Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 480 Filed 10/31/22 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 21292
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`SEAGEN INC.,
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`v.
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`Plaintiff,
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`DAIICHI SANKYO CO., LTD.,
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`Defendant, and
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`ASTRAZENECA
`PHARMACEUTICALS LP and
`ASTRAZENECA UK LTD.,
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`CASE NO. 2:20-cv-00337-JRG
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` Intervenor-Defendants.
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`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR
`RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER
`OF LAW AS TO NON-INFRINGEMENT AND DAMAGES
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 480 Filed 10/31/22 Page 2 of 15 PageID #: 21293
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`Seagen’s Opposition brief highlights its failure to provide the jury with a legally sufficient
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`basis to find infringement, willful infringement, and to support the damages verdict in view of the
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`evidence presented at trial. With respect to alleged direct infringement, instead of comparing
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`Enhertu®’s structure and function to the language of the Asserted Claims, Seagen focused its
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`arguments almost exclusively on documents describing Enhertu® in a manner distinct from the
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`specific, operative meanings of the specific claim language found in the Asserted Claims. In
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`contrast, the legally appropriate comparison made by Defendants’ expert Dr. Lambert established
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`that Enhertu® does not meet the functional requirement that is claimed in the ’039 patent.
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`With respect to alleged induced infringement, instead of attempting to show that Daiichi
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`Sankyo Japan had subjective “knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement,”
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`Seagen assumed what it believes Daiichi Sankyo Japan “should have known” based on its meritless
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`(and rejected) allegations that Daiichi Sankyo Japan copied Seagen’s technology. The evidence
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`presented at trial demonstrated that Daiichi Sankyo Japan reasonably believes that the sale of
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`Enhertu® does not infringe the Asserted Claims. Reasonable jurors could not reach a contrary
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`conclusion.
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`Seagen’s allegations of willful infringement are similarly not legally supported. Seagen
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`improperly focused its argument at trial on pre-issuance conduct concerning laboratory production
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`methods, which are not present in the Asserted Claims and are not used to commercially
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`manufacture Enhertu®. Further, those arguments are belied by Seagen and Daiichi Sankyo Japan’s
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`separate arbitration (which involved the same copying allegations), where the arbitrator rejected
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`Seagen’s position, finding Enhertu® was neither Seagen’s technology nor made using Seagen’s
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`technology.1
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`1 (See Dkt. 447 at Exs. 6-7.)
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 480 Filed 10/31/22 Page 3 of 15 PageID #: 21294
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`Contrary to the argument Seagen advances in its Opposition brief, Defendants’ arguments
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`with respect to damages were not waived because the admissibility of a damages expert’s
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`testimony and the sufficiency of the evidence at trial to support the jury’s award are separate and
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`independent issues. Seagen did not present substantial evidence, from Ms. Distler’s testimony or
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`otherwise, to support the jury’s damages award in the amount of $41.28 million.
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`A.
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`No Reasonable Jury Could Find That
`Daiichi Sankyo Japan Directly Infringed the ’039 Patent
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`1.
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`Seagen’s Improper Reliance on Inapposite
`“Representations” Regarding Intracellular Cleavage
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`No reasonable jury would have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find Enhertu® meets
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`the Drug Moiety Intracellular Cleavage Limitation,2 because Seagen’s presented support focuses
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`almost entirely on inapposite statements made in contexts fully unrelated to the Asserted Claims.
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`(See Dkt. 468 (“Opp.”) at 3-5; see also Mot. at 3-7.) Although FDA regulatory documents shown
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`at the trial state that Enhertu® undergoes “intracellular linker cleavage,” as explained by Dr.
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`Lambert, this does not mean its “drug moiety is intracellularly cleaved in a patient” as that claim
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`limitation was construed by the Court.3 (See Mot. at 6-7.) Seagen ignores that the cited documents
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`have a different meaning than the claim limitations of its patent. Seagen’s misplaced reliance on
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`such documents cannot overcome the (1) lack of experimental evidence and (2) failure to prove
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`“free drug” disassociates from the antibody inside the cell. (Mot. at 4-7.)
