`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
`WESTERN DIVISION
`
`
`
`ADRIAN PAUL McCLAREN,
`
` Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`KEYSTONE MEMPHIS, LLC d/b/a
`COMPASS INTERVENTION CENTER,
`
` Defendant.
`
`
` Case No. 08-2806
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`ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`
`Before the Court is Defendant Keystone Memphis, LLC’s
`(“Keystone”) May 20, 2009, Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Adrian
`Paul McClaren’s First Amended Complaint alleging that Keystone,
`acting through Compass Intervention Center (“Compass”), fired
`McClaren in violation of the clear public policy of the State of
`Tennessee. McClaren has filed a memorandum opposing Keystone’s
`Motion. Taking all facts alleged by McClaren as true, the Court
`finds that McClaren’s First Amended Complaint does not state a
`cause of action under Tennessee law and, therefore, GRANTS
`Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
`I.
` Factual Background
`McClaren, a resident of Olive Branch, Mississippi, worked
`as a marriage and family therapist at Compass’ Memphis,
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`Tennessee, center from April 8, 2002, until the events giving
`rise to the present suit. (Compl. ¶ 8.)1 During that time,
`McClaren’s personal vehicle displayed two license plates that
`depicted the Confederate Battle Flag. On the front of the
`vehicle was a novelty tag displaying solely the Confederate
`Battle Flag. (Id. ¶ 9.) McClaren displayed a state-issued
`Mississippi license plate on the rear of his vehicle. Rather
`than the standard-issue Mississippi plate, McClaren chose to
`display the specialty plate honoring the Sons of Confederate
`Veterans (“SCV”).2 (Id.; see also id. Ex. A, available at
`http://www.mstc.state.ms.us/mvl/tag_img/SonsofConfederateVet.jpg
`(last visited Dec. 16, 2009).) The SCV plate depicts a small
`Confederate Battle Flag as part of the SCV’s emblem. It also
`displays the state flag of Mississippi, which incorporates the
`Confederate Battle Flag in its upper-left corner. (Compl. Ex.
`A.)
`McClaren did not receive any negative response to his two
`license plates until Dr. Mark Monroe, Compass’ clinical
`director, asked McClaren to remove the front license plate from
`
`
`1 All citations are to the First Amended Complaint. (See Dkt. No. 13.)
`McClaren does not plead that Compass employed him for a specific contractual
`time period, and Compass admits that McClaren was an at-will employee. (Id.;
`Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss at 6-9.) (“Def’s.
`Memo”)
`2 The SCV specialty plate is one of many such plates issued by the State of
`Mississippi and available to its drivers for an additional fee. Other such
`plates are devoted to wildlife conservation, military service, the State’s
`universities
`and
`colleges,
`and
`boxing.
`
`See
`Tag
`List,
`http://www.mstc.state.ms.us/mvl/taglist.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2009).
`2
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`his vehicle in the spring of 2006. (Id. ¶ 11.) McClaren
`“politely declined.” (Id.) No further negative comments about
`McClaren’s license plates were made until Nashon McPherson
`became chief executive officer of Compass. On September 28,
`2007, McPherson asked Plaintiff to park his vehicle so that the
`front novelty plate, bearing the Confederate Battle Flag, would
`not be visible. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff again refused; and on
`October 1, 2007, McPherson sent Plaintiff a written warning for
`refusing to conceal his front license plate. (Id. ¶ 16 & Ex.
`D.) The notice informed Plaintiff that failure to follow the
`directive could result in further punishment, including
`termination. (Id.)
`The next day, October 2, 2007, Plaintiff parked his vehicle
`“head in” so that the front plate would no longer be visible to
`anyone walking through the parking lot. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff
`informed McPherson of his willingness to cooperate, and
`McPherson visited Plaintiff’s car in the parking lot to confirm
`that Plaintiff had complied with McPherson’s request. McPherson
`discovered, however, that Plaintiff’s state-issued rear license
`plate also contained the Confederate Battle Flag. McPherson
`once again issued a written warning to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 19-
`21.) Although from October 2 to October 8, 2007, Plaintiff
`continued to park his car so that the front license plate was
`not visible, McPherson continued to issue written reprimands.
`
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`(Id. ¶ 22.) When Plaintiff asked McPherson why he continued to
`receive disciplinary notices after changing the way he parked,
`McPherson suggested that Plaintiff “do something” about his
`rear, state-issued license plate. (Id. ¶ 25.)
