Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 36 Filed 04/04/24 Page 1 of 24 PageID #: 955
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`TOUCHSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., et
`al.,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`TOUCHSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`
`Lead Case No. 2:23-cv-00059-JRG
`Member Case No. 2:23-cv-00062-JRG
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS,
`LLC, D/B/A XFINITY, et al.,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`TOUCHSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.’S OPENING
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 36 Filed 04/04/24 Page 2 of 24 PageID #: 956
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`I.
`BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................ 1
`II.
`LEGAL STANDARDS ...................................................................................................... 2
`III.
`IV. DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS ............................................................................................. 3
`
`A.
`
`Terms Common to Multiple Patents ....................................................................... 3
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`“media player” (’251 Patent claims 1, 2) / “media player application”
`(’751 Patent claims 12, 13, 14, 16) / “media playing application (’934
`Patent claims 17, 18, 19) ............................................................................. 3
`“a synchronization code” / “the synchronization code” (’251 Patent claims
`1, 8, 9, and ’751 Patent claim 12) ............................................................... 4
`“synchronization code” (’251 Patent claims 1, 8, 9, and ’751 Patent claim
`12) ............................................................................................................... 5
`“Method claim steps” (All Asserted Patents) ............................................. 8
`
`B.
`
`Terms in the ’251 Patent ....................................................................................... 10
`
`5.
`
`“storing . . . based on the synchronization code” (’251 Patent claim 1) ... 10
`
`C.
`
`Terms in the ’751 Patent ....................................................................................... 11
`
`6.
`7.
`
`“first format” / “second format” (’751 Patent claims 12, 16) ................... 11
`“the first format of the first message” (’751 Patent claim 12) .................. 13
`
`D.
`
`Terms in the ’934 Patent ....................................................................................... 15
`
`8.
`9.
`10.
`
`“a unique identifier” / “the unique identifier” (’934 Patent claim 17) ...... 15
`“unique identifier” (’934 Patent claim 17) ................................................ 16
`“first format” / “universal format” (’934 Patent claim 17) ....................... 18
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 18
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 36 Filed 04/04/24 Page 3 of 24 PageID #: 957
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.,
`805 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015)............................................................................................8, 18
`
`BASF Corp. v. Johnson Matthey Inc.,
`875 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................13
`
`CA, Inc. v. Netflix, Inc.,
`No. 2:21-cv-00080-JRG-RSP, 2021 WL 5323413 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2021) ...................5, 15
`
`Candela Corp. v. Palomar Med. Techs., Inc.,
`No. CIV.A. 9:06-CV-277, 2008 WL 3285255 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2008) ...............................10
`
`Cisco Sys., Inc. v. XR Commc'ns, LLC,
`835 F. App'x 590 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ...........................................................................................11
`
`Credle v. Bond,
`25 F.3d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994)..................................................................................................10
`
`EmeraChem Holdings, LLC v. Volkswagen Grp. of America, Inc.,
`714 F. Appx. 995 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .............................................................................................4
`
`Kruse Tech. P'ship v. Volkswagen AG,
`544 F. App'x 943 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ...........................................................................................10
`
`Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,
`395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................11
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`572 U.S. 898, 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) ......................................................................................13
`
`O2 Micro Intern. Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..................................................................................................4
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)........................................................................................2, 6, 16
`
`Power Mosfet Techs., L.L.C. v. Siemens AG,
`378 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................11
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................2
`
`
`
`iii
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 36 Filed 04/04/24 Page 4 of 24 PageID #: 958
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`
`
`United Access Techs., LLC v. AT & T Corp.,
`757 F. App'x 960 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ...........................................................................................14
`
`VLSI Tech. LLC v. Intel Corp.,
`53 F.4th 646 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ..............................................................................................8, 18
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 .....................................................................................................................2, 3
`
`Other Authorities
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,356,251...................................................................................................... passim
`
`U.S. Patent No. 11,048,751.................................................................................................... passim
`
`U.S. Patent No. 11,086,934.................................................................................................... passim
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 36 Filed 04/04/24 Page 5 of 24 PageID #: 959
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`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Touchstream’s positions are rooted in the core tenets of claim construction set forth by the
`
`Federal Circuit. Though the claims are easy to understand using their plain and ordinary meaning,
`
`Defendants propose to inject unnecessary, confusing, and sometimes contradictory limitations into
`
`the claims. Defendants’ proposals should be rejected.
