Case 2:15-cv-00225-JRG-RSP Document 80 Filed 01/25/16 Page 1 of 43 PageID #: 7343
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`
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`PARTHENON UNIFIED MEMORY
`ARCHITECTURE LLC,
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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` On October 26, 2015, the Court held a hearing to determine the proper construction of
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`the disputed terms in nine Asserted Patents. The Court, having considered the parties’ claim
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`construction briefing (Dkt. Nos. 56, 60, and 64) and their arguments at the hearing, issues this
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`Memorandum Opinion and Order construing the disputed terms.
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`BACKGROUND AND THE ASSERTED PATENTS
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`Parthenon Unified Memory Architecture LLC (“PUMA”) brought this action against
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`ZTE Corp., ZTE USA, Inc., and ZTE (TX), Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging that
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`Defendants infringe U.S. Patent Nos. 5,812,789 (“the ’789 Patent”), 6,058,459 (“the ’459
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`Patent”), 6,427,194 (“the ’194 Patent”), 7,321,368 (“the ’368 Patent”), 7,542,045 (“the ’045
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`Patent”), 7,777,753 (“the ’753 Patent”), 8,054,315 (“the ’315 Patent”), 8,681,164 (“the ’164
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`Patent”) and 5,960,464 (“the ’464 Patent”) (collectively, “the Asserted Patents”). The ’789
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`Patent and the ’459 Patent were filed on the same day, have similar specifications, and
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`incorporate each other by reference. Six patents are based on continuation applications of the
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`’459 Patent: the ’194 Patent, the ’368 Patent, the ’045 Patent, the ’753 Patent, the ’315 Patent,
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`1
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`Plaintiff,
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`
`v.
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`ZTE CORP., ZTE USA, INC. AND
`ZTE (TX), INC.,
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`Defendants.
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`
`
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
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`Case No. 2:15-cv-00225-JRG-RSP
`(Lead)
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`

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`Case 2:15-cv-00225-JRG-RSP Document 80 Filed 01/25/16 Page 2 of 43 PageID #: 7344
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`and the ’164 Patent.1 All nine Asserted Patents were subject to claim construction orders issued
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`by this Court in Parthenon Unified Memory Architecture, LLC v. HTC Corp. et al., 2:14-cv-
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`0690-JRG-RSP, Dkt. No. 155 (E.D. Tex. July 30, 2015) (“the Parthenon I Order”) and
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`Parthenon Unified Memory Architecture, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. et al., 2:14-cv-902-
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`JRG-RSP, Dkt. No. 155 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2016) (“the Parthenon II Order”). Furthermore, one
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`additional Eastern District of Texas claim construction order involved the ’789 Patent.
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`STMicroelectronics, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
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`In general, the ’789 Patent, the ’459 Patent, the ’194 Patent, the ’368 Patent, the ’045
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`Patent, the ’753 Patent, the ’315 Patent, and the ’164 Patent relate to systems in which a first
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`device (for example a processor) and a decoder/encoder share a common memory. The ’459
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`Patent abstract recites:
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`An electronic system provides direct access between a first device and a
`decoder/encoder and a memory. The electronic system can be included in a
`computer in which case the memory is a main memory. Direct access is
`accomplished through one or more memory interfaces. Direct access is also
`accomplished in some embodiments by direct coupling of the memory to a bus,
`and in other embodiments, by direct coupling of the first device and
`decoder/encoder to a bus. The electronic system includes an arbiter for
`determining access for the first device and/or the decoder/encoder to the memory
`for each access request. The arbiter may be monolithically integrated into a
`memory interface of the decoder/encoder or the first device. The decoder may be
`a video decoder configured to decode a bit stream formatted to comply with the
`MPEG-2 standard. The memory may store predicted images which are obtained
`from a single preceding image and may also store intra images. Bidirectional
`images which are directly supplied to a display adapter may be obtained from two
`preceding intra or predicted images.
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`’459 Patent Abstract.
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`1 The specification of the ’464 Patent is not shared by the other Asserted Patents.
