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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
`MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
`COLUMBIA DIVISION
`
`
`JAMES DARRELL BEARD,
`
`
` Plaintiff,
`
`
`v.
`
`
`
`HICKMAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT,
`
`
` Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`NO. 1:22-cv-00019
`
`JUDGE CAMPBELL
`
`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`
`
`MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
`
`The Court is in receipt of the parties’ filings regarding the equitable remedies of
`
`reinstatement and front pay in this matter. (See Doc. Nos. 108, 109,113, 114, 117, 124). For the
`
`reasons stated herein, the Court AWARDS Plaintiff James Darrell Beard the remedy of
`
`reinstatement to the Sheriff’s Department of Defendant Hickman County Government.
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Hickman County’s Sheriff’s Department hired Mr. Beard in 2011. (Parties’ Joint Fact
`
`Stipulations, Doc. No. 94 ¶ 1). As part of his employment, Hickman County provided Mr. Beard
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`with health insurance, disability benefits, and contributed to his retirement with the Tennessee
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`Consolidated Retirement System. (Id. ¶¶ 24-25). Mr. Beard is diabetic, and his left leg was
`
`amputated in May 2021. Hickman County terminated Mr. Beard’s employment less than a month
`
`later. At the time of his termination, Mr. Beard’s annual rate of pay was $44,280.00 (Id. ¶ 22). Mr.
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`Beard lost his designation as Peace Officer Standards and Training (“POST”) certified when
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`Hickman County terminated his employment.
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`Case 1:22-cv-00019 Document 125 Filed 04/25/25 Page 1 of 9 PageID #: 1417
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`

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`On February 28, 2025, a jury in Columbia, Tennessee found that Hickman County
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`unlawfully terminated Mr. Beard’s employment because of his disabilities and in retaliation for
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`exercising his federally protected civil rights. (Verdict Form, Doc. No. 105).1 The jury awarded
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`Mr. Beard $143,387.00 in backpay and $250,000.00 in compensatory damages. On March 3, 2025,
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`the Court entered a judgment in conformity with the jury’s verdict. (Judgment, Doc. No. 107).
`
`The Court ordered the parties to file post-trial briefs addressing the remedies of front pay
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`and reinstatement. (See Doc. No. 106). Mr. Beard seeks reinstatement or, in the alternative, front
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`pay. (Doc. No. 108). Hickman County opposes reinstating Mr. Beard because of his disabilities.
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`(Doc. No. 109). It also opposes front pay. (Id.). Both parties identify POST certification as a
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`potential hinderance to Mr. Beard’s reinstatement as a sergeant with the Sheriff’s Department.
`
`II.
`
`POLICE OFFICER QUALIFICATIONS, STANDARDS, AND TRAINING
`
`The qualifications for police officers in Tennessee are set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 38–
`
`8–106, which states:
`
`Any person employed as a full-time police officer, and any person
`employed or utilized as a part-time, temporary, reserve or auxiliary
`police officer or as a special deputy, shall:
`
`(1) Be at least eighteen (18) years of age;
`
`(2) Be a citizen of the United States, or a permanent legal resident
`of the United States who is an honorably discharged veteran of
`the United States armed forces pursuant to § 38-8-105(d);
`
`(3) Be a high school graduate or possess a high school equivalency
`credential approved by the state board of education;
`
`(4) Not have been convicted of or pleaded guilty to or entered a plea
`of nolo contendere to any felony charge or to any violation of
`any federal or state laws or city ordinances relating to force,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`Hickman County did not assert the “direct threat” affirmative defense, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 12113(b),
`or any other affirmative defenses as to liability.
`
`
`
`Case 1:22-cv-00019 Document 125 Filed 04/25/25 Page 2 of 9 PageID #: 1418
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`2
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`

