Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 399 Filed 05/06/22 Page 1 of 14 PageID #: 15523
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`SEAGEN INC.,
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`v.
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`Plaintiff,
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`DAIICHI SANKYO CO., LTD.,
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`Defendant, and
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`ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS
`LP and ASTRAZENECA UK LTD.,
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`Intervenor-Defendants.
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`CASE NO. 2:20-cv-00337-JRG
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`OPPOSITION TO SEAGEN’S MOTION FOR ENTRY
`OF AN ACCELERATED POST-TRIAL BRIEFING SCHEDULE
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 399 Filed 05/06/22 Page 2 of 14 PageID #: 15524
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`I.
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`The Court should schedule the equitable defenses for trial
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`Before the jury trial commenced, the Court noted its intent to hold a separate bench trial
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`on prosecution laches.1 The Parties litigated the jury issues—and the Court excluded certain
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`defense evidence—on that basis.2 Seagen now asks the Court to backtrack.3 No authority
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`supports such a request, which explains why Seagen cites none.
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`A.
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`The Parties are entitled to a trial
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`The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a bench trial of the prosecution laches
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`defense. “Prosecution laches is an equitable affirmative defense to patent infringement.”
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`Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Apple, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 3d 664, 684 (E.D. Tex. 2021);
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`Hyatt v. Hirshfeld, 998 F.3d 1347, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The defense requires the Court to
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`determine (1) whether Seagen’s “delay in prosecution was unreasonable and inexcusable under
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`the totality of the circumstances” and (2) whether a defendant “or the public suffered prejudice
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`attributable to the delay.” Personalized Media, 552 F. Supp. 3d at 684. This involves “a fact-
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`intensive inquiry that depends on the specific circumstances.” Id. at 685.
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39 requires that issues not tried to the jury “are to be
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`tried by the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(b); Personalized Media, 552 F. Supp. 3d at 667 (finding
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`1 The Court held that Daiichi Sankyo Japan’s prosecution laches expert is “not going to testify
`live before the jury, but I will certainly hear him on the issue of prosecution laches during the
`following and subsequent bench trial as may be informed by whatever the verdict the jury returns
`may be.” (Dkt. 343, Pretrial Conference Tr. Vol. 1 at 82:16-83:1.) The jury’s verdict for Seagen
`did not moot the issue, which is potentially dispositive.
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`2 (See Dkt. 347 at 4; Dkt. 343, Pretrial Conference Tr. Vol. 1 at 83:2-6.)
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`3 (See Dkt. 390 (“Mot.”).)
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 399 Filed 05/06/22 Page 3 of 14 PageID #: 15525
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`prosecution laches after a bench trial); DeFelice v. Am. Int’l Life Assurance Co. of N.Y., 112 F.3d
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`61, 65 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding a defendant’s right to a bench trial on an equitable claim).4
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`Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a) requires that, “[a]t trial, the witnesses’
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`testimony must be taken in open court unless a federal statute [or rule] provide otherwise.” Fed.
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`R. Civ. P. 43(a) (emphasis added). Seagen cites no such statute or rule exempting prosecution
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`laches defenses from this mandate. Instead, Seagen asks the Court to violate Rule 43(a) flatly—
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`to prejudge the witnesses’ testimony as unhelpful and to decide the issue based on expert reports,
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`declarations, and depositions. (Mot. 2-3.) Seagen effectively concedes that this would not
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`qualify as a “trial.” (See id.)
