Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 475 Filed 10/20/22 Page 1 of 17 PageID #: 21228
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`Civil Action No. 2:20-CV-00337-JRG
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`SEAGEN INC.,
`
`v.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`DAIICHI SANKYO CO., LTD.,
`
`Defendant,
`
`ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS LP,
`and ASTRAZENECA UK LTD,
`
`
`
`Intervenor-Defendants.
`
`SEAGEN’S SURREPLY IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
`JUDGMENT OF INVALIDITY BASED ON POST-TRIAL DISCLAIMER
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 475 Filed 10/20/22 Page 2 of 17 PageID #: 21229
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Page
`
`
`I.
`II.
`III.
`
`IV.
`V.
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
`DEFENDANTS’ MOTION IS PROCEDURALLY IMPROPER .................................... 1
`DISCLAIMER OF CLAIMS 6-8 DOES NOT INVALIDATE CLAIMS 1-5 OR
`9-10 .................................................................................................................................... 2
`A.
`Seagen’s Disclaimer Cannot Invalidate Non-Disclaimed Claims ......................... 2
`B.
`The Patent Office’s Adverse Judgment Does Not Invalidate Any Non-
`Disclaimed Claims ................................................................................................. 5
`1.
`The Patent Office’s Estoppel Regulation Has No Application Here ......... 5
`2.
`Claim Preclusion Does Not Invalidate Seagen’s Asserted Claims ............ 7
`3.
`Issue Preclusion Does Not Invalidate Seagen’s Asserted Claims ............. 8
`THE DISCLAIMER DOES NOT LIMIT THE ASSERTED CLAIMS’ SCOPE ............. 9
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 10
`
`i
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`

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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 475 Filed 10/20/22 Page 3 of 17 PageID #: 21230
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`Cases
`
`Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co.,
`819 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1987)............................................................................................5, 10
`
`Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc.,
`299 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2002)..................................................................................................4
`
`Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp.,
`294 U.S. 477 (1935) ...................................................................................................................4
`
`Apple Inc. v. Softview LLC,
`No. 2021-005530, 2022 WL 1210851 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 6, 2022) ................................................6
`
`Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
`880 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................8
`
`Brooks v. Dist. of Columbia,
`841 F. Supp. 2d 253 (D.D.C. 2012) ...........................................................................................2
`
`Clearlamp, LLC v. LKQ Corp.,
`No. 12 C 2533, 2016 WL 4734389 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2016) ...................................................6
`
`Dunbar v. Myers,
`94 U.S. 187 (1876) ...................................................................................................................10
`
`Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp.,
`935 F.2d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 1991)..................................................................................................2
`
`Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.,
`721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013)..................................................................................................4
`
`Guinn v. Kopf,
`96 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1996)................................................................................................3, 4
`
`Hartford-Empire Co. v. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co.,
`59 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 1932).........................................................................................................3
`
`Imperium IP Holdings (Cayman), Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`No. 4:14-CV-00371, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63979 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2017) .......................2
`
`Jones v. Hardy,
`727 F.2d 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1984)..................................................................................................4
`
`
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 475 Filed 10/20/22 Page 4 of 17 PageID #: 21231
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(cont’d)
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`Lemaire Illumination Techs., LLC v. HTC Corp.,
`No. 2:18-CV-00021-JRG, 2019 WL 1489065 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2019) ..................................4
`
`Magdo v. Kooi,
`699 F.2d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1983)..................................................................................................3
`
`Maytag Co. v. Hurley Mach. Co.,
`307 U.S. 243 (1939) ...............................................................................................................4, 5
`
`Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co.,
`26 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1994)....................................................................................................2
`
`Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC,
`735 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2013)..................................................................................................9
`
`PerDiemCo, LLC v. Industrack LLC,
`No. 2:15-CV-00727-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 6534524 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2016) ........................2
`
`Reed v. Cropp Concrete Mach. Co.,
`239 F. 869 (7th Cir. 1916) .........................................................................................................3
`
`Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp.,
`926 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..................................................................................................8
`
`Rothschild Location Techs. LLC v. Vantage Point Mapping, Inc.,
`No. 6:15-cv-682, 2016 WL 7049401 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2016) ............................................1, 2
`
`SimpleAir, Inc. v. Google LLC,
`884 F.3d 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................7
`
`Soundscriber Corp. v. United States,
`360 F.2d 954 (Ct. Cl. 1966) .....................................................................................................10
`
`Sycamore IP Holdings LLC v. ABB, Inc.,
`No. 2:15-CV-238-JRG, 2015 WL 8207750 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2015) ......................................7
`
`SynQor, Inc v. Vicor Corp.,
`988 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2021)..................................................................................................8
`
`VMware, Inc. v. Clouding Corp.,
