Case 4:16-cv-00099-ALM-KPJ Document 28 Filed 03/08/17 Page 1 of 12 PageID #: 120
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`SHERMAN DIVISION
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:16cv99
`
`§§
`
`§
`§
` §
` §
`
`STEVEN D. WALKER, #1927071
`
`VS.
`
`IMRAN RAJWANI, Medical Director,
`UTMB c/o Buster Cole State Jail
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
`
`Pro se Plaintiff Steven D. Walker, previously an inmate confined at the Buster Cole Unit in
`
`Bonham, Texas, filed the above-styled and numbered lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42
`
`U.S.C. § 1973(a). In response, Dr. Imran Rajwani filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)
`
`of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to which Plaintiff filed a reply. This opinion concerns Dr.
`
`Rjwani’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. #21).
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Plaintiff filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to §1983 against Dr. Imran Rajwani, and also
`
`included a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), the Health Insurance Portability and
`
`Accountability Act (HIPAA). He seeks equitable relief and compensatory and punitive damages
`
`totaling $1 million. Plaintiff sues Dr. Rajwani in both his official and individual capacities.
`
`STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
`
`In his civil rights complaint, Plaintiff asserts Dr. Rajwani refused to lower his dosage of insulin
`
`for treatment of diabetes, after initially agreeing to do so. He claims Dr Rajwani refused to switch
`
`Plaintiff from insulin to metformin, a pill-based diabetes medication. Plaintiff further claims that he
`
`was not treated for diabetes for a week, between October 7 and October 14, 2015. Finally, Plaintiff
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 4:16-cv-00099-ALM-KPJ Document 28 Filed 03/08/17 Page 2 of 12 PageID #: 121
`
`alleges Dr. Rajwani refused to speak to him in private regarding his diabetes treatment, in violation
`
`of HIPAA. Plaintiff seeks equitable relief in the form of a full investigation and hearing, as well as
`
`compensatory and punitive damages.
`
`REQUIREMENT TO EXHAUST REMEDIES
`
`The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that prisoners are required to exhaust their
`
`administrative remedies before filing suit. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007). Section
`
`§1997e(a) of 42 U.S.C. provides that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
`
`under Section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,
`
`or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” The
`
`grievance must give the correctional authorities “fair notice” of the problem being complained of, such
`
`that these authorities have a fair opportunity to address the problem that will later form the basis of the
`
`lawsuit. Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 516-17 (5th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court stated that
`
`correctional authorities will not have a “fair opportunity” to consider the grievance unless the prisoner
`
`complies with the procedural rules – meaning that “proper” exhaustion, within the procedural rules
`
`laid out by the grievance system, is required. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 94 (2006); Johnson v.
`
`Ford, 261 F.App’x 752 (5th Cir. 2008).
`
`Texas state prisons use a two-step formal grievance process. Johnson, 385 F.3d at 515. A
`
`Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) prisoner must file a Step One Grievance within fifteen
`
`(15) days of the incident being grieved. Id., TDCJ Offender Orientation Handbook 74 (Jan. 2015),
`
`available at http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/documents/Offender_Orientation_Handbook_English.pdf.
`
`After receiving an adverse response from Step One grievance, the prisoner may then appeal via Step
`
`Two grievance within fifteen (15) days. Johnson, 385 F.3dd at 515. A prisoner must strictly adhere
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 4:16-cv-00099-ALM-KPJ Document 28 Filed 03/08/17 Page 3 of 12 PageID #: 122
`
`to TDCJ grievance procedures to properly exhaust a claim. Id. Inmates may not present new issues
`
`at the Step Two level, but must present their claims at both Step One and Step Two levels. Randle v.
`
`Woods, 299 F. App’x 466 (5th Cir. 2008). Prisoners are limited to pursuing a single issue per
`
`grievance. Id., at 467 (noting that “Randle’s complaint against Woods is raised for the first time in
`
`Randle’s Step Two grievance, in violation of TDCJ requirements that only one issue per grievance be
`
`presented, and that each issue have been filed at Step One”).
`
`In this case, the record shows the response from prison officials to Step Two grievance:
`
`A review of the Step 1 grievance and documentation was completed regarding your
`request not to be seen by the provider you saw on 10-7-15. An appellate review of the
`medical grievances and clinical records indicates you were given appropriate
`information in the Step 1 Response. Additionally, although you stated the date of your
`complaint[,] there is no evidence to support your complaint against the provider who
`saw you on that date. Documentation indicates you were seen in accordance with
`Correctional Managed Health Care Policy E-44.1 [pertains to the effort to ensure
`continuity of care upon the transfer of a prisoner from facility to facility]. No further
`action is warranted through the grievance process.
