`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`
`UNILOC USA, INC., et al,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`
`v.
`
`
`
`AVG TECHNOLOGIES USA, INC.,
`BITDEFENDER INC.,
`PIRIFORM, INC.,
`UBISOFT, INC.,
`KASPERSKY LAB, INC.,
`SQUARE ENIX, INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`UNILOC USA, INC., et al,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`
`v.
`
`
`
`ADP, LLC,
`BIG FISH GAMES, INC.,
`BLACKBOARD, INC.,
`BOX, INC.,
`ZENDESK, INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`§
`§
`§ Case No. 2:16-cv-00393-RWS
`§
`
`LEAD CASE
`§
`§
`§ Case No. 2:16-cv-00394-RWS
`§ Case No. 2:16-cv-00396-RWS
`§ Case No. 2:16-cv-00397-RWS
`§ Case No. 2:16-cv-00871-RWS
`§ Case No. 2:16-cv-00872-RWS
`
`§
`§
`§ Case No. 2:16-cv-00741-RWS
`§
`
`LEAD CASE
`§
`§
`§ Case No. 2:16-cv-00858-RWS
`§ Case No. 2:16-cv-00859-RWS
`§ Case No. 2:16-cv-00860-RWS
`§ Case No. 2:16-cv-00863-RWS
`
`DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSIVE SUPPLEMENTAL MARKMAN BRIEF
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`
`
`
`
`
`Case 2:16-cv-00741-RWS Document 216 Filed 08/01/17 Page 2 of 17 PageID #: 3518
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`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`I.
`STATEMENT OF LAW......................................................................................................... 2
`II. ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................... 2
`A.
`“application launcher program” ....................................................................................... 2
`B.
`“make the application program available for use” ........................................................... 6
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`Page
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`i
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`Case 2:16-cv-00741-RWS Document 216 Filed 08/01/17 Page 3 of 17 PageID #: 3519
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`
`Page
`
`
`CASES
`
`Andersen Corp v. Fiber Composites, LLC,
`474 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................5
`
`Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd. v. OAM, Inc.,
`265 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001)..................................................................................................3
`
`HTC Corp. v. IPCom GmbH,
`667 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................4
`
`Jonsson v. Stanley Works,
`903 F.2d 812 (Fed. Cir. 1990)....................................................................................................5
`
`Laitram Corp v. Morehouse Indus., Inc.,
`143 F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998)..................................................................................................5
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc.,
`357 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004)..........................................................................................2, 5, 7
`
`Nystrom v. TREX Co.,
`424 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..............................................................................................2, 6
`
`Omega Eng’g, Inc, v. Raytek Corp.,
`334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003)..............................................................................................3, 5
`
`On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc.,
`442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006)..................................................................................................2
`
`Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc.,
`199 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1999)..................................................................................................6
`
`Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.,
`503 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................5
`
`Watts v. XL Sys., Inc.,
`232 F.3d 877 (Fed. Cir. 2000)....................................................................................................6
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
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`
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`Case 2:16-cv-00741-RWS Document 216 Filed 08/01/17 Page 4 of 17 PageID #: 3520
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`Defendants Bitdefender Inc., Piriform, Inc., Ubisoft, Inc., Square Enix, Inc., ADP, LLC,
`
`Big Fish Games, Inc., Blackboard Inc., Box, Inc., and Zendesk Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”)
`
`respectfully submit this supplemental brief pursuant to the Court’s Order of July 5, 2017 (2:16-
`
`cv-00393 D.I. 168; 2:16-cv-00741 D.I. 199) and responsive to the opening supplemental brief of
`
`Plaintiffs Uniloc USA, Inc. and Uniloc Luxembourg, SA (collectively, “Plaintiffs” or “Uniloc”).1
`
`Uniloc asserts four patents related to application management and distribution in a
`
`computer network.2 The ’466 and ’293 patents share a written description, as do the ’766 and
`
`’578 patents. (Plaintiffs’ opening brief (2:16-cv-00393 D.I. 140; 2:16-cv-00741 D.I. 151) (“Op.