`No. IPR2014-01292, 2015 WL 10381774 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 3, 2015)......................................8, 9
`
`iii
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`

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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 475 Filed 10/20/22 Page 5 of 17 PageID #: 21232
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(cont’d)
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`Page(s)
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`
`
`
`Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 112(b) ...........................................................................................................................4
`
`35 U.S.C. § 253(a) .......................................................................................................................3, 4
`
`35 U.S.C. § 281 ................................................................................................................................6
`
`35 U.S.C. § 282(a) ...........................................................................................................................4
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) .......................................................................................................................6
`
`35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(4) .......................................................................................................................6
`
`Other Authorities
`
`37 C.F.R. § 41.127(a)(1) ..................................................................................................................5
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.73(a).........................................................................................................................8
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2) ....................................................................................................................7
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d) ....................................................................................................................5, 6
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)....................................................................................................................2
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) ....................................................................................................................1, 2
`
`Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 30 (1982) ............................................................................8
`
`Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial & Appeal Board,
`77 Fed. Reg. 48,612 (Aug. 14, 2012).....................................................................................5, 6
`
`iv
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 475 Filed 10/20/22 Page 6 of 17 PageID #: 21233
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`
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Defendants’ reply fails to confront the critical defects of their motion. Defendants still
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`identify no authority that might support the extraordinary relief they seek: a post-trial
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`termination of an infringement judgment on patent claims that neither the jury nor the Patent
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`Office has found invalid. No rule or precedent provides a procedural basis for such a “motion
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`for judgment” to invalidate claims after a trial.
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`Even if Congress or the courts had contemplated such a procedure, no substantive law
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`supports Defendants’ theory of invalidity. Nothing in the Patent Act, the Patent Office’s
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`regulations, or any precedent requires—or permits—this Court to find that the disclaimer of
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`some claims can invalidate other, non-disclaimed claims. Defendants try to side-step basic
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`patent law principles and Federal Circuit precedent expressly holding that disclaimer affects only
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`disclaimed claims and that each claim must be examined independently. But they do so by
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`relying on cases based on repealed, pre-1952 patent law or by stretching theories of estoppel and
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`preclusion beyond recognition.
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`On the facts, Defendants have failed to meet their factual burden to show that the
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`differences between the asserted claims and the disclaimed claims do not raise materially
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`different invalidity issues. Defendants’ own invalidity contentions preclude such a showing.
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`Any one of these defects is fatal to Defendants’ arguments; the motion should be denied.
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`II.
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`DEFENDANTS’ MOTION IS PROCEDURALLY IMPROPER
`
`Defendants’ reply confirms that their motion for invalidity is procedurally improper.
`
`Defendants’ new purported reliance on Rule 59(e) ignores that rule’s narrow confines.
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`Rule 59(e) provides for an “extraordinary remedy” warranted only “(1) where there has been an
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`intervening change in controlling law; (2) where the movant presents newly discovered evidence
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`that was previously unavailable; or (3) to correct a manifest error of law or fact.” Rothschild
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`1
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`

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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 475 Filed 10/20/22 Page 7 of 17 PageID #: 21234
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`
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`Location Techs. LLC v. Vantage Point Mapping, Inc., No. 6:15-cv-682, 2016 WL 7049401, at *2
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`(E.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2016). Defendants do not argue that there was an intervening change in
`
`controlling law or that the jury’s verdict “amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling
`
`law.” See id. at *8. Nor can Defendants contend that Seagen’s disclaimer of unasserted patent
`
`claims after the jury’s verdict constitutes “newly discovered evidence” for purposes of a
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`Rule 59(e) motion. See Imperium IP Holdings (Cayman), Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 4:14-
`
`CV-00371, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63979, at *6-7 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2017) (evidence “not in
`
`existence at the time of the judgment” cannot be “newly discovered evidence” under Rule 59(e)).
