Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. https://estta.uspto.gov
`
`ESTTA Tracking number:
`
`ESTTA1198576
`
`Filing date:
`
`03/24/2022
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`Proceeding no.
`
`91242453
`
`Party
`
`Correspondence
`address
`
`Defendant
`The CRATE Inc.
`
`JORDAN GREENBERGER
`J GREENBERGER PLLC
`500 SEVENTH AVENUE 8TH FLOOR
`NEW YORK, NY 10018
`UNITED STATES
`Primary email: jordan@jgreenbergerlaw.com
`718-502-9555
`
`Submission
`
`Filer's name
`
`Filer's email
`
`Signature
`
`Date
`
`Brief on Merits for Defendant
`
`Jordan Greenberger
`
`jordan@jgreenbergerlaw.com
`
`/Jordan Greenberger/
`
`03/24/2022
`
`Attachments
`
`TRIAL - Applicants Brief.pdf(519099 bytes )
`
`

`

`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
` Opposition No. 91242453
`
`
`
`CHICAGO CUBS BASEBALL CLUB, LLC,
`
`-against-
`
`
`THE CRATE INC.,
`
`
`
`Opposer,
`
`
`Applicant.
`
`
`APPLICANT’S TRIAL BRIEF
`
`J. GREENBERGER, PLLC
`Counsel for Applicant
`Jordan Greenberger, Esq.
`Mailing: 41 Watchung Plaza, #334, Montclair, NJ 07042
`NY: 500 7th Ave., 8th Fl., New York, NY 10018
`(718) 502-9555
`jordan@jgreenbergerlaw.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ......................................................................................... 1
`
`II. FACTS CONCERNING THE CRATE & ITS SUBJECT MARK .................................. 3
`
`III. ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................................... 4
`
`A. OPPOSER HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF, BUT HAS NOT EVEN SUFFICIENTLY PLEADED ITS
`CLAIMS ........................................................................................................................................ 4
`
`B. OPPOSER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED A LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION ....................................... 8
`
`1. Similarity Of The Parties’ Marks .................................................................................... 9
`
`2. Strength/Fame Of Opposer’s C Marks ......................................................................... 11
`
`3. Similarity Of The Parties’ Goods/Services ................................................................... 15
`
`4. Similarity Of Trade Channels and Purchasers ............................................................. 15
`
`5. Applicant’s Intent .......................................................................................................... 17
`
`6. Purchaser Sophistication .............................................................................................. 20
`
`7. Actual Confusion ........................................................................................................... 24
`
`8. Third Party Use............................................................................................................. 27
`
`C. OPPOSER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED DILUTION BY BLURRING .............................................. 28
`
`1. The Cubs Have Not Established Which Of Their Marks Are “Famous” ..................... 28
`
`2. The Cubs Have Not Established An Association Or Impairment ................................. 31
`
`D. OPPOSER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED A FALSE SUGGESTION OF CONNECTION ....................... 33
`
`IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 35
`
`
`//
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`
`i
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`