`2
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`Case 2:15-cv-00225-JRG-RSP Document 80 Filed 01/25/16 Page 3 of 43 PageID #: 7345
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`The ’464 Patent relates, generally, to a system whereby a decoder, which requires
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`contiguous blocks of memory, can utilize noncontiguous blocks of the system’s memory. The
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`’464 patent abstract recites:
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`A method and apparatus employing a memory management system that can be
`used with applications requiring a large contiguous block of memory, such as
`video decompression techniques (e.g., MPEG 2 decoding). The system operates
`with a computer and the computer's operating system to request and employ
`approximately 500 4-kilobyte pages in two or more noncontiguous blocks of the
`main memory to construct a contiguous 2-megabyte block of memory. The
`system can employ, on a single chip, a direct memory access engine, a
`microcontroller, a small block of optional memory, and a video decoder circuit.
`The microcontroller retains the blocks of multiple pages of the main memory, and
`the page descriptors of these blocks, so as to lock down these blocks of memory
`and prohibit the operating system or other applications from using them. The
`microcontroller requests the page descriptors for each of the blocks, and programs
`a lookup table or memory mapping system in the on-chip memory to form a
`contiguous block of memory. As a result, the video decoder circuit can perform
`operations on a 2-megabyte contiguous block of memory, where
`the
`microcontroller employs the lookup table to translate each 2-megabyte contiguous
`address requested by the video decoder circuit to its appropriate page in the main
`memory. As soon as the video decoding operations are complete, the
`microcontroller releases the blocks of multiple pages of memory back for use by
`the computer.
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`’464 Patent Abstract.
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`APPLICABLE LAW
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`1. Claim Construction
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`“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention
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`to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
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`1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.,
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`Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To determine the meaning of the claims, courts start
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`by considering the intrinsic evidence. Id. at 1313; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388
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`F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 262
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`F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The intrinsic evidence includes the claims themselves, the
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`Case 2:15-cv-00225-JRG-RSP Document 80 Filed 01/25/16 Page 4 of 43 PageID #: 7346
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`specification, and the prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at
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`861. Courts give claim terms their ordinary and accustomed meanings as understood by one of
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`ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in the context of the entire patent. Phillips,
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`415 F.3d at 1312–13; Alloc, Inc. v. International Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
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`2003).
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`The claims themselves provide substantial guidance in determining the meaning of
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`particular claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. First, a term’s context in the asserted claim
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`can be very instructive. Id. Other asserted or unasserted claims can also aid in determining the
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`claim’s meaning, because claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent. Id.
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`Differences among the claim terms can also assist in understanding a term’s meaning. Id. For
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`example, when a dependent claim adds a limitation to an independent claim, it is presumed that
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`the independent claim does not include the limitation. Id. at 1314–15.
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`“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” Id.
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`(quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
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`“[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is
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`dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id. (quoting Vitronics
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`Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am.
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`Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This is true because a patentee may define his own
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`terms, give a claim term a different meaning than the term would otherwise possess, or disclaim
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`or disavow the claim scope. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. In these situations, the inventor’s
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`lexicography governs. Id. The specification may also resolve ambiguous claim terms “where the
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`ordinary and accustomed meaning of the words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to
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`permit the scope of the claim to be ascertained from the words alone.” Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at
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`Case 2:15-cv-00225-JRG-RSP Document 80 Filed 01/25/16 Page 5 of 43 PageID #: 7347
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`1325. But, “‘[a]lthough the specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of
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`disputed claim language, particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification
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`will not generally be read into the claims.’” Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d
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`1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560,
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`1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. The prosecution history is another
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`tool to supply the proper context for claim construction because a patent applicant may also
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`define a term in prosecuting the patent. Home Diagnostics, Inc., v. Lifescan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352,
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`1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“As in the case of the specification, a patent applicant may define a term
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`in prosecuting a patent.”).
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`Although extrinsic evidence can be useful, it is “‘less significant than the intrinsic record
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`in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317
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`(quoting C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 862). Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a court
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`understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in the art might use
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`claim terms, but technical dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are too broad or
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`may not be indicative of how the term is used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly, expert
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`testimony may aid a court in understanding the underlying technology and determining the
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`particular meaning of a term in the pertinent field, but an expert’s conclusory, unsupported
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`assertions as to a term’s definition are entirely unhelpful to a court. Id. Generally, extrinsic
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`evidence is “less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read
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`claim terms.” Id.