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`Seagen acknowledges that actual experimental evidence is required for it to meet its burden
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`2 The Drug Moiety Intracellular Cleavage Limitation refers to a “metabolic process or reaction
`inside a cell” whereby “the linker[] between the drug moiety (D) and the antibody (Ab) is broken,
`resulting in the free drug dissociated from the antibody inside the cell.” (Mot. at 4.)
`3 Seagen’s other purported evidence is even further from the patent’s language or are statements
`of design. (Compare Opp. at 4 (listing, e.g., “protease digestion in tumor cell” and “designed to
`be cleaved”) with DX-0001 at Claim 1 (“drug moiety is intracellularly cleaved in a patient”).)
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 480 Filed 10/31/22 Page 4 of 15 PageID #: 21295
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`(Opp. at 5), but the only evidence Seagen claims to have presented on this issue was “DSC’s own
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`scientific publications,” which it alleges provide “experimental assays that show Enhertu’s
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`intracellularly-cleaving mechanism.” (Id.) Seagen ignores Dr. Lambert’s testimony that the cited
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`experiments cannot show whether Enhertu®’s “drug moiety is intracellularly cleaved in a patient”
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`as required by the Asserted Claims. (See Mot. at 5.) The articles relied on by Seagen thus cannot
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`provide the legally sufficient proof required for Seagen to meet its burden.4 (See Mot. at 4-5 (citing
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`Zenith Lab’ys., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1423-24 (Fed. Cir. 1994).)
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`Further, Seagen appears to concede that the Drug Moiety Intracellular Cleavage Limitation
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`requires that “free drug” “disassociate[s] from the antibody inside the cell,” yet argues that alleged
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`“representations” prove that Enhertu® releases DXd as “free drug” to meet this limitation—largely
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`because witnesses confirmed FDA filings are “accurate.” (Opp. at 3-5.) The accuracy of the FDA
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`filings, however, is a red herring. Each witness who testified about those documents explained
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`that statements made within the FDA filings are accurate within “the context of the document.”
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`(E.g., Trial Tr. (Day 1) at 286:25-287:4 (emphasis added).) Because (as explained supra) Seagen
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`did not evaluate any such alleged “representations” concerning “free drug” in the context of the
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`’039 patent, as it was required to do, the evidence detailed in Defendants’ Motion shows that DX-
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`8951 (i.e., “free drug”) does not “disassociate[s] from the antibody inside the cell,” and, therefore,
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`Enhertu® does not meet the Drug Moiety Intracellular Cleavage Limitation, and no reasonable jury
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`would have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find otherwise. (See Mot. at 3-7.)
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`4 Nor can Seagen’s misleading quote from Dr. Lambert, who was not discussing experimental
`evidence (or even referring to “intracellular cleavage” as defined in the ’039 patent). (Opp. at 5.)
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 480 Filed 10/31/22 Page 5 of 15 PageID #: 21296
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`2.
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`Seagen’s Improper Reliance on Inapposite
`“Representations” Regarding Self-Immolative Spacer
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`No reasonable jury would have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find Enhertu® has
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`a self-immolative spacer. Seagen relies only on out-of-context statements. Any references to
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`“self-immolative” presented by Seagen to the jury were made in contexts entirely separate from
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`the Asserted Claims. The evidence detailed in Defendants’ Motion, and presented by Defendants
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`at trial, shows that Enhertu® has a non self-immolative spacer—as that term is defined in the ’039
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`patent—because a portion of the spacer unit remains attached to the drug moiety. (See Mot. at 7-
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`8.)
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`3.
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`No Reasonable Jury Could Find That
`Daiichi Sankyo Japan Committed an Act of Direct Infringement
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`Seagen argues that Daiichi Sakyo Japan “sells Enhertu into the United States,” but it did
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`not offer any evidence on the location of contracting the relevant agreements. (Opp. at 8-9.)
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`Seagen cannot credibly dispute that the evidence confirms that Daiichi Sankyo Japan manufactures
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`Enhertu® in Japan, Daiichi Sankyo Japan sells bulk vials of Enhertu® to non-party Daiichi Sankyo
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`US, Daiichi Sankyo US imports Enhertu® into the United States, and Daiichi Sankyo US sells (and
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`co-markets with AstraZeneca) Enhertu® to third-party distributors in the United States. (Mot. at
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`8-9.) Similarly, Seagen’s purported evidence of importation fails to contest that Daiichi Sankyo
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`US controls the process whereby Enhertu® “crosses the United States’ border.” (Mot. at 9.)5
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`Given the actual evidence of record, no reasonable jury would have a legally sufficient evidentiary
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`basis to find Daiichi Sankyo Japan commits an infringing act in the United States.
