Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 465 Filed 09/22/22 Page 1 of 30 PageID #: 19730
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`SEAGEN INC.,
`
`v.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`DAIICHI SANKYO CO., LTD.,
`
`Civil Action No. 2:20-CV-00337-JRG
`
`Defendant,
`
`ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS LP,
`and ASTRAZENECA UK LTD,
`
`
`
`Intervenor-Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`SEAGEN’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF
`INVALIDITY BASED ON POST-TRIAL DISCLAIMER
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 465 Filed 09/22/22 Page 2 of 30 PageID #: 19731
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`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Page
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
`
`PROCEDURAL HISTORY............................................................................................... 2
`
`THE MOTION FOR “JUDGMENT” IS PROCEDURALLY IMPROPER ..................... 3
`
`SEAGEN’S DISCLAIMER OF CLAIMS 6-8 HAS NO BEARING ON THE
`VALIDITY OF CLAIMS 1-5 AND 9-10 .......................................................................... 4
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Seagen’s Disclaimer Cannot Invalidate Non-Disclaimed Claims ......................... 4
`
`The Patent Office’s Adverse Judgment Does Not Invalidate Any Non-
`Disclaimed Claims ................................................................................................. 8
`
`1.
`
`The Patent Office’s Estoppel Regulation Does Not Render
`Seagen’s Asserted Claims Invalid ............................................................. 9
`
`a.
`
`b.
`
`Rule 42.73(d)(3) does not estop the patent owner in district
`court litigation ................................................................................ 9
`
`Seagen’s assertion of the remaining claims is not
`inconsistent with the adverse judgment on the disclaimed
`claims ........................................................................................... 10
`
`2.
`
`Issue Preclusion Does Not Invalidate Seagen’s Asserted Claims ........... 12
`
`a.
`
`b.
`
`The validity of Seagen’s claims was not actually litigated in
`the PGR and was not necessary to the final judgment ................. 12
`
`Issue preclusion could not apply here because claims 1-5
`and 9-10 raise materially different validity issues from
`disclaimed claims 6-8 .................................................................. 15
`
`V.
`
`SEAGEN’S DISCLAIMER DOES NOT ALTER THE SCOPE OF THE
`ASSERTED CLAIMS ..................................................................................................... 19
`
`VI.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 22
`
`
`
`-i-
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`

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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 465 Filed 09/22/22 Page 3 of 30 PageID #: 19732
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`Cases
`
`Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co.,
`819 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1987)..............................................................................................6, 7
`
`Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp.,
`294 U.S. 477 (1935) ...................................................................................................................7
`
`Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc.,
`No. 99-1356, 2007 WL 3237622 (D. Minn. Oct. 30, 2007) ......................................................5
`
`Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.,
`No. IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2020) .........................................................2
`
`Apple Inc. v. Softview LLC,
`No. 2021-005530, 2022 WL 1210851 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 6, 2022) ..............................................10
`
`Arizona v. California,
`530 U.S. 392 (2000) .................................................................................................................14
`
`Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
`880 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..........................................................................................14, 15
`
`B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc.,
`575 U.S. 138 (2015) ...............................................................................................12, 13, 14, 15
`
`Best Med. Int’l, Inc. v. Elekta Inc.,
`No. 2021-2099, 2022 WL 3693470 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 29, 2022) ...............................................14
`
`Boehringer Ingelheim Int’l GmbH v. Barr Lab’ys, Inc.,
`592 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010)................................................................................................21
`
`Choon’s Design, LLC v. Zenacon, LLC,
`No. 2:13-CV-13568, 2015 WL 539441 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 9, 2015) .....................................8, 16
`
`Clearlamp, LLC v. LKQ Corp.,
`No. 12 C 2533, 2016 WL 4734389 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2016) ...................................................9
`
`CoreBrace LLC v. Star Seismic LLC,
`566 F.3d 1069 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................20
`
`Daiichi Sankyo, Inc v. Seagen Inc.,
`No. PGR2021-00030, Paper 31 (July 15, 2022) ........................................................................3
`
`
`
`-i-
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 465 Filed 09/22/22 Page 4 of 30 PageID #: 19733
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`Daiichi Sankyo, Inc. v. Seagen Inc.,
`No. PGR2021-00042, Paper 18 (Apr. 7, 2022)........................................................................13
`
`Daiichi Sankyo, Inc. v. Seagen Inc.,
`No. PGR2021-00042, Paper 24 (May 11, 2022) .....................................................................14
`
`Daiichi Sankyo, Inc. v. Seagen Inc.,
`No. PGR2021-00042, Paper 25 (July 25, 2022) ................................................................11, 14
`
`Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Lab’ys, Inc.,
