`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
`P.O. Box 1451
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Mailed: December 8, 2010
`
`Opposition No. 91196218
`
`The Black Dog Tavern Company,
`Inc.
`
`
`v.
`
`
`Black Dog Baits
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`George C. Pologeorgis, Interlocutory Attorney:
`
`
`Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) and Trademark Rules
`
`2.120(g)(1) and (2), the parties to this proceeding
`
`conducted a discovery conference with Board participation.1
`
`
`
`The parties agreed to hold the telephonic discovery
`
`conference with Board participation at 2:00 p.m. Eastern
`
`time on Monday, December 6, 2010. The conference was held as
`
`scheduled among John L. Welch and Emily LaPointe, as counsel
`
`for opposer, Kenneth C. Brooks, as counsel for applicant,
`
`and George C. Pologeorgis, as a Board attorney responsible
`
`for resolving interlocutory disputes in this case.
`
`This order memorializes what transpired during the
`
`conference.
`
`
`1 A request for Board participation in the discovery conference
`was received via telephone from opposer on November 16, 2010.
`
`
`
`
`
`Opposition No. 91196218
`
`
`During the discovery conference, the parties advised
`
`the Board that there was minimal discussion regarding
`
`settlement prior to the conference and settlement has not
`
`been reached. The parties further advised that there are no
`
`related Board proceedings, federal district court actions,
`
`or third-party litigation concerning the subject application
`
`and/or the marks at issue.
`
`The Board reviewed the pleadings herein and indicated
`
`that opposer has alleged a claim of priority and likelihood
`
`of confusion, as well as a dilution claim.2 Additionally,
`
`the Board noted that applicant has asserted a counterclaim
`
`seeking to cancel opposer’s pleaded Registration No. 2396059
`
`on the grounds of abandonment and fraud. With regard to
`
`opposer’s priority and likelihood of confusion claim, the
`
`parties stipulated that priority is not an issue, except as
`
`it concerns opposer’s pleaded Registration No. 2396059.
`
`With regard to applicant’s counterclaim of fraud, the
`
`Board noted applicant merely identified this ground for
`
`cancellation on the ESTTA filing cover sheet of its
`
`answer/counterclaim without providing sufficient allegations
`
`in support of the claim within the body of applicant’s
`
`
`2 During the telephone conference, the Board noted that opposer’s
`dilution claim was not pleaded properly since it appeared that
`there was no affirmative allegation that opposer’s mark became
`famous prior to applicant’s first use of its mark. Upon further
`review of opposer’s pleading, however, the Board finds that
`opposer did in fact make such an affirmative allegation. See
`Paragraph 5 of Notice of Opposition. Accordingly, the Board finds
`that opposer has properly pleaded its dilution claim.
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`Opposition No. 91196218
`
`
`pleading. Accordingly, the Board found that applicant’s
`
`fraud claim was deficiently pleaded.
`
`Fraud in procuring or maintaining a trademark
`
`registration occurs when an application for registration or
`
`a registrant in a declaration of use or a renewal
`
`application knowingly makes specific false, material
`
`representations of fact in connection with an application to
`
`register or in a post-registration filing with the intent of
`
`obtaining or maintaining a registration to which it
`
`otherwise is not entitled. See In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d
`
`1240, 91 USPQ2d 1938 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
`
`Further, pleadings of fraud made “on information and
`
`belief,” when there is no allegation of “specific facts upon
`
`which the belief is reasonably based” are insufficient. In
`
`re Bose Corp., 91 USPQ2d at 1938.
`
`Additionally, under USPTO Rule 11.18, the factual basis
`
`for a pleading requires either that the pleader know of
`
`facts that support the pleading or that evidence showing the
`
`factual basis is “likely” to be obtained after a reasonable
`
`opportunity for discovery or investigation. Allegations
`
`based solely on information and belief raise only the mere
`
`possibility that such evidence may be uncovered and do not
`
`constitute pleading of fraud with particularity. Thus, to
`
`satisfy Rule 9(b), any allegations based on “information and
`
`belief” must be accompanied by a statement of facts upon
`
`which the belief is founded. See Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart
`
`Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 91 USPQ2d 1656, 1670 n. 7 (Fed.
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`Opposition No. 91196218
`
`
`Cir. 2009), citing Kowal v. MCICommc’n Corp., 16 F.3d 1271,
`
`1279 n. 3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) “(‘[P]leadings on information and
`
`belief [under Rule 9(b)] require an allegation that the
`
`necessary information lies within the defendant's control,
`
`and … such allegations must also be accompanied by a
`
`statement of the facts upon which the allegations are
`
`based’).”
`
`A pleading of fraud on the USPTO must also include an
`
`allegation of intent. In re Bose, 91 USPQ2d at 1939-40.
`
`Moreover, although Rule 9(b) allows that intent may be
`
`alleged generally, the pleadings must allege sufficient
`
`underlying facts from which a court may reasonably infer
`
`that a party acted with the requisite state of mind. Exergen
`
`Corp., 91 USPQ2d at 1667, n. 4. Pleadings of fraud which
`
`rest solely on allegations that the trademark applicant or
`
`registrant made material representations of fact in
`
`connection with its application or registration which it
`
`“knew or should have known” to be false or misleading are an
`
`insufficient pleading of fraud because it implies mere
`
`negligence and negligence is not sufficient to infer fraud
`
`or dishonesty. In re Bose, 91 USPQ2d at 1940, quoting
`
`Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1582
`
`(Fed. Cir. 1991).
