument that would justify a finding in its favor in this
`
`matter.
`
`Applicant has overlooked the fact that the Opposition is premised on t\»v_o distinct
`
`and equally important legal bases. These are (1) the substantial harm that will be caused to
`
`Opposer if Applicant is allowed the trademark registration in the disputed categories and
`
`(2) the fact that Opposer has priority use of the mark. Applicant’s brief utterly fails to
`
`refute either basis for the Opposition.
`
`Ultimately, it is important to recognize that this matter is not solely about Opposer’s
`
`use of the mark. This matter also concerns the Applicant’s lack of use of the mark in the
`
`disputed categories, constituting abandonment of the mark by Applicant in the disputed
`
`categories. Applicant has the burden of proving its use of the mark to support its
`
`Application for Registration through these proceedings.
`
`It utterly failed to meet this
`
`p...
`
`$\OO0-~JC\LlI-PsLJJi\J
`
`D-—‘
`
`.—n
`
`;—a
`
`nu l\.)
`
`»—A DJ
`
`E >
`
`—-- L)‘:
`
`O\
`
`in--d *--J
`
`>— 00
`
`www.nobelaw.com
`
`i—I NO
`
`burden.
`
`Applicant’s brief fails to address the significant evidence, submitted by Applicant
`
`itself, establishing that Applicant abandoned its claimed use of the mark in the disputed
`
`categories _a_t___l_iit seven (7) years ago.
`
`Instead, Applicant tries to mis—cite evidence, mis-
`
`quote testimony and 1nis—direct the Board in order to distract from its lack of use of the
`
`mark for the past many years.
`
`Ultimately, Applicant is not legally entitled to registration of the “Dita” mark
`
`regardless of Opposer’s use of the mark. Therefore, as a matter of law, the abandonment of
`
`use by Applicant alone would be substantial justification for the Board to find in Opposer’s
`
`[0 CD
`
`IN.)
`
`>-A
`
`l\J I\J
`
`l\J DJ
`
`to -13
`
`I\-J ‘J:
`
`l\J Ch
`
`l\.) ‘-4
`
`NJ 00
`
`-2-
`
`
`OPPOSER JUDITH MENDEZ’S REPLY TRIAL BRIEF
`
`
`
`NOVAK8:BEN-COHEN,LLP
`
`LAWYERS
`
`
`
`3383WilshireBoulevard,Suite1004
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BeverlyHills.California90211
`
`
`
`
`
`Telephone:(323)651-4222Facsimile:(323)651-4221
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`NOVAK8:BEN-COHEN,LLP LAWYERS
`
`
`
`8383WilshireBoulevard,Suite1004
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BeverlyHills,Caiifornia90211
`
`
`
`
`
`Telephone:(323)651-4222Facsimile:(323)651-4221
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`www.nobe|aw.com
`
`\OO<J--JO\<JI-lib-?l\-J
`
`10
`
`li
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`l7
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`favor in this matter. Furtherniore, Applicant concedes Opposer is currently using the mark
`
`on t—sl1irts, establishing that Opposer is the senior user of the mark at this time.
`
`11.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`Applicant has continuously acted under the mistaken impression that its claiined (yet
`
`unproven) efforts to sell sunglasses establishes a right to the use of the “Dita” mark in other
`
`categories. Such a position is directly contrary to the law. See, e.g., U.S. Trademark
`
`Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP) §1403 et seq. As a matter of law leather goods,
`
`clothing and jewelry are not products related to eyewear. They are legally distinct
`
`categories of goods as administered by the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
`
`E US Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP) 2009 §l401.02(b).
`
`Section E403 states that if an item is consistently classified in a particular class, the
`
`applicant cannot obtain registration in another class merely by adding language that
`
`indicates the other class. §_e,§ Q; seem TMEP §1-401 .07.