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`2. Claim Indefiniteness
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`
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`Patent claims must particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter regarded
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`as the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. “[I]ndefiniteness is a question of law and in effect part of
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`Case 2:15-cv-00225-JRG-RSP Document 80 Filed 01/25/16 Page 6 of 43 PageID #: 7348
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`claim construction.” ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 517 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A
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`party challenging the definiteness of a claim must show it is invalid by clear and convincing
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`evidence. Young v. Lumenis, Inc., 492 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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`
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`The definiteness standard of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 requires that:
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`[A] patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history,
`inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable
`certainty. The definiteness requirement, so understood, mandates clarity, while
`recognizing that absolute precision is unattainable. The standard we adopt
`accords with opinions of this Court stating that “the certainty which the law
`requires in patents is not greater than is reasonable, having regard to their subject-
`matter.”
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`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129–30 (2014) (internal citations
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`omitted).
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`3. Construing Claim Terms that Have Previously Been Construed by This Court or
`Other Courts
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`This is not the first time a Court in this District has construed some of the disputed terms.
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`The Parthenon I Order and Parthenon II Order construed a number of the presently disputed
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`terms, and in STMicroelectronics, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Tex. 2004)
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`the Court construed the ’789 Patent. These previous constructions are not controlling here but
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`can be instructive and will, at times, provide part of the basis for the Court’s analysis. See Burns,
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`Morris & Stewart Ltd. P’ship v. Masonite Int’l Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 692, 697 (E.D. Tex. 2005)
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`(while a previous construction may be instructive and provide the basis of the analysis, the
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`previous construction is not binding on the Court, particularly when there are new parties and
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`those parties have presented new arguments).
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`AGREED TERMS
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`The parties agreed to the following constructions in their joint claim construction chart:
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`Case 2:15-cv-00225-JRG-RSP Document 80 Filed 01/25/16 Page 7 of 43 PageID #: 7349
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`Term
`“simultaneously accesses the bus” (’789 Patent
`claim 1)
`“display device” (’194 Patent claims 1, 3, 7,
`11, 16-17; ’368 Patent claims 1, 7, 13, 14, 20,
`21; ’045 Patent claims 1, 4-6, 12, 13; and ’753
`Patent claims 1, 7)
`“display adapter” (’368 Patent claims 2, 3;
`’045 Patent claim 2; and ’753 Patent claim 3)
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`(Dkt. No. 65-2 at 4-5.)
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`Agreed Construction
`“accesses the bus at the same time”
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`“screen and its circuitry”
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`“an adapter that processes images for a display
`device”
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`DISPUTED TERMS
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`1. “bus” (’789 Patent claims 1, 13, 15, 28; ’459 Patent claims 1, 2, 7, 11, 13; ’194 Patent
`claims 1, 2, 9, 11, 16-18, 23; ’368 Patent claims 1, 5, 7, 13, 19, 20, 23; ’045 Patent
`claims 1, 4, 5, 12, 15; ’753 Patent claims 1, 7; ’315 Patent claim 1 and ’164 Patent
`claims 1, 6, 7)
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`PUMA’s Construction
`No construction necessary.
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`Alternatively:
`“a signal line or a set of associated signal
`lines to which a number of devices are
`coupled and over which information may be
`transferred between them”
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`Defendants’ Construction
`“a signal line or set of associated signal lines
`to which a number of devices are connected
`and over which information may be
`transferred by only one device at a time”
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`The parties dispute (1) whether devices must be “connected” verses “coupled” to a bus
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`and (2) whether a bus may only transfer information one device at a time.
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`Positions of the Parties
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`
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`PUMA asserts that the term “bus” is known in the art and does not need construction. Its
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`alternative construction comes from STMicroelectronics. In STMicroelectronics, the parties
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`agreed to “a signal or set of signal lines to which a number of devices are coupled and over
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`which information may be transferred between them.” STMicroelectronics, 327 F. Supp. 2d at
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`Case 2:15-cv-00225-JRG-RSP Document 80 Filed 01/25/16 Page 8 of 43 PageID #: 7350
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`711. PUMA asserts its construction is consistent with an IEEE extrinsic evidence dictionary.