`

`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`CASES
`
`7-Eleven, Inc. v. Lawrence I. Wechsler, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1715 (T.T.A.B. 2007) ................. 7, 30, 32
`A & H Sportswear Co., Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 155, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d
`1143 (E.D. Pa. 1999), judgment aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 237 F.3d 198,
`57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 2000)........................................................................................... 23
`
`A.B. v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc., 484 F.Supp.3d 921 (D. Or. 2020) .................................. 5
`
`Affiliated Hosp. Prod., Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1975) ................ 24
`Aktiebolaget Electrolux v. Armatron Int’l, Inc., 999 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1993) ................................. 24
`Application of E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) ......................... 9
`
`B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015) .................... 5
`
`Barbaras Bakery, Inc. v. Barbara Landesman, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1283 (T.T.A.B. 2007) ................ 25
`
`Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia v. Buzas Baseball, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (N.D.
`Ga. 2001)................................................................................................................................... 15
`
`Board of Regents, University of Texas System ex rel. University of Texas at Austin v. KST Elec.,
`Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 657 (W.D. Tex. 2008) ............................................................................ 31
`
`Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prod., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2002) . 9, 13
`Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Velocity, 117 U.S.P.Q.2d 1492 (T.T.A.B. 2015) ................................... 34
`Boston Pro. Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.
`1975) ......................................................................................................................................... 20
`Boston Red Sox Baseball Club Limited P’ship v. Sherman, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1581 (T.T.A.B. 2008)
`................................................................................................................................................... 34
`
`CareFirst of Maryland, Inc. v. First Care, P.C., 434 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2006) ........................... 24
`
`Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1645, 1662, 2010 WL 595586
`(T.T.A.B. 2010), aff’d, 637 F.3d 1344, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ......................... 24
`Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d 1713 (Fed. Cir.
`2012) ............................................................................................................................. 15, 29, 30
`
`Dakota Industries Inc. v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1590, 2001 WL 1448600 (D.S.D.
`2001), aff’d, 37 Fed. Appx. 846 (8th Cir. 2002) ....................................................................... 23
`Elec. Design & Sales, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1388 (Fed. Cir.
`1992) ......................................................................................................................................... 17
`
`Gap, Inc. v. G.A.P. Adventures Inc., No. 07 CIV. 9614 AKH, 2011 WL 2946384 (S.D.N.Y. June
`24, 2011) ................................................................................................................................... 32
`
`Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 130 F.R.D. 92 (N.D. Ind. 1990)
`................................................................................................................................................... 29
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Greenway Nutrients, Inc. v. Blackburn, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Colo. 2014) .............................. 6
`
`Hard Candy, LLC v. Anastasia Beverly Hills, Inc., 921 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 2019) ................... 25
`
`In re Eldorado Resorts LLC, Serial No. 88514634, Ex Parte Appeal 88514634 (July 8, 2021) .... 9
`
`In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .............................................................. 25
`
`In Re Nieves & Nieves LLC, 113 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629 (T.T.A.B. 2015) ........................................... 34
`
`In re The W.W. Henry Company, L.P., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1213, 2007 WL 186661 (T.T.A.B. 2007)17
`International Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Winship Green Nursing
`Center, 103 F.3d 196, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1251 (1st Cir. 1996) ...................................................... 21
`
`Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48, 53, 227 U.S.P.Q. 794 (D.N.M.
`1985), judgment aff’d, 828 F.2d 1482, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1987) ........................... 23
`Kansas City Royals Baseball Corporation v. Anschutz Manchester Hockey, LLC, Opposition No.
`91163833, 2008 WL 5256409 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 9, 2008) ........................................................... 20
`
`Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453 (Fed. Cir.
`1992) ......................................................................................................................................... 12
`
`Kole v. Vill. of Norridge, 941 F. Supp. 2d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2013) ..................................................... 6
`
`Kookai, S.A. v. Shabo, 950 F. Supp. 605, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1783 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)......................... 23
`
`M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Communications, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 1944 (Fed. Cir.
`2006) ......................................................................................................................................... 16
`
`Maas & Waldstein Co. v. Am. Paint Corp., 288 F.2d 306 (8th Cir. 1961) ................................... 25
`
`McDonaltds Corp. v. McSweet LLC, 112 U.S.P.Q.2d 1268 (T.T.A.B. 2014) .............................. 13
`
`McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 202 U.S.P.Q. 81 (2d Cir. 1979) ... 17, 22
`Nat’l Pork Board and Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. Supreme Lobster and Seafood Co., 96
`U.S.P.Q.2d 1479 (T.T.A.B. 2010) ............................................................................................ 20
`
`New Era Cap Co., Inc. v Pro Era, LLC, No. 91216455, 2020 WL 2853282 (T.T.A.B. May 29,
`2020..................................................................................................................................... 13, 14
`
`Nike, Inc. v. Peter Maher & Patricia Hoyt Maher, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d 1018 (T.T.A.B. 2011) . 28, 29,
`32
`
`Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 55 S. Ct. 428 (1935) .......................................................... 29
`
`NSM Resources Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 113 U.S.P.Q.2d 1029 (T.T.A.B. 2014) ....................... 6
`One Industries, LLC v. Jim O’Neal Distributing, Inc., 578 F.3d 1154, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (9th
`Cir. 2009) .................................................................................................................................. 11
`
`Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Systems, Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 231 U.S.P.Q. 634 (5th Cir. 1986) ......... 25
`
`Paco Sport, Ltd. v. Paco Rabanne Parfums, 86 F. Supp. 2d 305, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1205 (S.D.N.Y.
`2000), judgment aff’d, 234 F.3d 1262 (2d Cir. 2000 ................................................................ 23
`Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distributors, Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1189 (2d
`Cir. 1993) .................................................................................................................................. 23
`
`
`
`iii
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`