`
`Section 30 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §11l2, providesauthority for
`
`establishing a classification system. As of September l, 1973, the international
`
`classification of goods and services is the primary classification used by the United States,
`
`and it applies to all applications filed on or after September 1, 1973, and their resulting
`
`registrations, for all statutory puiposes. See 37 C.F.R. §2.85(a).
`
`The identification of goods and/or sen/ices for obtaining a trademark must be
`
`specific, definite, clear, accurate, and concise. E In re Societe Generale des Eaux
`
`Minerales de Vittel S.A., 1 USPQ2d 1296 (TTAB 1986), rev’d on other grounds, 824 F.2d
`
`957, 3 USPQ2d 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1987); The Procter & Gamble Co. v. Economics
`
`Laboratoiy, lnc., 175 USPQ 505 (TTAB 1972), modified without opinion, 498 F.2d 1406,
`
`
`181 USPQ 722 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Cardinal Laboratories lnc., 149 USPQ 709 (TTAB
`
`i966); California Spray-Chemical Corp. v. Osinose Wood Preserving Co. of America, Inc,
`
`102 USPQ 321 (Comm’r Pats. 1954); Ex parte The A.C. Gilbert Co., 99 USPQ 344
`
`(Connn’r Pats. i953). The accuracy of identification language in the original application is
`
`-3-
`
`OPPOSER JUDITH MENDEZFS REPLY TRIAL BRIEF
`
`
`
`
`
`NOVAK8.BEN-COHEN,LLP LAWYERS
`
`
`
`8333WilshireBoulevard,Suite1004
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BeverlyHiils,California90211
`
`
`
`
`
`Telephone:(323)651-4222Facsimile:(323)651-4221
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`.—i
`
`g\DOO--.lO\lJi-D-L»->i\)
`
`i_i
`
`p........a
`
`>-—- ix.)
`
`—A LN
`
`r-4 -[>-
`
`i# U]
`
`i# ON
`
`r---A
`
`'---J
`
`>—- 00
`
`I-uni \O
`
`l\J G
`
`2i
`
`22
`
`23
`
`www.nobelaw.com
`
`important because the identification cannot later be expanded. _S_ga_ 37 C.F.R. §2.7i(a);
`
`TMEP §§l402.06 et seq. and 1402.07 et seq.; In re M.V Et Associes, 21 USPQ 2d 1628
`
`(C0m1n’1' Pats. 199]).
`
`In the instant matter, the holding of a tradeniark in the category of eyewear gives
`
`Applicant no legal priority or right to the mark in other categories. Evidence of the fact that
`
`registration of a mark in one category does not extend to other categories can be found in
`
`the existing Applications for registration of the “DITA” mark in other categories by third
`
`parties. For example, hockey equipment manufacturer Dita, International currently has an
`
`application pending before the USPTO for registration of the “DITA” mark in Class 28,
`
`defined generally as gymnastic/hockey equipment with an Application Serial No.
`
`77938547. Furthermore, adult film star Dita Von Teese presently has applications pending
`
`for registration of the “DITA” mark in Class 33 (alcoholic beverages); Class 4]
`
`(entertainment services); Class 43 (providing of food and drink) and Class 3 (perfume,
`
`cosmetics, etc.). with Application Serial No. 79056772.
`
`Under the law, the mere filing by Applicant of Applications with the USPTO for
`
`registration of the “DITA” mark in the disputed categories does not give Applicant a legal
`
`right to the mark. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. §2.8l. Even if Opposer had not filed this
`
`Opposition, Applicant is legally obligated to provide evidence to the Board of c11_ri_*_iar1_t use
`
`of the mark in order to support its Application. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. §2.8l et seq.; 37 CPR.
`
`§2.88. No such evidence exists, or has been produced by Applicant at any time.
`
`The fact that Applicant has ciearly abandoned use of the mark in the disputed
`
`categories also constitutes abandonment of its Application for registration of the mark,
`
`justifying outright denial of its Application. Meanwhile, the 0pposer’s undisputed
`
`24 continuous use of the mark in the disputed categories justifies the granting of the
`
`Opposition with prejudice due to the harm Applicant has and will cause to Opposer.