`
`Br.”) at 2.) The ’293 patent claims priority to the ’466 patent, and the ’766 patent claims priority
`
`to the ’578 patent. The ’578 patent indicates that it is “related” to the ’466 patent, and vice versa.
`
`(Ex. A, ’466 patent 1:8-12; Ex. B, ’578 patent 1:9-13). Finally, each Asserted Patent
`
`incorporates by reference the others’ specifications. (Ex. A, ’466 patent 7:41-48; Ex. B, ’578
`
`patent 7:17-24).
`
`Despite these commonalities, Uniloc maintains that the ’466 and ’766 patents claim
`
`fundamentally different inventions from the ’293 and ’578 patents. Uniloc acknowledges that the
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`asserted claims of the ’466 patent (and those reciting application execution in the ’766 patent) do
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`not include systems that execute applications at a server, as these claims are limited on their face
`
`to execution at a client. (See Op. Br. at 4.) Based on the absence of similar express limitations in
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`the asserted claims of the ’293 and ’578 patents, Uniloc argues that those patents do cover
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`systems that execute applications at a server. But Uniloc does not identify a single embodiment
`
`
`1 Defendant Kaspersky Lab, Inc. does not join in this brief, and proposes that the Court adopt Uniloc’s constructions
`of the two terms addressed herein. Each other captioned Defendant submits this supplemental brief insofar as one or
`more of the Asserted Patents is asserted against that Defendant.
`2 U.S. Pat. Nos. 6,510,466 (the “’466 patent”), 6,728,766 (the “’766 patent”), 6,324,578 (the “’578 patent”) and
`7,069,293 (the “’293 patent”, and collectively, the “Asserted Patents”) (provided as Exhibits A-D).
`
`
`
`1
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`
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`Case 2:16-cv-00741-RWS Document 216 Filed 08/01/17 Page 5 of 17 PageID #: 3521
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`in any specification in suit that does so, other than those distinguished as “background.”
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`Two terms are addressed in this brief. Uniloc originally agreed with Defendants’
`
`proposed constructions for these terms. Those constructions come directly from the specification
`
`and file history of the patents in suit. Only after initial claim construction briefing was completed
`
`did Uniloc realize that these constructions—which Defendants maintain are correct—undermine
`
`Uniloc’s attempt to broaden the claims of the ’293 and ’578 patents. Uniloc’s about-face
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`required a delay of the Markman hearing and resulted in the instant supplemental briefing.
`
`I.
`
`STATEMENT OF LAW
`
`Defendants refer to the Statement of Law set forth in their Responsive Claim
`
`Construction Brief (“Resp. Br.”) (2:16-cv-00393 D.I. 150; 2:16-cv-00741 D.I. 159). Defendants
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`emphasize that claims cannot be broader in scope than their underlying disclosure, see On
`
`Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), and that a
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`patentee’s statements during prosecution characterizing a claim
`
`term are relevant
`
`to
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`understanding the scope of that term even in earlier-issued patents, see Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-
`
`Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A limited construction of a term is correct
`
`if nothing in the record suggests the patentees meant to use the term more broadly than they
`
`disclosed at filing. See Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1144–46 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
`
`II.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`“application launcher program”
`
`Plaintiffs’ Proposed Construction
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`a program distributed to a client to initially
`a program distributed to a client to initially
`populate a user desktop and
`to request
`populate a user desktop and to request the
`execution of the application program
`application program from a server
`
`
`The term “application launcher program” appears in—and is used consistently by—the
`
`
`
`2
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`
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`Case 2:16-cv-00741-RWS Document 216 Filed 08/01/17 Page 6 of 17 PageID #: 3522
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`claims and specifications of all four Asserted Patents.3 It is not a term of art, but rather an
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`expression coined by the patentee specifically for these patents. Uniloc mischaracterizes certain
`
`disclosures in the ’578 patent to attempt to broaden the term, while avoiding clear statements in
`
`both the ’466 and ’766 patent specifications and prosecution histories which define it. But the
`
`same claim term used in related patents is presumed to carry the same construed meaning.