`
`II.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Touchstream was founded in 2011 to build a business around Mr. Strober’s inventions
`
`involving the “casting” of content from a personal device (e.g., smart phone, tablet, etc.) to a
`
`second display (e.g., a TV, computer, etc.). As a startup based on this concept of casting,
`
`Touchstream sought to protect its intellectual property—including by filing the applications
`
`resulting in the patents asserted here. The Asserted Patents in this case are U.S. Patent No.
`
`8,356,251 (“’251 Patent”); U.S. Patent No. 11,048,751 (“’751 Patent”); and U.S. Patent No.
`
`11,086,934 (“’934 Patent”). The ’251 Patent is a continuation of Application No. 12/157,821, of
`
`which the ’751 and ’934 patents are both continuations-in-part. The Asserted Patents share a
`
`specification, and each claim priority to the same U.S. Provisional Patent Application No.
`
`61/477,998, which was filed on April 21, 2011.
`
`Prior to the inventions of Mr. Strober, a user of personal computing device, such as a phone,
`
`could find, view, and control content on his or her device. But bringing this content up on a
`
`secondary display was typically cumbersome—the main mode being to use the TV remote to
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`launch the app, search for and start the content, fast-forward to the current point being watched,
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`then stop the content on the phone. While “mirroring” existed—that is, sending the contents of a
`
`phone’s screen to a second screen for simultaneous display—this had significant disadvantages,
`
`including requiring a continuous connection between the phone and the TV, using significant
`
`
`
`1
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 36 Filed 04/04/24 Page 6 of 24 PageID #: 960
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`
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`battery on the phone, and being unable to use the mobile phone for texting or other purposes while
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`the content was being “mirrored” to the TV (or inadvertently “mirroring” a text message
`
`conversation to the TV).
`
`To address these disadvantages, the technology disclosed in the Asserted Patents enables a
`
`user to locate content on his or her mobile device, select a second device (e.g. a TV, computer,
`
`tablet, etc.), and transfer the content—along with the responsibility for downloading and playing
`
`the content—to the second device. This freed the mobile devices while maintaining control over
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`the content, providing a user-friendly and seamless way of consuming content. These innovations
`
`drove significant value to consumers and businesses through promoting and facilitating the
`
`consumption of content on larger screens.
`
`III.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`
`
`“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to
`
`which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2005). A court may only depart from the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms
`
`in two circumstances: (1) where a patentee defines a term, thus acting as his own lexicographer,
`
`or (2) when a patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term in the specification or during
`
`prosecution. Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`
`This Court is familiar with the law of definiteness. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 requires “that a
`
`patent's claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled
`
`in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Fractus, S.A., v. Tcl Corp.,
`
`Tcl Communication Technology Holdings Ltd., Tct Mobile Worldwide, Ltd., Tct Mobile
`
`International, Ltd., No. 2:20-CV-00097-JRG, 2021 WL 2983195, at *4 (E.D. Tex. July 14, 2021)
`
`(citing Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910, 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014)).
`
`
`
`2
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`

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`
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`Further, a defendant must prove a claim indefinite by “clear and convincing evidence.” Id. (citing
`
`Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
`
`IV.
`
`DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS1
`
`A.
`
`Terms Common to Multiple Patents
`
`1. “media player” (’251 Patent claims 1, 2) / “media player application”
`(’751 Patent claims 12, 13, 14, 16) / “media playing application (’934
`Patent claims 17, 18, 19)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Touchstream’s Proposal
`
`Defendants’ Proposal
`
`No construction necessary. Plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`
`“application software for playing back video
`content.” (’251 Patent)
`
`“application software for playing back
`content” (’751 and ’934 Patents)
`
`The terms “media player,” “media player application,” and “media playing application”
`
`are well-known, easily understood terms used in accordance with their plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`As such, no construction is necessary. Nevertheless, Defendants’ attempt to convolute the term by
`
`including the phrase “application software.” Claim construction serves to clarify—not obfuscate—
`
`the meanings of disputed terms. The scope of “media player” is clearer than that of “application
`
`software.” A juror will understand what is or is not a “media player,” but may, and likely will,
`
`have difficulty understanding whether something is “application software.” Defendants’ proposed
`
`construction is, at best, unnecessary as redundant and, at worst, risks confusing the jury while
`
`deviating from the terms’ ordinary meaning.
