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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`SHERMAN DIVISION
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`DANA BOWMAN
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`v.
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`RJM CENTER, LLC, and
`LINKS CONSTRUCTION, LLC
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`PLAINTIFF
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`CAUSE NO. 4:15CV272-LG-CMC
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`DEFENDANTS
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
`DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
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`BEFORE THE COURT is the Joint Motion to Dismiss [4] filed by the
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`defendants RJM Center, LLC, and Links Construction, LLC. After the Motion to
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`Dismiss was filed, the plaintiff, Dana Bowman, filed a First Amended Complaint
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`and a response in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. The defendants did not file a
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`reply or otherwise address the First Amended Complaint. After reviewing the
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`submissions of the parties, the record in this matter, and the applicable law, the
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`Court finds that the Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
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`FACTS
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`In his First Amended Complaint , Bowman asserts that he lost both of his
`1
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`legs while serving in the United States Army. (1st Am. Compl. at 3, ECF No. 5).
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`Bowman asserts that he visited Centre Place Apartments in October of 2014, and
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`he “personally encountered various barriers to accessibility, including the complete
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` The Court finds that Bowman’s First Amended Complaint was timely filed
`1
`pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). “An amended complaint supersedes the
`original complaint and renders it of no legal effect unless the amended complaint
`specifically refers to and adopts or incorporates by reference the earlier pleading.”
`King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994). As a result, the Court will only
`address Bowman’s First Amended Complaint in this opinion.
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`Case 4:15-cv-00272-LG-CMC Document 17 Filed 08/07/15 Page 2 of 8 PageID #: 152
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`absence of handicapped-accessible parking.” (Id. at 7). He further claims that he
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`“observed that there were numerous accessibility problems that would interfere
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`with his ability to navigate his wheelchair through the apartments and otherwise
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`access the facilities.” (Id.) He claims these “barriers and the lack of accessible
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`features and adaptive design deterred [him] from renting an apartment at the
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`Property.” (Id.) According to Bowman, Centre Place was designed and constructed
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`by the defendants RJM Center and Links Construction. (Id. at 3, 7).
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`Bowman asserts the following causes of action pursuant to the Fair Housing
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`Act (FHA): (1) the defendants “discriminated in the rental of, or otherwise made
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`unavailable or denied, dwelling to persons because of their disabilities in violation
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`of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1);” (2) the defendants “discriminated against persons because
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`of their disabilities in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of a dwelling, or
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`in the provision of services or facilities in connection with the rental of a dwelling,
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`in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 304(f)(2);” and (3) the defendants “failed to design and
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`construct dwellings in compliance with the requirements mandated by 42 U.S.C. §
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`3604(f)(3)(C) and the applicable regulations, 24 C.F.R. Part 100.205 (2008).” (Id. at
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`11). Bowman seeks a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, monetary damages,
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`punitive damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees. (Id. at 11-12).
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`Prior to the filing of the First Amended Complaint, the defendants had filed a
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`Joint Motion to Dismiss that concerned Bowman’s original Complaint. The
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`defendants seek dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P.
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`-2-
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`Case 4:15-cv-00272-LG-CMC Document 17 Filed 08/07/15 Page 3 of 8 PageID #: 153
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`12(b)(6). The defendants have not presented any arguments related to the First
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`Amended Complaint; however, in an effort to conserve time and resources, the
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`Court will consider the defendants’ arguments in relation to the First Amended
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`Complaint.
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`DISCUSSION
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`I. The Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) Motion
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`A. Standing
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`The defendants first argue that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, because
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`Bowman does not have standing to pursue this lawsuit pursuant to Article III of the
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`United States Constitution. While Bowman claims that the defendants violated the
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`FHA, most of the arguments and authority raised by the defendants concern
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`standing pursuant to a separate statute, the Americans with Disabilities Act.
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`Nevertheless, it appears that the defendants claim that Bowman lacks standing
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`because Bowman never alleged that he intended to rent an apartment at Centre
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`Place. The defendants have produced evidence that Bowman owns a home worth
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`over $500,000 that is located fifty-three miles from Centre Place. They further
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`claim that Bowman has filed eighty FHA lawsuits in three different states in less
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`than two years; thus, they assert that he is a “tester” who never had any interest in
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`renting an apartment at Centre Place and never suffered an injury by being denied
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`access to an apartment. 2
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` The Supreme Court has defined “testers” as “individuals who, without an
`2
`intent to rent or purchase a home or apartment, pose as renters or purchasers for
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`Case 4:15-cv-00272-LG-CMC Document 17 Filed 08/07/15 Page 4 of 8 PageID #: 154
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`In order to establish standing, a “plaintiff must have suffered an injury in
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`fact – an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
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`particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”
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`Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal citations and
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`quotation marks omitted). “Second, there must be a causal connection between the
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`injury and the conduct complained of – the injury has to be fairly . . . traceable to
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`the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action
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`of some third party not before the court.” Id. “Third, it must be likely, as opposed
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`to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id.
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`at 561. “At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from
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`the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that
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`general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the
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`claim.” Id.
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`Although the defendants attached evidence in support of their Rule 12(b)(1)
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`Motion, they assert that their Motion constitutes a “facial attack” on Bowman’s
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`Complaint. The Fifth Circuit has explained:
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`A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Rule
`12(b)(1), can be based on the lack of jurisdiction on the face of the
`complaint. If so, the plaintiff is left with safeguards similar to those
`retained when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a
`claim is raised – the court must consider the allegations in the
`plaintiff’s complaint as true.
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`the purpose of collecting evidence.” Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,
`373 (1982).