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`Rule 43(a) applies equally to jury trials and to bench trials on equitable issues. See
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`Bellaire Gen. Hosp. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 97 F.3d 822, 827 n.5 (5th Cir. 1996)
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`(collecting cases). Rule 43(a) expressly incorporated the former Equity Rule 46, which required
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`that, “[i]n all trials in equity[,] the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court,
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`except as otherwise provided by statute or these rules.” Rules of Practice for the Courts of
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`Equity of the United States, 226 U.S. 649, 661 (1912). Notably, the Federal Rules did not adopt
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`a prior exception to Equity Rule 46. “In a case involving the validity or scope of a patent or
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`trademark,” Equity Rule 48 had permitted district courts to take “the testimony in chief of expert
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`witnesses” on matters of opinion by affidavit, although opposing parties had a right to cross-
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`examine the expert witness “before the court upon the trial,” and, if the witness was not
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`produced, “his affidavit shall not be used as evidence in the cause.” Id. at 662. Rule 43(a),
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`4 See also, e.g.¸ Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Rsch. Found., 422 F.3d 1378
`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (upholding prosecution laches defense after bench trial); Hyatt, 998 F.3d at 1358
`(reviewing prosecution laches defense after bench trial); Cancer Rsch. Tech. Ltd. v. Barr Lab’ys,
`Inc., 625 F.3d 724, 727 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (same).
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 399 Filed 05/06/22 Page 4 of 14 PageID #: 15526
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`however, “abolishe[d] in patent and trademark actions” the former practice of accepting expert
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`testimony-in-chief by affidavit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a) advisory committee’s note to 1937
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`adoption. As a result, Daiichi Sankyo Japan has the right to a bench trial in which the testimony-
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`in-chief of the witnesses on prosecution laches, cross-examination, and any reexamination must
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`be adduced (along with any other relevant evidence).5
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`The requirement to try a prosecution laches defense to the Court is underscored by
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52. Rule 52 provides that “[i]n an action tried on the facts
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`without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court must find the facts specially and state its
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`conclusions of law separately,” and it must do so “after the close of evidence,” either orally or in
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`writing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (emphasis added). Further, a party is entitled to “question the
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`sufficiency of the evidence supporting the findings,” and, on appeal, to ask the reviewing court to
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`set aside findings of fact as clearly erroneous in light of the totality of the evidence. See Fed. R.
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`Civ. P. 52(a)(5), (6); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (“A finding is
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`‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
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`entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”)
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`(emphasis added). This Court has recognized that it must make Rule 52 findings on the evidence
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`after a bench trial on prosecution laches, making “factual determinations based on the applicable
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`5 United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Robertson, 354 F.2d 877, 879 (5th Cir. 1966) (noting
`that “[c]ross-examination of a witness is a matter of right” during a bench trial in a condemnation
`action); see also Fairfield Sci. Corp. v. United States, 611 F.2d 854, 862 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (quoting
`Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691 (1931)) (“Cross-examination of a witness is a matter
`of right” in an administrative adjudication); Fed. R. Evid. 607 (“Any party . . . may attack the
`witness’s credibility.”); id. R. 1101(b) (applying the Rules of Evidence to all “civil cases and
`proceedings”).
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 399 Filed 05/06/22 Page 5 of 14 PageID #: 15527
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`burden of proof.” See Personalized Media, 552 F. Supp. 3d at 684. Factual findings require
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`evidence—and evidence requires a trial.6
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`Apart from the Federal Rules, forgoing a trial at this stage would violate due process,
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`which “requires that there be an opportunity to present every available defense.” Lindsey v.
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`Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972); see also Ackermann v. United States, 178 F.2d 983, 985 (5th
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`Cir. 1949) (“The right of a litigant to a trial in accordance with the forms of law, and with an
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`opportunity to present his claim or defense, if he desires to do so, is a vital part of due process.”).
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`This includes “the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”
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`PPS Data, LLC v. Jack Henry & Assocs., Inc., 404 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1032 (E.D. Tex. 2019)
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`(quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). The substantial interests involved,
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`and the value of new evidence to the Court’s determination of a new issue, far outweighs the cost
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`of a bench trial. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. “While incremental increases in judicial
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`economy might be claimed and are important to be pursued where practicable, such benefits
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`should never come at the cost of constitutionally secured rights.” PPS Data, 404 F. Supp. 3d at
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`1033.