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`-4-
`
`OPPOSER JUDITH MENDEZ’S REPLY TREAL BRIEF
`
`
`
`THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHES A PRIMA FACIE
`CASE THAT APPLICANT HAS LEGALLY ABANDONED ANY USE
`OF THE “DITA” MARK IN THE DISPUTED CATEGORIES
`
`lt is undisputed from the evidence submitted by Applicant that Applicant does not
`
`use the “Dita” mark in any of the disputed categories at issue in this matter, and has not
`
`used the mark in said categories for Lleflfl seven (7) years. fig Exhibits “4'-“l0“ to the
`
`Trial Testimony of Jeff Solorio, Vol. I of May 19, 2010; Exhibits “20"—“22" to the Trial
`
`Testimony of Jeff Solorio, Vol. II of May 20, 2010. As a matter of law, this constitutes
`
`prinia facte evidence of abandonment under 15 U.S.C. §l 127(1). Section 1127(1)
`
`expressly states:
`
`A mark shall be deemed to be "abandoned" if either of the following occurs:
`
`(1) When its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume
`such use. Intent not to resume may be inferred from
`circumstances. Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be
`prima facie evidence of abandonment. "Use" of a mark
`means the bona ftde use of such mark made in the ordinary
`course of trade, and not made merely to reseive a right in a
`mark.
`
`(Emphasis added).
`
`In an effort to distract from the fact that there is a priina facie case of abandonment
`
`by Applicant, Applicant’s Brief contains numerous clearly fraudulent misrepresentations to
`
`the Board concerning Applicant’s claimed “expansion” into clothing, jewelry and leather
`
`goods. fie Applicanfs Brief, at 2-4. Applicant cleverly skirts around its clear
`
`abandonment of the use of the mark by claiming it “expanded” into these areas in the 2002
`
`time period, implying it continues to sell the products to date.
`
`I_cL However, the
`
`documentary “evidence” Applicant seeks to rely on for these false claims clearly
`
`contradicts Applicant’s claims. Sfi Exhibits “4'—“i0" to the Trial Testimony of 3eff
`
`Solorio, Vol. I of May 19, 2010; Exhibits “20"-“22" and “25"-“28" to the Trial Testimony
`
`of Jeff Solorio, Vol. II of May 20, 2010.
`
`In reality, Applicant’s documents show that, g'_t_n@, Applicant sold some leather
`
`goods and/or jewelry for a brief period of time in the years 2002-2003. Li. It abandoned
`
`these product lines by May, 2003.
`
`l_d.
`
`-5-
`
`
`
`OPPOSER JUDITH MENDEZ’S REPLY TRIAL BRIEF
`
`,...
`
`ié‘\DO0-JO\Ll1-l>bJl\J
`
`,_n
`
`,_s
`
`r—I E\)
`
`—- DJ
`
`E 1
`
`-4 U}
`
`>—- C!\
`
`>-—-
`
`'--J
`
`._.. O0
`
`>—n \O
`
`l\J CD
`
`l\J >-A
`
`I\J Ix)
`
`I\J DJ
`
`IQ -I5
`
`IN) LII
`
`l\J O\
`
`E\J -.]
`
`l\J 00
`
`www.nobeiaw.com
`
`
`
`NOVAK&BEN-COHEN,LLP
`
`LAWYERS
`
`
`
`
`
`8383WilshireBoulevard,Suile1OD4
`
`
`
`
`
`BeverlyHills,California90211
`
`
`
`
`
`Telephone:(323)651-4222Facsimile:(323)651-422i
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`NOVAKE:BEN-COHEN,LLP
`
`LAWYERS
`
`
`
`
`
`8383WilshireBoulevard,Suite1004
`
`
`
`
`
`BeverlyHills.California90211
`
`
`
`
`
`Telephone:(323)651-4222Facsimile:(323)651-4221
`
`
`
`
`
`www.nobelaw.com
`
`1
`
`\OOO--JO\U':-l’>LaJI\.)