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`5 Seagen attempts to distinguish MEMC (despite its plain applicability to this action) and relies on
`Apple and Litecubes, ignoring that in Apple the Northern District of California court found the
`foreign defendant “exerted a high degree of control” over the domestic subsidiaries, and, in
`Litecubes, the defendant shipped the products directly to customers in the United States. See
`Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 920 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2013); (Opp. at 8.)
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 480 Filed 10/31/22 Page 6 of 15 PageID #: 21297
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`Likewise, no reasonable jury would have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find that
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`Daiichi Sankyo Japan is liable for infringement under an agency theory of liability. Seagen’s cited
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`contracts do not constitute the level of control needed for a principal-agent relationship, and the
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`evidence in Defendants’ Motion demonstrates that non-party Daiichi Sankyo US operates
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`independently. (Opp. at 9-10; Mot. at 9.)6
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`B.
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`No Reasonable Jury Could Find That Daiichi
`Sankyo Japan Induced Infringement of the ’039 Patent
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`Beyond the lack of direct infringement, Seagen failed to present legally sufficient evidence
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`for a reasonable jury to find that Daiichi Sankyo Japan took affirmative acts to bring about the
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`commission by others of acts of infringement and had “knowledge that the induced acts constitute
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`patent infringement.” (Mot. at 10-12.) Contrary to Seagen’s assertions, Defendants do not agree
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`that Daiichi Sankyo Japan encouraged infringing acts or had actual knowledge of the ’039 patent
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`when Seagen alleges. (See Opp. at 10-11.) And Seagen’s assumptions (and selective citations to
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`contractual agreements) cannot provide sufficient evidentiary support to prove either of these
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`disputed issues.
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`Tellingly, Seagen tries to flip the burden for indirect infringement. (See Opp. at 11.) It
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`fails to cite any evidence showing Daiichi Sankyo Japan’s subjective knowledge that its acts
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`constituted patent infringement. Instead it relies on unsupported claims that Daiichi Sankyo Japan
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`(1) had weak non-infringement arguments and (2) “should have known it would face IP risk from
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`copying Seagen’s technology.” (Opp. at 11.) As explained in Dkts. 447 and 457 (“Defendants’
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`Exceptional Case Oppositions”), Defendants had strong non-infringement positions before and
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`after the Court’s claim construction Order. Daiichi Sankyo Japan’s position that Enhertu® is not
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`6 Seagen’s cited email does not constitute waiver of Defendants’ defense of lack of personal
`jurisdiction, which was properly maintained before and after the Court’s Order. (See Dkt. 114.)
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 480 Filed 10/31/22 Page 7 of 15 PageID #: 21298
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`Seagen’s technology is consistent with the finding of the arbitrator in Seagen and Daiichi Sankyo
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`Japan’s separate arbitration (which involved the same Seagen copying allegations).
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`C.
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`No Reasonable Jury Could Find That
`Daiichi Sankyo Japan Willfully Infringed the ’039 Patent
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`1.
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`Seagen Fails to Demonstrate That Pre-Issuance
`Conduct is Relevant to Willful Infringement in this Action
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`Seagen does not dispute that the evidence it relies on to support its willfulness claim
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`occurred years before the ’039 patent issued, nor that Daiichi Sankyo Japan made Enhertu® well
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`before Seagen even filed the ’839 application. (Mot. at 12-14.) Seagen further acknowledges that
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`“willfulness is generally based on conduct that occurred after a patent issued” and never disputes
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`that cases finding pre-issuance conduct to be relevant to willful infringement are generally limited
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`to those that demonstrate “particularly egregious behavior”7 or copying of a commercial
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`embodiment.8 (Compare Opp. at 15-16 with Mot. at 13-14.) There is no dispute that Seagen’s
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`scientists had never made or seen an ADC within the scope of the Asserted Claims until after they
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`saw Daiichi Sankyo Japan’s Enhertu®. (Mot. at 17.)