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`6 The expert reports and declarations that Seagen proposes for disposition of this defense (Mot. at
`3) are not “evidence” on which Rule 52 findings on an equitable defense can be made. See Ty,
`Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that, while
`“[a]ffidavits . . . are fully admissible in summary proceedings, including preliminary-injunction
`proceedings,” they “are ordinarily inadmissible at trials”). Indeed, Rule 43 distinguishes
`between trials (where “witnesses’ testimony must be taken in open court”) and motions (where
`“the court may hear the matter on affidavits”). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a), (c). Further, contrary
`to Seagen’s suggestion, Mot. at 3, evidence adduced at the jury trial would not suffice in this
`particular case. (See infra pp. 6-8.)
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 399 Filed 05/06/22 Page 6 of 14 PageID #: 15528
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`B.
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`Having failed to move for summary judgment, Seagen
`cannot credibly ask this Court to decide the prosecution laches
`defense based on expert reports, declarations, and depositions
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`Seagen suggests that this Court may decide the issue based on expert reports,
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`declarations, and depositions. (Mot. at 2-3.) The summary-judgment procedures of Federal Rule
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`of Civil Procedure 56 provide a mechanism to avert a trial based on expert affidavits,
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`declarations, and depositions, but only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
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`any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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`56(a), (c)(1)(A). At this stage, there is no mechanism to forgo a trial. The deadline for filing
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`dispositive motions has long passed.7 Seagen could have filed a dispositive motion on this issue
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`before that deadline, but it chose not to, presumably recognizing the weakness in its opposition.
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`Seagen makes no attempt to identify a basis for its request, asserting only that a trial would be
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`unhelpful and that the prosecution laches defense lacks merit. (Mot. at 2-3.)8 But of course,
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`7 (See Dkt. 229 at 3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b).
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`8 In a footnote, Seagen suggests that that the prosecution laches defense is unavailable for
`applications filed after the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (filed “post-
`GATT”). (Mot. at 3 n.2.) A motion for a briefing schedule is not the vehicle for raising
`substantive defenses, but regardless, this argument is wrong. GATT did not eliminate the
`prosecution laches defense; it merely changed the strategy used by submarine patentees. Pre-
`GATT, submarine patentees would delay the publication of a claim by using dilatory tactics to
`delay its issuance. Post-GATT, they delay publication by delaying their application for the
`claims. The harm remains the same: both tactics deprive the public of knowing what is claimed
`and what is not, causing parties like Daiichi Sankyo Japan to pour significant investment into a
`product before a submarine patentee swoops in to try to claim it. The reasoning behind the
`prosecution laches defense is as applicable post-GATT as it was pre-GATT:
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`Any practice by the inventor and applicant for a patent through
`which he deliberately and without excuse postpones beyond the date
`of the actual invention, the beginning of the term of his monopoly,
`and thus puts off the free public enjoyment of the useful invention,
`is an evasion of the statute and defeats its benevolent aim.
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`Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U.S. 50, 56 (1923); see also Hyatt, 998 F.3d at 1360 (relying
`on Woodbridge). In support of its contrary assertion, Seagen cites only (1) a magistrate’s report
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 399 Filed 05/06/22 Page 7 of 14 PageID #: 15529
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`deciding the merit of a claim or defense is exactly what a trial is for. If Seagen now believes the
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`evidence to be insufficient, or the defense to be unavailable, then it can make those arguments in
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`its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law after trial (having not made them in a
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`summary-judgment motion).
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`C.
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`A trial is necessary to a proper presentation of the defense
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`Even if a trial were not plainly required under the Constitution and the Federal Rules, it
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`would be necessary to a proper adjudication of the prosecution laches defense in this case.9
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`First, the following evidence,10 central to the issue of prosecution laches, is not available
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`to the Court in the current trial record:
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` The prosecution history of the related patents in the ’039 patent family, which
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`reveals Seagen’s “late-claiming” delay tactic and its purposeful 15-year delay in
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`disclosing the full extent of its invention. Determining the unreasonableness of
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`Seagen’s delay requires “an examination of the totality of the circumstances,
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`including the prosecution history of all of a series of related patents.”11 The
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`finding insufficient evidence of prosecution laches, Chrimar Sys., Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent Enter.
