Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 482 Filed 10/31/22 Page 1 of 14 PageID #: 21316
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`SEAGEN INC.,
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`v.
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`Plaintiff,
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`DAIICHI SANKYO CO., LTD.,
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`Defendant, and
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`ASTRAZENECA
`PHARMACEUTICALS LP and
`ASTRAZENECA UK LTD.,
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`CASE NO. 2:20-cv-00337-JRG
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` Intervenor-Defendants.
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`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR RENEWED
`MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF INVALIDITY AS A MATTER OF LAW
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 482 Filed 10/31/22 Page 2 of 14 PageID #: 21317
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`Defendants’ renewed motion for judgment of invalidity as a matter of law does not hinge
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`on a credibility determination.1 The Court’s claim construction provides that the Asserted Claims
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`cover ADCs where the drug moiety (“D”) encompasses all drug moieties of any possible type
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`known or unknown to man. Further, each Asserted Claim requires that a boundless genus of ADCs
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`intracellularly cleave in a patient. (Dkt. 155.) It defies logic that the specification’s disclosure of
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`only ADCs where the drug moiety is certain auristatins could (1) be sufficient written description
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`and (2) provide enablement support in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms to make and use
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`the full scope of the claimed ADCs that can comprise any and all drug moieties. Nor does it
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`adequately describe ADCs using the claimed Gly/Phe-only tetrapeptide linkers. While Seagen
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`spun a story at trial about what its scientists supposedly invented, no amount of attorney argument
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`or expert testimony can cure the lack of disclosure in Seagen’s patent titled appropriately for only
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`auristatin-type compounds, and reasonable jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion.
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`A.
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`No Reasonable Jury Could Reject Defendants’ Written Description Defense
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`Seagen argues it provided “substantial trial evidence establishing the shared specification
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`meets [the written description] requirement.” (Opp. at 3.) Seagen’s arguments, however, are
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`conclusory and its trial evidence is not adequate to support the jury’s verdict as to written
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`description for ADCs comprising any drug moiety.2 (Mot. at 3-10.) For adequate written
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`description that meets the quid pro quo of the patent system, “the public must receive meaningful
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`1 Seagen misstates arguments from Defendants’ previous summary judgment motion as there is
`not complete overlap with this Motion. (Compare Dkt. 255 with Dkt. 444 (“Mot.”).)
`2 Further, contrary to Seagen’s assertions, Dr. Lambert applied the correct standard on these
`issues. At most, Seagen alleges that at trial Dr. Lambert did not fully state the legal standard he
`had applied. (Dkt. 467 (“Opp.”) at 2.) His expert report, however, set forth six pages of legal
`standards he used when reaching the opinions and conclusions he later presented at trial. Seagen
`also never raised in its Daubert motion any concern with the legal standards Dr. Lambert
`applied. (See Dkt. 252.)
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 482 Filed 10/31/22 Page 3 of 14 PageID #: 21318
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`disclosure in exchange for being excluded from practicing the invention for a limited period of
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`time.” Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Seagen’s trial
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`evidence and the specification’s disclosure of ADCs using only dolastatin/auristatin drug moieties
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`is not adequate to show that Seagen invented and disclosed the entire broadly claimed genus. See
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`Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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`Seagen’s assertion
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`that “the shared specification
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`recites
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`the claimed ADC
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`formula … word-for-word” is also misleading and incorrect. (Opp. at 1 (emphasis added).)
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`Without context, Seagen points to the specification and finds the same image recited in Claim 1.3
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`(Opp. at 5.) In context, however, this image is described as an “[e]mbodiment[] of the Formula[s]
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`Ia′ and Ic,” which always limit “D” to auristatins. (See, e.g., DX-0001 at 47:20-50, 57:20-59:49,
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`70:18-19.) These formulas are thus far from “word-for-word” disclosures of the unlimited formula
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`in Claim 1, and are not sufficient to describe ADCs with any drug moiety of any possible variety.
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`Further, Seagen misleadingly asserts that the disclosure in the specification is “not limited
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`to ADCs made with dolastatin/auristatin derivatives” because it generally mentions “daunomycin,
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`doxorubicin, methotrexate, vindesine, geldamycin, calicheamicin or maytansinoids.” (Opp. at 14.)
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`These prior art drugs, however, are disclosed in the background section, which describes the state
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`of the art, not the present invention. The specification also makes plain that this background list
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`of chemotherapeutic agents does not describe drug moieties within the context of the ’039 patent.