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`2.
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`Seagen Has Not Established Willful Infringement
`Based on Either Pre-Issuance or Post-Suit Conduct
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`Seagen failed to present substantial evidence of willful infringement because Seagen’s pre-
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`issuance evidence focuses on conjugation methods that its own expert admits are not claimed in
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`7 Seagen admits as much with its citation to Chimie. (See Opp. at 15 (“the court held that, where
`there is particularly egregious behavior . . . that behavior may be considered as evidence of
`willfulness.”) (emphasis added).)
`8 Seagen misleadingly argues that copying a commercial embodiment has never been required for
`willful infringement (Opp. at 16). But Defendants’ actual argument is that Seagen did not have
`anything within the scope of the Asserted Claims to copy and Daiichi Sankyo Japan invented
`Enhertu® almost eight years before Seagen drafted a patent application attempting to lay claim to
`Daiichi Sankyo’s technology. (See DX-0006 at 842 (“It is quite manifest that Applicants are
`trying to lay claim on Daiichi [Sankyo Japan’s DS-8201] . . . .”).)
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 480 Filed 10/31/22 Page 8 of 15 PageID #: 21299
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`the ’039 patent. (Mot. at 15.) The undisputed record instead demonstrates that Daiichi Sankyo
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`Japan invented and developed Enhertu®, as well as received at least three patents covering
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`Enhertu® years prior to Seagen filing its ’839 application. (Dkt. 447 at 2-3.) Moreover, after
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`spending years investigating what made Daiichi Sankyo Japan’s drug-linker “better” without
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`successfully developing a similar commercial product, Seagen drafted claims attempting to cover
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`Enhertu® after learning Daiichi Sankyo Japan chose not collaborate with Seagen.9 (Id.; DX-0490
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`at 7; Trial Tr. (Day 2) at 127:15-19, 147:14-17.) Unsurprisingly, the arbitrator (hearing Seagen’s
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`same allegations of copying) found Enhertu® was neither Seagen’s technology nor made using
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`Seagen’s technology, and rejected the notion that Daiichi Sankyo Japan or any of its employees
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`acted in bad faith. (Dkt. 447 at Exs. 6-7.)
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`Similarly, Seagen failed to present substantial evidence that any alleged infringement by
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`Daiichi Sankyo Japan was willful based on post-suit conduct. Seagen limits its argument to Daiichi
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`Sankyo Japan’s alleged lack of a good faith belief of non-infringement throughout the action.
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`(Opp. at 16-17.) As described supra, and in Defendants’ Exceptional Case Oppositions, Daiichi
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`Sankyo Japan has maintained strong litigation defenses of lack of written description, lack of
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`enablement, anticipation, prosecution laches, and non-infringement (and a good faith belief
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`therein) throughout this action. (See Dkts. 447, 457.) Moreover, Seagen does not dispute that
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`Enhertu® was sold prior to the ’039 patent’s issuance, and that neither side wanted to remove a
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`life-saving drug from the market. It has failed to cite any case holding this decision is irrelevant
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`to the analysis of willful infringement based on post-suit conduct.
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`9 Seagen argues the collaboration teachings are relevant because it invented the broad genus recited
`in the Asserted Claims (Opp. at 14), yet ignores admissions from the inventors of the ’039 patent
`that they had never even seen an ADC having a glycine/phenylalanine-only tetrapeptide linker
`until Daiichi Sankyo Japan created it. (Mot. at 17.)
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 480 Filed 10/31/22 Page 9 of 15 PageID #: 21300
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`D.
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`The Jury’s Damages Award is Not Supported by Substantial Evidence
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`Defendants’ Motion is a Proper JMOL Motion
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`1.
