`THIS DECISION IS NOT A
`PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
`P.O. Box 1451
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
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`GCP
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` Mailed: May 14, 2012
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`Opposition No. 91194716
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`DC Comics
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`v.
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`Gotham City Networking, Inc.
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`Before Seeherman, Ritchie, and Wolfson,
`Administrative Trademark Judges.
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`By the Board:
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`
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`Gotham City Networking, Inc. (“applicant”) filed two
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`applications for registration. The first application is for
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`the mark GOTHAM BATMEN in standard characters.1 The second
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`application is for the mark as displayed below:2
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`
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`1 Application Serial No. 77669383, filed on February 12, 2009,
`based upon an allegation of use in commerce under Section 1(a) of
`the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), claiming February 1,
`2006 as both the date of first use and the date of first use in
`commerce for the services identified in both International
`Classes 35 and 41. Applicant has disclaimed the term “GOTHAM.”
`2 Application Serial No. 77668420, filed on February 11, 2009,
`based upon an allegation of use in commerce under Section 1(a) of
`the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), claiming February 1, 2006
`as both the date of first use and the date of first use in
`commerce for the services identified in both International
`Classes 35 and 41. Applicant has disclaimed the term “GOTHAM.”
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`Opposition No. 91194716
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`Both applications recite the following identification of
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`services: “general business networking referral services,
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`namely, promoting the goods and services of others by passing
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`business leads and referrals among group members” in
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`International Class 35 and “entertainment in the nature of
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`amateur softball games” in International Class 41.
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`DC Comics (“opposer”) filed a notice of opposition to
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`registration of applicant’s marks on the following grounds:
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`(1) priority and likelihood of confusion, (2) dilution, (3)
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`lack of bona fide use of the marks in commerce as of the
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`filing dates of applicant’s involved use-based applications,
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`(4) lack of a current bona fide use of the marks in commerce,
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`and (5) fraud based on lack of a bona fide use of the marks in
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`commerce as of the filing date of applicant’s involved
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`applications. In support of its asserted claims, opposer has
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`claimed common law use and ownership of numerous registrations
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`for the mark BATMAN, as well as a related family of bat logo
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`design marks, as illustrated below, used in association with
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`its comic books series and related goods and services, such as
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`television programs, motion pictures, and licensed merchandise
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`including sporting equipment, sports clothing and footwear,
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`protective gear for use in sports activities, toys, food,
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`records, audio/visual tapes, cassettes, CDs and DVDs.
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`2
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`Opposition No. 91194716
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`Additionally, opposer alleges common law use and
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`ownership of the registered marks GOTHAM GIRLS, GOTHAM CENTRAL
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`and GOTHAM KNIGHTS used in connection with comics and related
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`animated television series with direct spin-off storylines
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`from its alleged famous BATMAN comics. Opposer also alleges
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`ownership of the registered mark GOTHAM CITY for a variety of
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`goods and services, including toys and sporting goods such as
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`soccer balls, playground balls, baseballs, basketballs, and
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`baseball gloves.
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`This case now comes before the Board for consideration of
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`(1) applicant’s motion for summary judgment on opposer’s
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`asserted claims of likelihood of confusion, dilution, lack of
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`bona fide use of the marks, and fraud, and (2) opposer’s
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`cross-motion for summary judgment on its asserted claims of
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`3
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`Opposition No. 91194716
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`likelihood of confusion, dilution and lack of bona use of the
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`marks. The motions are fully briefed.
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`A party is entitled to summary judgment when it has
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`demonstrated that there are no genuine disputes as to any
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`material facts, and that it is entitled to judgment as a
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`matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The evidence must be
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`viewed in a light favorable to the nonmoving party, and all
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`justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the nonmovant’s
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`favor. Opryland USA Inc. v. The Great American Music Show,
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`Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 23 USPQ2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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`When the moving party has supported its motion with
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`sufficient evidence which, if unopposed, indicates there is no
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`genuine dispute of material fact, the burden then shifts to
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`the non-moving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine
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`dispute of material fact to be resolved at trial. Enbridge,
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`Inc. v. Excelerate Energy LP, 92 USPQ2d 1537, 1540 (TTAB
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`2009). Further, merely because both parties have moved for
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`summary judgment does not necessarily mean that there are no
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`genuine disputes of material fact, and does not dictate that
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`judgment should be entered. See University Book Store v.