`Plaintiff had his final meeting with McPherson on October
`8, 2007. McPherson asked Plaintiff if he “had changed his mind
`regarding the plates.” (Id. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff responded that he
`would continue to park his car so that the front plate would be
`hidden, but Plaintiff declined to remove or replace his rear SCV
`specialty license plate. (Id.) McPherson consequently
`terminated Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff unsuccessfully
`attempted to appeal his termination through Compass’ internal
`review process. (Id. Ex. J.) The State of Tennessee, however,
`granted Plaintiff’s application for unemployment benefits after
`finding that “[t]he employer has not provided sufficient
`evidence to prove that [McClaren’s] actions constitute work-
`related misconduct.” (Id. Ex. I.)
`II. Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
`Plaintiff, a Mississippi resident, filed suit to contest
`his termination on October 7, 2008, in the Circuit Court for
`Shelby County, Tennessee. McClaren asserts that Compass
`terminated him in violation of the clear public policy of
`Tennessee requiring all automobiles to have and display a state-
`issued license plate. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-4-110(a).
`
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`4
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`Defendant, a Tennessee-based corporation, removed this action to
`federal court on November 11, 2008, based on this Court’s
`diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Plaintiff
`filed his First Amended Complaint on April 20, 2009, seeking
`damages in excess of $75,000, after which Defendant filed the
`present Motion to Dismiss. (Amended Compl. at 9.)
`In diversity actions, the substantive law of the state in
`which the federal court sits governs, including the forum
`state’s choice of law provisions. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
`304 U.S. 64 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313
`U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Cole v. Mileti, 133 F.3d 433, 437 (6th
`Cir. 1998). Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim sounds in
`tort. See Weber v. Moses, 938 S.W.2d 387, 393 (Tenn. 1996).
`Tennessee has adopted the Restatement’s approach to resolve
`conflict-of-law issues arising in tort. See Hataway v.
`McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tenn. 1992) (adopting the
`Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws as the governing
`standard). Under this approach, the law of the state with the
`most significant relationship to the injury will govern. Id.
`The parties here properly assume that Tennessee law governs this
`action, which is a claim by an employee against the Tennessee
`place-of-business where he worked. See id. (noting that the
`place where the injury occurred, the place where the
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`relationship of the parties is centered, and the business’s
`location are all factors in the choice-of-law analysis).
`III. Standard of Review
`In addressing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
`claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court
`must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
`plaintiff and accept all well-pled factual allegations as true.
`League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523,
`527 (6th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff can support a claim “by
`showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the
`complaint.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563
`(2007). This standard requires more than bare assertions of
`legal conclusions. Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand C.P.A., 272 F.3d
`356, 361 (6th Cir. 2001). “[A] formulaic recitation of the
`elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
`at 555. Any claim for relief must contain “a short and plain
`statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
`relief.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). “Specific
`facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the
`defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
`upon which it rests.’” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.)
`Nonetheless, a complaint must contain sufficient facts “to state
`a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” to survive a
`motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
`
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`(2009). “This plausibility standard is not akin to a
`‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
`possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
`(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To survive a motion to
`dismiss, a complaint ultimately must demonstrate “facial
`plausibility,” defined as “factual content that allows the court
`to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
`for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted).
`IV. Analysis
`In its Motion to Dismiss, Compass asserts that McClaren’s
`First Amended Complaint fails to state a common law cause of
`action for termination in violation of public policy.
`Specifically, Compass argues that there is no Tennessee public
`policy mandating that McClaren display a specialty plate such as
`the SCV plate. (Def’s. Memo at 7-8.) Compass further asserts
`that its actions did not require McClaren to violate a
`fundamental public policy of Tennessee, which it argues is
`necessary to succeed under a common law wrongful termination
`action. (Id. at 8-9.) Compass also alleges that McClaren
`failed to file suit before the expiration of the one-year
`statute of limitations. (Id. at 10-11.) Plaintiff responds
`that, because Compass terminated him for displaying a state-
`issued plate, it violated the well-established Tennessee public
`policy requiring all vehicles to display license plates.
`
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`(Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
`Dismiss at 5-8.) (“Pl.’s Resp.”) Plaintiff further asserts
`that he has complied with the applicable statute of limitations.