`Seagen improperly characterizes Defendants’ JMOL argument as a Daubert motion in an
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`effort to argue that it is waived. (Opp. at 17.) But Defendants’ argument is not that Ms. Distler’s
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`testimony was inadmissible. Rather, Defendant’s argument is that the damages evidence was
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`insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury’s damages award of $41.28 million award. See
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`Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[O]n post-trial JMOL
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`motions, district court judges must scrutinize the evidence carefully to ensure that the ‘substantial
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`evidence’ standard is satisfied, while keeping in mind that a reasonable royalty analysis
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`‘necessarily involves an element of approximation and uncertainty.’”). Admissibility of a damages
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`expert’s testimony and the sufficiency of the evidence at trial to support the jury’s award are
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`separate and independent issues. Bio-Rad Lab’ys., Inc. v. 10X Genomics Inc., 967 F.3d 1353,
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`1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2020). As the Federal Circuit has explained, while “[t]his court has often
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`excluded licenses that are technologically or economically non-comparable,” “the issue of
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`comparability is often one of sufficiency of the evidence, not admissibility.” Id.; see also Ericsson,
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`Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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`The cases relied on by Seagen are not to the contrary—they simply stand for the proposition
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`that where a challenge is solely to an expert’s methodology, or admissibility of a particular
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`agreement as a comparable license, the proper vehicle is a motion to exclude under Rule 702. See
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`Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (denying JMOL
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`where “deciding questions” “boil down to the admissibility of evidence”); see also KAIST IP US
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`LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 439 F. Supp. 3d 860, 888-893 (E.D. Tex. 2020) (considering
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`sufficiency of expert testimony to support damages verdict notwithstanding absence of motion to
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`exclude that testimony). Here, for example, Ms. Distler’s expert report, unlike her trial testimony,
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 480 Filed 10/31/22 Page 10 of 15 PageID #: 21301
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`cited the full set of licenses that Seagen had granted with respect to its ADC patent estate—but
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`Ms. Distler opted not to address the vast majority of them in any way at trial, which resulted in a
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`failure to present substantial evidence from which the jury could conclude that a damages award
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`of $41.28 million (and a purported implied royalty of 8%) was appropriate. (See Ex. 1.)
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`The Damages Award was not Supported by Substantial Evidence
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`2.
`The jury’s damages award was not supported by substantial evidence. In support of an
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`implied 8% royalty, Seagen relied on four licenses—
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`,
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` and
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` But Seagen has no answer for the criticisms Defendants posed in their motion
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`regarding these agreements, which cannot provide substantial evidence for the jury’s award of an
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`implied 8% royalty.
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`The
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` Agreement. This agreement does not have an implied 8% royalty.
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`Instead, the undisputed evidence at trial reflected a rate of
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`. (DX-0336); see also Lucent Techs., 580 F.3d at 1329; Apple, 25 F. 4th at 972-73; (Trial
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`Tr. (Day 4) at 209:22-212:3, 268:6-16.) There was no basis therefore for the jury, based on Ms.
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`Distler’s testimony or otherwise, to arrive at any royalty rate greater than
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` for the ’039 patent
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`alone based on the
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` Agreement.
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`The
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` Agreement. This agreement—which is
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`—is not comparable. It is undisputed that it does not actually contain
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`. (See Trial Tr. (Day 4) at 280:9-282:6.)
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`Ms. Distler’s purported
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` was concocted from an inapplicable calculation of
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`Distler failed to address the agreement’s actual patent license royalty rate of
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`. (Id. at 222:15-18.) Nor did she account for the fact Seagen had agreed to
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`. (Id. at 280:9-282:6.)
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`. Ms.
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 480 Filed 10/31/22 Page 11 of 15 PageID #: 21302
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`The
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` Agreement. This agreement cannot provide substantial evidence for an
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`implied 8% royalty. The undisputed evidence showed that the agreement also granted
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`the foregoing and accordingly adjust the royalty rate downward. (Trial Tr. (Day 4) at 227:24-
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`. Ms. Distler failed to address
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`228:2.)
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`The
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` Agreement. This agreement, entered into by Daiichi Sankyo Japan
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`, cannot provide substantial
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`evidence for an implied 8% royalty. The undisputed evidence showed that the agreement
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` Ms. Distler again
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`failed to address the foregoing and accordingly adjust the royalty rate downward. (PX-0931; see
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`Trial Tr. (Day 4) at 228:21-229:14, 231:6-12, 284:18-21.)
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`Finally, Ms. Distler completely ignored dozens of other license agreements that Seagen
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`entered into including the ’039 patent family as well as the nine other licenses that explicitly
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`quantified
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` (Trial Tr. (Day 4) at 262:9-264:7, 275:5-276:13.) Seagen offered no
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`testimony from Ms. Distler, or any other witness, to address this critical evidence. In the face of
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`the undisputed testimony that multiple agreements valued
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`, no reasonable jury could have found a damages award of $41.28 million.