`USA Inc., No. 6:15-CV-00163-JDL, 2017 WL 345991, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2017) (cited at
`Mot. at 3 n.2); and (2) a case involving inequitable conduct (not prosecution laches), which notes
`that aiming to foreclose a competitor’s product is not, by itself, inequitable, BlephEx, LLC v.
`Myco Indus., Inc., 24 F.4th 1391, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (cited at Mot. at 3 n.2). Neither case
`found, as a matter of law, that applicants could deliberately delay their applications in order to
`benefit from others’ investments. Here, prosecution laches is still available, and this issue should
`be tried to the Court.
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`9 Daiichi Sankyo Japan agrees that a one-day trial will suffice, because each side plans to call
`live only one witness.
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`10 This list is not intended to be exhaustive. Daiichi Sankyo Japan reserves the right to present
`additional evidence at trial.
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`11 See Personalized Media, 552 F. Supp. 3d at 685-86 (quoting Hyatt, 998 F.3d at 1362).
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 399 Filed 05/06/22 Page 8 of 14 PageID #: 15530
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`prosecution history of the ’039 patent itself was mentioned at the prior trial only
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`generally.
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` The opinion of Mr. Manspeizer, Daiichi Sankyo Japan’s prosecution laches
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`expert, who will testify as to Seagen’s abandonments of certain patent
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`applications within the ’039 patent family, Seagen’s interactions with the patent
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`office during the prosecution of certain patent applications within the ’039 patent
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`family, changes in claim scope after 15 years, and how those events corresponded
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`to actions taken by Defendants. Mr. Manspeizer’s 30 years of experience with
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`patent-prosecution strategy in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology fields will
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`help the Court “evaluate how a reasonable patent applicant would prosecute his
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`patent.” Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 270 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
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` The extent and timing of Defendants’ investment, work, and use of the claimed
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`technology, which is central to the element of prejudice under prosecution laches.
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`Defendants’ significant investments of time and money in Enhertu® were not fully
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`explored at trial. The exact figures related to Defendants’ investment are
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`consequently not in the trial record.
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`Second, cross-examination gives the Court, as the trier of fact, the “opportunity to judge
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`the witnesses’ credibility,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6), and the chance to ask clarifying
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`questions, see Fed. R. Evid. 614(b). Weighing the relative credibility of the experts through live
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`testimony will be particularly important in this case.
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`For example, the opinions of Daiichi Sankyo Japan’s expert, Mr. Manspeizer, derive
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`from his experience in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. By contrast, Seagen’s
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`expert, Mr. Smith, derives almost all of his prosecution experience from the electrical and
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 399 Filed 05/06/22 Page 9 of 14 PageID #: 15531
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`mechanical arts. The importance of this difference can only effectively be revealed through live
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`cross-examination. Mr. Smith should be made available for questioning about, among other
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`things, his analysis, the factors he considered in forming his opinions, and the questions he was
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`unable to answer at deposition.12
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`Resolving these issues plainly requires a trial.
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`II.
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`The Court should not reach other post-trial issues until the Arbitration concludes
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`Seagen has pursued various claims against Daiichi Sankyo Japan in arbitration. “A
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`decision in the arbitration case is expected in mid-2022.” (Ex. B (Seagen Form 10-Q (Q1 2022))
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`at 13.)
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`According to Seagen’s damages expert both in the arbitration and in this case,
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` (Ex. C (Distler Dep. Tr.) at 149:12-20.) And
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`while Daiichi Sankyo Japan vigorously disputes that Seagen is entitled to any recovery in the
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`arbitration and believes that it will prevail both in that proceeding and this case, Seagen’s
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`damages expert testified that,
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`. (Id.