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`(See Mot. at 6-8.) The specification does not provide any disclosure that those drugs, or any other
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`drugs, are even capable of being used as the drug moiety in the claimed ADCs. It is undisputed
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`3 To the extent Seagen argues its 2004 disclosure broadly taught ADCs meeting the image of Claim
`1, this is incredible, as many of the variables, including the MC group, were already disclosed in
`the prior art, and so cannot represent the inventive subject matter. (See, e.g., Trial Tr. (Day 2) at
`115:10-17; Trial Tr. (Day 4) at 61:19-22.)
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 482 Filed 10/31/22 Page 4 of 14 PageID #: 21319
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`that the only compounds described or exemplified in the “The Drug Unit (Moiety)” section are of
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`the “dolastatin/auristatin-type” and even these drug moieties are not disclosed as a part of an ADC
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`of the Asserted Claims as they lack a Gly/Phe-only tetrapeptide. (See Mot. at 5-6.)
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`Seagen’s reliance on testimony from its inventor, Dr. Toki, does not show that the POSA
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`would understand the “chemotherapeutic agents” to disclose drug moieties for use in the claimed
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`ADCs.4 (Opp. at 15.) Further, Seagen’s expert could not point to any disclosure in the
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`specification of an ADC where the drug moiety was something other than dolastatin/auristatin, nor
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`any disclosure of an ADC meeting all claim elements. (See, e.g., Trial Tr. (Day 4) at 119:5-16.)
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`Seagen’s argument that there is sufficient written description support because the
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`“specification offers two elements shared by all the drug moieties in the claimed genus: (1) their
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`cell-killing properties and (2) the presence of a functional group for conjugation to an ADC,” also
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`fails. (Opp. at 15-16.) These “elements” are not “common structural features,” as required by
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`Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., nor do they allow the POSA to visualize which drug moieties
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`are and are not in the genus. 598 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). For example, while
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`Seagen asserts that “tubulin binding, DNA binding, or topoisomerase inhibition” are cell killing
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`properties common to all drug moieties (Opp. at 16), these mechanisms are functional, not
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`structural features, and Seagen has not (and cannot) demonstrate a correlation between structure
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`and function.5 See Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 964. Further, even if “cell killing” functional
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`features were sufficient to define the claimed genus (for which Seagen provides no support) these
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`three cell killing properties all function differently. (See, e.g., DX-0085 at 9-19.)
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`4 Seagen did not disclose Dr. Toki as an expert, and his testimony cannot substitute for that of the
`POSA, from whose perspective written description is evaluated. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a); cf.
`Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 448 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
`5 Even drug moieties with these cell killing mechanisms have different structural features, further
`preventing the mechanisms from defining the genus. (DX-0083 at 6-8; DX-0085 at 9-19.)
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 482 Filed 10/31/22 Page 5 of 14 PageID #: 21320
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`Likewise, Seagen argues the “presence of a functional group” is an element shared by all
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`drug moieties in the claimed genus. (Opp. at 16.) The claim scope, however, is not limited to drug
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`moieties with one functional group, or even select functional groups, rather the scope is broad
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`enough to encompass all drug moieties (with and without functional groups).6 (Mot. at 4.) Even
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`if Seagen’s cherry-picked list of functional groups limited the “D is a drug moiety” claim term
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`(they do not), those functional groups still do not share common structural features. (DX-0082 at
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`8; see also, e.g., DX-0085 at 10-13 (showing structural differences between maytansine
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`compounds with disulfide linkages and auristatins with amine linkages); Trial Tr. (Day 3) at 40:7-
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`41:5.) There is no structural feature common to the innumerable drug moieties allowed by the
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`Asserted Claims, and linkage through a single atom is not sufficient to identify the claimed genus.
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`Seagen’s smoke and mirrors attempt to conjure common structural features should not be credited.
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`No reasonable jury could conclude the inventors possessed ADCs using all possible drug moieties.
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`B.
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`No Reasonable Jury Could Reject Defendants’ Enablement Defense
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`Defendants presented clear and convincing evidence that given the inconceivable breadth
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`of the claims and the complex nature of ADCs, the POSA would require examples and guidance
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`to make the full scope of the claimed ADCs without undue experimentation.7 (Mot. at 10-15.)