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`(Dkt. No. 56 at 6.)
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`
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`PUMA objects to Defendants’ construction with regard to the “one device at a time”
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`limitation. PUMA asserts that such limitation would read out common bus technologies such as
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`split-transaction buses and other buses that can transfer information between multiple devices at
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`the same time. PUMA points to the prior art described in U.S. Patent No. 4,785,394 (the ’394
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`Patent) which shows a split-transaction bus where multiple devices use the bus at the same time:
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`For example, the ’394 Patent states: “During the time period which elapses between the read
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`address signal and the response from the memory, the other processors in the computer system
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`are communicating other signals to other components of the system over the bus.” (Dkt. No. 56
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`at 6-7 (quoting Dkt. No. 56 Ex. L at 1:58–62).)
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`
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`PUMA also points to the prior art Mercury RACEway bus as a bus that allows multiple
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`devices to send information at the same time. (Id. at 7.) PUMA asserts that Defendants’
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`construction would exclude this prior art bus. PUMA notes that the defendants in Parthenon II
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`characterized the Mercury RACEway bus as a “fabric” but that PUMA identified documents
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`associated with the chips in the Parthenon II defendants’ products that characterized the “fabric”
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`as a bus. (Id.) In its reply, PUMA notes that Defendants removed the word “directly” from their
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`proposed construction. Based on such removal, PUMA asserts that the only issue in dispute is
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`the “one device at a time” limitation. (Dkt. No. 64 at 1.)
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`Case 2:15-cv-00225-JRG-RSP Document 80 Filed 01/25/16 Page 9 of 43 PageID #: 7351
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`Defendants incorporate by reference the evidence and arguments of the defendants from
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`Parthenon II. (Dkt. No. 60 at 3.)2 Defendants summarized the Parthenon II arguments that it
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`adopted as follows:
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`• The construction of “bus” from the Parthenon I Order is incomplete because it does not
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`provide sufficient guidance on where one bus ends and another bus begins.
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`• The limitation “by only one device at a time” clarifies that, if two devices may transmit
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`at the same time on different signal lines, those lines are not part of a single “bus.”
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`• Using the term “coupled” to define a “bus” makes it impossible to differentiate between
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`one bus and two buses.
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`(Id.).
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`Defendants assert that the Parthenon I Order made clear that the PCI bus, ISA bus and
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`memory bus lines are separate buses. Defendants state, however, that the Parthenon I Order left
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`room for mischief and confusion at trial. (Id. at 4.) Specifically, Defendants assert that the
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`construction in that Order did not provide a method for determining whether one set of lines is
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`part of a bus. (Id.)
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`Furthermore, Defendants state that the lines of a bus are a shared transmission medium
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`and that a “one device at a time” limitation is fundamental to a shared medium. (Id.) Defendants
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`assert that if more than one device could simultaneously transmit data over a “set of associated
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`signal lines,” then that set of signal lines is not a bus within the meaning of the patents-in-suit.
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`(Id. at 4–5.) Defendants assert that there would be collisions if more than one device transmitted
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`2 Defendants’ responsive brief did not provide substantive argument for six of the nine disputed
`term groupings. Rather, Defendants merely incorporated by reference arguments, exhibits and
`even expert reports/testimony from the Parthenon I or II cases. The Court does not approve of
`such techniques. Though the Court has considered such arguments here, in circumstances in
`which the Court views such briefing techniques as skirting this District’s local rules regarding
`disclosures, page limits, expert testimony, evidence, etc. the Court may decide otherwise.
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`Case 2:15-cv-00225-JRG-RSP Document 80 Filed 01/25/16 Page 10 of 43 PageID #: 7352
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`at a time. Defendants assert that mechanisms such as the “arbiter” in the patents prevent or deal
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`with these collisions. (Id. at 5–6.)
