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`United States District Court
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`SHERMAN DIVISION
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`Civil Action No. 4:15-CV-764
`Judge Mazzant
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`SHAWN MINSHALL, LISA VICTORIA
`MINSHALL, LAUREN VICTORIA
`MINSHALL
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`v.
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`HARTMAN EQUINE REPRODUCTION
`CENTER, P.A.
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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`Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Judgment (Dkt. #132). Having
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`considered the motion and the pleadings, the Court finds that the motion should be denied.
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`BACKGROUND
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`This civil action proceeded to a jury trial on February 27, 28 and on March 1, 2, 3, 6, and
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`7, 2017. Plaintiffs alleged Defendant was liable for (1) violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade
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`Practices Act; (2) negligent misrepresentation; (3) negligence; (4) fraud; (5) joint enterprise; (6)
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`civil conspiracy; and (7) aiding and abetting after Otto, a foal Plaintiffs bred at Defendant
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`veterinary clinic, contracted Hereditary Equine Regional Dermal Asthenia (“HERDA”), a genetic
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`skin disease.
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`The jury returned a verdict on March 7, 2017. The jury found that Plaintiffs proved by a
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`preponderance of the evidence that Defendant’s negligence proximately caused Plaintiffs’
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`damages (Dkt. #131, Question 7). The jury found no liability against Defendant as to Plaintiffs
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`claims for violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, negligent misrepresentation,
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`fraud, joint enterprise, civil conspiracy, and aiding and abetting (Dkt. #131). The parties dispute
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`the measure of damages for Plaintiffs’ negligence claim and whether the Court should award
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`Case 4:15-cv-00764-ALM Document 135 Filed 04/26/17 Page 2 of 5 PageID #: 3264
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`attorneys’ fees. The Court finds Plaintiffs are entitled to $3,000 in damages and are not entitled to
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`an award of attorneys’ fees.
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`Damages
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`At the conclusion of the evidence, the Court submitted final instructions to the jury
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`providing specific factors for the jury to consider when awarding damages for each specific cause
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`of action (Dkt. #124). The Court instructed the jury that if it found Defendant negligent, in
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`awarding damages it should consider “the difference, if any, in the market value of Otto and the
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`market value Otto would have had if he had not been HERDA-affected.” (Dkt. #124 at p. 23). See
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`Pasadena State Bank v. Isaac, 228 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. 1950) (holding that “the general rule for
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`measuring damages to personal property is the difference in the market value immediately before
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`and immediately after the injury to such property”); Texas Pattern Jury Charges: Negligence
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`§ 31.3 (2016). For the other causes of action Plaintiffs alleged, the Court instructed the jury that
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`it could consider additional factors in determining damages, such as the reasonable and necessary
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`expenses related to foaling, raising, boarding, and training Otto in the past and future and Plaintiffs’
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`lost profits (Dkt. #124 at p. 21-24). See Texas Pattern Jury Charges: Business §§ 115.9-10;
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`115.20-21.
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`As requested by the parties, the verdict form contained one question regarding
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`compensatory damages (Dkt. #131, Question 14). The question instructed the jury to answer “what
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`sum of money . . . would fairly and reasonably compensate Plaintiffs for their damages, if any, that
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`were a producing or proximate cause of the occurrence in question” (Dkt. #131, Question 14). The
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`jury found the following damages:
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` $30,000 for the difference in value Otto would have had if he had not been HERDA-
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`affected;
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`2
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`Case 4:15-cv-00764-ALM Document 135 Filed 04/26/17 Page 3 of 5 PageID #: 3265
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` $28,408 for the reasonable and necessary expenses related to foaling, raising,
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`boarding, and training Otto in the past;
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` $75,000 for the reasonable and necessary expenses, in reasonable probability, the
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`Plaintiffs will incur related to caring for Otto in the future;
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` $30,000 for lost profits, in reasonable probability, Plaintiffs will sustain in the
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`future.
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`(Dkt. #131, Question 14). The jury thus found compensatory damages totaling $163,408. The
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`jury further found that Defendant was ten percent responsible for Plaintiffs’ injury (Dkt. #131,
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`Question 19).
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`Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to $16,340.80 in damages because the jury found
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`Plaintiffs suffered damages of $163,408 (Dkt. #132 at p. 3). Plaintiffs argue that “notwithstanding
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`the jury instruction on negligence, compensatory damages for economic losses proximately caused
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`by a party’s negligence are available to the prevailing party as a matter of law in Texas.”