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`University of Wisconsin Board of Regents, 33 USPQ2d 1385, 1389
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`(TTAB 1994).
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`Likelihood of Confusion Claim
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`The parties have cross-moved for summary judgment on the
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`claim of likelihood of confusion. Essentially, the parties
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`4
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`Opposition No. 91194716
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`have taken contradictory positions regarding, among other
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`things, the relatedness of the parties’ respective goods and
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`services, as well as the trade channels of such goods and
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`services. Applicant additionally argues that, since its
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`involved marks constitute an effective parody of opposer’s
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`pleaded marks, there can be no likelihood of confusion.
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`We initially note that parody is not, per se, a “defense”
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`to a claim of likelihood of confusion; rather, “it is merely a
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`way of phrasing the traditional response that customers are
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`not likely to be confused as to source, sponsorship or
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`approval.” Schieffein & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, 725 F. Supp.
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`1314, 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting J. Thomas McCarthy,
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`McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 31:156 (4th
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`ed. database updated 2012)). Thus, parody is simply another
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`factor which is relevant to the analysis of likelihood of
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`confusion because parody is merely another way of arguing that
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`confusion is not likely. Nike, Inc. v. Just Did It
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`Enterprises, 6 F.3d 1125, 28 USPQ2d 1942 (7th Cir. 1993); Utah
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`Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. For Apologetic Info. and
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`Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 86 USPQ2d 1865 (10th Cir. 1988). In
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`other words, even if the defendant’s mark has a parody aspect,
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`that is not necessarily sufficient to prevent likelihood of
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`confusion. See Elvis Presley Enterprises Inc. v. Capece, 141
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`F.3d 188, 46 USPQ2d 1737, 1744 (5th Cir. 1998); Dr. Seuss
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`5
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`Opposition No. 91194716
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`Enterprises L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d 1394, 42
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`USPQ2d 1184, 1193 (9th Cir. 1977).
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` In any event, we find, as discussed infra, that there
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`is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
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`applicant’s marks would be perceived as a parody. We also
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`find that there are genuine disputes of material fact as to
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`the relatedness of the parties’ respective goods and
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`services and the channels of trade of such goods and
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`services. Accordingly, applicant’s motion for summary
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`judgment and opposer’s cross-motion for summary judgment on
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`opposer’s pleaded claim of likelihood of confusion are
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`denied.
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`Dilution
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`When an application to register a mark is challenged on
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`the grounds of dilution, as is the case here, the Board
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`looks to three elements: (1) whether the opposer’s mark is
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`famous, (2) whether the opposer’s mark became famous prior
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`to applicant’s use of the mark; and (3) whether the
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`applicant’s mark is likely to blur the distinctiveness of
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`the opposer’s famous mark. National Pork Board v. Supreme
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`Lobster and Seafood Co., 96 USPQ2d 1479, 1494-5 (TTAB
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`2010).3
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`3In determining whether a mark is likely to cause dilution by
`blurring, we consider all factors relevant to the issue,
`including the six factors that are enumerated in Section
`43(c)(2)(B) of the Trademark Act.
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`6
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`Opposition No. 91194716
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`As a threshold matter, we note that opposer’s asserted
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`claim of dilution is deficiently pleaded. Specifically, the
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`notice of opposition does not include an allegation that
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`opposer’s pleaded BATMAN and GOTHAM marks became famous prior
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`to applicant’s first use of its involved marks in commerce.
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`Rather, opposer merely alleges that registration of
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`applicant’s proposed GOTHAM BATMEN marks is likely to lead to
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`dilution of the distinctive and famous BATMAN marks and GOTHAM
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`marks. See Notice of Opposition ¶ 16.