`
`Omega Eng’g, Inc., v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1334-34 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Fin
`
`Control Sys. Pty, Ltd. v. OAM, Inc., 265 F.3d 1311, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
`
`An application launcher program allows a client to inter alia request an instance of an
`
`application from a server by selecting that application’s icon. See Ex. A, ’466 patent4 at 16:18-
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`23; Ex. B, ’578 patent 11:60-65.5 The ’466 and ’293 patents’ specification states that, upon
`
`selection of an icon, the application launcher program “populates client station 202 with the
`
`instance of the selected application program for execution.” Ex. A, ’466 patent 16:23-25; see
`
`also id. 16:26-29 (stating that preferences may be obtained from the server “for use in executing
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`the instance of the application program at the client station”). The ’578 and ’766 patent’s
`
`specification similarly states that the application launcher program is used to “obtain . . . the
`
`application program’s executable code” from the server. Ex. B, ’578 patent 11:32-41 (emphasis
`
`added). Other embodiments in the specifications are similarly described. See, e.g., id. 11:65-12:1.
`
`In contrast, no embodiment in either specification expressly states that an application
`
`launcher program is used to execute programs on a server. Uniloc provides no citation or
`
`
`3 Uniloc provides no legal significance for the distinction drawn in its opening supplemental brief (2:16-cv-00393
`D.I. 173; 2:16-cv-00741 D.I. 208) (“Op. Supp. Br.”) at 1 n.2, namely, that the “application launcher program”
`appears in the independent claims of only one patent-in-suit while in the dependent claims of the other three.
`4 Because the ’466 and ’293 patent share a common specification, specification citations for these patents are made
`collectively to the ’466 patent specification for ease of review. Likewise, as the ’578 and ’766 patent share a
`common specification, specification citations are made collectively to the ’578 patent specification.
`5 In some embodiments, an application launcher program can facilitate additional tasks like preference management.
`See, e.g., Ex. B. ’578 patent at 10:23-32.
`
`
`
`3
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`
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`Case 2:16-cv-00741-RWS Document 216 Filed 08/01/17 Page 7 of 17 PageID #: 3523
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`quotation to support its statement that “Defendants’ construction . . . would not cover launchers
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`that request execution at the server” because no such launcher is ever in fact expressly
`
`described in the specification. (See Op. Supp. Br. at 3.) Rather, Uniloc takes out-of-context the
`
`phrase “request to initiate execution of the application” and asks the Court to hypothesize that
`
`such execution could take place on the server itself. (Id. at 2 (citing Ex. B, ’578 patent 4:6-9).)
`
`But the full passage further specifies that the server responds by “providing an instance of the
`
`application program for execution.” Ex. B, ’578 Patent 10:9-12. Moreover, the request is
`
`received by an “on-demand server,” Ex. B, ’578 patent 4:15-18, which the specification defines
`
`as a server “delivering” applications to clients, not executing applications itself. Id. 6:51-53 (“As
`
`used herein, ‘on-demand’ refers to a server delivering applications as needed responsive to user
`
`requests as requests are received.”)6. Thus, it is the client which executes an application program
`
`following its delivery by the on-demand server.
`
`Server-side execution is expressly discussed in the patents only in the “Background of the
`
`Invention,” in which the patentee distinguishes prior art mainframe systems whose applications
`
`were executed “at the server rather than the client.” (Resp. Br. at 5–6 (quoting Ex. B, ’578 patent
`
`2:50-55, 3:5-8 and citing Ex. A, ’466 patent 2:52-57).) Had the patentee intended to claim an
`
`application launcher program that requests execution at a server as Uniloc contends, the patentee
`
`could have used similar language to describe even one embodiment of its system—but it did not.
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`Instead, the patentee repeatedly assigned to the application launcher program the function of
`
`distributing applications to clients. When a specification exclusively assigns functions to certain
`
`claimed elements, that assignment should be reflected in that element’s claim construction. See
`
`HTC Corp. v. IPCom GmbH, 667 F.3d 1270, 1275-76 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`
`6 Uniloc appears to acknowledge the importance of this definition by strategically omitting via ellipses that the
`application is requested from an “on-demand” server. (See Op. Supp. Br. at 2.)