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`-4-
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`Case 4:15-cv-00272-LG-CMC Document 17 Filed 08/07/15 Page 5 of 8 PageID #: 155
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`Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981). Thus, a dismissal
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`pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is proper only if it appears certain, taking all facts as true
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`and resolving all inferences and doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, that the plaintiff’s
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`claim would not entitle him to relief. See Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d 19, 21
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`(5th Cir. 1992).
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`Bowman alleges that he observed numerous barriers to accessibility at
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`Centre Place that deterred him from renting an apartment there. Thus, it must
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`reasonably be inferred that Bowman intended to rent an apartment at Centre
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`Place. Because the defendants have made a facial challenge of Bowman’s
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`Complaint, the Court must accept Bowman’s allegations and the inferences from
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`those allegations as truthful. Therefore, Bowman’s allegations are sufficient to
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`grant him standing to pursue this lawsuit, and it is not necessary for the Court to
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`consider at this time whether testers have standing to pursue claims under 42
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`U.S.C. § 3604(f). See Elmowitz v. Exec. Towers at Lido, LLC, 571 F. Supp. 2d 370,
`3
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`376 (E.D. N.Y. 2008) (holding that a plaintiff stated a plausible claim for relief
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`pursuant to the FHA because he alleged he was disabled and that he was prevented
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`from renewing his apartment lease). The issues presented by the defendants’
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`motion must be fleshed out through discovery and summary judgment, not in a
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`facial attack at the pleadings stage. As a result, the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
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`for lack of standing is denied.
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` Bowman’s attorney has also represented to the Court that Bowman is not a
`3
`“tester.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 17, ECF No. 10).
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`-5-
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`Case 4:15-cv-00272-LG-CMC Document 17 Filed 08/07/15 Page 6 of 8 PageID #: 156
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`B. Ripeness
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`The Fifth Circuit has explained:
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`The ripeness doctrine’s basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through
`avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in
`abstract disagreements. A court should dismiss a case for lack of
`ripeness when the case is abstract or hypothetical. The key
`considerations are the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the
`hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. A case is
`generally ripe if any remaining questions are purely legal ones;
`conversely, a case is not ripe if further factual development is required.
`However, even where an issue presents purely legal questions, the
`plaintiff must show some hardship in order to establish ripeness.
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`Choice Inc. of Tex. v. Greenstein, 691 F.3d 710, 715 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal
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`quotation marks and citations omitted). “The Supreme Court has found hardship to
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`inhere in legal harms, such as the harmful creation of legal rights or obligations;
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`practical harms on the interests advanced by the party seeking relief; and the harm
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`of being forced to modify one’s behavior in order to avoid future adverse
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`consequences.” Id.
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`The defendants argue that Bowman’s claim is not ripe, because he has not
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`alleged that the defendants denied him reasonable accommodation or otherwise
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`discriminated against him. First, Bowman has not asserted a claim for denial of
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`reasonable accommodation; thus, it was not necessary for him to allege denial of
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`reasonable accommodation. Furthermore, Bowman has alleged that the defendants
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`failed to design and construct Centre Place in compliance with the FHA. The FHA
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`specifically included noncompliant design and construction within its definition of
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`“discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3). Finally, as explained previously, Bowman
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`-6-
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`Case 4:15-cv-00272-LG-CMC Document 17 Filed 08/07/15 Page 7 of 8 PageID #: 157
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`has alleged that he was deterred from renting an apartment at Centre Place as a
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`result of the barriers to access that he witnessed. As a result, the defendants’
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`arguments are without merit.
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`II. The Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
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`A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
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`that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In order to survive a
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`motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead
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`“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Turner v.
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`Pleasant, 663 F.3d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
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`U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “This standard ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a
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`reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary claims
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`or elements.” In re S. Scrap Material Co., LLC, 541 F.3d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 2008)
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`(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In Twombly, the Court held that “heightened
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`fact pleading of specifics” is not required, but “[f]actual allegations must be enough
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`to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the
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`allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S.
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`at 555, 570. However, a court should not accept conclusory allegations,
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`unwarranted factual inferences, and legal conclusions as true. In re Great Lakes
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`Dredge & Dock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010).
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`The defendants allege that Bowman’s claims should be dismissed because he
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`failed to identify the specific location of each alleged barrier to access. In support of
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`-7-
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`Case 4:15-cv-00272-LG-CMC Document 17 Filed 08/07/15 Page 8 of 8 PageID #: 158
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`this argument, however, the defendants rely on cases that concern the pleading
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`requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act, not the FHA.
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`In his First Amended Complaint, Bowman claims that Centre Place had no
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`accessible parking spaces for tenants or their guests when he visited. He also
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`claims that the tenant mailboxes were inaccessible due to their height as well as
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`the existence of a seven to ten inch curb. He further claims that the dumpster on
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`the property was inaccessible. He alleges that the thresholds at exterior doors
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`exceeded the maximum allowable height. Light switches, electrical outlets, and
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`thermostats were also too high. Some apartments had insufficient space
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`surrounding refrigerators and doors that were not wide enough for entry. The
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`Court finds that Bowman provided sufficient information to state a claim under the
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`FHA. If the defendants need additional information, they can request it in
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`discovery. As a result, the Motion to Dismiss is denied in this respect.
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`CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied.
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`IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Joint Motion
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`to Dismiss [4] filed by the defendants RJM Center, LLC, and Links Construction,
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`LLC, is DENIED.
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`SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 7 day of August, 2015.
`th
`
`s/ Louis Guirola, Jr.
`LOUIS GUIROLA, JR.
`CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
`
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