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`Defendants counter PUMA’s assertions in three ways. First, Defendants assert that every
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`bus described in the Asserted Patents has a shared medium in which only one device at a time
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`can transmit. (Id. at 6.) Second, Defendants contend that “one device at a time” does not exclude
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`split-transaction bus protocols. Defendants assert that a split-transaction bus does not allow two
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`devices to transmit at once. Defendants claim that even in a split-transaction bus any particular
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`transaction is split into a request and a response. (Id.) Defendants assert that while one device’s
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`transaction is being worked on (for example the request is worked on), other devices can transmit
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`on the bus. However, Defendants assert only one device is transmitting at a time. (Id. 6-7, n. 10.)
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`Third, Defendants disagree with PUMA’s statements on the Mercury RACEway. Defendants
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`agree that their construction would exclude the Mercury RACEway. Defendants assert, however,
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`that the Mercury RACEway is not a bus (id. at 7) and that even if it were an exotic species of
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`bus, it would be very different from the buses in the specification.
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`Defendants assert that the intrinsic record does not show that the inventors considered a
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`“bus” to be anything other than the type of bus discussed in the specification. Defendants state
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`that the specification and file history do not mention fabrics or crossbars. Therefore, Defendants
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`assert that PUMA is not entitled to a construction that is divorced from the context of the
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`intrinsic record. (Id.) Defendants further assert that the RACEway is not a bus but rather a
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`crossbar extension to a VMEbus. Defendants cite to an explanation provided by Mercury
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`Systems:
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`As a backward-compatible upgrade, Interlink modules transform the topology of
`an existing VMEbus chassis from a single transaction bus to a scalable real-time
`fabric . . . .
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`Case 2:15-cv-00225-JRG-RSP Document 80 Filed 01/25/16 Page 11 of 43 PageID #: 7353
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` (Dkt. No. 60 at 8 (quoting Dkt. 56 Ex. O at 1).) Defendants assert that Mercury System’s
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`literature describes the product as something that works with ordinary buses:
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`The RACEway interconnect fabric provides a uniform communications medium
`that connects processors, I/O devices, and standard bus interfaces, such as VME
`and VSB, in a consistent way throughout the system.
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`(Id. (quoting Dkt. 56 Ex. O at 3-4).) Defendants assert that the term “bus” is never used to refer
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`to the RACEway system, except insofar as a “bus” is something that RACEway connects to and
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`transforms. (Id.) Defendants assert that in context of the patents, the RACEway creates
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`additional connections between the devices through the RACEway crossbar, so that the devices
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`do not need to use the actual bus. Defendants assert that because the RACEway allows multiple
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`devices to transmit at once, it is not a shared medium that each connected device uses to
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`transmit.
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`Defendants assert that the additional documents that PUMA cites to regarding the
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`RACEway are third party non-Mercury Systems documents. Defendants assert that third party
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`descriptions of the RACEway are not relevant and not probative. Defendants contend that any
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`evidentiary value they may possess is far outweighed by the relevant intrinsic record. (Id. at 9.)
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`Defendants point out that the first additional document PUMA cites (PUMA’s Exhibit N) relates
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`to military digital signal processor architectures. Defendants assert that the document references
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`different types of buses including control buses, data buses (Defendants consider RACEway a
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`data bus), test buses, input/output buses, local/wide area network buses, and PC buses.
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`Defendants assert that all the examples of buses in the patent fall within the PC bus category. (Id.
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`at 10.) Defendants assert that though other examples of buses are listed, such examples are not
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`useful in the context of the patents-in-suit which are about personal computer or system-on-chip
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`architectures. (Id.) As to PUMA’s Exhibit M, Defendants assert that this document relates to
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`military radar systems and on one page refers to Mercury RACEway Bus. (Id.) Defendants assert
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`that the description is inaccurate. Further, Defendants assert the field (radars) is not relevant to
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`the technology and audience of the patents-in-suit. (Id.)
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`As to PUMA’s Exhibit X (which appears to use “fabric” interchangeably with “bus”),
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`Defendants assert the document is not relevant. Defendants note that the document is dated 2011,
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`and, thus, assert that it is not probative on the use of the term “bus” fifteen years earlier.