`(Pl.’s Resp. at 9-10.)
`A. Plaintiff’s Suit is Not Barred by the Statute of
` Limitations
`Compass first argues that McClaren failed to file suit
`within the one-year statute of limitations applicable to common
`law actions for wrongful termination in violation of public
`policy. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a) (establishing a one-
`year limitations period for personal tort actions); Weber, 938
`S.W.2d at 39 (“A claim for retaliatory discharge is a tort
`action which is governed by the general tort statute of
`limitations which requires that a lawsuit be ‘commenced within
`one (1) year after the cause of action accrued . . . .’"
`(quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104)). In determining when the
`statute of limitations begins to run in wrongful termination
`cases, Tennessee follows the discovery rule, which states that a
`claim becomes ripe “when the employer provides unequivocal
`notice of the adverse employment action - in this case,
`termination.” Fahrner v. SW Mfg., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 141, 144
`(Tenn. 2001). The easiest application of the discovery rule is
`when an employer gives a formal termination notice to its
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`employee. The statute of limitations begins to run on the date
`the employee receives notice of his dismissal. Id.
`
`The parties agree that Compass terminated McClaren on
`October 8, 2007. (See Compl. ¶ 33; Def.’s Memo at 10.)
`McClaren filed suit on October 7, 2008, seemingly within the
`one-year limitations period. (See Compl. at 1.) However,
`Compass argues that, because disciplinary warnings were given
`before October 7, 2008, this Court cannot consider them as
`evidence because they fall more than one-year before McClaren
`filed suit.
`
`Compass’ argument fundamentally misunderstands the function
`of a statute of limitation. The purpose of a limitations period
`is to provide a date certain by which an aggrieved party must
`bring suit after the events giving rise to the cause of action
`have occurred. Fahrner, 48 S.W.3d at 144. By definition, a
`plaintiff cannot file a wrongful termination suit until his
`employer has dismissed him. See id. (noting that the
`limitations period does not begin to run until the plaintiff
`receives “unequivocal notice” of his termination). The one-year
`statute of limitations governing wrongful termination actions
`does not limit the relevant facts about the termination that a
`court may consider as long as the plaintiff has filed suit
`within one year of termination. See, e.g., Vancleave v.
`Reelfoot Bank, No. W2008-01559-COA-R3-CV, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS
`
`
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`9
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`724, at *4-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2009) (noting that the
`bank terminated the employee on November 6, 2002, but
`nonetheless considering the actions from November 1 – 6, 2002,
`that led to her termination). In other words, a statute of
`limitations serves to limit when a party may file suit, not as a
`rule of evidence limiting the facts a court may consider.
`Compass’ argument, if accepted, would require McClaren to have
`filed suit for wrongful termination before his claim was ripe,
`i.e., before Compass had fired him. Because the statute of
`limitations does not require such an absurd result, the Court
`finds that, by filing suit on October 7, 2008, McClaren met the
`statute’s one-year filing deadline. This Court may consider all
`relevant evidence presented in the Complaint surrounding his
`termination. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a).
`B. Plaintiff Cannot Prove That His Termination Violated an
` Important Tennessee Public Policy
`Defendant next argues that McClaren cannot succeed on his
`claim because he has failed to demonstrate that Defendant
`terminated him for refusing to violate a state statute, much
`less one that represents an important element of Tennessee
`public policy. (Def.’s Memo at 7-9.) Plaintiff responds that
`Tennessee law clearly requires every car to have a valid license
`plate affixed to its rear, so that Defendant’s request that he
`“do something” about his rear tag was a request that he violate
`
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`the law. (Pl.’s Resp. at 6.) Plaintiff further asserts that
`the unambiguous statutory requirement to place a license plate
`on one’s car is sufficiently clear to support a wrongful
`termination action. (Id. at 7-8.)
`
`Employment at will “is a bedrock of Tennessee common law.”
`Franklin v. Swift Transp. Co., 210 S.W.3d 521, 527 (Tenn. Ct.