`251 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 2001)..................................................................................................16
`
`EMG Tech., LLC v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc.,
`No. 6:10-CV-536, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205421 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2012) ........................3
`
`Ford Motor Co. v. Versata Software, Inc.,
`No. 15-11624, 2017 WL 3485812 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2017) ..............................................20
`
`Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.,
`721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013)................................................................................................15
`
`Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd.,
`753 F.3d 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................21
`
`Ginsburg v. United States,
`922 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019)................................................................................................20
`
`Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Impax Laboratories, Inc.,
`356 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................21
`
`Guinn v. Kopf,
`96 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1996)....................................................................................................8
`
`Imperium IP Holdings (Cayman), Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`C.A. No. 4:14-CV-00371, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63979 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 27,
`2017) ..........................................................................................................................................4
`
`Jones v. Hardy,
`727 F.2d 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1984)............................................................................................5, 20
`
`Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc.,
`No. 85-2174, 1986 WL 721181 (Fed. Cir. June 11, 1986) ......................................................11
`
`Lemaire Illumination Technologies, LLC v. HTC Corp.,
`C.A. No. 2:18-CV-00021-JRG, 2019 WL 1489065 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2019) ..........................8
`
`
`
`-ii-
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`

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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 465 Filed 09/22/22 Page 5 of 30 PageID #: 19734
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`Littelfuse, Inc. v. Mersen USA EP Corp.,
`29 F.4th 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ................................................................................................16
`
`Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc.,
`140 S. Ct. 1589 (2020) .............................................................................................................13
`
`Magdo v. Kooi,
`699 F.2d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1983)..................................................................................................5
`
`Maytag Co. v. Hurley Machine Co.,
`307 U.S. 243 (1939) ...........................................................................................................5, 6, 7
`
`Motionless Keyboard Co. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`486 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007)................................................................................................11
`
`Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC,
`735 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2013)..........................................................................................15, 16
`
`Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp.,
`926 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2019)................................................................................................12
`
`Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC v. Dr. Reddy’s Lab’ys, Inc.,
`933 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2019)................................................................................5, 15, 21, 22
`
`SimpleAir, Inc. v. Google LLC,
`884 F.3d 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................12
`
`Soundscriber Corp. v. United States,
`360 F.2d 954 (Ct. Cl. 1966) .....................................................................................................20
`
`SynQor, Inc v. Vicor Corp.,
`988 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2021)................................................................................................13
`
`Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels,
`812 F.3d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................13
`
`Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp.,
`162 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998)............................................................................................5, 11
`
`VMware, Inc. v. Clouding Corp.,
`No. IPR2014-01292, 2015 WL 10381774 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 3, 2015)........................................12
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 65 (1934) ......................................................................................................................7
`
`
`
`-iii-
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`

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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 465 Filed 09/22/22 Page 6 of 30 PageID #: 19735
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
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`35 U.S.C. § 71 (1946) ..................................................................................................................6, 7
`
`35 U.S.C. § 253 ..................................................................................................................4, 5, 8, 11
`
`35 U.S.C. § 282(a) ...........................................................................................................................5