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`There is also no legal basis to support dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). Rule 12 motions
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`“must be heard and decided before trial unless the court orders a deferral until trial.”
`
`PerDiemCo, LLC v. Industrack LLC, No. 2:15-CV-00727-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 6534524, at *8
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`(E.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2016). Even if the motion were timely, Defendants could not show that their
`
`alleged invalidity defense would deprive the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. Exxon Chem.
`
`Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 935 F.2d 1263, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (jurisdictional challenge
`
`fails when “in fact directed only to the merits of a question of patent law”). None of Defendants’
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`cited cases supports a request for post-trial “judgment” outside what the Rules of Civil Procedure
`
`contemplate. See, e.g., Brooks v. Dist. of Columbia, 841 F. Supp. 2d 253 (D.D.C. 2012)
`
`(rejecting Rule 59(e) reconsideration motion because movant showed no intervening change of
`
`controlling law, availability of new evidence, or need to correct clear error or prevent manifest
`
`injustice); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 26 F.3d 1573, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (reversing
`
`district court’s liability judgment where all asserted claims were subsequently held invalid).
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`III. DISCLAIMER OF CLAIMS 6-8 DOES NOT INVALIDATE CLAIMS 1-5 OR 9-10
`
`A.
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`Seagen’s Disclaimer Cannot Invalidate Non-Disclaimed Claims
`
`Like their motion, Defendants’ reply suffers from a fatal flaw: no law provides that the
`
`2
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`

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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 475 Filed 10/20/22 Page 8 of 17 PageID #: 21235
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`
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`disclaimer of some claims makes invalid any other, non-disclaimed claims. (Dkt. 465 at 4-8.)
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`The disclaimer statute itself says nothing about disclaimer invalidating non-disclaimed claims.
`
`35 U.S.C. § 253(a). And the Federal Circuit has held that “disclaimer extends only to the
`
`particular claims involved and does not affect any other claims.” Magdo v. Kooi, 699 F.2d 1325,
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`1329 (Fed. Cir. 1983). That holding squarely forecloses Defendants’ argument.
`
`Defendants describe Seagen’s reading of Magdo as “formalistic,” and they try to discern
`
`unstated meaning by saying that the court was actually “paraphras[ing]” a different rule.
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`(Dkt. 470 at 3.) But there is no need to go beyond what the Federal Circuit said. The court
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`expressly stated that the applicant’s disclaimer of certain claims “does not effect a disclaimer” of
`
`related claims in co-pending interferences. Magdo, 699 F.2d at 1326, 1329. The court never
`
`inquired whether the non-disclaimed claims were “patentably distinct” or “definitely
`
`distinguishable” from the disclaimed claims—statutory language Congress eliminated in 1952.
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`(Dkt. 470 at 3; Dkt. 465 at 6-7.) Defendants suggest Magdo “embraces” their purported rule
`
`because Magdo cited pre-1952 Patent Act decisions as support for its holding. (Dkt. 470 at 3.)
`
`But none of those decisions held a disclaimer invalidated non-disclaimed claims or turned on
`
`statutory text Congress repealed. Hartford-Empire Co. v. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 59 F.2d 399,
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`412 (3d Cir. 1932) (disclaimer “must be restricted to the particular matter of the claim
`
`relinquished”); see also, e.g., Reed v. Cropp Concrete Mach. Co., 239 F. 869, 875 (7th Cir.
`
`1916) (disclaimer during interference “shall extend only to the particular claim or claims as to
`
`which the interference is declared”).
`
`Defendants’ reliance on various cases for the proposition that a disclaimer “relinquishe[s]
`
`any right to exclude others from the subject matter of” the disclaimed claims is misplaced.
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`(Dkt. 470 at 2 (quoting Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).) Those statements
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`3
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`

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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 475 Filed 10/20/22 Page 9 of 17 PageID #: 21236
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`
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`only mean that when a claim is disclaimed, “the patentee loses any cause of action based on that
`
`claim.” Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
`
`(emphasis added). After all, “each claim must be considered as defining a separate invention.”