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`While we recognize that a party may not obtain summary
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`judgment on an improperly pleaded claim, see Asian and Western
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`Classics B.V. v. Lynee Selkow, 92 USPQ2d 1478, 1480 (TTAB
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`2009), citing Intermed Communications, Inc. V. Chaney, 197
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`USPQ 501, 503 n. 2 (TTAB 1977)(“if a claim has not been
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`properly pleaded one cannot obtain summary judgment thereon”),
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`inasmuch as applicant, in support of its motion for summary
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`judgment, has conceded the fame of opposer’s pleaded BATMAN
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`marks, and in response to opposer’s cross-motion for summary
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`judgment on opposer’s claim of dilution, does not contest that
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`opposer’s pleaded BATMAN marks became famous prior to
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`applicant’s first use of its involved marks, we deem, solely
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`for purposes of the parties’ cross-motions for summary
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`judgment, opposer’s notice of opposition to properly assert a
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`claim of dilution, but only as to opposer’s pleaded BATMAN
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`7
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`Opposition No. 91194716
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`marks, and that applicant has denied the salient allegations
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`regarding this claim.4
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`In view of the foregoing, we find that there are no
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`genuine disputes of material fact that opposer’s pleaded
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`BATMAN marks are famous and that opposer’s BATMAN marks
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`acquired their fame prior to applicant’s first use of its
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`involved marks.
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`It is only on the final element of the three-part test,
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`i.e., in considering the six non-exclusive factors set forth
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`in Section 43(c)(2)(B) of the Trademark Act, that the
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`parties take contradictory positions. Applicant argues that
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`established law permits applicant’s use of its involved
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`marks as a permissible parody which does not blur opposer’s
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`pleaded BATMAN marks.
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`Parody, however, is not delineated as a defense to a
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`claim of dilution where the defendant uses the parody as its
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`own designation of source, i.e., as a trademark or service
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`mark. See Section 43(c) of the Act, which provides the
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`following exclusions to a claim of dilution:
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`(3) Exclusions.--The following shall not be actionable
`as dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment
`under this subsection:
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`4 With respect to opposer’s claim that its GOTHAM marks are diluted by
`blurring, as noted supra, opposer has not alleged in its pleading that
`its GOTHAM marks became famous prior to applicant’s first use of its
`marks, and applicant has not conceded this. Thus, opposer’s pleading
`that applicant’s marks are likely to dilute its GOTHAM marks is
`deficient, and we cannot consider the motions for summary judgment as
`they relate to these marks.
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`8
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`Opposition No. 91194716
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`(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or
`descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair
`use, of a famous mark by another person other than
`as a designation of source for the person's own
`goods or services, including use in connection with-
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`...(ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or
`commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods
`or services of the famous mark owner. ....
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`15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(emphasis added).
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`Under the statute’s plain language, parodying a famous
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`mark is protected by the fair use exclusion only if the
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`parody is not “a designation of source for the person’s own
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`goods or services.” Here, applicant is clearly using its
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`GOTHAM BATMEN and GOTHAM BATMEN and design marks as source
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`indicators for its identified services. Accordingly, the
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`parody exclusion under Section 43(c)(3) of the Trademark Act
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`is not applicable in this case.
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`We further note that applicant relies on Louis Vuitton
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`Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 84
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`USPQ2d 1969 (4th Cir. 2007). In that case, although the
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`Fourth Circuit noted that the fair use exception for parody
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`under Section 43(c)(3)(A) does not extend to parodies used
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`as trademarks, the Court held that “a defendant’s use of a
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`mark as a parody is relevant to the overall question of
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`whether the defendant’s use is likely to impair the famous
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`mark’s distinctiveness.” Louis Vuitton, 84 USPQ2d at 1978.
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`The Court explained:
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`Factor (v) (whether the defendant intended to
`create an association with the famous mark) and
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`9
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`Opposition No. 91194716
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`factor (vi) whether there exists an actual
`association between the defendant’s mark and the
`famous mark) directly invite inquiries into the
`defendant’s intent in using the parody, the
`defendant’s actual use of the parody, and the
`effect that its use has on the famous mark. While
`a parody intentionally creates an association with
`the famous mark in order to be a parody, it also
`intentionally communicates, if it is successful,
`that it is not the famous mark, but rather a
`satire of the famous mark. That the defendant is
`using its mark as a parody is therefore relevant
`in the consideration of these statutory factors.
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`Id. at 1978-79.
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`We note that no other federal courts have adopted the
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`Fourth Circuit’s interpretation that, even though the
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`statute specifically excludes parody as a fair use defense
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`to a dilution claim, the possible parody effect of the
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`defendant’s mark should be considered in determining whether
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`the plaintiff has proved dilution by blurring. In fact, the
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`Second Circuit, in deciding Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s
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`Borough Coffee Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 92 USPQ2d 1769 (2d Cir.