`
`10
`
`11
`
`i2
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`Ultimately, App1icant’s Brief admits that Applicant “narrowed its product lines in
`
`those categories after 2007", but claims that Applicant “plans to re-expand those lines in
`
`2011". §e_e l_d. at 6. Applicant clearly misrepresents when it “narrowed” its product line
`
`based upon the evidence, and its efforts to color its abandonment as a “narrowing” of the
`
`product line does not change the legal effect of its own admission of abandonment of the
`
`product lines in the disputed categories LI_t;;c_1it three (3) years ago.
`
`1_d..
`
`As a result, Applicant has Q legal basis on which to defend itself from Opposer’s
`
`Opposition to its trademark applications at issue in this matter. A trade-mark does not
`
`confer upon its owner the right to prohibit a competitor's use of the mark unless the owner
`
`himself uses the mark in connection with an existing business. §e_§ Electro Source, LLC v.
`
`Brandess-Kalt-Aetna Group, inc, 458 F.3d 931, 939 (9"‘ Cir. 2006)(citing Siegel V.
`
`Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 48 n. 2 (9th Cir.1971)).
`
`To acquire ownership of a trademark it is not enough to have invented the mark first
`
`or even to have registered it first; the party claiming ownership must have been the first to
`
`actually use the mark in the sale of goods or services.” Sengoku Works Ltd. vs. RMC 1nt’1,
`
`ILL, 96 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir.1996); Dep’t of Parks & Recreation vs. Bazaar del
`
`
`Mundo Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1124-26 (9th Cir.1999).
`
`Applicant has admitted under oath that the o_11l3: product it currently offers for sale
`
`are sunglasses. _S§§ Trial Testimony of Jeff Solorio, at V0]. 1 of May 19, 2010, at 85:4-9;
`
`Trial Testimony of Jeff Solorio, Vol. II of May 20, 2010 at 178216-179: 10. It further admits
`
`that it has not offered any other type of product for sate for the past several years. $9 Trial
`
`Testimony of Jeff Solorio, at Vol. I of May 19, 2010 at 84:24-85:14. Specifically, Mr.
`
`Solorio testified under oath that it has not soid any product except sunglasses since 2007.
`
`He further testified that the company has no specific plans as to whether it intends to ever
`
`offer products other than sunglasses for sale in the fiiture. id at 85:15-23. It has
`
`undertaken no affinnative actions to move forward with any claimed plan to “go back into”
`
`selling clothing and accessories. fie Trial Testimony of Jeff Solorio, Vol. II of May 20,
`
`2010 at at 199:9-200: 10. This is clear abandonment of the mark under the law.
`
`
`OPPOSER JUDITH lV{ENDEZ’S REPLY TRIAL BRIEF
`
`-6-
`
`
`
`In order to maintain a trademark there must be continuing use. E Brookfield
`
`Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Co1_p., 174 F.3d 1036, 1047(C.A.9
`
`
`
`1999); Sengoku Works, 96 F.3d at 1219; Casual Corner Assoc. Inc. V. Casual Stores of
`
`Nevada. inc., 493 F.2d 709, 712 (9th Cir.1974).
`
`In order to satisfy the continuing use
`
`requirement, the use of the mark must be maintained without interruption. See, e.g., Qsu_al
`
` , 493 F.2d at 712. Trademark rights are not created by sporadic, casual, and nominal
`
`shipments of goods bearing a mark. Q, There must be a trade in the goods sold under the
`
`mark or at least an active and public attempt to estabiish such a trade.