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`The only examples and guidance Seagen presented, however, center on attaching
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`dolastatin/auristatin drug moieties. Nothing in the specification teaches the POSA how to attach
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`6 Seagen’s citation to Erfindergemeinschaft UroPep GbR v. Eli Lilly & Co. is inapposite as the
`Court’s discussion pertained to structural features. 276 F. Supp. 3d 629, 653 (E.D. Tex. 2017),
`aff’d, 739 F. App’x 643 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Erfindergemeinschaft found common structural features
`because patentee’s expert presented unrebutted evidence of “a common ‘physical’ structure”
`shared by all members of the genus. Id. The same cannot be said for the innumerable drug moieties
`claimed by “D is a drug moiety.” (Opp. at 15-17.)
`7 ADCs are not modular as Seagen suggests. Nor is there any evidence that designing an ADC
`consistent with the claim limitations would be taught “in a freshman laboratory.” (Opp. at 18.)
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 482 Filed 10/31/22 Page 6 of 14 PageID #: 21321
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`other drug moieties to a protease-cleavable, Gly/Phe-only tetrapeptide linker to form the claimed
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`ADCs. (See, e.g., DX-0001 at 153:11-154:14.) Seagen’s specification fails to “enable any person
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`skilled in the art to … make and use the [invention]” without “undue experimentation.” § 112(a)
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`(emphasis added); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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`Seagen’s reference to Section 9.3.3 “The Spacer Unit” is not sufficient to disclose
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`“methods for attaching various types of drug classes.” (Opp. at 20-21.) Section 9.3.3 only
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`discloses a specific PAB spacer (that is not required by the claims) and how to attach a limited
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`number of drug moieties to that specific spacer unit.8 Further, Toki 2002 cited in this section,
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`discusses the mechanism of releasing a drug through a PAB group. It thus does not provide a
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`general teaching that is applicable to the broadly claimed genus of ADCs with any drug moiety,
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`and provides no guidance for ADCs that lack a PAB spacer. Seagen’s assertion that Toki 2002
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`teaches attachment of alcohol-type drug moieties is also misleading, because, at the time, Seagen
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`scientists did not consider these drug moieties to be attachable to make ADCs.9 (DX-0495.) Given
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`that Seagen scientists found it difficult to attach whole classes of drugs in 2004 (Mot. at 14 (citing
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`DX-0495)), it is not credible for Seagen to now argue that many or most drugs have structure
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`8 To the extent Seagen alleges that Figures 20-23 provide enablement support for ADCs with any
`drug moiety, these figures, for the same reason as the 2002 publication by Dr. Toki (“Toki
`2002”), demonstrate only the mechanism of action of the PAB spacer and do not provide
`examples of whole ADCs or even attachment to the claimed linker.
`9 Seagen accuses Defendants of “improperly relying on evidence that did not come into existence
`until after the filing of the priority application.” Seagen is wrong—the filing date of the ’039
`patent is not 2004—it is July 2019. Regardless, as Amgen explains, post-filing evidence may be
`relevant to various issues regarding enablement, including whether the patent’s examples are
`“representative” of the claimed scope and whether the patentee could practice its own patent
`without undue experimentation. Amgen, Inc. v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
`Dr. Lambert’s discussion of Seagen’s need to invent new methods (after 2004) to attach drugs
`Seagen now claims were attachable before 2004 supports Defendants’ claim that the ʼ039 patent
`fails to enable attachment of such drugs, and is thus relevant to the enablement inquiry.
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 482 Filed 10/31/22 Page 7 of 14 PageID #: 21322
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`suitable for linking or could be modified readily. (Opp. at 18-19.) Creating handles for attachment
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`for any/all drug moieties, including those moieties without known handles, is complex and
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`unpredictable, and would require the POSA to engage in significant trial and error to discover
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`undisclosed claimed embodiments. (Mot. at 11-13, 15-19.)
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`Seagen further fails to address the claims’ functional requirement that the ADC’s drug
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`moiety be “intracellularly cleaved in a patient.” (DX-0001 at Claim 1 (“Intracellular Cleavage
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`Limitation”).) This functional cleavage requirement is an activity requirement,10 meaning that
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`enabling the full scope of the claim requires not only that the POSA must be able to make the
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`ADC, but also be able to use the ADC as the Asserted Claims require. See, e.g., Idenix Pharms.