`
`
`
`4
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`Case 2:16-cv-00741-RWS Document 216 Filed 08/01/17 Page 8 of 17 PageID #: 3524
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`Even if arguendo the specification supported embodiments in which application launcher
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`programs initiate server execution of applications, the patentee disavowed such claim scope
`
`during prosecution of the ’766 patent, continuation of the ’578 patent, when the patentee defined
`
`the application launcher program to require local execution. The prosecution history of related
`
`patents is highly relevant to claim construction. (See Resp. Br. at 8 (citing Andersen Corp v.
`
`Fiber Composites, LLC, 474 F.3d 1361, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Microsoft Corp, 357 F.3d at
`
`1349); see also Laitram Corp v. Morehouse Indus., Inc., 143 F.3d 1456, 1460, n.2 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1998); Jonsson v. Stanley Works, 903 F.2d 812, 818 (Fed. Cir. 1990).) Further, disclaimers of
`
`claim scope in one patent also apply to related patents. See Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage
`
`Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1306-07 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Omega, 334 F.3d at 1334.
`
`Original claims 26 and 28 of the ’766 patent, presented by preliminary amendment,
`
`recited use of “an application launcher program.” Ex. F, ’766 File History at Preliminary
`
`Amendment of April 10, 2001, UNILOC_IBM_2016_0809. Notably, the express language “to
`
`the client for execution” was recited in claims 27 and 29, but not in claims 26 and 28. Id.
`
`Nevertheless, the patentee repeatedly relied on local distribution of applications to distinguish
`
`this “application launcher program” from cited prior art application launchers. First, the patentee
`
`distinguished the application launcher of Franklin as a “launcher . . . that merely accesses
`
`applications which are stored and launched from a server,” while characterizing the claimed
`
`application launcher program as one that “populates clients.” Id. at Amendment of Aug. 1, 2002,
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`UNILOC_IBM_2016_0843-44. Then, after that art was withdrawn, the patentee attempted to
`
`distinguish the examiner’s new grounds of rejection based on Duvoori because that reference’s
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`application “wrapper” failed to “request a configurable instance of an application from a server
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`for execution at the client as with the recited application launcher programs of the present
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`
`
`5
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`Case 2:16-cv-00741-RWS Document 216 Filed 08/01/17 Page 9 of 17 PageID #: 3525
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`invention.” Id. at Amendment of Jan. 27, 2003, UNILOC_IBM_2016_0868 (emphasis added).
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`Thereafter, on appeal the patentee repeated its arguments regarding Duvoori, and further
`
`distinguished the Christiano reference as lacking “an application launcher program that obtains
`
`‘the application program's executable code from the server on-demand.’” Id. at Appeal Brief of
`
`Apr. 15, 2003, UNILOC_IBM_2016_0886 (quoting the ’766 patent 11:36-37) (emphasis added).
`
`Each of these arguments makes clear that the patentee intended the term “application launcher
`
`program” to mean a program that requests application programs from a server.
`
`Uniloc incorrectly suggests that Defendants’ construction reads out an embodiment in the
`
`’578 patent specification “where the launcher distributed to the client includes the entire
`
`application the vendor provided.” Op. Supp. Br. at 3-4 (citing Ex. A, ’466 patent 14:32-34). But
`
`Uniloc misreads this passage, which in full recites that the application launcher program may be
`
`an “entire program provided by a software vendor” (i.e., to perform all operations associated
`
`with application requests) or “merely a portion” of such program “distributed to a client to
`
`perform particular operations” (i.e., a subset of operations associated with application requests).
`
`Ex. A, ’466 patent 14:32-41 (emphasis added).