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`2009), specifically stated that “we need not adopt or reject
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`Louis Vuitton’s parody holding,” because it found that the
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`defendant’s use of its mark was not a parody that would
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`favor defendant in the dilution analysis “even if we were to
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`adopt the Fourth Circuit’s rule.” Starbucks Corp., 92
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`USPQ2d at 1778.
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`Just like the Second Circuit in Starbucks, “we need not
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`adopt or reject Louis Vuitton’s parody holding” at this point.
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`Instead, we find that there is a genuine dispute as to whether
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`10
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`Opposition No. 91194716
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`applicant’s marks would be viewed by the consuming public as a
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`parody, as applicant asserts. As part of this question, there
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`is a genuine dispute as to the similarity of the parties’
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`respective goods and services, and this affects whether
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`applicant’s marks would be viewed as a parody.
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`Accordingly, applicant’s motion and opposer’s cross-
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`motion for summary judgment on opposer’s claim of dilution,
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`as they relate to opposer’s BATMAN marks, are denied.
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`Lack of Bona Fide Use of Applicant’s Marks in Commerce and
`Fraud
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`With respect to opposer’s claims of lack of bona fide use
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`of applicant’s marks in commerce as of the filing date of
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`applicant’s applications,5 and fraud based on such lack of
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`bona fide use of the marks, applicant maintains that its
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`amateur softball team was formed in February 2006 and that
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`members of its amateur softball team, who are also members of
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`its networking referral group, cross state lines to
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`participate in the softball league while wearing uniforms
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`displaying applicant’s marks. Further, in addition to playing
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`softball, these members refer business to one another and
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`5 We note that opposer has also alleged in its notice of
`opposition that applicant does not currently make bona fide use
`of its marks. It appears that opposer is actually alleging a
`claim of abandonment based upon no bona fide use and/or nonuse
`since the filing date of applicant’s applications. We note,
`however, that an abandonment claim has not been pleaded and
`therefore we have given no consideration to such a claim in our
`determination herein.
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`11
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`Opposition No. 91194716
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`generally discuss networking opportunities throughout the
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`United States. See Declaration of Fred C. Klein, applicant’s
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`co-founder, at ¶¶ 5-8, submitted with applicant’s motion for
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`summary judgment. Further, applicant contends that its
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`network business referral group and associated softball team
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`are prominent on the Internet, id. at ¶ 9, and that the
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`specimen of use filed with applicant’s application, and
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`accepted by the USPTO, clearly illustrates the nexus between
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`applicant’s business networking referral services and its
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`softball team. Applicant therefore contends that there are no
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`genuine disputes of material fact that it had made bona fide
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`use of its marks at the time of the filing of its applications
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`and therefore, based on such bona fide use, there is no
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`genuine dispute of material fact and that, as a matter of law,
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`it did not commit fraud on the Office.
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`In opposition to applicant’s motion and in support of its
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`cross-motion on its asserted claim of lack of bona fide use in
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`commerce, opposer argues that applicant has not made any
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`service mark use of its GOTHAM BATMEN marks. Specifically,
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`opposer contends that applicant has admitted, in response to
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`opposer’s interrogatory requests, as well as by the testimony
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`of applicant’s president, that it does not direct any
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`advertising, promotional materials, or solicitations for goods
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`and services bearing its marks to the public. Opposer further
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`maintains, based on applicant’s responses to opposer’s
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`12
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`Opposition No. 91194716
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`interrogatory requests, that applicant’s use of its marks is
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`confined to applicant’s communicating information about its
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`amateur softball team to other members within its private
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`organization, to members of its softball team, and to league
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`officials.
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`Opposer also contends that applicant’s use of its marks
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`on softball jerseys as the name of a team does not constitute
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`bona fide use of the marks in commerce because there is no
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`interstate use of applicant’s GOTHAM BATMEN marks and,
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`therefore, applicant is not using its marks to promote
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`commercial activities, or even non-profit activities, across
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`state lines. Moreover, opposer argues that the specimens of
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`use submitted in support of applicant’s applications confirm
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`applicant’s lack of bona fide use in commerce. Specifically,
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`opposer contends that the specimens consist of nothing more
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`than news stories on applicant’s website about applicant’s
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`amateur softball team and, as such, do not constitute bona
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`fide use of applicant’s marks in commerce.