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`liquor, controlled
`theft, dishonesty, gambling,
`violence,
`substances or controlled substance analogues;
`
`(5) Not have been released or discharged under any other than
`honorable discharge from any of the armed forces of the United
`States;
`
`(6) Have the person's fingerprints on file with the Tennessee bureau
`of investigation;
`
`(7) Have passed a physical examination by a licensed physician or
`a nurse practitioner or physician assistant, so long as the task is
`expressly included in the written protocol developed jointly by
`the supervising physician and the nurse practitioner or physician
`assistant, whichever is applicable, setting forth the range of
`services that may be performed by the nurse practitioner or
`physician assistant;
`
`(8) Have a good moral character as determined by a thorough
`investigation conducted by the employing agency; and
`
`(9) Have been certified by a Tennessee licensed health care provider
`qualified in the psychiatric or psychological field as being free
`from any impairment, as set forth in the current edition of the
`Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)
`of the American Psychiatric Association at the time of the
`examination, that would, in the professional judgment of the
`examiner, affect the applicant's ability to perform an essential
`function of
`the
`job, with or without a
`reasonable
`accommodation.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`The Tennessee Legislature established the POST Commission (referred to herein as the
`
`“POST Commission” or the “Commission”), see Tenn. Code Ann. § 38-8-102, “to develop, plan,
`
`and implement law enforcement training programs for local law enforcement officers in Tennessee,
`
`establish uniform standards for the employment and training of police officers, and to establish
`
`minimum standards and curriculum requirements for courses of study for training police officers.”
`
`Carter v. McWherter, 859 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). Police officers in Tennessee are
`
`required to be certified by the POST Commission. See Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs., ch. 1110–2–.01(1)
`
`(“All persons, who are employed as full-time law enforcement officers on or after July 1, 1982,
`
`
`
`Case 1:22-cv-00019 Document 125 Filed 04/25/25 Page 3 of 9 PageID #: 1419
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`3
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`

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`shall comply with and maintain the pre-employment standards and meet the Basic Law
`
`Enforcement Training requirements before being certified as law enforcement officers.”).
`
`POST certification means “the designation conferred by the Commission on a person who
`
`has successfully completed a minimum, advanced, or specialized course of study and instruction
`
`required for a law enforcement officer in the State of Tennessee, and who meets all applicable
`
`requirements of T.C.A. §§ 38-8-106 and 38-8-107, and Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1110-02 and 1110-
`
`03.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1110-01-.01(6); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 38-8-107(a) (“The
`
`commission shall issue a certificate of compliance to any person who meets the qualifications for
`
`employment and satisfactorily completes an approved recruit training program.”). An “Application
`
`for Certification” must be submitted to the POST Commission “not later than the end of the first
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`day on which [the individual's] employment as a law enforcement officer commences.” Wright v.
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`Tennessee Peace Officer Standards & Training Comm'n, 277 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008)
`
`(quoting Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs., ch. 1110–5–.01(1)).
`
`The POST Commission is vested with authority to “establish criteria for determining
`
`whether to grant an exception to or waive the qualifications of minimum standards as provided in
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`§ 38–8–106[.]” Id. at 2–3. “If a waiver is granted, then a police department may employ an officer
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`who would otherwise be in violation of § 38–8–106.” Id. The Commission has discretion to grant
`
`a waiver of pre-employment requirements under the following circumstances:
`
`(a) No person in need of a waiver under this section may be
`employed as a law enforcement officer unless a request for a
`waiver has been submitted to the Commission. The waiver
`request will be scheduled to be considered at a Commission
`meeting as soon as reasonably practicable. Any person who
`shall appoint any applicant, who, to the knowledge of the
`appointee, fails to meet the minimum standards required by the
`Commission, and any person who signs the warrant or check for
`the payment of the salary of any person who, to the knowledge
`of the signer, fails to meet the qualifications as a law
`
`
`
`Case 1:22-cv-00019 Document 125 Filed 04/25/25 Page 4 of 9 PageID #: 1420
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`4
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`