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`Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see 35 U.S.C. § 282(a). And as Seagen
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`showed (Dkt. 465 at 7-8), none of Defendants’ cited cases hold that disclaimer affects non-
`
`disclaimed claims. See Guinn, 96 F.3d at 1421 (“single issue” to be decided was whether Patent
`
`Office rule on adverse judgments was properly promulgated); Lemaire Illumination Techs., LLC
`
`v. HTC Corp., No. 2:18-CV-00021-JRG, 2019 WL 1489065, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2019)
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`(dismissal of infringement counts without prejudice after disclaimer “should not give rise to any
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`form of claim preclusion”). No “fundamental principle” or “universal rule” requires that “when
`
`a particular claim is disclaimed and thereby surrendered to the public, patentably indistinct
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`claims . . . fall.” (Contra Dkt. 470 at 6.) Any such rule would contravene Congress’s decision to
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`let patentees file disclaimers on a claim-by-claim basis. 35 U.S.C. § 253(a).1
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`Equally flawed is Defendants’ continued misreading of cases that do not apply current
`
`law. (Dkt. 470 at 5.) Defendants ignore that the Supreme Court’s pre-1952 Altoona decision
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`held only that a patentee who had made an improper disclaimer could not “revive[]” the pre-
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`disclaimer claims. Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 490-92
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`(1935); (Dkt. 465 at 7). Altoona did not hold—or suggest—that the “disclaimer relinquishes
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`rights” in any other claims. (Contra Dkt. 470 at 5.) And Defendants, not Seagen, “misread[]
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`Maytag.” (Id. at 5 n.2.) According to Defendants, Maytag held that “by the disclaimer of
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`Claim 38, the patentee also had no rights to the method of Claim 39.” (Id. at 6 n.2.) But it was
`
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`1 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) precludes “set[ting] forth in a claim” matter that “is not what the
`patentee regarded as his invention.” Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336,
`1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002). It has no bearing on a disclaimer’s effect. (Contra Dkt. 470 at 4, 6.)
`
`4
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`

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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 475 Filed 10/20/22 Page 10 of 17 PageID #: 21237
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`
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`claim 38’s invalidation in a prior proceeding and the statutory bar against bringing suit based on
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`claims not “definitely distinguishable from the parts claimed without right”—not the patentee’s
`
`disclaimer of claim 38—that rendered claim 39 unenforceable. Maytag Co. v. Hurley Mach. Co.,
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`307 U.S. 243, 245-47 (1939). Regardless, nothing in Maytag survived the 1952 Patent Act’s
`
`enactment: Maytag “was expressly based on the statutory language that Congress deleted in
`
`1952.” Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
`
`B.
`
`The Patent Office’s Adverse Judgment Does Not Invalidate Any Non-
`Disclaimed Claims
`
`1.
`
`The Patent Office’s Estoppel Regulation Has No Application Here
`
`Defendants fail to demonstrate why or how the Board’s estoppel regulation, 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.73(d)(3), could apply outside Patent Office proceedings. (Dkt. 465 at 9-12.) They contend
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`that if the Patent Office wanted subsection (d)(3) to be so limited the regulation would say so.
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`(Dkt. 470 at 7-8.) But that is precisely what the Patent Office did. Subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2)
`
`preclude only actions “in the Office,” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(1)-(2), and the only “action[s]
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`inconsistent with the adverse judgment” subsection (d)(3) discusses are ones that can occur in the
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`Office and nowhere else, such as “obtaining in any patent” certain claims or specification
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`changes. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(2)-(3). Adding “in the Office” when those actions can only occur
`
`in the Office would be superfluous.
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`For similar reasons, it is irrelevant that the Patent Office’s estoppel regulation for appeals
`
`and interferences prohibits inconsistent actions “in the Office.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.127(a)(1).
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`Section 42.73(d)(3)’s text and context make clear that patent owner estoppel for IPRs and PGRs
`
`is no broader. (Dkt. 465 at 9-10.) Had the Patent Office intended such a radical difference from
`
`its estoppel rules for other types of proceedings, the agency would have at least acknowledged
`
`and justified that change. It did not. Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial &
`
`5
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`

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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 475 Filed 10/20/22 Page 11 of 17 PageID #: 21238
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`
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`Appeal Board, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612, 48,614, 48,624-25, 48,648-49 (Aug. 14, 2012).
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`For that reason, it should come as no surprise that Defendants identify no decision of any
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`court or the Patent Office suggesting that § 42.73(d)(3) applies outside the Patent Office.