`
`
`1 Defendants are no longer seeking construction of [1] “a server system” / “the server system”
`(’251 and ’934 Patents), [2] “remote server device” (’751 Patent), and [3] “universal playback
`control command” (’251 Patent). Accordingly, Touchstream does not address those terms here.
`
`
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`
`3
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 36 Filed 04/04/24 Page 8 of 24 PageID #: 962
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`
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`“Claim construction is ‘not an obligatory exercise in redundancy.’” EmeraChem Holdings,
`
`LLC v. Volkswagen Grp. of America, Inc., 714 F. Appx. 995, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “[D]istrict
`
`courts are not (and should not be) required to construe every limitation present in a patent’s asserted
`
`claims…Rather, ‘[c]laim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical
`
`scope, to clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims, for use
`
`in the determination of infringement.’” O2 Micro Intern. Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`
`Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis original).
`
`
`
`Not only are Defendants’ construction(s) redundant and unnecessary, they are inconsistent.
`
`For instance, Defendants’ proposed construction of these terms differs between the ’251 Patent
`
`and the ’751 and ’934 Patents, limiting this term to only “video content” in the ’251 Patent. This
`
`confusing variation is unwarranted, as the asserted ’251 Claims are already limited to video
`
`content by the language in the ’251 claims. See ’251 Patent at Claim 1 (11:37-38, reciting “video
`
`content” rather than just “content”). Thus, limiting the term “media player” to only video content
`
`in the ’251 Patent serves only to duplicate a limitation already present in the claim.2
`
`The jury would not benefit from a construction of this term, and Defendants’ proposal does
`
`not resolve any apparent scope disputes. A plain and ordinary construction is appropriate here.
`
`2. “a synchronization code” / “the synchronization code” (’251 Patent
`claims 1, 8, 9, and ’751 Patent claim 12)
`
`
`
`Touchstream’s Proposal
`
`Defendants’ Proposal
`
`No construction necessary. Plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`
`“Must be the same ‘synchronization code’
`throughout the claim.”
`
`
`2 While Defendants may point to the February 22, 2012, Remarks made in Amendment to support
`their construction, this argument is based on similarly flawed reasoning. In said Remarks counsel
`stated that “media player” referred to “application software for playing back video content.” But,
`the claim language at issue was already limited to video content, so this construction of “media
`player” would render the “video content” claim language of the ’251 Patent superfluous and cannot
`be correct.
`
`
`
`4
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`

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`
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`It is unnecessary to construe this term. Touchstream is confused by Defendants’ reasoning
`
`here: a jury does not need assistance to understand common terms like “a” and “the.” Such a
`
`construction is unnecessary and risks obscuring the plain and ordinary meaning of these terms.
`
`
`
`Here, the antecedent basis rule renders Defendants’ construction redundant. See CA, Inc.
`
`v. Netflix, Inc., No. 2:21-cv-00080-JRG-RSP, 2021 WL 5323413, at *11 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 16,
`
`2021). “Synchronization code” is introduced in the claim using the indefinite article “a” and
`
`referred back to with the definite article “the.” ’251 Pat., 11:26, 11:31, 11:34; ’751 Pat. 12:66–67,
`
`13:1, 13:3–4, 13:6. This use of indefinite and definite articles is obviously extremely common.
`
`The jury needs no guidance as to whether “a synchronization code” and “the synchronization code”
`
`refer to the same “synchronization code” because the jury is capable of understanding the words
`
`“a” and “the.”
`
`Defendants do not appear confused by these words either, as they do not propose similar
`
`constructions for other terms with definite articles. For example, Defendants take no issue with the
`
`’251 Patent’s use of “a server system” vs. “the server system,” or “a message” vs. “the message.”
`
`’251 Pat., 11:28, 11:30–31. This implicit admission is that words like “a” and “the” are best
`
`understood by their plain and ordinary meaning. Construing this term is unnecessary.