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`enforcement officer required by the Commission, commits a
`Class A misdemeanor, and upon conviction will be subject to a
`fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) pursuant to
`T.C.A. § 38-8-105.
`
`(b) Military History. The Commission may waive pre-employment
`requirements relating to the military history on an individual
`basis and depending on the circumstances.
`
`1. Waivers may be granted from pre-employment requirements
`for the following separations from military service:
`i.
`Entry Level Separation;
`ii. General Discharge under Honorable Conditions; or
`iii. Uncharacterized Discharge.
`
`
`2. Waivers will not be granted from pre-employment
`requirements for the following separation from military
`service:
`i. Dishonorable Discharge;
`ii. Bad Conduct Discharge; or
`iii. Other Than Honorable Discharge.
`
`
`(c) Criminal Activity. The Commission may waive pre-
`employment requirements relating to criminal activity on an
`individual basis and depending on the circumstances.
`
`
`
`1. The Commission may waive pre-employment requirements
`for a person who has been convicted of, pleaded guilty to, or
`entered a plea of nolo contendere to any felony charge of any
`violation of federal or state laws or city ordinances relating
`to force, violence (excluding domestic violence), theft,
`dishonesty, gambling, liquor and other alcoholic beverages,
`or controlled substances when the offense was classified as
`a misdemeanor.
`
`2. No waiver will be granted while the individual is under the
`jurisdiction of the court or considered on probation, whether
`supervised or unsupervised. For driving under the influence
`violations, the individual must have met all the requirements
`of the Tennessee Department of Safety and received a
`restoration of his/her permanent driving privileges under the
`laws of the State of Tennessee before a waiver may be
`considered.
`
`3. No waiver will be granted for a narcotics violation that could
`result in a felony charge, a conviction for domestic violence,
`
`Case 1:22-cv-00019 Document 125 Filed 04/25/25 Page 5 of 9 PageID #: 1421
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`5
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`

`

`
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`
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`
`
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`
`
`
`or any offense set forth in 18 U.S.C § 922(g) that would
`make the possession of a firearm or weapon a prohibited act.
`
`4. The agency sponsoring or considering employing the
`affected individual seeking employment or certification
`shall present a written request for waiver for any charges and
`provide a copy of the final court disposition of the case to
`the Commission prior to placing any applicant in a position
`of employment.
`
`5. Some of the factors the Commission will consider when
`determining whether to grant a waiver are:
`
`i.
`ii.
`iii.
`iv.
`v.
`
`The amount of time since the offense;
`The amount of time since completion of the sentence;
`The type, circumstances, and severity of the offense;
`The applicant's activities since the offense; and
`The applicant's ability to carry a firearm pursuant to
`federal and state law.
`
`(d) Mental Impairment. A waiver will not be granted from pre-
`employment requirements for a mental impairment that would
`affect the person's ability to perform an essential function of the
`job, with or without a reasonable accommodation.
`
`(e) Education. A waiver will not be granted from pre-employment
`requirements relating to minimum education requirements.
`
`(f) Previous decertification or voluntary surrender of certification
`as a law enforcement officer. The Commission may waive pre-
`employment requirements relating to previous decertification or
`voluntary surrender of certification as a law enforcement officer
`on an individual basis.
`
`1. Some of the factors the Commission will consider when
`determining whether to grant a waiver are:
`
`
`
`i.
`
`ii.
`
`The circumstances of the previous decertification or
`voluntary surrender of certification as a
`law
`enforcement officer;
`The amount of time since the previous decertification
`or voluntary surrender of certification as a law
`enforcement officer;
`The applicant's activities since the offense; and
`The applicant's ability to carry a firearm pursuant to
`federal and state law.
`
`Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1110-09-.04.
`
`iii.
`iv.
`
`
`
`Case 1:22-cv-00019 Document 125 Filed 04/25/25 Page 6 of 9 PageID #: 1422
`
`6
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`

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`III.
`
`STANDARD OF REVIEW
`
`“Congress enacted the [ADA] with the noble purpose of ‘provid[ing] a clear and
`
`comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
`
`disabilities.’” Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 536 (6th Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds
`
`by Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)).
`
`To that end, the ADA incorporates the remedial provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
`
`1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). “Upon a finding of invidious discrimination, a district court has
`
`wide discretion to impose equitable remedies in order to ‘fashion the most complete relief possible’
`
`designed to ‘make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole.’” Fuhr v. Sch. Dist. of City of
`
`Hazel Park, 364 F.3d 753, 760 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 42 F.3d
`
`373, 377 (6th Cir. 1994) and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975)).
`
`“A victim of discrimination ‘is to be placed, as near as may be, in the situation he would
`
`have occupied if the wrong had not been committed.’” United States v. City of Warren, Mich., 138
`
`F.3d 1083, 1097 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418–19); Ford Motor Co. v. E. E.
`
`O. C., 458 U.S. 219, 230 (1982) (“… the victims of job discrimination want jobs, not lawsuits.”).
`
`In the Sixth Circuit, “victims of discrimination are presumptively entitled to instatement or
`
`reinstatement” and “reinstatement is the preferred equitable remedy in cases where discrimination
`
`has been proved.” Fuhr, 364 F.3d at 761 (internal citations omitted). “The availability of
`
`reinstatement is entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court.” McGruder v. Metro. Gov't
`
`of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tennessee, 99 F.4th 336, 343-44 (6th Cir. 2024) (citations and
`
`internal quotations omitted).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 1:22-cv-00019 Document 125 Filed 04/25/25 Page 7 of 9 PageID #: 1423
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`7
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`