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`(Dkt. 470 at 7-8.) Defendants have no response to the contrary authorities Seagen cited.
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`(Dkt. 465 at 9-10.) Clearlamp, LLC v. LKQ Corp., No. 12 C 2533, 2016 WL 4734389, at *6 n.8
`
`(N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2016) (rejecting argument that Board decision had preclusive effect in district
`
`court litigation under § 42.73(d)(3)); Apple Inc. v. Softview LLC, No. 2021-005530, 2022 WL
`
`1210851, at *54 n.7 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 6, 2022) (“it is not disputed that [§ 42.73(d)(3)(i)] is limited
`
`to proceedings before the Office” and does not apply “in an infringement action”).
`
`Defendants are also wrong that the AIA would authorize the Patent Office to regulate
`
`estoppel outside the agency. (Dkt. 470 at 7.) Sections 316(a)(4) and 326(a)(4) authorize the
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`Patent Office to promulgate regulations governing IPRs and PGRs “and the relationship of such
`
`review[s] to other proceedings under this title.” 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(4), 326(a)(4). Defendants
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`contend that “proceedings under this title” includes “actions for patent infringement under 35
`
`U.S.C. § 281.” (Dkt. 470 at 7.) But the Patent Office itself rightly has recognized that the phrase
`
`means proceedings before the Patent Office—not in district court. Rules of Practice, 77 Fed.
`
`Reg. at 48,649 (“Under 35 U.S.C. 316(a)(4), as amended, and 35 U.S.C. 326(a)(4), the Office is
`
`required to prescribe regulations setting forth the relationship between the review and other
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`proceedings in the Office (e.g., examination).” (emphasis added)).
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`DSC’s argument independently fails because Seagen’s assertion of claims 1-5 and 9-10 is
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`not “inconsistent with the adverse judgment” on claims 6-8 under § 42.73(d)(3). (Dkt. 465 at 10-
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`12.) Defendants’ only response is to assert that “enforc[ing] claims that are patentably indistinct
`
`from those against which adverse judgment was entered” is somehow “inconsistent” with the
`
`6
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`

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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 475 Filed 10/20/22 Page 12 of 17 PageID #: 21239
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`
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`adverse judgment. (Dkt. 470 at 8.) But as Seagen showed (Dkt. 465 at 11), the adverse
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`judgment in the PGR after Seagen disclaimed claims 6-8 was just a recognition that Seagen had
`
`“no remaining claim in the trial” before the Board. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). There is nothing
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`“inconsistent” between disclaiming some claims—or the resulting adverse judgment on those
`
`disclaimed claims—and continuing to assert other claims from the same patent.
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`2.
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`Claim Preclusion Does Not Invalidate Seagen’s Asserted Claims
`
`For the first time, Defendants now contend that “Seagen’s suit is barred by claim
`
`preclusion.” (Dkt. 470 at 8.) Defendants earlier asserted only that “[a]dministrative judgments,
`
`including consent judgments, have preclusive effects on judicial proceedings.” (Dkt. 442 at 13.)
`
`But they never identified the requirements of claim preclusion, let alone attempted to show that
`
`they are satisfied here. Defendants’ unexplained citations to claim preclusion cases fail to
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`preserve a distinct claim preclusion argument. Sycamore IP Holdings LLC v. ABB, Inc.,
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`No. 2:15-CV-238-JRG, 2015 WL 8207750, at *11 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2015) (“Arguments that
`
`are not appropriately developed in a party’s briefing may be deemed waived.”).
`
`Regardless, even in their reply, Defendants never explain how claim preclusion’s
`
`elements are met. (Dkt. 470 at 8.) Nor could they. Among other elements, claim preclusion
`
`requires that “there has been a final judgment on the merits” and “the earlier case and later case
`
`involve the same cause of action.” SimpleAir, Inc. v. Google LLC, 884 F.3d 1160, 1165 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2018) (applying Fifth Circuit law). Defendants meet neither. The Board’s adverse
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`judgment in the PGR based on Seagen’s disclaimer of claims 6-8 was not a merits judgment on
`
`Defendants’ patentability challenges. And Defendants cite no cases holding that a PGR and
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`infringement claims involve the same cause of action. See id. at 1163 (analyzing claim
`
`7
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`

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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 475 Filed 10/20/22 Page 13 of 17 PageID #: 21240
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`
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`preclusion in successive district court infringement actions).2
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`3.