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`In reply, applicant contends that, in response to
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`opposer’s requests for admissions, applicant responded with an
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`explicit denial when asked to admit that it did not direct
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`“advertising, promotional materials, or solicitations for
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`goods and services” displaying its GOTHAM BATMEN marks to the
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`public. In fact, applicant points to the testimony of its
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`president and co-founder, Fred Klein, as well as to its
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`13
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`Opposition No. 91194716
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`responses to opposer’s interrogatory requests, that applicant
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`has placed its GOTHAM BATMEN marks on promotional materials
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`viewed by the public. Further, applicant argues that, while
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`its GOTHAM BATMEN marks are used to promote its softball team,
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`they are also used to promote the business networking referral
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`services offered by applicant, including those offered via
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`applicant’s softball team.
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`With regard to applicant’s motion for summary judgment on
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`the ground of fraud, opposer maintains that genuine disputes
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`of material fact exist which would preclude disposition of
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`this claim by summary judgment. Specifically, opposer argues
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`that applicant made material misrepresentations to the USPTO
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`when it claimed it had made bona fide use of its GOTHAM BATMEN
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`marks as of the filing date of its applications, because
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`applicant never made such use in commerce.6
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`6 We note that opposer also asserts, in opposing applicant’s
`motion for summary judgment on opposer’s fraud claim, that
`applicant intentionally misrepresented its dates of first use in
`its involved applications. Opposer did not allege, as a basis
`for its asserted fraud claim in its notice of opposition, that
`applicant had provided false dates of use. Even were we to deem
`the notice of opposition amended so as to assert this basis,
`opposer is advised that, if a mark was in use at the time an
`application is filed, a claim as to the date of first use, even
`if false, does not constitute fraud. See Western Worldwide
`Enterprises Group Inc. v. Qingdao Brewery, 17 USPQ2d 1137, 1141
`(TTAB 1990) (“The Board repeatedly has held that the fact that a
`party has set forth an erroneous date of first use does not
`constitute fraud unless, inter alia, there was no valid use of
`the mark until after the filing of the [Section 1(a)]
`application.”).
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`14
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`Opposition No. 91194716
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`Based upon the parties’ conflicting arguments regarding
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`applicant’s specimen of use, as well as other submitted
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`evidence, we find that genuine disputes of material fact
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`exist as to whether applicant made bona fide use of its
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`involved marks in commerce as of the filing date of its
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`involved applications with regard to its networking services
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`and whether applicant’s use of its marks in connection with
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`such networking services constitutes service mark usage. We
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`also find that, at a minimum, genuine disputes of material
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`fact remain as to applicant’s intent to commit fraud on the
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`Office. The parties are advised that the factual question
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`of intent is particularly unsuited to disposition on summary
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`judgment. Copelands' Enterprises Inc. v. CNV Inc., 945 F.2d
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`1563, 20 USPQ2d 1295, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Asian
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`and Western Classics B.V. v. Selkow, supra, 92 USPQ2d 1478.
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`We further find, however, that there are no genuine
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`disputes of material fact as to whether applicant had made
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`bona fide use of its marks as of the filing date of its
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`applications with regard to its entertainment services in
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`the nature of softball games. Specifically, opposer does
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`not contest that, as of the filing date of applicant’s
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`applications, applicant’s amateur softball team crossed
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`state lines to participate in softball league play and that
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`applicant’s marks appear on the jerseys of applicant’s
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`softball team members. Further, applicant’s co-founder and
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`15
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`Opposition No. 91194716
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`president, Fred Klein, testified that members of the general
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`public attend the softball games, see Klein Deposition at
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`57:25-58:3, submitted as Exhibit E to the Declaration of
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`Nancy J. Mertzel, counsel for opposer, filed in support of
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`opposer’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Opposer does
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`not contest this fact. Although applicant does not charge
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`the general public for attending the softball games and/or
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`sell the softball jerseys bearing applicant’s marks, this
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`does not equate to a lack of bona fide use of the marks.
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`Indeed, use of marks in conjunction with the rendering of
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`free services [in this case entertainment services in the
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`nature of amateur softball games] still constitutes a “use
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`in commerce” under the Trademark Act. See Capital Speakers,
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`Inc. v. Capital Speakers Club of Washington D.C. Inc., 41
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`USPQ2d 1030, 1035 fn. 3 (TTAB 1996) (holding that the mere
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`provision of services is sufficient for registration and
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`that a for-profit sale is not required). In view thereof,
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`we find that applicant is entitled to judgment in its favor
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`as a matter of law with respect to opposer’s claim of lack
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`of bona fide use as of the filing date of applicant’s
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`applications solely in regard to applicant’s recited
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`entertainment services in the nature of amateur softball
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`games.