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`at 147:22-149:20.) Such circumstances would result in an impermissible double recovery. See,
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`e.g., Aero Prods. Int’l, Inc. v. Intex Recreation Corp., 466 F.3d 1000, 1018-19 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
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`(vacating trademark-infringement-damages award based on prior patent-damages award).
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`12 For example, by the time of his deposition,
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`64:21-65:9.)
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`(See, e.g., Ex. A (Smith Dep. Tr.) at 63:1-9;
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 399 Filed 05/06/22 Page 10 of 14 PageID #: 15532
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`When a plaintiff seeks recovery for the same sales both in court and in arbitration, it is
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`reversible error for the court not to consider the arbitral award and offset any judgment
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`accordingly. See Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1554-55 (10th Cir. 1988)
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`(reversing employment-discrimination-damages award for failing to offset arbitration award).
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`Likewise, district courts abuse their discretion by entering judgment on a first award while
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`claims that might result in double recovery remain pending. See Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v.
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`Beazer E., Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1338-39 (4th Cir. 1993). Again, while Daiichi Sankyo Japan
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`vigorously disputes that Seagen is entitled to any recovery in the arbitration and believes that it
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`will prevail in that proceeding and this case, Seagen argues the opposite. Given the impending
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`decision in the arbitration, this Court should wait to resolve any post-trial disputes, including
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`Seagen’s request for ongoing royalties and the entry of any money judgment, until it is clearer
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`what effect, if any, the arbitration decision has on this case. That is an especially prudent and
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`efficient course here.
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`III. The Court should not accelerate the filing of post-trial motions
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`Seagen’s proposal to accelerate post-trial motions before the prosecution laches trial
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`makes no sense. There is no reason for the Court to solicit such motions until it determines
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`which side has prevailed.
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`Because prosecution laches is a complete defense to enforcement of the patent, the
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`outcome of the prosecution laches trial could moot several of the Parties’ post-trial motions
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`entirely. Seagen’s requests for costs, fees, supplemental damages, interest, and a running
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`royalty13 would all be moot if the patent-in-suit were found unenforceable. Likewise, if the
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`13 Ex. D (Apr. 20, 2022 Email from Evelyn Chang) (describing post-trial relief that Seagen
`intends to seek).
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 399 Filed 05/06/22 Page 11 of 14 PageID #: 15533
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`Court finds prosecution laches, Defendants’ motions under Rules 50 and 59 for judgment as a
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`matter of law or a new jury trial would be moot as well, while their motion to declare this case
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`exceptional and recover their fees would need to be decided.
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`For this very reason, the Rules provide that most post-trial motions are due only after
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`entry of a final, appealable judgment.14 For instance, the Parties have until 28 days after the
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`entry of judgment to move for a new trial or to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law.15
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`This deadline cannot be accelerated.16 And, of course, a final judgment cannot be entered until
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`all potentially dispositive defenses (including prosecution laches) have been tried.17 So briefing
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`other (potentially moot) post-trial motions ahead of time would not speed things along—it would
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`only waste the Court’s and the Parties’ time and resources. Moreover, after the bench trial,
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`Defendants will have the right (if circumstances warrant) to move to add or amend findings of
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`fact, move for a new trial, or move to alter or amend the judgment. See Fed. Rs. Civ. P. 52(b),
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`59(a)(1)(B), 59(e).
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`14 See, e.g., Fed. Rs. Civ. P. 50(b), 54(d)(2)(B)(i), 59(b); see also id. R. 54(a) (defining
`“judgment” throughout the Rules to mean a final, appealable judgment).
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`15 Fed. Rs. Civ. P. 50(b), 59(b).
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`16 See Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 981 F.3d 1360, 1384
`(Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The courts of appeals have uniformly rejected district court rules setting a
`time limit inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Paluch v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't
`Corr., 442 F. App’x 690, 692-93 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that district court’s local rule could not
`impose a 14-day period to file a motion to alter or amend the judgment when Federal Rule of
`Civil Procedure 59(e) allowed 28 days to file such a motion).