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`LLC v. Gilead Scis. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Similar to the broad structural and
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`functional requirements in Amgen v. Sanofi, Seagen’s functional requirement is not enabled by the
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`specification, which has so little guidance that the POSA is left to trial and error. 987 F.3d 1080,
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`1083-86, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (finding lack of enablement despite two separate juries returning
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`verdicts finding that lack of enablement was not proven).
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`Exacerbating Seagen’s enablement problem, the Intracellular Cleavage Limitation requires
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`testing of ADCs to determine whether they meet it, but the specification does not describe any
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`methods for such testing in a patient. The Federal Circuit has consistently found patents not
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`enabled in such circumstances. See Idenix, 941 F.3d at 1161 (candidate compounds “would need
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`to be tested”); Enzo Life Scis., Inc. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 928 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
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`2019) (“each labeled polynucleotide would need to be tested”). Seagen’s assertion that “ADCs
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`are designed as targeted therapies with limited cytotoxicity outside of the tumor cell” correctly
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`10 Seagen moved to strike the therapeutic viability portions of Dr. Lambert’s expert report; that
`motion failed. (Pretrial Conf. Tr. (Vol. 1) at 79:21-25.) Seagen’s reliance on Broadcom Corp. v.
`Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008) to argue waiver is misplaced. No waiver occurred.
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 482 Filed 10/31/22 Page 8 of 14 PageID #: 21323
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`articulates the goal of ADC therapy, but ignores that not all ADCs necessarily behave in the desired
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`manner. This is why experimentation is required. Seagen’s methods for ADC testing are
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`insufficient—it assays for cell death, which can occur even without intracellular cleavage, and it
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`assumes, incorrectly, that the results of in vitro assays directly translatable to function in a patient.
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`(Mot. at 16-18.) The specification does not teach the POSA how to identify which of the myriad
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`ADCs that fall within the claims’ structural limitations will also meet their functional requirement.
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`No reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.
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`C.
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`The Shared Specification Does Not Describe “Gly/Phe-Only” Tetrapeptide Linkers
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`Claim 1 Requires an ADC with a “Gly/Phe-Only” Tetrapeptide Linker
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`1.
`The Parties agreed: the Asserted Claims require an ADC with a “Gly/Phe-only”
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`tetrapeptide linker. (Trial Tr. (Day 4) at 12:7-21, 92:19-21, 94:9-11, 96:20-97:2; Dkt. 263 at 16,
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`27). Seagen’s post-trial rewriting of Claim 1 to recite ADCs with “tetrapeptides comprising Gly
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`or Phe” is simply not credible. (Opp. at 4, 7, 11.) Comprising claims “allow[] additional elements
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`to be present as long as the named elements are present.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112
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`F.3d 495, 499 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Claim 1 is not a comprising claim. It requires an ADC having the
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`recited formula wherein “-Ww- … is a tetrapeptide,” and “each -W- unit having the formula [of
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`Gly or Phe].” Because “each” amino acid is Gly or Phe, in stark contrast to the 2004 Application’s
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`disclosure that “each” amino acid must be one of 83 choices, the Asserted Claims require ADCs
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`with Gly/Phe-only tetrapeptides. Claim 1 thus departed dramatically from the 2004 Application’s
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`disclosure, eliminating all but 81 of over 47 million tetrapeptide options. (Mot. at 21-22.)
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`On the Facts of this Case, Written Description is a Purely Legal Issue
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`2.
`Seagen’s 2004 Application discloses 12 categories of linkers (one is tetrapeptides) and 83
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`possible amino acids (not limited to Gly and Phe) for use in peptide linkers. It discloses more than
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`47 million tetrapeptide linkers alone. (Id.) The ’039 patent claims ADCs using 81 of those 47
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 482 Filed 10/31/22 Page 9 of 14 PageID #: 21324
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`million tetrapeptides that contain only Gly and/or Phe. (Id.) But it does not contain a single
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`example of an ADC with a Gly/Phe-only linker, let alone a Gly/Phe-only tetrapeptide linker. (Id.)
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`No one disputes these facts, only their legal impact, and Seagen’s legal theories fail.
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`First, Seagen argues ipsis verbis disclosure, asserting that its Application uses the words
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`“tetrapeptide” and “each,” and the structure of glycine and phenylalanine. (Opp. at 5-6.) The
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`Federal Circuit explicitly rejected this “laundry list” theory of disclosure for narrow subgenuses.