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`Parfums de Coeur, Ltd. v. Lory Lazarus, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1012, 2007 WL 683784 (T.T.A.B. 2007)
`................................................................................................................................................... 16
`
`Piano Factory Grp., Inc. v. Schiedmayer Celesta GmbH, 11 F.4th 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2021).... 33, 34
`
`Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482 (1st Cir. 1981) ......... 24
`
`Planet Hollywood (Region IV), Inc. v. Hollywood Casino Corp., 80 F. Supp. 2d 815 (N.D. Ill.
`1999), opinion clarified, No. 96 C 4660, 1999 WL 1186802 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 1999) ............ 25
`
`Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 128 U.S.P.Q. 411 (2d Cir. 1961) .......... 27
`
`QuikTrip W., Inc. v. Weigel Stores, Inc., 984 F.3d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ..................................... 8
`
`Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1894 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ............................... 10
`
`Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 217 U.S.P.Q. 658 (2d Cir. 1983) ................ 22
`
`Smith v. Tobacco By-Prod. & Chem. Corp., 243 F.2d 188 (C.C.P.A. 1957) ............................... 25
`Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 736 F.3d 198, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1581 (2d Cir.
`2013) ......................................................................................................................................... 32
`
`Strange Music, Inc. v. Strange Music, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ..................... 21
`
`Sullivan v. CBS Corp., 385 F.3d 772, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d 1586 (7th Cir. 2004) ................................. 22
`Sunenblick v. Harrell, 895 F. Supp. 616, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1716, 1731 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 101
`F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1996)............................................................................................................. 21
`
`Sunnen Products Co. v. Sunex International Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1744, 1987 WL 123805
`(T.T.A.B. 1987) ........................................................................................................................ 24
`The Pierce-Arrow Soc’y v. Spintek Filtration, Inc., No. 91224343, 2019 WL 3834985 (T.T.A.B.
`Aug. 12, 2019) .......................................................................................................................... 34
`
`Toro Co. v. ToroHead Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1164, 2001 WL 1734485 (T.T.A.B. 2001) ........ 28, 32
`
`TPI Holdings, Inc. v. Trailertrader.com, LLC, 126 U.S.P.Q.2d 1409, 2018 WL 1942229
`(T.T.A.B. 2018) ........................................................................................................................ 24
`
`UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d 1868 (T.T.A.B. 2011) ............................. 8
`
`Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 217 U.S.P.Q.
`505 (Fed. Cir. 1983) .................................................................................................................. 34
`
`Yellowfin Yachts, Inc. v. Barker Boatworks, LLC, 898 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2018) .................... 19
`
`Zimmerman v. Buttigieg, 521 F. Supp. 3d 1197 (M.D. Fla. 2021) ................................................. 5
`
`STATUTES
`
`15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) ...................................................................................................................... 33
`
`15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) ........................................................................................................................ 8
`
`15 U.S.C. § 1063(b) .................................................................................................................. 1, 35
`
`15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) .................................................................................................................. 29
`
`
`
`iv
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`