`App. 2006). Under this common law doctrine, absent a
`contractual provision to the contrary, courts presume that
`employment contracts are for an indefinite term and terminable
`at will by either party for “good cause, bad cause, or no cause
`at all.” Id.; see also Guy v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 79 S.W.3d
`528, 534-35 (Tenn. 2002). However, the employment-at-will
`doctrine is subject to a small exception that allows a cause of
`action to lie against an employer who, in terminating an
`employee, violates a clear public policy of the State of
`Tennessee. See Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., 762 S.W.2d 552,
`556 (Tenn. 1988) (establishing the common law cause-of-action
`for retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy). To
`succeed on a claim for “this very exceptional tort action,” id.,
`a plaintiff must demonstrate the presence of three necessary
`elements: an employment-at-will relationship; the violation of
`“a clear declaration of public policy [that] imposes duties upon
`the employee or employer”; and the termination of the employee
`for refusing to violate the applicable duties. Reynolds v.
`
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`Ozark Motor Lines, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tenn. 1994).3
`Later decisions have added that a “substantial factor” in the
`employer’s decision to discharge the employee must have been
`“his exercise of protected rights or his compliance with clear
`public policy.” Franklin, 210 S.W.3d at 528.
`
`For purposes of its Motion to Dismiss, Compass concedes
`that McClaren has presented evidence that would suggest he can
`meet three of the four elements of the common law retaliatory
`discharge action. Compass focuses its argument on the
`contention that it asked McClaren to violate “a clear direction
`of public policy” when it told him to “do something” about his
`rear SCV specialty license plate. (Def.’s Memo at 6-9); see
`also Reynolds, 887 S.W.2d at 825. Compass argues that the
`statutory requirement McClaren cites – that every car have a
`license plate – cannot support an action for common law wrongful
`termination. (Def.’s Memo at 8-9.)
`
`Not every violation of the law is sufficiently
`consequential to support an action for wrongful termination.
`See Franklin, 210 S.W.3d at 531 (“[I]t was not enough . . . to
`simply show that the employer violated a law or regulation.”)
`
`
`3 Following the Tennessee Supreme Court’s recognition of a common law
`retaliatory discharge action, the Tennessee General Assembly created a
`statutory cause of action for wrongful discharge under the Tennessee Public
`Protection Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304. This statutory cause of
`action is cumulative to the common law action and requires a plaintiff to
`prove slightly different elements to succeed. See Guy, 79 S.W. 3d at 535,
`537. McClaren has asserted a claim solely under the common law. (See Compl.
`¶¶ 52-54; Pl.’s Resp. at 5.)
`
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`Instead, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his actions have
`furthered “some ‘important public policy interest embodied in
`the law.’” Id. (quoting Guy, 79 S.W.3d at 538). The public
`policy implicated must be “fundamental.” Vancleave, 2009 Tenn.
`App. LEXIS 724, at *11. To determine what constitutes a
`fundamental element of Tennessee public policy, courts consider
`“the constitution and the laws, and the course of administration
`and decision.” Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714, 717
`(Tenn. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
`The Plaintiff is the master of his Complaint and, therefore,
`bears the responsibility of pointing the Court to statutory
`provisions or administrative regulations evincing the public
`policy position he claims for his protection. Vancleave, 2009
`Tenn. App. LEXIS 724, at *12.
`
`McClaren has identified one Tennessee statutory provision
`that he claims Compass violated when CEO McPherson ordered him
`to “do something” about his state-issued rear license plate.
`Tennessee Code Annotated Section 55-4-110 requires the display
`of vehicle registration plates on each motor vehicle in
`Tennessee and states, in pertinent part:
`(a) The registration plate issued for passenger motor
`vehicles shall be attached on the rear of the vehicle.
`. . .
`
`(b) Every registration plate shall at all times be
`securely fastened in a horizontal position to the
`vehicle for which it is issued so to prevent the plate
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`from swinging and at a height of not less than twelve
`inches (12”) from the ground, measuring from the
`bottom of the plate, in a place and position to be
`clearly visible and shall be maintained free from
`foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly
`legible. . . .
`
`(c)(1) A violation of this section is a Class C
`misdemeanor. All proceeds from the fines imposed by
`this subsection (c) shall be deposited in the state
`general fund.
` (2) A person charged with a violation of this
`section may, in lieu of appearance in court, submit a
`fine of ten dollars ($10.00) for a first violation,
`and twenty dollars ($20.00) on second and subsequent
`violations to the clerk of the court that has
`jurisdiction of the offense within the county in which
`the offense charged is alleged to have been committed.
`
`Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-4-110(a)-(c). Thus, a person who violates
`this statutory provision is guilty of a Class C misdemeanor, the
`least serious criminal-violation category under Tennessee law.