`
`In sum, the specifications and prosecution history of all four patents in suit are consistent
`
`with the construction of “application launcher program” that Defendants propose. In contrast, the
`
`specifications never describe an application launcher program of the type Uniloc posits, so
`
`Uniloc’s proposed broadening construction is improper. See Nystrom, 424 F.3d at 1143–45
`
`(“Nystrom is not entitled to a claim construction divorced from the context of the written
`
`description and prosecution history.”); Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 883 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
`
`Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
`
`B.
`
`“make the application program available for use”
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`
`Plaintiffs’ Proposed Construction
`
`
`
`6
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`
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`Case 2:16-cv-00741-RWS Document 216 Filed 08/01/17 Page 10 of 17 PageID #: 3526
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`make the application available for access
`and download, responsive to user requests
`
`
`1.
`
`
`
`make the application program available for use
`
`Position of Defendants Bitdefender, Piriform, ADP, LLC, Blackboard,
`Box, and Zendesk
`
`This phrase appears only in the ’293 patent claims. Those claims relate to an “on-
`
`demand” server, defined in the specification as a server “delivering applications as needed
`
`responsive to user requests as requests are received.” Ex. A, ’466 patent 6:62-64 (emphasis
`
`added). Here, Uniloc again tries to leverage ambiguity in the term “available for use” by reading
`
`out responsiveness to user requests and by expanding the claims to arguably include making
`
`application programs available for execution on servers. But as noted supra, the patentee knew
`
`how to describe application execution at a server, as it did in the background of the invention.
`
`But no described embodiment of an on-demand server expressly describes the remote “use” of an
`
`application on a server (or indeed anywhere other than at a client). Rather, the ’293 patent
`
`specification repeatedly confirms that an on-demand server delivers or distributes an application
`
`(i.e. by download) for execution at the client. See Ex. A, ’466 patent 3:64-4:3; 6:15-17; 6:22-24;
`
`10:61-64. When a specification “repeatedly and consistently describes” an invention in a certain
`
`way, the Court should apply a commensurate claim scope. Microsoft Corp., 357 F.3d at 1348.
`
`During prosecution of the ’466 patent—parent to the ’293 patent—the patentee made
`
`multiple statements characterizing the invention as accessing and downloading selected
`
`application programs for local execution at the client. (See Resp. Br. at 9 (citing ’466 patent file
`
`history at Oct. 23, 2001 remarks, UNILOC_IBM_2016_0629 and May 16, 2002 Appeal Brief,
`
`UNILOC_IBM_2016_0659).) The patentee defined “the invention” as involving “access[ing]
`
`and download[ing] selected application programs.” Ex. E, ’466 file history at May 31, 2001
`
`Amendment, UNILOC_IBM_2016_0610. More importantly, to overcome the prior art the
`
`patentee defined “application programs” as application level software programs that “execute[]
`7
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`
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`Case 2:16-cv-00741-RWS Document 216 Filed 08/01/17 Page 11 of 17 PageID #: 3527
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`locally at the client as a separate application from the browser interface.” Id. at Oct. 23, 2001
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`remarks, UNILOC_IBM_2016_0629; accord
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`id. at May 16, 2002 Appeal Brief,
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`UNILOC_IBM_2016_0659. Uniloc points to nothing that would suggest that the applicants
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`defined “application program” differently for the ’466 patent than they did for the ’293 patent.
`
`To avoid the effect of these statements, Uniloc has repeatedly argued that the ’293 patent
`
`is entitled to broader claim scope as a divisional of the ’466 patent. (See Plaintiffs’ reply claim
`
`construction brief (2:16-cv-00393 D.I. 155; 2:16-cv-00741 D.I. 165) (“Rep. Br.”) at 6; Op. Supp.
`
`Br. at 6.) Uniloc emphasizes that the ’466 and ’293 were subject to a restriction requirement,
`
`requiring separate patent filings directed
`
`to
`
`independent
`
`inventions for “application
`
`management” and “distribution of application” [sic], respectively. (Op. Supp. Br. at 6); see Ex.
`
`E, ’466 patent file history at Office Action of March 28, 2001 at 2-3, UNILOC_IBM_2016_590.