`
`Thus under Bose, intent is a specific element of a
`
`fraud claim and an allegation that a declarant “should have
`
`known” a material statement was false does not make out a
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`Opposition No. 91196218
`
`
`proper pleading. See also Media Online Inc. v. El
`
`Casificado, Inc., 88 USPQ2d 1285, 1287 (TTAB 2008) (finding
`
`proposed amended pleading insufficient in part because the
`
`pleading lacked allegations of scienter); Crown Wallcovery
`
`Corp. v. The Wall Paper Mfrs. Ltd., 188 USPQ 141, 144 (TTAB
`
`1975) and cases cited therein (“in order to state a claim
`
`upon which relief can be granted on the ground of fraud, it
`
`must be asserted that the false statements complained of
`
`were made willfully in bad faith with the intent to obtain
`
`that to which the party making the statements would not
`
`otherwise have been entitled”).
`
`In view of the foregoing and in light of the noted
`
`deficiencies in applicant’s pleading regarding its apparent
`
`fraud claim, applicant is allowed up to, and including,
`
`January 5, 2011 in which to file and serve an amended
`
`pleading which properly sets forth a claim of fraud, failing
`
`which applicant’s counterclaim will proceed solely on the
`
`asserted claim of abandonment. In the event applicant does
`
`file an amended answer/counterclaim, opposer is allowed
`
`thirty days from the date indicated on the certificate of
`
`service of applicant’s amended pleading in which to file and
`
`serve an answer to the amended counterclaim.
`
`The Board also advised the parties of the Board’s
`
`accelerated case resolution (“ACR”) process. While the
`
`parties declined to stipulate to pursue ACR at this time,
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`Opposition No. 91196218
`
`
`the parties have the right to pursue ACR at a future date,
`
`if appropriate.3
`
` The Board then advised the parties of the automatic
`
`imposition of the Board’s standard protective order in this
`
`case and further indicated that the parties would control
`
`which tier of confidentiality applies. Additionally, the
`
`Board stated that if the parties wished to modify the
`
`Board’s standard protective order, they could do so by
`
`filing a motion for Board approval.
`
`Furthermore, the Board noted that the exchange of
`
`discovery requests could not occur until the parties made
`
`their initial disclosures as required by Fed. R. Civ. P.
`
`26(f). Additionally, the Board advised the parties that if
`
`either party plans to file a motion to compel discovery, the
`
`moving party must first contact the Board by telephone so
`
`that the Board can ascertain whether the moving party has
`
`demonstrated a good faith effort in resolving the discovery
`
`dispute before filing its motion. The Board also noted that
`
`a motion for summary judgment may not be filed until initial
`
`disclosures were made by the parties.
`
`The Board also provided the parties instruction as to
`
`what the required initial disclosures entail under Fed. R.
`
`Civ. P. 26(a).
`
`
`3 For more information regarding the Board’s ACR process, the
`parties are directed to the following website:
`http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/acrognoticerule.
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`Opposition No. 91196218
`
`
`Moreover, the parties agreed to accept service of
`
`papers by e-mail, and that opposer may be served at the
`
`following email addresses: JWelch@Lalaw.com and
`
`emilylapointe@theblackdog.com and; and that applicant may be
`
`served at the following email address:
`
`kcb@brookspatents.com. The parties, however, may serve
`
`responses to documents requests via first-class mail or by
`
`express overnight mail. Further, the Board noted that since
`
`the parties have agreed to service by email, the parties may
`
`no longer avail themselves of the additional 5 days for
`
`service provided under Trademark Rule 2.119(c) that is
`
`afforded to parties when service is made by first-class of
`
`express mail.
`
`Additionally, the Board recommended that the parties
`
`file papers via the Board’s electronic filing system, ESTTA,
`
`and that they should review the ESTTA filing guidelines
`
`found on the Board’s website.
`
`Trial dates are reset as follows:
`
`Initial Disclosures Due
`Expert Disclosures Due
`Discovery Closes
`Plaintiff's Pretrial Disclosures
`30-day testimony period for
`plaintiff's testimony to close
`Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff's
`Pretrial Disclosures
`
`March 8, 2011
`July 6, 2011
`August 5, 2011
`September 19, 2011
`
`November 3, 2011
`
`November 18, 2011
`
`30-day testimony period for defendant
`and plaintiff in the counterclaim to
`close
`Counterclaim Defendant's and
`Plaintiff's Rebuttal Disclosures Due
`
`January 2, 2012
`
`January 17, 2012
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`Opposition No. 91196218
`
`
`30-day testimony period for defendant
`in the counterclaim and rebuttal
`testimony for plaintiff to close
`Counterclaim Plaintiff's Rebuttal
`Disclosures Due
`15-day rebuttal period for plaintiff
`in the counterclaim to close
`Brief for plaintiff due
`Brief for defendant and plaintiff in
`the counterclaim due
`
`Brief for defendant in the
`counterclaim and reply brief, if any,
`for plaintiff due
`Reply brief, if any, for plaintiff in
`the counterclaim due
`
`
`March 2, 2012
`
`March 17, 2012
`
`April 16, 2012
`June 15, 2012
`
`July 15, 2012
`
`August 14, 2012
`
`August 29, 2012
`
`In each instance, a copy of the transcript of testimony
`
`together with copies of documentary exhibits, must be served
`
`on the adverse party within thirty days after completion of
`
`taking of testimony. Trademark Rule 2.125.
`
`Briefs shall be filed in accordance with Trademark
`
`Rules 2.128(a) and (b). An oral hearing will be set only
`
`upon request filed as provided by Trademark Rule 2.129.
`
`
`
`8