`
`35 U.S.C. § 288 ................................................................................................................................7
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) .....................................................................................................................10
`
`35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(4) .....................................................................................................................10
`
`Other Authorities
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.73 .....................................................................................................9, 10, 11, 12, 16
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 .............................................................................................................................3
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 .............................................................................................................................3
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 .............................................................................................................................4
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 .............................................................................................................................4
`
`Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial & Appeal Board and Judicial
`Review of Patent Trial & Appeal Board Decisions, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612
`(Aug. 14, 2012) ....................................................................................................................9, 10
`
`
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`-iv-
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`

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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 465 Filed 09/22/22 Page 7 of 30 PageID #: 19736
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`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`Defendants’ “motion for judgment” contends that Seagen’s disclaimer of unasserted
`
`claims 6-8 invalidates the claims Seagen asserted at trial. Defendants’ motion should be denied
`
`for at least three independent reasons: (1) it is procedurally improper, (2) Defendants’ arguments
`
`fail as a matter of law because Seagen’s disclaimer does not invalidate the asserted claims and
`
`the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s decisions have no issue preclusive effect, and (3) even if
`
`issue preclusion could apply, Defendants have not shown as a factual matter that the differences
`
`between the asserted claims and the disclaimed claims do not materially alter the question of
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`invalidity.
`
`Defendants’ motion fails at the outset because it does not identify any rule that provides
`
`for the relief it seeks. But even if the motion were procedurally proper, it would still fail as
`
`nothing in the Patent Act, the Patent Office’s regulations, or any case law supports Defendants’
`
`theory. Under the disclaimer statute and cases interpreting it, disclaimer affects only the
`
`disclaimed claims—not other claims in the patent. The Court should reject Defendants’ attempt
`
`to reject existing precedent and invent a contrary rule by cobbling together cases interpreting a
`
`long-defunct version of the Patent Act or not even addressing disclaimer.
`
`Equally flawed are Defendants’ arguments based on the Board’s adverse judgment on
`
`claims 6-8 in the PGR. Under the Board’s estoppel regulation, the adverse judgment affects only
`
`actions taken by the patent owner in the Patent Office—not district court litigation—and there is
`
`nothing inconsistent about asserting claims different from those disclaimed anyway. And
`
`because the Board did not finally decide any patentability issues and can enter an adverse
`
`judgment for reasons unrelated to patentability, none of the requirements of issue preclusion
`
`could be satisfied.
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`1
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`

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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 465 Filed 09/22/22 Page 8 of 30 PageID #: 19737
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`As a backup, Defendants urge the Court to create another new rule for disclaimer—that
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`disclaimed claims surrender the scope of non-disclaimed claims. Beyond being little more than a
`
`repackaging of their invalidity arguments, binding precedent rejects the very same claim-scope
`
`argument Defendants assert here.
`
`II.
`
`PROCEDURAL HISTORY
`
`Defendants filed two PGR petitions: one challenging claims 1-5, 9 and 10; the other
`
`challenging claims 6-8. In June 2021, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the “Board”) denied
`
`institution of both PGRs under Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., No. IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5-6
`
`(P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential), because the same issues in the PGRs would be
`
`presented to a jury in this Court at a trial set to take place months before the projected date for
`
`the Board to issue a decision in the PGRs.
`
`Defendants filed requests for rehearing of the institution decisions, arguing that claims
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`6-8 had been dropped from this litigation, so there was no longer an “overlap” of claims for one
`
`of the PGRs, and the other PGR was substantively similar enough that the Board ought to
`
`institute it also. The requests for rehearing remained pending for eight months until April 2022,
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`in the middle of the trial before this Court. At that point the Board granted rehearing “in light of
`
`the changed circumstances of claims 6–8 of the ’039 patent no longer being asserted in the
`
`parallel district court proceeding.” The Board found it appropriate in light of this changed
`
`circumstance to institute both PGR proceedings.