`

`
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`Barton Beebe & C. Scott Hemphill, The Scope of Strong Marks: Should Trademark Law Protect
`the Strong More Than The Weak?, New York Univ. Law Review [November 2017, Vol.
`92:1339] .................................................................................................................................... 12
`Ryan Mac and Kellen Browning, “Apps and Oranges: Behind Apple’s ‘Bullying’ on
`Trademarks”, New York Times (March 11, 2022) ..................................................................... 1
`TBMP 801.03 .................................................................................................................................. 7
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`RULES
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) ....................................................................................................................... 5
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2)(C) ............................................................................................................. 6
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`TREATISES
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`3 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 20:3 (5th ed.) ........................................... 4
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`4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:62 (5th ed.) ......................................... 8
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`4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24:53.50 (5th ed.) .................................. 16
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`4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24:105 (5th ed.) ..................................... 31
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`4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24:106 (5th ed.) ..................................... 30
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`4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24:119 (5th ed.) ..................................... 33
`
`
`
`//
`
`
`
`v
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`

`

`
`
`Applicant The Crate Inc. (“Applicant” or “The Crate”), by its undersigned counsel,
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`respectfully submits this trial brief in response to the trial brief of opposer Chicago Cubs
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`Baseball Club, LLC (“Opposer” or “the Cubs”). Opposer’s opposition should be denied, the
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`Notice of Opposition should be dismissed, and Applicant’s application for registration of its
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`subject “C” mark should proceed to a final registration (15 U.S.C. § 1063(b)).
`
`I.
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`PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
`
`
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`This is a David vs. Goliath dispute between a minority-owned business from Queens,
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`New York, and the Chicago Cubs baseball team. Regardless of whatever success they may have
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`had on the playing field, in this trademark dispute, the Cubs in their overly aggressive1 attempt to
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`police their trademarks have struck out.
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`
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`Strike one: The Crate has used its “C” mark since February 2016 with substantial sales
`
`and usage, but neither party has identified a single instance of actual consumer confusion. The
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`absence of any actual consumer confusion during this six (6) year period creates an extremely
`
`strong inference against a likelihood of confusion. This factor alone could end the matter, like
`
`how in baseball a caught foul ball results in the batter being called out.
`
`
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`Strike two: The Crate’s “C” mark is visually and commercially distinct from the hodge-
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`podge of “Opposer’s C Marks,” most of which contain other elements that do not in any way,
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`shape or form appear in The Crate’s mark (e.g., the word “Cubs”, a picture of a bear, a circle
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`outline around the letter C). The Crate’s “C” is divided into three outline-pieces whereas the
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`Chicago Cubs marks are all a continuous line forming the “C.” The Cubs do not own a
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`
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`1 See generally Ryan Mac and Kellen Browning, “Apps and Oranges: Behind Apple’s ‘Bullying’
`on Trademarks”, New York Times (March 11, 2022)
`[https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/11/technology/apple-trademarks.html]
`
`
`
`1
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`