`
`3. “synchronization code” (’251 Patent claims 1, 8, 9, and ’751 Patent
`claim 12)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Touchstream’s Proposal
`
`Defendants’ Proposal
`
`No construction necessary. Plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`
`“a code which can be obtained by a user from
`the [display device / content presentation
`device] and provided by the user to the
`[personal computing device / remote
`computing device]”
`
`The term “synchronization code” is used in accordance with its plain and ordinary
`
`meaning. Defendants’ proposed construction offers no clarification or guidance as to the meaning
`
`
`
`5
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 36 Filed 04/04/24 Page 10 of 24 PageID #: 964
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`
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`of the term “synchronization code.” Rather, Defendants seek to limit how a synchronization code
`
`may be communicated between a display device/content presentation device and a personal
`
`computing device/remote computing device beyond that imposed by the plain language of the
`
`claims. Defendants’ proposed construction disregards the claim language, seeking to limit their
`
`scope to a single embodiment. In doing so, Defendants stray from the “‘bedrock principle’ of
`
`patent law that the ‘claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the
`
`right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
`
`
`
`Claim 1 of the ’251 Patent recites, in relevant part, steps of “assigning, by a server system,
`
`a synchronization code to the display device; receiving, in the server system, a message from a
`
`personal computing device . . . wherein the message includes the synchronization code” and
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`“storing, by the server system, a record establishing an association between the personal computing
`
`device and the display device based on the synchronization code . . . .” ’251 Pat. at Claim 1 (11:26-
`
`34). Similarly, claim 12 of the ’751 Patent recites, in relevant part, “obtaining, by a content
`
`presentation device, a synchronization code associated with the content presentation device,
`
`wherein the associated synchronization code is stored on a remote server device” and “providing,
`
`by the content presentation device, the synchronization code to a remote computing device in
`
`communication with the remote server device, wherein the provided synchronization code causes
`
`the remote server device to store an association between the content presentation device and the
`
`remote computing device . . . .” ’751 Pat. at Claim 12 (12:66-13:9). These steps clearly set forth
`
`the claimed requirements for the synchronization code, including which elements must be involved
`
`in the “assigning,” “receiving,” and “obtaining” of it.
`
`
`
`The claims do not require that a user act as an intermediary to obtain the synchronization
`
`code from a display device before providing that synchronization code to the personal computing
`
`
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`6
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 36 Filed 04/04/24 Page 11 of 24 PageID #: 965
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`
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`device. Instead, the claims describe communication between a display device and a personal
`
`computing device—not between a display device and a user. The ’251 Patent requires that the
`
`server system receives a message containing a synchronization code from the personal computing
`
`device, while the ’751 Patent further describes the content presentation device providing a
`
`synchronization code to the remote computing device. ’251 Pat. at Claim 1 (11:26-34); ’751 Pat.
`
`at Claim 12 (12:66-13:9). Notably absent from the claim language is a requirement that a user
`
`obtain the synchronization code. Without support in the claim language, the merit of Defendants’
`
`construction relies wholly on the ’251 and ’751 specifications.
`
`
`
`Defendants support their proposed construction with a single, exemplary embodiment
`
`disclosed in the specifications. Both the ’251 and ’751 specifications describe that “the user can
`
`select the display device by entering a synchronization code uniquely associated with the particular
`
`display device.” ’251 Pat. 5:14–16; ’751 Pat. 5:31–33. But this is only one of many embodiments,
`
`and it explicitly says that the user can select the display device by entering a synchronization
`
`code—not that the user must. Further, the specification discloses other options:
`
` “As illustrated in FIG. 7A, the synchronization code 48 can be displayed for example, on
`a splash page of the display device as text on the screen or as an image such as a QR code,
`and can be entered into the mobile phone 20, for example, manually by the user or by
`scanning the code into the mobile phone.” ’251 Pat. 5:16–21; ’751 Pat. 5:35–39 (emphasis
`added).
`
` “In some implementations, the server system stores a look-up table that includes a
`synchronization code uniquely associated with the display device. A message from the
`personal computing device can include the synchronization code, and in response to
`receiving the message from personal computing device, the server system can use the
`synchronization code and the look-up table to identify the display device on which the
`content is to be played.” ‘251 Pat. 2:16–26; ‘751 Pat. 2:24–34.
`
` “The code can be scanned, for example, using optical scanning or RFID techniques.” ’251
`Pat. 5:21–23; ’751 Pat. 5:39-40.
`
` “Once the synchronization code is entered into, or captured by, the mobile phone 20, it is
`sent from the mobile phone 20 to the server system 24 . . . .” ’251 Pat. 5:36–38; ’751 Pat.
`5:53–55.
`
`
`
`7
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`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 36 Filed 04/04/24 Page 12 of 24 PageID #: 966
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`
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`So while the user may obtain a synchronization code from the display device and enter that
`
`synchronization code to a personal computing device in some embodiments, other embodiments
`
`teach that the display device may provide the synchronization code directly to the personal
`
`computing device without the user serving as an intermediary. See ’251 Pat. 5:8–41; ’751 Pat.