`
`After trial was complete and the jury found the asserted claims to be valid and willfully
`
`infringed, Seagen filed a disclaimer with the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
`
`disclaiming claims 6-8, the only claims not adjudicated in the jury trial. Seagen then filed a
`
`request for rehearing with the Board, arguing that there were two changed circumstances that
`
`merited revisiting the institution decision: (1) claims 6-8, the Board’s justification for its
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`2
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 465 Filed 09/22/22 Page 9 of 30 PageID #: 19738
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`rehearing decision to institute the PGRs, were no longer at issue before the PTAB, as Seagen had
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`disclaimed those claims; and (2) there now was a jury verdict rejecting the very invalidity
`
`defenses Defendants hoped to present to the PTAB.
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`The Board agreed with Seagen. It found both changed circumstances justified reverting
`
`to its original decision to deny institution. As a result, it issued a decision granting rehearing and
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`denying institution of the PGR challenging the asserted claims. The Board found that
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`“[c]ontinuing with [the PGR] proceeding would result in duplicative efforts and potentially
`
`conflicting results between the district court and the Board.” Decision Denying Institution at 7,
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`Daiichi Sankyo, Inc v. Seagen Inc., No. PGR2021-00030, Paper 31 (July 15, 2022).
`
`III. THE MOTION FOR “JUDGMENT” IS PROCEDURALLY IMPROPER
`
`As a threshold matter, Defendants’ motion fails as it seeks “judgment” but fails to
`
`identify a basis for the motion under any Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. It is up to Defendants
`
`to identify a basis for their motion. Neither Seagen nor the Court should be required to guess
`
`which rule might justify the relief sought.
`
`If the Court were inclined to search for an applicable rule, the motion would still fail.
`
`The motion could not have been brought under Rule 12 because pleading motions cannot be
`
`brought after the entry of judgment. See, e.g., EMG Tech., LLC v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp.,
`
`Inc., No. 6:10-CV-536, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205421, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2012) (“[a]
`
`motion for judgment on the pleadings provides a court with a method for summary adjudication
`
`of a defense after the pleadings are closed but before trial” (emphasis added)). Defendants could
`
`not have brought a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) as it is not
`
`a “renewed” motion for an issue raised during the trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (permitting only
`
`“renewed” motions for issues timely raised in a Rule 50(a) motion made during trial).
`
`Defendants similarly could not have supported a motion to “amend or alter the judgment” under
`
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`3
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 465 Filed 09/22/22 Page 10 of 30 PageID #: 19739
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`Rule 59(e). Imperium IP Holdings (Cayman), Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., C.A. No. 4:14-CV-
`
`00371, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63979, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2017) (evidence that “was not in
`
`existence at the time of the judgment” cannot be “newly discovered evidence” under 59(e)).
`
`Defendants have also failed to make a showing of exceptional or extraordinary circumstances to
`
`justify relief from judgment under Rule 60. See, e.g., Imperium IP Holdings, 2017 U.S. Dist.
`
`LEXIS 63979, at *6 n.1 (relief from judgment under Rule 60 requires “extraordinary
`
`circumstances”). In short, the Court should deny this motion as failing to support any claim to
`
`relief under an applicable rule of civil procedure.
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`IV.
`
`SEAGEN’S DISCLAIMER OF CLAIMS 6-8 HAS NO BEARING ON THE
`VALIDITY OF CLAIMS 1-5 AND 9-10
`
`Even if Defendants had brought a procedurally proper motion, it would still fail.
`
`Defendants contend that the disclaimer of certain patent claims renders invalid other,
`
`non-disclaimed claims. (See Dkt. 442 at 10.) Yet Defendants cite no statute, regulation, or
`
`decision that so holds. Instead, Defendants stitch together snippets from decisions discussing
`
`pre-1952 patent law or cases having nothing to do with disclaimer. The Court should reject
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`Defendants’ invitation to manufacture new law.
`
`A.