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`CONCLUSION
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`For the reasons explained above and in Dkt. 445, Defendants’ motion should be granted.
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 480 Filed 10/31/22 Page 12 of 15 PageID #: 21303
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`Dated: October 7, 2022
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`By: /s/ Preston K. Ratliff II
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`
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`Deron R. Dacus
`State Bar No. 00790553
`ddacus@dacusfirm.com
`THE DACUS FIRM, P.C.
`821 ESE Loop 323, Suite 430
`Tyler, Texas 75701
`Telephone: 903.705.1117
`Facsimile: 903.581.2543
`
`J. Mark Mann
`State Bar No. 12926150
`mark@themannfirm.com
`G. Blake Thompson
`State Bar No. 24042033
`Blake@themannfirm.com
`MANN | TINDEL | THOMPSON
`300 West Main Street
`Henderson, Texas 75652
`Telephone: 903.657.8540
`Facsimile: 903.657.6003
`
`Of Counsel:
`
`Preston K. Ratliff II
`prestonratliff@paulhastings.com
`Ashley N. Mays-Williams
`ashleymayswilliams@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`200 Park Avenue
`New York, New York 10166
`Telephone: 212.318.6000
`
`Jeffrey A. Pade
`jeffpade@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`2050 M Street NW
`Washington, DC 20036
`Telephone: 202.551.1700
`
`Attorneys for Defendant Daiichi Sankyo
`Company, Limited
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 480 Filed 10/31/22 Page 13 of 15 PageID #: 21304
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`Dated: October 7, 2022
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`By: /s/ David I. Berl
`
`
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`David I. Berl
`dberl@wc.com
`Jessamyn S. Berniker
`jberniker@wc.com
`Thomas S. Fletcher
`tfletcher@wc.com
`Jessica L. Pahl
`jpahl@wc.com
`Kathryn S. Kayali
`kkayali@wc.com
`Kevin Hoagland-Hanson
`khoagland-hanson@wc.com
`Andrew L. Hoffman
`ahoffman@wc.com
`Angela Gao
`agao@wc.com
`WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP
`725 Twelfth Street, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: 202.434.5000
`Facsimile: 202.434.5029
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`Jennifer Parker Ainsworth
`Texas State Bar No. 00784720
`jainsworth@wilsonlawfirm.com
`WILSON, ROBERTSON & CORNELIUS,
`P.C.
`909 ESE Loop 323, Suite 400
`Tyler, Texas 75701
`Telephone: 903.509.5000
`Facsimile: 903.509.5092
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`Attorneys for Intervenor-Defendants AstraZeneca
`Pharmaceuticals LP and AstraZeneca UK Ltd.
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 480 Filed 10/31/22 Page 14 of 15 PageID #: 21305
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that all counsel of record who have consented to
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`electronic service are being served with a copy of this document via electronic mail on October 7,
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`/s/ Preston K. Ratliff II
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 480 Filed 10/31/22 Page 15 of 15 PageID #: 21306
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`Plaintiff,
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`SEAGEN INC.,
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`v.
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`CASE NO. 2:20-cv-00337-JRG
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`FILED UNDER SEAL
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`DAIICHI SANKYO CO., LTD.,
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`Defendant, and
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`ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS
`LP and ASTRAZENECA UK LTD.,
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`Intervenor-Defendants.
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`DECLARATION OF PRESTON K. RATLIFF II IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’
`REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
`AS A MATTER OF LAW AS TO NON-INFRINGEMENT AND DAMAGES
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`I, Preston K. Ratliff II, am a Partner with the law firm of Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park
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`Avenue, New York, New York 10166, and counsel for Daiichi Sankyo Company, Limited in this
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`matter. I make this Declaration in support of Defendants’ Reply in Support of Their Renewed
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`Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law as to Non-Infringement and Damages.
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`1.
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`Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of excerpts of the Updated
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`Expert Report of Carrie L. Distler, dated December 13, 2021.
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`I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
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`Dated: October 7 2022
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`/s/ Preston K. Ratliff II
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