`
`First, this restriction requirement did not address where applications are executed, and did not
`
`invite the patentee to adopt a different meaning for an “application program” across the two
`
`applications. Moreover, this restriction requirement reveals the inconsistency in Uniloc’s
`
`argument. Uniloc agrees that all claims of the ’466 patent, representing the “application
`
`management” alleged invention, “unambiguously require[e] execution at the client.” (Rep. Br. at
`
`7). Those same claims require that the applications be installed at servers first, before being
`
`executed at clients. Ex. A, ’466 patent Independent Claims 1, 15, 16. But if the applications
`
`being per se managed are first being downloaded from the server to the client for execution,
`
`claims directed to the inventive “distribution” of those applications would necessarily involve
`
`that very download from the server to the client. Stated differently, Plaintiff’s construction and
`
`corresponding reading of the claims presumes that two not just independent but potentially
`
`incompatible inventions were filed in the same specification, and even (as Uniloc points out)
`
`
`
`8
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`
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`Case 2:16-cv-00741-RWS Document 216 Filed 08/01/17 Page 12 of 17 PageID #: 3528
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`described in alternating paragraphs throughout the specification. (See Rep. Br. at 7; Op. Supp.
`
`Br. at 6.) The Court should reject Uniloc’s attempt to arbitrarily assign clear portions of its
`
`specification to the ’466 patent claims only, but use other ambiguous passages to broaden the
`
`’293 patent. Rather, the Court should adopt the natural reading that the managed local
`
`applications of the ’466 patent are distributed in the ’293 patent by downloading them to the
`
`client for use.
`
`Here, again, Uniloc’s Supplemental briefing for the “available for use” term also contains
`
`a misleading quote. On page 5 of its Supplemental brief, Uniloc notes that the phrase “make the
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`application program available for use” was first added to the claims of the ’293 patent by
`
`amendment on December 7, 2004. Uniloc then asserts that the inventors relied on “’466 patent at
`
`17:40-49” to support that amendment, a passage which Uniloc argues “was not intended to
`
`prescribe, and thus did not discuss, where applications would be executed.” Op. Supp. Br. at 5. But,
`
`in fact, the inventors only cited “page 28, lines 3-4” of the original specification, corresponding
`
`to the ’466 patent at 17:47-49, in support of their amendment. Ex. G, ’293 patent file history at
`
`December 7, 2004 amendment, UNILOC_IBM_2016_1312; see id. at Original Specification
`
`page 28, UNILOC_IBM_2016_1245. Insofar as Uniloc may have quoted lines 17:40-46 for
`
`context, Uniloc arbitrarily excludes the immediately preceding sentence in the same paragraph,
`
`which recites that this very embodiment “provides server and client software for distributing a
`
`software package from a server to a list of TivoliTM clients.” Ex. A, ’466 patent 17:35-40. Thus,
`
`the very portion of the file history relied on by Uniloc in its brief supports Defendants’ position
`
`that the phrase “make the application program available for use” was intended to convey the
`
`availability of programs for distribution (i.e., download) to one or more clients.
`
`2.
`
`
`
`Position of Defendants Ubisoft, Square Enix, and Big Fish
`
`Uniloc contends that the phrase “available for use” is “not limiting.” Op. Supp. Br. at 4.
`9
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`Case 2:16-cv-00741-RWS Document 216 Filed 08/01/17 Page 13 of 17 PageID #: 3529
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`In fact, this term has a specific meaning in the context of the ’293 patent—it is not meaningless,
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`as Uniloc suggests. The independent claims of the ’293 patent require “preparing a file packet
`
`associated with the application program and including a segment configured to initiate
`
`registration operations for the application program” and “distributing the file packet to the target
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`on-demand server to make the application program available for use by a user at a client.”
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`(emphasis added). Thus, the file packet that is distributed to the on-demand server to make the
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`application program “available for use by a user at a client” is the same file packet that is
`
`prepared and includes a “segment configured to initiate registration operations.”