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`Issue Preclusion Does Not Invalidate Seagen’s Asserted Claims
`
`Issue preclusion requires that “the issue was actually litigated in the first action” and that
`
`“resolution of the issue was essential to a final judgment in the first action.” SynQor, Inc v.
`
`Vicor Corp., 988 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Neither the Board’s institution decision nor
`
`its post-disclaimer adverse judgment satisfies those requirements. (Dkt. 465 at 12-15.)
`
`Defendants’ conclusory responses lack merit. Defendants repeat that the Board’s
`
`“institution decision on priority was actually decided and necessary to the judgment because it
`
`established the patent’s eligibility for post-grant review.” (Dkt. 470 at 8-9.) But Defendants
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`ignore that the Board need not institute a trial (and thus need not determine eligibility for a trial)
`
`before entering an adverse judgment after a disclaimer. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
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`880 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018); (Dkt. 465 at 14-15). And the Board repeatedly
`
`emphasized that the enablement and written-description analysis underlying its PGR eligibility
`
`determination was “preliminary” and subject to change after trial. (See Dkt. 465 at 13-14.)
`
`Those non-final decisions cannot have issue-preclusive effect.
`
`Defendants also argue that the adverse judgment “disposes of all issues that were, or by
`
`motion reasonably could have been, raised and decided.” (Dkt. 470 at 9 (quoting 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.73(a)).) Seagen explained that § 42.73(a) precludes parties from raising post-judgment in
`
`the same proceeding an issue that “reasonably could have been[] raised” earlier. VMware, Inc. v.
`
`
`2 Defendants assert “there is no need to prove a common cause of action” because a PGR
`is supposedly “an in rem judgment.” (Dkt. 470 at 8.) The passage Defendants invoke for the
`notion that PGRs are in rem proceedings comes from the panel members’ additional views, not
`the opinion of the Court. See Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1342
`(Fed. Cir. 2019) (additional views of Dyk, Wallach, and Hughes, JJ.) (“the opinion for the court
`does not reach the issue” whether IPRs are “in rem proceedings”). Even so, the Restatement
`section Defendants cite nowhere states that claim preclusion’s same-cause-of-action requirement
`does not apply to in rem judgments. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 30 (1982).
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 475 Filed 10/20/22 Page 14 of 17 PageID #: 21241
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`
`
`Clouding Corp., No. IPR2014-01292, 2015 WL 10381774, at *3 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 3, 2015);
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`(Dkt. 465 at 12 n.1). That rule does not give a judgment preclusive effect in other proceedings.
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`Moreover, issue preclusion would not apply on the facts here. (Dkt. 465 at 15-19.) The
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`party asserting issue preclusion bears the burden to prove that “the differences between the
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`unadjudicated patent claims and adjudicated patent claims do not materially alter the question of
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`invalidity.” Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
`
`Defendants failed to meet that burden. Indeed, Defendants do not even attempt to defend their
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`expert’s use of the incorrect standard: whether the asserted claims are “anticipated by, or
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`obvious in light of,” the disclaimed claims. (Dkt. 442, Ex. A ¶ 10.)
`
`Seagen showed, however, that disclaimed claims 6-8 involve materially different
`
`patentability questions than the claims asserted at trial. (Dkt. 465 at 17-19.) Defendants’ own
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`invalidity contentions—which identified separate validity issues for claim 8—show that claim 8
`
`involves materially different patentability questions than the non-disclaimed claims. (Id. at 18-
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`19.) Thus, Defendants are incorrect that Seagen did not “compare the Asserted Claims with
`
`Claim 8 to show any material alteration of the question of invalidity.” (Id.) Defendants have no
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`response to Seagen’s showing under the correct legal standard. (Dkt. 470 at 9 & n.5.)3
`
`IV.
`
`THE DISCLAIMER DOES NOT LIMIT THE ASSERTED CLAIMS’ SCOPE
`
`Defendants fare no better with their attempt to repackage their invalidity arguments as
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`claim-scope arguments. (Dkt. 470 at 9-10.) According to Defendants, “the Asserted Claims
`
`must be construed as limited to” ADCs not covered by claim 8. (Id. at 10.)