`
`5:25–58.
`
`
`
`As the Federal Circuit has repeatedly cautioned, “claims should not be limited ‘to preferred
`
`embodiments or specific examples in the specification.’” VLSI Tech. LLC v. Intel Corp., 53 F.4th
`
`646, 652 (Fed. Cir. 2022). “[E]ven where a patent describes only a single embodiment, claims will
`
`not be read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim
`
`scope using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.” Akamai Techs., Inc. v.
`
`Limelight Networks, Inc., 805 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015). No clear intention to limit claim
`
`scope is present here.
`
`
`
`Lacking support in the claims or specifications, Defendants’ proposed construction is
`
`improper. Defendants’ proposal should be rejected in favor of the term’s plain and ordinary
`
`meaning.
`
`4. “Method claim steps” (All Asserted Patents)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Touchstream’s Proposal
`
`Defendants’ Proposal
`
`The terms are not chronologically limited
`under relevant case law, and the jury does not
`need instruction on ordering of claim steps, as
`any ordering requirements are reasonably
`clear from the claims themselves.
`
`All steps of claim 12 must occur in order
`(’751 Patent)
`
`All steps of claim 17 must occur in order
`(’934 Patent)
`
`Step 2.A (“checking”) must occur after step
`1.D (“receiving, in the server system, one or
`more signals”). (’251 Patent)
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 36 Filed 04/04/24 Page 13 of 24 PageID #: 967
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`
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`Any required order of operations applicable to the Asserted Claims is readily ascertainable
`
`from the claim language alone. The jury needs no guidance to determine whether the claim steps
`
`need be performed in a particular order.
`
`
`
`“When analyzing whether an order exists between steps of a method claim, the
`
`presumption is that limitations may be performed in any order.” Datanet LLC v. Dropbox, Inc.,
`
`No. 622CV001142OLGDTG, 2023 WL 7545234, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2023) (citing Altiris,
`
`Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). “Courts first look at the ‘claim
`
`language to determine if, as a matter of logic or grammar, they must be performed in the order
`
`written’ and, if not, whether the specification ‘directly or implicitly requires such a narrow
`
`construction.’” Id.
`
`
`
`While the presumption is that steps may be performed in any order, it is apparent from the
`
`claims themselves that some steps must be performed in order. For instance, “obtaining a
`
`synchronization code” must occur before it is “stored” in the ’751 Patent, (i.e., the code cannot be
`
`“stored” before it is “obtained”). ’751 Pat. 11:53–55. Similarly, the code must be “provided”
`
`before it “causes the remote device to store an association.” ’751 Pat. 11:56–61. But this order is
`
`apparent from how those limitations are written, and an explicit instruction, for example, that “[a]ll
`
`steps of claim 12 must occur in order,” risks confusing the jury—especially because the claim
`
`contemplates a “second message” existing before the receiving of a “first message.” ’751 Pat.
`
`11:62–67. Just because the first message is introduced in the claims before the second message
`
`does not require it to be sent before the second message exists. Indeed, this would defy a plain
`
`reading of the claims. An instruction that all steps must occur in order would introduce confusing
`
`baggage for the jury to read the claims, and not change the requirements of infringement. The jury
`
`needs no such instruction.
`
`
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`9
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 36 Filed 04/04/24 Page 14 of 24 PageID #: 968
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`B.
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`Terms in the ’251 Patent
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`5. “storing . . . based on the synchronization code” (’251 Patent claim 1)
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`Touchstream’s Proposal
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`Defendants’ Proposal
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`No construction necessary. Plain and ordinary
`meaning.
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`“based on the synchronization code, storing”
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`Defendants inject ambiguity where none exists. The relevant limitation of the ’251 Patent
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`reads in full: “storing, by the server system, a record establishing an association between the
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`personal computing device and the display device based on the synchronization code.” ’251 Pat.,
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`11:32–34. The relative phrase “based on the synchronization code” describes the immediately
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`preceding object: “an association between the personal computing device and the display device.”
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`Id. Thus, the server system is storing a record establishing an association, wherein the
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`association—not the storing—is based on the synchronization code. Defendants’ construction is
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`simply incorrect. Even if it were not, the jury does not need the Court’s assistance to comprehend
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`this basic English syntax.