`
`The question, then, is how does the ’293 patent describe making an application program
`
`“available for use” by a user at a client? The ’293 patent answers this question as follows:
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`At block 120, the on-demand server 22, 22’ updates the appropriate file and
`configuration information to make the new application program available to
`users. For example, on-demand server 22 may be configured to maintain a profile
`management list identifying various application programs available for execution
`by users at client stations 24, 24’ including a designation of which applications
`are authorized with respect to individual users.
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`’466 patent 18:7-15; see also id. 17:62-67 (“destination servers . . may be provided user
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`identification and password information controlling access to the application program . . .”),
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`19:22-29 (discussing “the PMImport command script” as a particular technique for “registering
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`the applets for use by authorized users”). Accordingly, in the context of the ’293 patent, making
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`an application program “available for use” involves designating which applications are
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`authorized with respect to individual users. While this is the plain and ordinary meaning of the
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`phrase in the context of the ’293 patent, the Court could construe the phrase to alleviate any
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`confusion as follows: “make the application program available for use” means “identify the
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`individual users to which the application program is available for execution.”
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`Case 2:16-cv-00741-RWS Document 216 Filed 08/01/17 Page 14 of 17 PageID #: 3530
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`Dated: August 1, 2017
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`
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`/s/ Christopher W. Adams, with permission by
`Matthew J. Moffa
`Kalpana Srinivasan
`California State Bar No. 237460
`SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.
`1901 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 950
`Los Angeles, CA 90067
`Telephone: (310) 789-3100
`Facsimile: (310) 789-3150
`Email: ksrinivasan@susmangodfrey.com
`
`Daniel H. Wu (Cal. Bar No. 198925)
`Admitted E.D. Texas
`daniel.wu@squirepb.com
`SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (US) LLP
`555 South Flower Street, 31st Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`Telephone: (213) 624-2500
`Fax: (213) 623-4581
`
`Christopher W. Adams (Virginia Bar No.
`74611)
`Admitted E.D. Texas
`christopher.adams@squirepb.com
`SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (US) LLP
`2550 M Street, NW
`Washington, DC 20037
`Telephone: (202) 457-6326
`Fax: (202) 457 6315
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
`BITDEFENDER INC.
`
`
`
`/s/ Ray Zado, with permission by Matthew J.
`Moffa
`J. Mark Mann
`State Bar No. 12926150
`MANN | TINDEL | THOMPSON
`300 West Main Street
`Henderson, Texas 75652
`Telephone: (903) 657-8540
`Facsimile: (903) 657-6003
`
`
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`11
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`/s/ Matthew J. Moffa
`William J. McCabe
`E-Mail: WMcCabe@perkinscoie.com
`Matthew J. Moffa
`E-Mail: MMoffa@perkinscoie.com
`PERKINS COIE LLP
`30 Rockefeller Plaza, 22nd Floor
`New York, NY 10112-0085
`Telephone: (212) 262-6900
`Facsimile: (212) 977-1649
`
`Victoria Q. Smith
`E-Mail: vsmith@perkinscoie.com
`PERKINS COIE LLP
`3150 Porter Drive
`Palo Alto, CA 94304
`Telephone: (650) 838-4321
`Facsimile: (650) 838-4350
`
`Michael E. Jones
`Texas Bar No.: 10929400
`E-Mail: mikejones@potterminton.com
`POTTER MINTON, PC
`110 North College Suite 500
`Tyler, TX 75702
`Telephone: (903) 597-8311
`Facsimile: (903) 593-0846
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT ADP, LLC
`
`
`/s/ Douglas F. Stewart, with permission by
`Matthew J. Moffa
`Douglas F. Stewart
`doug.stewart@bracewelllaw.com
`Bracewell LLP
`701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 6200
`Seattle, Washington 98104-7018
`(206) 204-6200 (t)
`(800) 404-3970 (f)
`
`
`
`Case 2:16-cv-00741-RWS Document 216 Filed 08/01/17 Page 15 of 17 PageID #: 3531
`
`
`mark@themannfirm.com
`
`Kevin Johnson
`kevinjohnson@quinnemanuel.com
`Victoria Maroulis
`victoriamaroulis@quinnemanuel.com
`Ray Zado
`rayzado@quinnemanuel.com
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
`SULLIVAN LLP
`555 Twin Dolphin Dr., 5th Floor
`Redwood Shores, CA 94065
`Tel: 650-801-5000
`Fax: 650-801-5100
`
`Sam Stake
`samstake@quinnemanuel.com
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
`SULLIVAN LLP
`50 California Street, 22nd Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Tel: 415-875-6600
`Fax: 415-845-9700
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
`ZENDESK, INC.