`
`Seagen’s Disclaimer Cannot Invalidate Non-Disclaimed Claims
`
`Neither the Patent Act nor precedent from any court supports Defendants’ argument that
`
`disclaimer “invalidates claims that are not patentably distinct.” (Dkt. 442 at 10.) For starters, the
`
`Patent Act says nothing about invalidating non-disclaimed claims. It merely states:
`
`Whenever a claim of a patent is invalid the remaining claims shall not thereby be
`rendered invalid. A patentee, whether of the whole or any sectional interest
`therein, may, on payment of the fee required by law, make disclaimer of any
`complete claim, stating therein the extent of his interest in such patent. Such
`disclaimer shall be in writing, and recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office;
`and it shall thereafter be considered as part of the original patent to the extent of
`the interest possessed by the disclaimant and by those claiming under him.
`
`35 U.S.C. § 253(a). This text nowhere suggests that disclaimer of certain claims results in the
`
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`4
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 465 Filed 09/22/22 Page 11 of 30 PageID #: 19740
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`disclaimer or invalidation of any other patent claims. Rather, it expressly states that the
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`invalidity of one claim does not make the other claims invalid and gives the patent owner the
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`right to disclaim “any complete claim.”
`
`Consistent with this text, courts have acknowledged that disclaimer does not affect non-
`
`disclaimed claims. The Federal Circuit has explained that “disclaimer extends only to the
`
`particular claims involved and does not affect any other claims.” Magdo v. Kooi, 699 F.2d 1325,
`
`1329 (Fed. Cir. 1983). For that reason, “[n]othing in § 253 suggests that the disclaimer of a
`
`patent claim, by itself, has an effect on any other patent claim.” Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v.
`
`Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc., No. 99-1356 (JRT/FLN), 2007 WL 3237622, at *2 (D. Minn.
`
`Oct. 30, 2007). Anything less would violate the Federal Circuit rule that “each claim must be
`
`considered as defining a separate invention.” Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1528 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1984); see 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (“Each claim of a patent (whether in independent, dependent, or
`
`multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other
`
`claims.”).
`
`Nor does disclaimer even “invalidate” the disclaimed claims, as Defendants suggest.
`
`Disclaimer merely leaves the patent “as if the disclaimed claims had never existed.” Sanofi-
`
`Aventis U.S., LLC v. Dr. Reddy’s Lab’ys, Inc., 933 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see Vectra
`
`Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (statutory disclaimer
`
`“effectively eliminate[s]” the disclaimed claims from the patent).
`
`Unable to point to anything in the present-day Patent Act or cases construing current law,
`
`Defendants cobble together bits and pieces of old law to divine a purported patent law “core
`
`principle” that “disclaimer invalidates other claims that are not patentably distinct inventions.”
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`(Dkt. 442 at 9.) Their primary basis for that argument is the Supreme Court’s decision in
`
`Maytag Co. v. Hurley Machine Co., 307 U.S. 243 (1939). But Maytag created no such core
`
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`5
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 465 Filed 09/22/22 Page 12 of 30 PageID #: 19741
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`principle—it is one entirely of Defendants’ invention. Maytag addressed the then-existing duty
`
`to promptly disclaim claims previously found invalid. Under the pre-1952 Patent Act, a patentee
`
`could not maintain an infringement action unless the remaining claims were “definitely
`
`distinguishable from the parts claimed without right”—that is, the claims previously found
`
`invalid. 35 U.S.C. § 71 (1946) (emphasis added).
`
`In Maytag, claim 38 of the asserted patent had been held invalid in a prior proceeding.