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`Grammar applies to patent claims. Candela Corp. v. Palomar Med. Techs., Inc., No.
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`CIV.A. 9:06-CV-277, 2008 WL 3285255, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2008); Kruse Tech. P'ship v.
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`Volkswagen AG, 544 F. App'x 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2013). A proposed construction is incorrect
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`when it is “at war with its grammar and syntax and thus would force an unreasonable
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`interpretation.” Credle v. Bond, 25 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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`Defendants’ proposed construction is not simply “at war with [the] grammar and syntax”
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`of the claim limitation—it actually usurps the limitation’s original meaning. According to
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`Defendants, instead of storing a record that is based on the synchronization code, the claims must
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`base the storing itself on the synchronization code. This interpretation changes the claim element
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`to something that is not written (i.e., something like “storing, by the server system, a record
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 36 Filed 04/04/24 Page 15 of 24 PageID #: 969
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`establishing an association between the personal computing device and the display device based
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`on the synchronization code.”). A construction that renders eighteen of the twenty-four words at
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`issue superfluous cannot stand. See Power Mosfet Techs., L.L.C. v. Siemens AG, 378 F.3d 1396,
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`1410 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2005) (“A claim construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over
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`one that does not do so.”). Indeed, the phrase “based on the synchronization code” is unambiguous.
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`The relative clause modifies the noun preceding it; here, it modifies “association.” Cisco Sys., Inc.
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`v. XR Commc'ns, LLC, 835 F. App’x 590, 592 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (finding relative clause
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`unambiguous). Only Defendants’ addition of an ellipsis introduces uncertainty as to what must be
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`“based on the synchronization code.” Id. The limitation, read in full, is otherwise clear and should
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`be afforded its plain and ordinary meaning.
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`C.
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`Terms in the ’751 Patent
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`6. “first format” / “second format” (’751 Patent claims 12, 16)
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`Touchstream’s Proposal
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`Defendants’ Proposal
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`No construction necessary. Plain and ordinary
`meaning.
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`Second format is different from the first
`format
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`The terms “first format” and “second format” should be given their plain and ordinary
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`meaning. Defendants’ proposed construction purports to differentiate between two formats while
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`actually injecting an unsupported limitation requiring every command in those formats to be
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`different. The jury does not need guidance to differentiate two formats.
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`Touchstream does not dispute that the “first format” and “second format” are different
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`formats. Such is apparent from the plain claim language; the jury does not require the Court’s
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`guidance to understand this. But two instances of a command may include the same expression in
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 36 Filed 04/04/24 Page 16 of 24 PageID #: 970
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`two separate formats. For instance, the word “no” is the same in both English and Spanish. Despite
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`different formats (or in this case, languages) the command (or in this case, the word) is the same.
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`The ’751 Patent accounts for this. Figure 5 of the ’751 Patent is illustrative, showing a “Universal”
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`command in a first format that results in the same content—but different format—for the “Specific
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`Player Command”:
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`’751 Pat., Fig. 5 (annotated). Here, there are at least two formats: a first format (universal command
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`format) and a second format (specific player command). For YouTube, the “pause” command in
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`the first, universal command format is equivalent to “yt_pauseVideo” in the second, specific player
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`command format. For Vimeo, however, the universal command “pause” remains the same in both
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`the first and second formats. While other players might look different, for instance the Ted.com
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`player would result in “pauseVideo,” it is not necessary the universal playback control command,
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`in every instance, be unrecognizable by the media player. This is further supported by the
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`specification, which details the command can be converted “if the command received from the
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`personal computing device is not recognizable by the media player.” ’751 Pat., 2:12-13. As the
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`’751 Patent teaches, converting does not necessarily require a change.
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`In short, Defendants’ proposed construction is confusing, redundant, and unsupported by
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`the claims and specification. This claim term should be afforded its plain and ordinary meaning.
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 36 Filed 04/04/24 Page 17 of 24 PageID #: 971
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`7. “the first format of the first message” (’751 Patent claim 12)
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`Touchstream’s Proposal
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`Defendants’ Proposal
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`No construction necessary. Plain and ordinary
`meaning.
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`Indefinite
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`The scope of this term is reasonably clear to those of skill in the art. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
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`Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910, 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014). As with other terms,
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`Defendants manufacture ambiguity where none exists. Defendants argue that “first format” is used
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`inconsistently, modifying both the “message” and the “command” as referenced earlier. But the
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`“command” is in the me