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`17 See, e.g., U.S. Sugar v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 196 F.2d 1015, 1016 (5th Cir.
`1952) (“There are other issues of fact in the case, yet to be determined, before final judgment can
`be entered.”); N.C. Nat. Gas Corp. v. Seaboard Surety Corp., 284 F.2d 164, 167 (4th Cir.
`1960) (“The assertion of the affirmative defenses by defendant raised issues of fact which must
`be determined before there can be a final judgment in this action.”).
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 399 Filed 05/06/22 Page 12 of 14 PageID #: 15534
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`Seagen suggests that deciding post-trial motions and equitable defenses simultaneously is
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`normal practice in this district. Not so. This Court regularly entertains briefing on post-trial
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`motions only after adjudicating equitable defenses. See, e.g., Personalized Media Commc’ns v.
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`Apple, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-01366, ECF No. 660 (Sept. 3, 2021) (defendant’s post-trial motion
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`filed after judgment was entered); KAIST IP US LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:16-CV-
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`01314, ECF No. 575 (Jan. 18, 2019) (order scheduling post-trial briefing after the Court’s
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`decision on equitable defenses was rendered). While this Court has occasionally heard post-trial
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`motions before officially entering a final judgment, it did so in Smartflash (cited by Seagen) only
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`after all triable issues had been decided. See Smartflash LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 6:13-CV-447,
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`ECF No. 503 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2015) (verdict), ECF No. 545 (Apr. 10, 2015) (post-trial-
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`briefing scheduling order). In only one case cited by Seagen did the parties brief equitable
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`defenses simultaneously with post-trial motions, and that was at the request of both parties. See
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`Elbit Sys. Land & C4I Ltd. v. Hughes Network Sys., LLC, No. 2:15-CV-37, ECF No. 502 at 2
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`(E.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2017).
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`Consequently, Daiichi Sankyo Japan requests that all briefing on post-trial motions take
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`place after the Court issues its decision on prosecution laches. Upon determining the prevailing
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`party, the Court can then determine what other relief should be granted. And only after entry of
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`a final judgment should the Court entertain motions under Rules 50 and 59.
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`CONCLUSION
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`This Court should deny Seagen’s motion and proceed to schedule a bench trial on the
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`prosecution laches defense.
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 399 Filed 05/06/22 Page 13 of 14 PageID #: 15535
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`Dated: May 3, 2022
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`Respectfully Submitted,
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` /s/ Preston K. Ratliff II
`Deron R. Dacus
`Texas State Bar No. 00790553
`ddacus@dacusfirm.com
`THE DACUS FIRM, P.C.
`821 ESE Loop 323, Suite 430
`Tyler, Texas 75701
`Telephone: 903.705.1117
`Facsimile: 903.581.2543
`
`J. Mark Mann
`Texas State Bar No. 12926150
`mark@themannfirm.com
`G. Blake Thompson
`Texas State Bar No. 240420033
`blake@themannfirm.com
`MANN | TINDEL | THOMPSON
`201 E. Howard Street
`Henderson, Texas
`Telephone: 903.357.8540
`Facsimile: 903.657.6003
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`Attorneys for Defendant Daiichi Sankyo
`Company, Limited
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`OF COUNSEL:
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`Preston K. Ratliff II
`Ashley N. Mays-Williams
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`200 Park Avenue
`New York, New York 10166
`Telephone: 212.318.6000
`
`Jeffrey A. Pade
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`2050 M Street NW
`Washington, DC 20036
`Telephone: 202.551.1700
`
`Attorneys for Defendant Daiichi Sankyo
`Company, Limited
`
`- 12 -
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 399 Filed 05/06/22 Page 14 of 14 PageID #: 15536
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`FILED UNDER SEAL PURSUANT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was filed electronically in
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`compliance with Local Rule CV-5(a). Therefore, this document was served on all counsel who are
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`deemed to have consented to electronic service on this the 3rd day of May, 2022.
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`/s/ Preston K. Ratliff II
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