`

`monopoly on the use of the letter C, nor can the Cubs claim ownership of the colors red, white,
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`and blue.
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`Additionally, the Cubs’ emphasis on the loyalty of the team’s fanbase supports The
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`Crate, not the Cubs, because loyal fans would likely recognize The Crate’s “C” mark as being
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`distinct from the Cubs’ marks. Just like fans of the Chicago Cubs would recognize that the
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`Cleveland Indian’s usage of the colors red, white and blue and of the letter “C” is distinct from
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`the Cubs’ usage of those colors and the letter “C”, the same fans should recognize that the usage
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`of a trisected letter “C” with various color combinations and other settings is a distinct mark
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`unaffiliated with their baseball team.
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`Strike three: The Cubs have not met their burden of proof, let alone properly pleaded
`
`their claim. In their pleadings and now also at trial, the Cubs have conflated over twenty (20)
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`marks into their definition of “Opposer’s C Marks” without distinguishing between those of their
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`marks that are merely the letter “C” and those that have additional elements, like the word
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`“Chicago” and/or a picture of a bear. The Cubs have not established which of their marks
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`actually are famous (and the Cubs disingenuously mischaracterize The Crate’s limited admission
`
`concerning fame.)
`
`
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`The Cubs’ attempt to paint The Crate as having adopted its “C” mark in bad faith is
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`factually incorrect and – like a dropped third strike in baseball where the batter is nonetheless
`
`thrown out at first base – does not change the outcome. There was no bad faith or intent to trade
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`off the Cubs’ goodwill. The Crate adopted its “C” mark because the company’s name starts with
`
`the letter “C” and the design was aesthetically pleasing to The Crate. The Crate used the colors
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`red, white and blue because they are common colors used in fashion, and also are the same
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`colors as the flag of the United States, where their goods are manufactured. The Crate is not
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`
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`2
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`

`

`selling anything specifically related to baseball; The Crate does sell baseball hats, but baseball
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`hats are part of the broader fashion world and are not limited to fans or participants of the sport
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`of baseball. The one hat that the Cubs identify whereby the word “Crate” incorporates logos of
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`various MLB teams (including a Chicago Cubs logo for the letter “C”) is a red-herring; it was a
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`one-off collaboration and the hat did not include The Crate’s stylized “C” mark that is the subject
`
`of this proceeding. There are no instances of The Crate’s subject mark being used by The Crate
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`in connection with indicia associated with Major League Baseball or The Chicago Cubs. There
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`is absolutely no evidence of any intent to trade off the Cubs’ goodwill, especially considering
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`that The Crate uses channels of sale (its physical store and website) which prominently identify
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`The Crate as the source of the merchandise.
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`This opposition is an overly aggressive, shotgun-style attempt by the Chicago Cubs to
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`police their trademarks. The Crate should be permitted to obtain the applied-for registration.
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`II.
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`FACTS CONCERNING THE CRATE & ITS SUBJECT MARK
`
`The Board is respectfully directed to the following submissions concerning The Crate and
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`its subject mark:
`
`• Declaration of Terrill Kirk, dated July 12, 2021 [52/53 TTABVUE]
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`• Applicant’s Amended First Notice of Reliance, dated October 26, 2021 [59
`
`TTABVUE].
`
`• Applicant’s Responses and Objections To Opposer’s First Set Of Requests For
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`Admission, which are attached as Exhibit B to Opposer’s Second Notice Of
`
`Reliance [34 TTABVUE 124-132].
`
`
`
`3
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`

`

`• Applicant’s Responses and Objections to Opposer’s Revised First Interrogatories,
`
`which are attached as Exhibit D to Opposer’s Second Notice Of Reliance [34
`
`TTABVUE 149-161].
`
`• Applicant’s Responses and Objections to Opposer’s Revised First Set of Requests
`
`for Production, which are attached as Exhibit E to Opposer’s Second Notice Of
`
`Reliance [34 TTABVUE 162-173].
`
`• Applicant’s first Amended Responses to Opposer’s Revised First Interrogatories
`
`and Requests for Production of Documents and Things, which are attached as
`
`Exhibit F to Opposer’s Second Notice Of Reliance [34 TTABVUE 174; 33
`
`TTABVUE].
`
`• Applicant’s Second Amended Responses to Opposer’s Revised First
`
`Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents and Things, which are
`
`attached as Exhibit G to Opposer’s Second Notice Of Reliance [34 TTABVUE
`
`175; 33 TTABVUE].
`
`III. ARGUMENT
`
`The Cubs have not satisfied their burden of proof in establishing a likelihood of
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`confusion, dilution by blurring, or false association. The Board should deny the opposition, and
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`a registration should issue for The Crate’s “C” mark.
`
`A. Opposer Has The Burden Of Proof, But Has Not Even Sufficiently Pleaded Its
`Claims
`
`“In an opposition proceeding, the opposer, as the party in the position of a plaintiff, has
`
`the burden of proof to establish that applicant does not have the right to register its mark.” 3
`
`McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 20:3 (5th ed.). As stated by the United
`
`States Supreme Court, “[t]he party opposing registration bears the burden of proof, see §
`
`
`
`4
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`