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`307 U.S. at 244. The patentee disclaimed claims 1 and 38 but not claim 39, which recited a
`
`method similar to claim 38. Id. The patentee then sued a different defendant for infringement of
`
`other claims of the patent, not including claim 39. Id. at 244-45. The Supreme Court concluded
`
`that “claim 39 describes the same method as” claim 38, as they “describe[] no difference in
`
`operation or result” despite a “difference in verbiage.” Id. at 246-47. And it explained that an
`
`entire patent becomes unenforceable when the patentee fails to disclaim claims that are not
`
`definitely distinguishable from already invalid claims. Id. Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, the
`
`Supreme Court did not hold that “the patentee’s disclaimer of Claim 38 resulted in the
`
`invalidation of undisclaimed method Claim 39 because it was not a distinct invention.”
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`(Dkt. 442 at 8.) It was the invalidation of claim 38 in a prior proceeding and the statutory bar
`
`against bringing suit based on claims not “definitely distinguishable from parts claimed without
`
`right,” which rendered claim 39 unenforceable—not the patentee’s disclaimer of claim 38.
`
`Regardless, all the law on which Maytag was based no longer exists. As the Federal
`
`Circuit has recognized, “the Maytag rule did not survive the ‘repeal’ in the 1952 Patent Act of
`
`the provisions of the earlier Patent Act upon which Maytag rested.” Allen Archery, Inc. v.
`
`Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Faced with this precedent,
`
`Defendants argue that Maytag’s “holding” had two “parts”: (1) “the patentee’s disclaimer of
`
`Claim 38 resulted in the invalidation of undisclaimed method Claim 39,” and (2) “the entire
`
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`6
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 465 Filed 09/22/22 Page 13 of 30 PageID #: 19742
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`patent,” including “otherwise valid” claims, were “invalid.” (Dkt. 442 at 8.) According to
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`Defendants, only “[t]he latter part of the Supreme Court’s holding” is “no longer the law” after
`
`the 1952 Patent Act. (Id.) But as just discussed, Maytag created no core principle that
`
`“disclaimer invalidates other claims that are not patentably distinct inventions.” (Contra id.
`
`at 9.) So Defendants’ made-up principle could not survive the repeal in the 1952 Patent Act
`
`because it never existed.
`
`In any event, Congress’s repeal of the law on which Maytag relied was not so narrow.
`
`Maytag applied pre-1952 Patent Act’s “provision that failure to disclaim additional invalid
`
`claims made the remaining valid claims unenforceable.” Allen Archery, 819 F.2d at 1095-96
`
`(noting that Maytag “rested upon the Court’s interpretation of sections 65 and 71 of title 35 . . .
`
`as they then read”). In the 1952 Patent Act, Congress replaced that provision with Section 288,
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`which specifies that when “a claim of a patent is invalid, an action may be maintained for the
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`infringement of a claim of the patent which may be valid.” 35 U.S.C. § 288. And Congress
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`eliminated any reference to claims “definitely distinguishable” from invalid claims. Thus,
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`nothing of Maytag survived the enactment of the 1952 Patent Act, as it “was expressly based on
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`the statutory language that Congress deleted in 1952.” Allen Archery, 819 F.2d at 1096.
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`Defendants’ other pre-1952 Patent Act authority fares no better. (See Dkt. 442 at 7-11.)
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`Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477 (1935), addressed pre-1952
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`Patent Act authority where patentees could disclaim part of a claim in addition to whole claims.
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`See 35 U.S.C. § 65 (1934). In Altoona, the patentee had improperly used disclaimer to add “a
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`new element to the combination previously claimed.” 294 U.S. at 490. The Supreme Court held
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`that the patentee could not “revive[]” the pre-disclaimer claims because the disclaimer
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`“withdr[e]w” the original claims “from the protection of the patent laws”; nowhere did it hold
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`that disclaimer of certain claims affected other, non-disclaimed claims of the patent. Id. at 492.