`
`I_d.; semi _L_a
`
`Societe A110ny_n1e des Parfums Le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2nd
`
`Cir. 1974). Therefore, “[1n]ere adoption of a mark without bona fide use, in an attempt to
`
`
`reserve it for the future, will not create trademark rights.” §e_e Blue Bell Inc. v. Farah
`
`Manuf. Co. Inc., 508 F.2d 1260, 1267 (5th Cir.1975); see also Garden of Life Inc. v.
`
`
`
`Letzer, 318 F.Supp.2d 946, 957 (C.D.Ca1.,2004).
`
`As stated above, under the Lanham Act, a mark is deemed abandoned when its use
`
`has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use. §_e_e 15 U.S.C. § 1 127(1). Intent
`
`not to resume may be inferred from circumstances.
`
`I_d. However, the statute explicitly
`
`states that nonuse for three (31 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of
`
`abandonment.
`
`I_d. (emphasis added). “Use” of a mark means the bona fide use of such
`
`mark made in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a
`
`mark. lg, Nothing in the statute entitles a registrant who has formerly used a mark to
`
`overcome a presumption of abandonment arising from subsequent non-use by simply
`
`averring a subjective affirmative
`
`‘intent not to abandon.’ Electro Source. LLC v. Brandess~Ka1t-Aetna Group, Inc., 458 F.3d
`
`931, 937 (9“‘ Cir. 2006)
`
`The meaning of “use” for the purposes of abandonment necessarily signifies “use in
`
`commerce” and thus includes the placement of a mark on goods sold or transported.
`
`ind. at
`
`.._.
`
`.C.TD‘\OOO--lO\U\-I>l.»Jl\J
`
`;........n
`
`pi
`
`>—n l\-J
`
`u-at L»)
`
`E >
`
`-—-I LII
`
`»—i O'\
`
`r# ‘--J
`
`n-—.-.4 GO
`
`»—A
`
`\-D
`
`l\.) G
`
`I\-J >—~
`
`1\J {U
`
`E\.) DJ
`
`to -13-
`
`t\-J LII
`
`I\.) O'\
`
`www.nobe!aw.com
`
`IN) '--J
`
`936.
`
`i\.3 00
`
`The abandonment by Appiicant in this matter is similar to the factual situation in
`
`-7-
`
`OPPOSER JUDITH MENDEZ’S REPLY TRIAL BRIEF
`
`
`
`NOVAK8:BEN-COHEN,LLP
`
`LAWYERS
`
`
`
`8383WiishireBouievard,Suite1004
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BeverlyHiEl5,California90211
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Telephone:(323)651-4222Facsimile:(323)651-4221
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`|___A
`
`$\DOO-~.lCfiLl‘I-i>~L.»Jt\.)
`
`>----4
`
`j .i
`
`r--d i\J
`
`»# DJ
`
`Oshman's Sporting Goods. Inc. v. Highland Import Com, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1395, £397
`
`(T.T.A.B.1990).
`
`ln Oslininan’s there was a finding that a mark was abandoned in the face
`
`of nonuse for several years where the trademark holder stopped ordering or importing the
`
`trademarked item, stopped advertising the item for sale, had no plans to resume use of the
`
`mark, and there were no records of shipments for a period of several years. E
`
`
`Osh1nan's 16 U.S.P.Q.2d atl397. As stated above, in the present action, Applicant admits
`
`that it has not advertised, offered for sale or sold any products bearing the “Dita” mark in
`
`any of the disputed categories in at least three (3) years. As also stated above, Applicant’s
`
`own evidence it has submitted for trial in this matter establishes that it has not actually
`
`advertised or offered for sale products in the disputed categories for at least seven (7) years.
`
`If the party alleging abandonment establishes a prima facie case of abandonment by
`
`showing a tl1ree—year period of non—use, then a presumption of abandonment is created. S_ee
`
`
`Abdul—Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Com, 85 F.3d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1 996); Star-Kist Foods Inc.
`
`v. R}. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir.l985). Such a prima facie case of
`
`abandonment exists with regard to Applicant based upon the testimony and evidence
`
`Applicant has produced at trial.