`
`
`3 Defendants are wrong that “Seagen does not contest patentable distinction except with
`regard to issue preclusion.” (Dkt. 470 at 8.) Defendants themselves have assumed that the same
`“patentable distinction” standard would govern regardless whether the inquiry was triggered by
`disclaimer itself, the Board’s estoppel regulation, or issue preclusion. (See Dkt. 442 at 15-16.)
`Seagen’s arguments thus apply equally in those contexts as well. (See Dkt. 465 at 15-16.)
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 475 Filed 10/20/22 Page 15 of 17 PageID #: 21242
`
`
`
`As Seagen explained (Dkt. 465 at 19-22), Soundscriber Corp. v. United States, 360 F.2d
`
`954, 961 (Ct. Cl. 1966) forecloses Defendants’ argument. See id. (concluding that products
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`covered “by a claim which has been disclaimed may be covered by other claims not
`
`disclaimed”). Defendants’ only response is to assert that “Soundscriber did not address
`
`independent claims that expressly recite the disclaimed subject matter.” (Dkt. 470 at 10.) But
`
`nothing in Soundscriber’s holding or reasoning suggests that a different rule would govern in
`
`that circumstance. The Court of Claims explained that “[t]he construction of a patent, after a
`
`disclaimer has been properly entered, must be the same that it would have been if the matter so
`
`disclaimed had never been claimed.” Soundscriber, 360 F.2d at 961. That rationale applies
`
`equally regardless of the relationship between the disclaimed and non-disclaimed claims.
`
`Nor does Soundscriber’s citation to Dunbar v. Myers, 94 U.S. 187 (1876), help
`
`Defendants. (Contra Dkt. 470 at 10.) The claim at issue in Dunbar recited a saw with “one or
`
`[two]” deflecting plates. 94 U.S. at 191. The patentee entered a disclaimer striking “one or”
`
`from the claim. Id. at 192.4 The Supreme Court thus concluded that after the disclaimer, the
`
`claim covered only saws with two deflecting plates. Id. at 192-93. In so recognizing, the Court
`
`observed that “[m]atters properly disclaimed cease to be a part of the invention.” Id. at 194.
`
`Read in context, that statement meant only that the asserted claim no longer covered the
`
`disclaimed subject matter (saws with one deflecting plate). Dunbar did not hold that disclaimer
`
`of a claim can limit the scope of other, non-disclaimed claims.
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`For these reasons and those in Seagen’s opposition (Dkt. 465), Defendants’ Motion for
`
`Judgment of Invalidity Based on Post-Trial Disclaimer should be denied.
`
`
`4 Under the pre-1952 Patent Act applied in Dunbar, patentees could disclaim part of a
`claim in addition to whole claims. See Allen Archery, 819 F.2d at 1096.
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 475 Filed 10/20/22 Page 16 of 17 PageID #: 21243
`
`
`
`Dated: October 20, 2022
`
`
`
`By: /s/ Michael A. Jacobs
`Michael A. Jacobs
`MJacobs@mofo.com
`Matthew A. Chivvis
`MChivvis@mofo.com
`MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
`425 Market Street
`San Francisco, CA 94105
`Telephone: 415.268.7000
`Facsimile: 415.268.7522
`
`
`
`Bryan Wilson
`BWilson@mofo.com
`MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
`755 Page Mill Road
`Palo Alto, California 94304-1018
`Telephone: 650.813.5600
`Facsimile: 650.494.0792
`
`
`
`Melissa R. Smith
`Texas State Bar No. 24001351
`melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com
`GILLAM & SMITH, LLP
`303 South Washington Avenue
`Marshall, Texas 75670
`Telephone: 903.934.8450
`Facsimile: 903.934.9257
`Of Counsel:
`T. John Ward, Jr.
`Texas State Bar No. 00794818
`jw@wsfirm.com
`Wesley Hill
`Texas State Bar No. 24032294
`wh@wsfirm.com
`Charles Everingham IV
`Texas State Bar No. 00787447
`ce@wsfirm.com
`Andrea L. Fair
`Texas State Bar No. 24078488
`andrea@wsfirm.com
`WARD, SMITH & HILL, PLLC
`1507 Bill Owens Parkway