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`Defendants further assert that the document contains no technical disclosure as to the meaning of
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`the term “fabric.” Defendants assert that “fabric” could mean a “bus” like those disclosed in the
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`patent (one device at a time) or could mean a type of switched network of buses. Defendants
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`contend that would not be a “bus” as used in the patent but rather a collection of multiple buses.
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`(Id. at 11.) Finally, Defendants state that the removal of “direct” from Defendants’ construction
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`has rendered the arguments over “direct” moot. (Id.)
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`In reply, PUMA reiterates that split-transaction buses and the Mercury RACEway bus
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`would be excluded by Defendants’ construction. As to the split-transaction bus, PUMA asserts
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`that Defendants admit that, in a split-transaction bus, while the request from one device “is being
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`worked on, other devices can transmit on the bus.” (Dkt. No. 64 at 2 (quoting Dkt. No. 60 at 6-
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`7).) PUMA asserts that Defendants’ construction, thus, excludes split-transaction buses. PUMA
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`state that Defendants attempt to avoid this problem by differentiating between requests and
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`responses and by suggesting that a bus can handle only one of each type of transaction at a time.
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`PUMA asserts that Defendants’ construction does not reflect this distinction. PUMA notes that
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`“request” and “response” transactions are not mentioned in the patents. (Id.) PUMA asserts this
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`would create jury confusion.
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`Case 2:15-cv-00225-JRG-RSP Document 80 Filed 01/25/16 Page 13 of 43 PageID #: 7355
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`PUMA contends that Defendants admit that their construction excludes the Mercury
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`RACEway. (See id. (“PUMA is correct that the term ‘bus’ as used in the patents-in-suit would
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`not read on Mercury RACEway.”) (quoting Dkt. No. 60 at 7).) PUMA asserts that the patents use
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`the term “bus” generally without disclaimer. PUMA asserts that, as a result, Defendants’ attempt
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`to carve out some buses from the construction should be rejected.
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`PUMA responds to Defendants’ argument that the Mercury RACEway is not a bus.
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`PUMA asserts that persons of ordinary skill in the art disagree with Defendants. PUMA asserts
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`that the exhibits cited by PUMA repeatedly refer to the Mercury RACEway as a bus. (Id. (citing
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`Dkt. No. 56 Ex. N at 203 and Ex. M at 31).) PUMA notes that Exhibit N states that “some
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`currently available choices for a data bus” include “RACEway (Mercury Computer).” (Dkt. No.
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`56 Ex. N at 203.) PUMA also notes prior art that states “[t]he Mercury Raceway bus is an
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`important part of the IFB architecture” and “[t]he P2 connector is also used to propagate the
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`Raceway bus from board to board.” (Dkt. No. 56 Ex. M at 31.) As to Defendants’ quote from
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`Exhibit O, PUMA asserts that it supports PUMA’s position. PUMA asserts that the document
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`states that the Mercury Interlink modules transform the topology from “a single transaction bus
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`to a scalable real-time fabric.” PUMA asserts that the document distinguishes between two types
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`of buses: “single transaction buses” and “real-time fabrics.” PUMA asserts that under
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`Defendants’ argument, the phrase “single transaction” would be entirely redundant because all
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`buses under Defendants’ construction would presumably be “single transaction” buses.
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`PUMA asserts that the Qualcomm technical documents that are central to this case refer
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`to the fabric as a type of bus. (Dkt. No. 64 at 3 (noting that Dkt. 56 Ex. X at 67 states that there
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`are “three buses that span the entire MSM device” and lists the “system fabric,” “applications
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`fabric” and “system fast peripheral bus.”).) PUMA cautions that it has raised this evidence for
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`Case 2:15-cv-00225-JRG-RSP Document 80 Filed 01/25/16 Page 14 of 43 PageID #: 7356
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`the simple purpose of assuring the Court that persons of ordinary skill in the art have always
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`understood the term “bus” to be broad and inclusive. PUMA asserts that based on the evidence
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`associated with the Mercury RACEway bus and the Qualcomm fabrics, persons of skill in the art
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`have not restricted the term “bus” in the manner urged by Defendants. (Id.)