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`In Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, the Court found the specification lacking even though (1) it expressly
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`disclosed the same molecular scaffold as in the claim, and (2) each chemical group that the claim
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`required (“cyclopropyl” and “4-fluorophenyl”) was expressly disclosed as one of several options
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`for the variable (“R” and “R0”) that it filled in the claim. 93 F.3d 1559, 1569-71 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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`Seagen strains to distinguish Fujikawa. Seagen argues that the words for the chemical
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`groups in Fujikawa’s claim (cyclopropyl and 4-fluorophenyl) did not appear verbatim in the
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`priority specification, while the structures for Gly and Phe do appear in Seagen’s application.
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`(Opp. at 13.) That is a distinction without a difference. The Fujikawa specification listed “C3-7
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`cycloalkyl” instead of “cyclopropyl,” but, as the Court explained, “cyclopropyl is another name
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`for C3 cycloalkyl.” 93 F.3d at 1570-71 & n. 12. Indeed, the Court acknowledged “cyclopropyl”
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`was listed “as one possible moiety for R in [the specification’s] disclosure of the genus,” before it
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`went on to explicitly reject the theory of written description support Seagen advances here. Id.11
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`Neither Fujikawa nor Wako turned on semantics. Rather, they involved a narrowing of the
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`options disclosed—in Wako, the options of 1, 2, 9, and 10 carbons were excluded, just as the
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`unchosen chemical groups in Fujikawa were excluded, and 80 of the 83 options for amino acids
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`11 Seagen repeats its argument with respect to Wako, preposterously urging the case turned on the
`specification’s disclosure of “C1–10 straight-chain, branched or cyclic alkyl group” instead of
`individually listing C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, and C10 straight-chains. (Opp. at 12.)
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 482 Filed 10/31/22 Page 10 of 14 PageID #: 21325
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`were excluded here. The issue “is whether a written description that discloses seven [here, twelve]
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`possible categories for a moiety in a basic chemical structure can support a claim that recites only
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`a narrow subset of one of those categories.” 4 F. App’x at 855. As in Wako, the answer is “no:”
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`Just because a moiety is listed as one possible choice for one position does not mean
`there is ipsis verbis support for every … sub-genus that chooses that moiety. Were
`this the case, a “laundry list” disclosure of every possible moiety for every possible
`position would constitute a written description of every species in the genus.
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`Fujikawa, 93 F.3d at 1571. Certainly, this case is not Driscoll. If Seagen had claimed an entire
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`category—all tetrapeptides disclosed in the 2004 Application—Driscoll may be analogous. But
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`Seagen claimed ADCs with 0.000172% (81 of 47 million) of the tetrapeptide category. Wako
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`explicitly distinguished cases like Driscoll from cases like Fujikawa, Wako, and this one (without
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`sufficient description) that require first selecting a category and then making an additional
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`selection to claim a subset of that category. 4 F. App’x at 857; (Opp. 13 n.5.)12
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`Second, Seagen argues blazemarks, asserting that the POSA would have selected one of
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`the 2004 Application’s tetrapeptide examples (indisputably non Gly/Phe-only), combined it with
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`a tripeptide example (non Gly/Phe-only), further combined it with prior art references, and thus
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`would have been “guided” to ADCs with Gly/Phe-only tetrapeptides. (Opp. at 7-11.) That
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`combining references argument is a classic obviousness analysis; it “does not satisfy the
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`requirement.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352; (Mot. at 26-29.) Seagen identifies no expert testimony to
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`support that the 2004 Application disclosed or described ADCs with the specific subgenus of 81
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`Gly/Phe-only tetrapeptides outside a laundry list. (Opp. at 11.) Instead, Dr. Bertozzi testified that
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`Gly/Phe-only tetrapeptides were “a straightforward leap” from what was disclosed, and that the
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`12 Seagen also relies on Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Plexxikon Inc., PGR2018-00069 (Jan. 16,
`2019). In that nonprecedential PTAB opinion, three disclosed examples fell within and
`supported the claimed subgenus. Plexxikon, at *17. No such examples save Seagen’s claims.
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 482 Filed 10/31/22 Page 11 of 14 PageID #: 21326
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`“POSA looking to make ADCs with tetrapeptide linkers would have been guided to a gly/phe
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`tetrapeptide based on the [GFLG] sequence listed as the first exemplary tetrapeptide in the
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`specification and the existing literature on ADCs and the protease-cleavage proclivities of different
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`peptide sequences.”13 (Id. at 8.) That is a classic and legally foreclosed obviousness argument.