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 465 Filed 09/22/22 Page 14 of 30 PageID #: 19743
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`Nor do any of the post-1952 Patent Act cases Defendants cite address—or even
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`suggest—that disclaimer affects non-disclaimed claims. In Lemaire Illumination Technologies,
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`LLC v. HTC Corp., C.A. No. 2:18-CV-00021-JRG, 2019 WL 1489065 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2019),
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`for instance, this Court declined to enter partial judgment on the pleadings for the defendant after
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`the patentee disclaimed certain asserted claims. Id. at *3. Instead, it “dismiss[ed]” the relevant
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`infringement claims “without prejudice as moot” and observing that the dismissal “should not
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`give rise to any form of claim preclusion.” Id. at *3. And in Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419 (Fed.
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`Cir. 1996), the “single issue” the Federal Circuit decided was “whether the Commissioner [of
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`Patent and Trademarks] properly promulgated” a rule permitting the Board to construe a
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`statutory disclaimer as a request for entry of an adverse judgment in an interference. Id. at 1421.
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`The Federal Circuit held that the disclaimer did not deprive the Board of jurisdiction over the
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`interference and that the rule did not improperly limit “the right of a patentee to statutorily
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`disclaim subject matter” under 35 U.S.C. § 253. Id. at 1421-22.
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`The Court should reject Defendants’ effort to extend old, repealed law so that the
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`“disclaimer of [a claim] invalidates all claims of [the] patent that are patentably indistinct” from
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`the disclaimed claim. (Dkt. 442 at 11.) See Choon’s Design, LLC v. Zenacon, LLC, No. 2:13-
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`CV-13568, 2015 WL 539441, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 9, 2015) (where defendants raised similar
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`argument based on disclaimer of non-asserted claims during IPR, noting that “[t]his type of
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`argument . . . is not found in the case law”).
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`B.
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`The Patent Office’s Adverse Judgment Does Not Invalidate Any Non-
`Disclaimed Claims
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`The Patent Office’s adverse judgment in the PGR on claims 6-8 based on Seagen’s
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`disclaimer of those claims provides no “independent basis” to invalidate claims 1-5 and 9-10.
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`(Contra Dkt. 442 at 12.)
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 465 Filed 09/22/22 Page 15 of 30 PageID #: 19744
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`1.
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`The Patent Office’s Estoppel Regulation Does Not Render Seagen’s
`Asserted Claims Invalid
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`a.
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`Rule 42.73(d)(3) does not estop the patent owner in district
`court litigation
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`Contrary to Defendants’ argument, the Board’s estoppel regulation has no effect in this
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`district court litigation because it governs only proceedings before the Patent Office. Clearlamp,
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`LLC v. LKQ Corp., No. 12 C 2533, 2016 WL 4734389, at *6 n.8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2016)
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`(rejecting defendant’s argument that Board decision had preclusive effect in district court
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`litigation under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3)). This conclusion follows directly from the regulatory
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`text and structure. Each of the three subsections of § 42.73(d) expressly apply only in the Patent
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`Office or to actions that can occur only in the Patent Office. Both subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2)
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`limit estoppel to “in the Office.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(1) (“A petitioner . . . is estopped in the
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`Office from requesting or maintaining a proceeding with respect to a claim for which it has
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`obtained a final written decision on patentability in an” AIA proceeding (emphasis added)); id.
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`§ 42.73(d)(2) (“In a derivation, the losing party who could have properly moved for relief on an
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`issue, but did not so move, may not take action in the Office after the judgment that is
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`inconsistent with that party’s failure to move . . . .” (emphasis added)). And in subsection (d)(3),
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`the only “action[s] inconsistent with the adverse judgment” the regulation discusses are ones a
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`patent owner or applicant can do in the Office, such as “obtaining in any patent” certain claims
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`or changes to a specification. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3).
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`The Patent Office itself shares this understanding of the regulation’s scope. In
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`promulgating § 42.73(d)(3), the Patent Office explained that the regulation was “consistent with”
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`the AIA provisions authorizing it to “prescribe regulations establishing and governing the
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`reviews and the relationship of such reviews to other proceedings under title 35”—i.e.,
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`“proceedings” before the Office. Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal
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`9
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`Cas