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`At the oral hearing, Defendants acknowledged that the Parthenon I and Parthenon II
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`constructions were technically correct but did not provide adequate jury guidance as to where
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`one bus begins and another bus ends. (Dkt. No. 69 at 7 (hereinafter “Oral Hearing Tr.”).)
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`Defendants also asserted that “connected” vs. “coupled” was not a primary dispute as that
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`dispute is better addressed with regard to the “coupled” claim term dispute. (See id. at 12.)
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`Defendants also acknowledge that they rely on the expert testimony from the Parthenon II case
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`and that the expert from the Parthenon II case never stated that a structure that could handle two
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`or more devices at the same time was not a bus. (Id. at 15-17.) At the Oral Hearing, Defendants
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`emphasized that any given wire can only transmit voltages from one device at any particular
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`time. (Id. at 17.)
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`Analysis
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`The analysis from Parthenon I and Parthenon II applies to the arguments raised by the
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`parties. Parthenon I Order at 14-17; Parthenon II Order at 13-16. As to the phrase “one device at
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`a time,” Defendants are, in effect, seeking a negative limitation that bars multiple devices. The
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`inclusion of a negative limitation within a claim construction generally requires support from the
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`intrinsic evidence. See Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharms., Inc., 694 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
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`(“Negative claim limitations are adequately supported when the specification describes a reason
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`to exclude the relevant limitation.”); Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1322-23
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`(Fed. Cir. 2003) (declining to add a negative limitation when there was no “express disclaimer or
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`Case 2:15-cv-00225-JRG-RSP Document 80 Filed 01/25/16 Page 15 of 43 PageID #: 7357
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`independent lexicography in the written description that would justify adding that negative
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`limitation”). As to the intrinsic evidence, Defendants only cite to an embodiment. Defendants do
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`not cite to any disclaimer or disavowal. Even if only a single embodiment exists, the preferred
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`embodiment is not required to be read into the claims. See Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport
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`Fittings, Inc., 632 F.3d 1246, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Even where a patent describes only a
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`single embodiment, claims will not be read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a
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`clear intention to limit the claim scope using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or
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`restriction.”) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, Defendants’ construction, in essence, reads
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`the arbiter concept into the “bus” term. However, as described in the patents, the arbiter is a
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`separate structure that has a separate function. ’459 Patent Figure 7, 12:49-13:36; ’789 Patent
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`Figure 2, 4:4-11, 9:42-57. The fact that the specification discloses a separate arbiter and
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`arbitration function shows that the structure and function are not inherent in the term “bus.” As
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`PUMA points out, the claims also confirm that the arbiter function is not inherently part of the
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`claimed bus. Some claims recite the arbiter and arbitration limitaions and some claims do not.
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`See, e.g., ’789 Patent Claims 15 and 19. The intrinsic record does not teach that buses that allow
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`multiple devices to access at the same time are excluded from the term “bus.”
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`Most of the parties’ briefing and oral argument focuses on whether the extrinsic evidence
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`established that “bus,” at the time of the invention, was thought of by those skilled in the art to
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`require a “one device at a time” limitation. On balance, the Court finds that the extrinsic
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`evidence does not support including a negative limitation on the term “bus.”
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`First, the Court notes that Defendants arguments mix concepts that relate to two distinct
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`structures: a single wire and a bus. None of the parties appears to dispute that a single wire a can
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`Case 2:15-cv-00225-JRG-RSP Document 80 Filed 01/25/16 Page 16 of 43 PageID #: 7358
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`transmit information for only one device at a time. However, “bus” contains a collection of
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`wires, not just a single wire.
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`As for Defendants’ reliance upon the expert declaration of Dr. Stone from Parthenon II,
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`it is telling that Dr. Stone does not affirmatively state that a bus cannot carry information from
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`more than one device at a time. See Parthenon II Dkt. No. 86-1 at 10-16. Defendants
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`acknowledged this issue with Dr. Stone’s testimony at the oral hearing. (Oral Hearing Tr. at 15-
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`17.) Indeed, the Court notes that Dr. Stone’s testimony was likely directed to a signal line and
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`not to a “bus”:
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`36. A wire or “signal line,” can carry only one symbol at any one time because a
`wire is only at one voltage level or carries only one current at any given time.
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`37.