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`Even if the 2004 Application suggests selecting and combining cherry-picked examples based on
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`uncited prior art (and it does not); that provides no more than a research plan (which is precisely
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`how Seagen’s lead inventor described it). (Trial Tr. (Day) 4 at 68:15-69:8); AbbVie Deutschland
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`GmbH v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F. 3d 1285, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Absent disclosure, Seagen
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`relies on “an imaginary specific example patterned on [a disclosed] specific example … so that we
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`can see what a simple change would have resulted in a specific supporting disclosure being present
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`in the specification. The trouble is that there is no such disclosure, easy though it is to imagine
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`it.” In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 995 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (emphasis added). Whether ADCs with
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`Gly/Phe-only tetrapeptides were a “simple change” or a “straightforward leap” from those that are
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`disclosed in the 2004 Application, “there is no such disclosure” of the claimed subgenus. Id.
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`Seagen’s cases are not to the contrary. (Opp. at 10). Boston Scientific rejected reliance on
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`prior art to supply support for a critical claim limitation. Falkner and Immunex simply reflect the
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`principle that a patent need not recite what is well known—there, written description did not
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`require recitation of well-known DNA sequences for genes disclosed in the specification by name
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`(Falkner) or reference number (Immunex). The POSA’s knowledge may not be used “to teach
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`limitations that are not in the specification.” Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1322 (emphasis added). Seagen
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`asks this Court to break that rule.
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`13 Seagen critiques Defendants’ focus on its expert’s “straightforward leap” testimony. Her other
`testimony (that the POSA would have been “guided” to the claimed subgenus) is of a kind.
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 482 Filed 10/31/22 Page 12 of 14 PageID #: 21327
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`Dated: October 7, 2022
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`By: /s/ Preston K. Ratliff II
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`Deron R. Dacus
`State Bar No. 00790553
`ddacus@dacusfirm.com
`THE DACUS FIRM, P.C.
`821 ESE Loop 323, Suite 430
`Tyler, Texas 75701
`Telephone: 903.705.1117
`Facsimile: 903.581.2543
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`J. Mark Mann
`State Bar No. 12926150
`mark@themannfirm.com
`G. Blake Thompson
`State Bar No. 24042033
`Blake@themannfirm.com
`MANN | TINDEL | THOMPSON
`300 West Main Street
`Henderson, Texas 75652
`Telephone: 903.657.8540
`Facsimile: 903.657.6003
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`Of Counsel:
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`Preston K. Ratliff II
`prestonratliff@paulhastings.com
`Ashley N. Mays-Williams
`ashleymayswilliams@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`200 Park Avenue
`New York, New York 10166
`Telephone: 212.318.6000
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`Jeffrey A. Pade
`jeffpade@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`2050 M Street NW
`Washington, DC 20036
`Telephone: 202.551.1700
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`Attorneys for Defendant Daiichi Sankyo
`Company, Limited
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`- 11 -
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 482 Filed 10/31/22 Page 13 of 14 PageID #: 21328
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`Dated: October 7, 2022
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`By: /s/ David I. Berl
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`David I. Berl
`dberl@wc.com
`Jessamyn S. Berniker
`jberniker@wc.com
`Thomas S. Fletcher
`tfletcher@wc.com
`Jessica L. Pahl
`jpahl@wc.com
`Kathryn S. Kayali
`kkayali@wc.com
`Kevin Hoagland-Hanson
`khoagland-hanson@wc.com
`Andrew L. Hoffman
`ahoffman@wc.com
`Angela Gao
`agao@wc.com
`WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP
`725 Twelfth Street, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: 202.434.5000
`Facsimile: 202.434.5029
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`Jennifer Parker Ainsworth
`Texas State Bar No. 00784720
`jainsworth@wilsonlawfirm.com
`WILSON, ROBERTSON & CORNELIUS,
`P.C.
`909 ESE Loop 323, Suite 400
`Tyler, Texas 75701
`Telephone: 903.509.5000
`Facsimile: 903.509.5092
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`Attorneys for Intervenor-Defendants AstraZeneca
`Pharmaceuticals LP and AstraZeneca UK Ltd.
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`Case 2:20-cv-00337-JRG Document 482 Filed 10/31/22 Page 14 of 14 PageID #: 21329
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that all counsel of record who have consented to
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`electronic service are being served with a copy of this document via electronic mail on October 7,
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`2022.
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`/s/ Preston K. Ratliff II
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