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`In summary, the parties’ respective motions for summary
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`judgment on opposer’s asserted claims of likelihood of
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`16
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`Opposition No. 91194716
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`confusion, dilution, and lack of a bona fide use in commerce
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`as of the filing date of the involved applications with
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`regard to applicant’s identified networking services, as
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`well as applicant’s motion for summary judgment on opposer’s
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`pleaded claim of fraud, are denied.7
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`However, applicant’s motion for summary judgment on
`
`opposer’s claim of lack of a bona fide use in commerce as of
`
`the filing date of the involved applications with regard to
`
`applicant’s identified entertainment services is granted and
`
`opposer’s cross-motion on the same claim is denied.
`
`We note that applicant has requested that the Board
`
`bifurcate this opposition into two separate opposition
`
`proceedings, one for each of applicant’s two involved
`
`applications. Applicant’s request is denied. Contrary to
`
`applicant’s arguments in support of bifurcation, we find
`
`that common issues of law and fact exist with respect to
`
`each of applicant’s applications vis-a-via opposer’s
`
`asserted claims and that it would be judicially efficient to
`
`maintain a single proceeding.
`
`
`7 The fact that we have identified certain genuine disputes of
`material fact as a sufficient basis for denying the parties’
`respective motions for summary judgment should not be construed
`as a finding that these disputes necessarily are the only ones
`which remain for trial. Moreover, the parties should note that
`the evidence submitted in connection with a motion for summary
`judgment or opposition thereto is of record only for
`consideration of that motion. Any such evidence to be considered
`at final hearing must be properly introduced in evidence during
`the appropriate trial period. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. R.
`Joseph Sportswear Inc., 28 USPQ2d 1464 (TTAB 1993); and Pet Inc.
`v. Bassetti, 219 USPQ 911 (TTAB 1983).
`
`
`
`17
`
`
`
`Opposition No. 91194716
`
`As a final matter, as noted above, opposer has not
`
`properly pleaded its dilution claim. Accordingly, opposer
`
`is allowed twenty days from the mailing date of this order
`
`in which to file and serve an amended pleading which
`
`properly sets forth a claim of dilution, failing which
`
`opposer’s dilution claim will be dismissed with prejudice.8
`
`In turn, applicant is allowed twenty days from the date on
`
`the certificate of service of opposer’s amended pleading to
`
`file and serve an answer to opposer’s amended notice of
`
`opposition.
`
`Trial Schedule
`
`Proceedings herein are resumed. Trial dates, beginning
`
`with the deadline for expert disclosures, are reset as
`
`follows:
`
`Expert Disclosures Due
`Discovery Closes
`Plaintiff's Pretrial
`Disclosures Due
`Plaintiff's 30-day Trial Period
`Ends
`Defendant's Pretrial
`Disclosures Due
`Defendant's 30-day Trial Period
`Ends
`Plaintiff's Rebuttal
`Disclosures Due
`Plaintiff's 15-day Rebuttal
`Period Ends
`
`
`8/1/2012
`8/31/2012
`
`10/15/2012
`
`11/29/2012
`
`12/14/2012
`
`1/28/2013
`
`2/12/2013
`
`3/14/2013
`
`
`8 As noted supra, we have treated opposer’s dilution claim with
`respect to its pleaded BATMAN marks as properly pleaded solely
`for purposes of our consideration of the parties’ cross-motions
`for summary judgment. Opposer’s dilution claim nonetheless
`remains deficiently pleaded, as explained above.
`
`
`
`18
`
`
`
`Opposition No. 91194716
`
`In each instance, a copy of the transcript of
`
`testimony, together with copies of documentary exhibits,
`
`must be served on the adverse party within thirty days after
`
`completion of the taking of testimony. Trademark Rule
`
`2.125.
`
`
`
`Briefs shall be filed in accordance with Trademark
`
`Rules 2.128(a) and (b). An oral hearing will be set only
`
`upon request filed as provided by Trademark Rule 2.129.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`19
`
`
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