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`(Dkt. #132 at p. 3). Defendant responds that pursuant to the Court’s instructions, the only
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`recoverable damage for negligence was the difference in the market value of Otto, which the jury
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`found was $30,000. Defendant states that Plaintiffs are only entitled to $3,000 because the jury
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`found Defendant was ten percent responsible for Plaintiffs’ injury (Dkt. #133 at p. 2–3).
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`The Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to $3,000 in damages. The general rule for
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`measuring damages to personal property is the difference in the market value immediately before
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`and immediately after the injury to such property. Pasadena State Bank v. Isaac, 228 S.W.2d 127
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`(Tex. 1950); J & D Towing, LLC v. Am. Alternative Ins. Corp., 478 S.W.3d 649, 661 (Tex. 2016).
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`Although economic damages are also available to a prevailing party in a negligence action, see
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`Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 83 (Tex. 1977), Plaintiffs did not object
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`3
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`Case 4:15-cv-00764-ALM Document 135 Filed 04/26/17 Page 4 of 5 PageID #: 3266
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`to the Court’s instruction limiting negligence damages to the difference in the market value of
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`Otto. The jury only found Defendant negligent and did not find Defendant liable under any other
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`cause of action.
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`Plaintiffs further argue that Defendant waived its right to object to any inconsistency in the
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`jury instructions, which limited negligence damages to Otto’s fair market value, and the jury
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`verdict, which did not limit the types of compensatory damages that the jury could award for each
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`cause of action. However, “the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that a jury’s answers are not
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`irreconcilably inconsistent when potentially inconsistent answers were in response to questions
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`that the jury should not have answered.” Oyefodun v. City of New Orleans, No. CIV.A. 98-3283,
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`2001 WL 775574, at *3 (E.D. La. July 9, 2001), aff'd, 54 F. App'x 793 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Smith
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`v. Tidewater Marine Towing, Inc., 927 F.2d 838, 840 (5th Cir.1991) (when jury found no
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`negligence and no unseaworthiness, answers to damage interrogatories were unnecessary); White
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`v. Grinfas, 809 F.2d 1157, 1161 (5th Cir.1987) (“If the district court has correctly found that the
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`jury’s answer to a question was supposed to terminate further inquiry is clear and disposed of the
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`legal issues, on review we must ignore the jury’s necessarily conflicting answers to any other
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`questions”)). See also Robroy Indus. Inc. v. Schwalbach, 481 F. App'x 133, 137 (5th Cir. 2012)
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`(“Where the jury has already answered a dispositive interrogatory, superfluous answers may be
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`disregarded”); Carr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 312 F.3d 667, 674 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that a
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`“district court does not abuse its discretion in reconciling verdicts containing answers to
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`interrogatories that the jury was instructed not to answer, when it . . . disregards the superfluous
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`answers in their entirety”).
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`Here, the Court instructed the jury that the only recoverable damage for Defendant’s
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`negligence was the difference in Otto’s market value. The jury only found Defendant negligent.
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`4
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`Case 4:15-cv-00764-ALM Document 135 Filed 04/26/17 Page 5 of 5 PageID #: 3267
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`Although the jury awarded additional compensatory damages, the Court will disregard the
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`superfluous answers. The jury may have misunderstood the Court’s instructions or awarded
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`additional damages for the fraud it found against Ed and Shona Dufurrena. See Willard v. The
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`John Hayward, 577 F.2d 1009, 1011 (5th Cir.1978) (“Even a jury verdict inconsistent on its face
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`is not inconsistent if it can be explained by assuming the jury reasonably misunderstood the
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`instructions.”). Plaintiffs’ motion for entry of judgment seeking compensation for all
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`compensatory damages is denied.
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`Attorneys’ Fees
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`Plaintiffs argue they are statutorily entitled to attorneys’ fees under Civil Practice and
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`Remedies Code Section 38.001(6). Section 38.001(6) states that “a person may recover reasonable
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`attorney’s fees from an individual or corporation, in addition to the amount of a valid claim and
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`costs, if the claim is for . . . killed or injured stock . . .” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
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`§ 38.001(6).
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`Plaintiffs’ complaint did not seek recovery of attorneys’ fees under Section 38.001(6).
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`Further, the jury did not make any findings regarding whether Otto was “injured” for purposes of
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`Section 38.001(6). Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees is denied.
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`CONCLUSION
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`It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Judgment (Dkt. #132) is
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`hereby DENIED. The Court will enter a final judgment consistent with this Memorandum
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`Opinion and Order.
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`5
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