`
`
`/s/ Christopher D. Bright, with permission by
`Matthew J. Moffa
`J. Thad Heartfield
`The Heartfield Law Firm
`2195 Dowlen Road
`Beaumont, Texas 77706
`(409) 866-3318
`Daniel R. Foster
`Christopher D. Bright
`MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP
`4 Park Plaza, Suite 1700
`Irvine, California 92614
`(949) 851-0633
`
`Michael S. Nadel
`MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP
`500 North Capitol Street, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20001
`(202) 756-8000
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`ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
`
`
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`David J. Ball
`david.ball@bracewelllaw.com
`Bracewell LLP
`1251 Avenue of the Americas
`New York, New York 10020
`(212) 508-6100 (t)
`(800) 404-3970 (f)
`
`Timothy R. Geiger
`tim.geiger@bracewelllaw.com
`Bracewell LLP
`711 Louisiana, Suite 2300
`Houston, Texas 77002
`(713)-223-2300
`(800)-404-3970
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT BIG
`FISH GAMES, INC.
`
`
`/s/ Seth B. Herring, with permission by Matthew
`J. Moffa
`John P. Bovich (Lead counsel, Pro Hac Vice)
`jbovich@reedsmith.com
`Christine M. Morgan
`cmorgan@reedsmith.com
`Seth B. Herring (Pro Hac Vice)
`sherring@reedsmith.com
`REED SMITH LLP
`101 Second Street, Suite 1800
`San Francisco, CA 94105-3659
`Telephone: 415.543.8700
`Facsimile: 415.391.8269
`
`Peter John Chassman (Texas Bar No.
`00787233)
`cchassman@reedsmith.com
`REED SMITH LLP
`811 Main Street, Suite 1700
`Houston, TX 77002-6119
`Telephone:713.469.3885
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`
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`Case 2:16-cv-00741-RWS Document 216 Filed 08/01/17 Page 16 of 17 PageID #: 3532
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`Facsimile: 713.469.3899
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`ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT BOX,
`INC.
`
`
`/s/ Mark Zambarda, with permission by
`Matthew J. Moffa
`Christopher C. Campbell
`COOLEY LLP
`ccampbell@cooley.com
`One Freedom Square
`Reston Town Center
`11951 Freedom Drive
`Reston, VA 20190
`(703) 456-8000
`
`ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT PIRIFORM
`INC.
`
`
`BLACKBOARD INC.
`
`/s/ Mark Lang, with permission by Matthew J.
`Moffa
`Michelle L. Marriott
`Eric A. Buresh
`Mark C. Lang
`ERISE IP, P.A.
`6201 College Blvd., Suite 300
`Overland Park, Kansas 66211
`Tel: (913) 777-5600
`Fax: (913) 777-5601
`
`Melissa Richards Smith
`melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com
`GILLAM & SMITH, LLP
`303 South Washington Avenue
`Marshall, TX 75670
`903/934-8450
`Fax: 903/934-9257
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
`UBISOFT, INC. AND SQUARE ENIX, INC.
`
`
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`Case 2:16-cv-00741-RWS Document 216 Filed 08/01/17 Page 17 of 17 PageID #: 3533
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that all counsel of record who have consented to electronic service are
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`being served with a copy of this document via the Court’s CM/ECF system per Local Rule CV-
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`5(a)(3) on August 1, 2017.
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`/s/ Matthew J. Moffa
`Matthew J. Moffa
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`14
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