`

`2.116(b), and if that burden cannot be met, the opposed mark must be registered, see 15 U.S.C. §
`
`1063(b).” B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 144, 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1300
`
`(2015). The Cubs have the burden of proof, but the Cubs have not met that burden let alone
`
`satisfied their burden at the pleadings stage.
`
`In their pleadings, discovery requests, and trial submissions, the Cubs repeatedly have
`
`conflated over twenty (20) marks into their singular definition of the term “Opposer’s C Marks”
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`despite numerous objections by The Crate and a pleaded affirmative defense concerning this
`
`issue. While the Cubs have introduced data concerning the volume of their sales and scope of
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`usage of the Opposer’s C Marks as a whole, the Cubs have not meaningfully distinguished
`
`between their marks that consist of only a stylized “C”, on the one hand, and those that also
`
`include the word “Cubs” and/or “Chicago”, the picture of a bear or the letter-C enclosed in a
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`circle, on the other hand.
`
`This is both a proof issue, as well as a pleading defect going back to the very beginning
`
`of this case when the Cubs took a “shotgun” approach to opposing the application. Notice of
`
`Opposition, ¶¶ 2-3 [1 TTABVUE 25]; Answer, at Affirmative Defense ¶ 2 [7 TTABVUE 10]
`
`(“Opposer’s pleading fails to allege with specificity, and fails to provide Applicant with notice
`
`of, the basis of its alleged claims.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) (“A party must state its claims or
`
`defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of
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`circumstances”); cf., Zimmerman v. Buttigieg, 521 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1207-08 (M.D. Fla. 2021)
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`(complaint improperly lumped all allegations against multiple defendants together); A.B. v.
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`Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc., 484 F.Supp.3d 921, 943-44 (D. Or. 2020) (a complaint that
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`asserts claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are
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`responsible for which acts or omissions constitutes an impermissible “shotgun” pleading); Kole
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`v. Vill. of Norridge, 941 F. Supp. 2d 933, 942 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (pleading improperly “lump[ed]
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`together four or five different constitutional amendments with little explanation of how
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`Defendants allegedly violated each amendment.”).
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`It was improper for Opposer to lump all its trademarks together at the pleadings stage
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`without differentiating how The Crate’s “C” mark allegedly is confusing to each of the Cubs’
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`various marks (accord, Greenway Nutrients, Inc. v. Blackburn, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1260 (D.
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`Colo. 2014)), and having continued to lump them all together for the trial the court should
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`dismiss the complaint now for failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2)(C); NSM
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`Resources Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 113 U.S.P.Q.2d 1029, 1039 n.19 (T.T.A.B. 2014) (Board
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`may sua sponte dismiss any insufficiently pleaded pleading).
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`For the trial, the Cubs continue to repeatedly refer to “Opposer’s C Marks” without
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`distinguishing between the scope and breadth of usage for each such mark included in that
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`broadly defined term. The Cubs’ trial declarations lump over 20 marks together. For example,
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`the Nolan Declaration discusses Opposer’s C Marks, which are defined to include the letter C
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`“alone or with other word, letter and/or design elements…” (emphasis added). 39 TTABVUE 7.
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`Mr. Nolan does not distinguish between merchandise bearing those other word, letter and design
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`elements, and merchandise bearing only the letter “C”; if anything, the examples he provides
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`reflect that the Chicago Cubs very frequently use other indicia on their goods/services. Kelly
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`King’s declaration similarly discusses the broadly defined Opposer’s C Marks all lumped
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`together, without distinguishing between marks that include other words, letter and design
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`elements; and even when she presents usage of a Cub’s “C” mark it frequently (if not always) is
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`accompanied by other indicia related to the Chicago Cubs (like the word “Cubs” and logos that
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`include other elements, like a bear). 41 TTABVUE 7. The Sarah Horvitz declaration, and its
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`hundreds and hundreds of pages of exhibits, suffers from the same issues. 44-49 TTABVUE.
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`See also the Declaration of Richard Claverie, who submitted information concerning the Chicago
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`Cubs as a whole rather than narrowly focused on marks allegedly confusingly similar. 37
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`TTABVUE.
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`The Cubs have not presented evidence in a clear and comprehensive manner as to which
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`of the subject marks is famous or is likely to be confused with The Crate’s mark. As pleaded and