`See Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-35-111(e) (listing the degrees of
`misdemeanors from A to C).
`Violation of such a minor provision is not the serious
`breach necessary to support a common law wrongful termination
`action in Tennessee. Because employment-at-will is such a well-
`ingrained principle of Tennessee law, Tennessee courts have been
`unwilling to recognize exceptions to this general rule except in
`cases where the interests at stake are both high and related to
`public safety and security. See, e.g., Guy, 79 S.W.3d at 537-38
`(granting relief where plaintiff refused to violate regulations
`designed to prevent insurance fraud); Crews v. Buckman Labs.
`
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`Int’l, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 852, 865 (Tenn. 2002) (plaintiff
`discharged for reporting in-house counsel’s unauthorized
`practice of law); Mason v. Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tenn.
`1997) (plaintiff reported violations of fire code and dangerous
`working conditions); Reynolds, 887 S.W.2d at 824-25 (driver
`insisted upon inspecting his eighteen-wheeler as required by law
`to ensure it was safe for operation); Vancleave, 2009 Tenn. App.
`LEXIS, at *12-17 (bank employee refused to open account under
`name of straw account holder, which would violate post-9/11
`reporting requirements); cf. Stein, 945 S.W.2d at 718-19
`(refusing to find a clear public policy preventing a private
`employer from requiring random drug testing); Franklin, 210
`S.W.3d at 532-33 (declining to find that an employer’s
`discharging an employee for refusing to drive a truck with a
`copy of a cab card when the applicable regulation required an
`original infringed an important public policy interest).
`The statement McClaren cites is ambiguous, as one could
`infer that to “do something” about his license plate meant
`merely to select a different plate from among the many options
`Mississippi offers its residents. However, even if one accepts
`the statement as McClaren interprets it – that Compass wanted
`him to drive his car without a license plate – no fundamental
`public policy interest would be implicated. The absence of a
`license plate is an annoyance, comparable to the absence of an
`
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`original cab card in a commercial vehicle. Cf. Franklin, 210
`S.W.3d at 532. A license plate is a de minimis contribution to
`the safety and welfare of the public and is not of comparable
`importance to avoiding dangerous working conditions or ensuring
`vehicle safety. Cf. Mason, 942 S.W.2d at 472; Reynolds, 887
`S.W.3d at 824-25.
`The Tennessee Court of Appeals has cited with approval the
`decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
`Circuit in Desoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655
`(9th Cir. 1992), which interpreted a similar provision of
`California law. See Franklin, 210 S.W.3d at 532-33 (citing
`Desoto). In Desoto, the plaintiff believed his employer had
`asked him to operate his delivery trailer with expired
`registration papers and an invalid “vehicle tag,” i.e., a
`license plate. 957 F.2d at 656. Desoto refused to deliver
`goods using the trailer, and Yellow Freight fired him. Id. The
`Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of DeSoto’s suit, finding
`that operating with expired papers and an invalid tag “does not
`implicate fundamental public policy concerns, such as health,
`safety, or crime prevention for which wrongful termination
`actions” will lie. Id. at 659. Instead, the implicated
`California statute was merely “one of the ‘many statutes [that]
`impose requirements whose fulfillment does not implicate
`fundamental public policy concerns.’” Id. (quoting Foley v.
`
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`Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 379 (Cal. 1988))
`(alteration in original). The same analysis applies here to a
`claim that Compass asked McClaren to remove his license plate.
`See Franklin, 210 S.W.2d at 532-33. Thus, because McClaren
`cannot satisfy the requirement that his claim rests upon an
`important provision of Tennessee public policy, that claim
`cannot succeed. See id. at 531.4
`V.
` Conclusion
`Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cause of action for
`which this Court may grant relief under Tennessee law. See Fed.
`R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court, therefore, GRANTS Defendant’s
`Motion to Dismiss.
`So ordered this 5th day of January, 2010.
`
`
`
`
`s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
`SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
`
`
`4 The result is unaffected by the specific cause the specialty license plate
`advances, be it the Sons of Confederate Veterans or a university football
`program. Tennessee law leaves “a great deal of discretion in employing or
`discharging employees” to corporate officials. Chism, 762 S.W.2d at 556.
`This case, as pled, does not implicate free speech or free expression.
`17