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`IV. ANALYSIS
`
`As noted above, Mr. Beard is presumptively entitled to reinstatement. And here, the Court
`
`finds that reinstatement is necessary to place Mr. Beard in, as near as may be, the situation he
`
`would have occupied if Hickman County had not unlawfully terminated his employment. See
`
`Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-21 (1975). Hickman County’s opposition to
`
`Mr. Beard’s reinstatement is not persuasive. First, Hickman County asserts that Mr. Beard is “not
`
`physically capable of performing the essential functions of a patrol deputy/sergeant.” (Doc. No.
`
`109 at 1). This argument fails as the jury necessarily rejected Hickman County’s position on this
`
`key issue of fact – Mr. Beard’s physical abilities to handle the job – by returning a verdict in Mr.
`
`Beard’s favor on his ADA discriminatory discharge claim. (See Verdict Form, Doc. No. 105).
`
`Next, Hickman County asserts that Mr. Beard “is likely unable to obtain the necessary POST
`
`certification,” (see Doc. No. 109 at 1), “due to his inability to pass the required physical
`
`examination[.]” (Id. at 5). Mr. Beard also has concerns that the POST Commission will not approve
`
`a pre-employment requirement waiver for him. (See Doc. No. 124).
`
`Here, where discriminatory discharge and other civil rights violations have been proved,
`
`the Court finds that reinstatement is necessary to be place Mr. Beard in as near as possible the
`
`situation he would have occupied if Hickman County had not wronged him. Accordingly, the
`
`Court AWARDS Mr. Beard the remedy of REINSTATEMENT backdated to June 24, 2021, the
`
`date of his unlawful termination. As part of Mr. Beard’s reinstatement, Hickman County SHALL
`
`expunge Mr. Beard’s unlawful termination from its records, including Mr. Beard’s employment
`
`file and all related documents. On or before May 1, 2025, Hickman County SHALL file under
`
`seal a copy of Mr. Beard’s initial POST certification and corresponding documents, including the
`
`application it previously submitted on Mr. Beard’s behalf. By the same date, Hickman County
`
`
`
`Case 1:22-cv-00019 Document 125 Filed 04/25/25 Page 8 of 9 PageID #: 1424
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`8
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`

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`shall file a notice confirming that is has expunged Mr. Beard’s unlawful termination from its
`
`records, including Mr. Beard’s employment file and all related documents.
`
`The parties are advised that Mr. Beard’s reinstatement is not comparable to re-hiring a
`
`former employee or hiring a new applicant; Mr. Beard is not re-applying for any position nor is he
`
`a potential job applicant. Rather, Mr. Beard is being reinstated as of the date of his unlawful
`
`termination so that he will be put back in the employment situation he would have occupied if
`
`Hickman County had not unlawfully terminated his employment in violation of his civil rights.
`
`See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-21 (1975).
`
`The Court is inclined to reinstate Mr. Beard to either: (1) his prior road deputy shift sergeant
`
`position, which requires POST certification; or (2) the jail tower operator position, which does not
`
`require POST certification. This issue is TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT, pending Hickman
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`County’s compliance with the present Order.
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`The Court AWARDS Mr. Beard the equitable remedy of REINSTATEMENT to Hickman
`
`County’s Sheriff’s Department. The Court will address the details of his reinstatement by separate
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`Order, pending Hickman County’s compliance with this Order.
`
`It is so ORDERED.
`
`
`___________________________________
`WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR.
`CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
`
`
`
`Case 1:22-cv-00019 Document 125 Filed 04/25/25 Page 9 of 9 PageID #: 1425
`
`9
`
`

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