`
`1.
`
`A licant’s Own “Evidence” It Has Submitted For Consideration at
`Triai In This Matter Conclusively Establishes That Applicant
`Abandoned Use of The Mark In The Disputed Categories In 2003
`
`Applicant has sought to rely on documents that were not timely produced in this
`
`action to try to support its claim of use of the mark in the disputed categories. Opposer has
`
`objected to these documents on a number of grounds. However, even if the Board were to
`
`consider these documents, they fail to support Applicant’s position.
`
`_S_e_:e Exhibits “4'—“i0"
`
`to the Trial Testimony of 3 eff Solorio, Vol. I of May 19, 2010; Exhibits “20"-“22" and
`
`“25"—“28" to the Trial Testimony of Jeff Solorio, Vol. II of May 20, 2010. A review of
`
`Applicant’s “evidence” illustrates that the East documented sale of a product by Applicant
`
`in the disputed category of leather goods was in the year 2003. Id; Applicant has never
`
`produced any documents evidencing a single sale of items in the clothing category. See,
`
`e.g., _i_d_.
`
`-3-
`
`
`OPPOSER JUDITH MENDEZ’S REPLY TRIAL BRIEF
`
`3 m
`
`‘L11
`
`a
`
`u—- O\
`
`>— '---I
`
`r----d O0
`
`»# NO
`
`Ix.) G
`
`l\) iv---A
`
`l\J I\J
`
`I\.J U)
`
`I\.) -55
`
`ix) U1
`
`l\.) ON
`
`I\) '--J
`
`I\.) O0
`
`www.nobelaw.com
`
`
`
`NOVAK&BEN-COHEN,LLF‘
`
`LAWYERS
`
`
`
`8383WiishireBouievarct,Suite1004
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BeverlyHills,California90211
`
`
`
`
`
`Telephone:(323)651-4222Facsimile:(323)651-4221
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`NOVAK&BEN-COHEN.LLP
`
`LAWYERS
`
`
`
`8383WilshireBoulevard,Suite1004
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BeverlyHills,California90211
`
`
`
`
`
`Telephone:(323)651-4222Facsimile:(323)651-4221
`
`
`
`
`
`www.nobelaw.com
`
`\OOO-.3O\<JI-13-‘-Nl\J
`
`10
`
`ll
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`As indicated in the Opposer’s Opening Trial Brief, ApplicantJ produced any
`
`evidence during the discovery process. It has sought to untimely introduce at trial
`
`documents not produced during the discovery period. Opposer has objected to this
`
`evidence as untimely and improper.
`
`However, even assuming in at--guendo that the subject documents were admissible,
`
`they do not support Applicant’s position. The documents _a,,t_1_ng_t estabtish that Applicant
`
`sold some leather accessories and bags during the 2002-2003 time period that they contend
`
`bore the “Dita” mark. “Sue; Applicant’s Trial Exhibits 6-11; 25-28. It appears from the
`
`Exhibits that the last date that Applicant sold a product it claims bore the “Dita” mark in
`
`any of the disputed categories was in May, 2003—over seven (7) years ago.
`
`l_d
`
`It is also important to note that Applicant produced no documents evidencing any
`
`sales ofj eweliy or clothing, two of the three disputed categories in this matter. As a result,
`
`its own documents establish that it has never offered for sale or sold products bearing the
`
`“Dita” mark in these categories.
`
`Applicant also sought to mislead the Board by submitting documents reiating to
`
`purported sale of products under its “Dita Legends” mark. See, e.g., Applicant’s Exhibits
`
`“2 1 " and “22" to the Trial Testimony of Jeff Solorio, Vol. ll of May 20, 2010. The “Dita
`
`Legends” mark is an entirely separate trademark, registered by Applicant under Serial No.
`
`77281657.
`
`its use is not at issue in this matter. Furthermore, the documents relating to sale
`
`by Applicant under the