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`proffered, it is possible that all (or much) of the sales, marketing and usage data presented by the
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`Cubs relates only to the following of their marks that they include in the definition of Opposer’s
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`C Marks and that plainly have a different commercial impression from The Crate’s mark:
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`[King Decl., ¶8].
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`Neither sloppy pleading nor lazy proof should prevail. And wholly absent from the Cubs
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`opening papers is any substantive argument that they have a family of marks. See generally, 7-
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`Eleven, Inc. v. Lawrence I. Wechsler, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1715 (T.T.A.B. 2007) (“Simply using a
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`series of similar marks does not of itself establish the existence of a family. There must be
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`recognition among the purchasing public that the common characteristic is indicative of a
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`common origin of the goods.”). The Cubs should not be permitted to make any such new
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`arguments in their reply papers. TBMP 801.03 (“…the reply brief shall be limited to the key
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`points in defendant’s brief which plaintiff believes require clarification or response, and should
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`not be used as an opportunity to argue plaintiff’s case in chief”).
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`But even if the Board were to consider all of the Cubs’ marks lumped together, in this
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`case many of the marks have dominant characteristics other than the letter “C”, like a drawing of
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`a bear or the word CUBS. Compare, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d
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`1868 (T.T.A.B. 2011) (“MOTOWN” appeared in all of the marks). The claims should be
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`dismissed for failure to meet Opposer’s pleading burden and burden of proof.
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`B. Opposer Has Not Established A Likelihood Of Confusion
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`“As in any ordinary civil litigation, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a
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`preponderance of the evidence that a likelihood of confusion exists.” 4 McCarthy on
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`Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:62 (5th ed.). The Cubs have not met that burden.
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`“Under § 2(d) of the Lanham Act, a mark may be refused registration on the principal
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`register if it is ‘likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause
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`confusion’ with another registered mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is a
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`legal determination based on underlying findings of fact relating to the factors set forth in
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`DuPont.” QuikTrip W., Inc. v. Weigel Stores, Inc., 984 F.3d 1031, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The
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`DuPont factors are:
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`(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to
`appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.
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`(2) The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as
`described in an application or registration or in connection with which a
`prior mark is in use.
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`(3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade
`channels.
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`(4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i. e.
`‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.
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`(5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use).
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`(6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.
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`(7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion.
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`(8) The length of time during and conditions under which there has been
`concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion.
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`(9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark,
`“family” mark, product mark).
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`(10) The market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior
`mark…
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`(11) The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of
`its mark on its goods.
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`(12) The extent of potential confusion, i. e., whether de minimis or
`substantial.
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`(13) Any other established fact probative of the effect of use.
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`Application of E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
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`As explained below, the balance of DuPont factors favors The Crate. “[T]he
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`determination of a likelihood of confusion does not require examination and findings as to each
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`and every DuPont factor,” Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prod., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1370, 63
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`U.S.P.Q.2d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2002), and the following focuses on the factors addressed by
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`Opposer in its opening trial brief and in Applicant’s affirmative defenses.
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`1. Similarity Of The Parties’ Marks
`The Crate’s “C” mark is not identical to any of O