`
`Dkt. #1-1 (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s one issue in his grievance No. 2016022748 was that he wanted
`
`to be seen by a different doctor. Thus, Plaintiff failed to administratively exhaust the claims brought
`
`in this civil action, which were related, but separate from his desire to be seen by a different doctor.
`
`TDCJ instructs inmates that they must present only one issue per grievance. Randle, 299 F. App’x at
`
`467. Because each of the four (4) claims Plaintiff makes herein were never processed through the
`
`prison grievance system as required, the complaint should be dismissed for failure to exhaust
`
`administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
`
`MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(1) and (6)
`
`Even if Plaintiff had properly exhausted his administrative remedies, motions filed under Rule
`
`12(b)(1) allow a party to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case.
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 4:16-cv-00099-ALM-KPJ Document 28 Filed 03/08/17 Page 4 of 12 PageID #: 123
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three
`
`instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in
`
`the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of
`
`disputed facts. Barrerra-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996). The burden
`
`of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction; thus, the plaintiff
`
`constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does, in fact, exist. Ramming v. United States,
`
`281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). When a Rule 12b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule
`
`12 motions, as in this case, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before
`
`addressing any attack on the merits. Id.
`
`Furthermore, Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which
`
`relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
`
`plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Severance
`
`v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 490, 501 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
`
`544 (2007)). The Supreme Court stated that Rule 12(b)(6) must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a),
`
`which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
`
`Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
`
`Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain
`
`statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
`
`677-78 (2009). Rule 8 does not require “detailed factual allegations but it demands more than an
`
`unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. A pleading offering “labels and
`
`conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not suffice, nor does
`
`a complaint suffice if it provides naked assertions that are devoid of further factual enhancement.
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 4:16-cv-00099-ALM-KPJ Document 28 Filed 03/08/17 Page 5 of 12 PageID #: 124
`
` Id. Thus, a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains “enough facts to state a claim
`
`to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A plaintiff meets this standard
`
`when he “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
`
`defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint may be
`
`dismissed if a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”
`
`Id. The distinction between merely being possible and plausible was reiterated by the Supreme
`
`Court in Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint that pleads facts “merely consistent with” a defendant’s
`
`liability “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id.
`
`If the facts alleged in a complaint “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
`
`possibility of misconduct,” a plaintiff has not shown entitlement to relief. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
`
`8(a)(2)). A factual allegation “merely creating a suspicion” that a plaintiff might have a right of action
`
`is insufficient. Rios v. City of Del Rio, Tex., 444 F.3d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 2006). “The plausibility
`
`standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
`
`defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. If the facts alleged in a complaint fail to
`
`permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, a plaintiff has not shown
`
`entitlement to relief. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Dismissal is proper if a complaint lacks a
`
`factual allegation regarding any required element necessary to obtain relief. Rios, 44 F.3d at 421.
`
`In Twombly, the Supreme Court noted, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
`
`allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the
`
`elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556
`
`U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 4:16-cv-00099-ALM-KPJ Document 28 Filed 03/08/17 Page 6 of 12 PageID #: 125
`
`ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
`
`The Eleventh Amendment bars suit in federal court against a state, or its agencies or
`
`departments, regardless of the relief requested. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Alderman, 465 U.S.
`
`89, 100 (1984). Neither Congress nor the State of Texas has waived Eleventh Amendment immunity
`
`regarding Section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989) (“Congress,
`
`in passing § 1983, had no intention to disturb the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). A suit
`
`for damages against a state official in his official capacity is not a suit against that individual, but a
`
`suit against the state. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991).
`
`In this case, Plaintiff’s allegations concern matters within the scope of the employment of
`
`Dr. Rajwani as a state employee. Consequently, to the extent Plaintiff is suing him for money
`
`damages in his official capacity, the Eleventh Amendment bars these claims. Plaintiff’s claims for
`
`money damages must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
`
`QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
`
`Dr. Rajwani also asserts he has qualified immunity for claims asserted against him in his
`
`individual capacity. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability
`
`for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly-established statutory or
`
`constitutional rights about which a reasonable person would have known. It gives government
`
`officials breathing room to make reasonable, but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly
`
`incompetent, or those who knowingly violate the law. Thompson v. Mercer, 762 F.3d 433, 436-37
`
`(5th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 4:16-cv-00099-ALM-KPJ Document 28 Filed 03/08/17 Page 7 of 12 PageID #: 126
`
`To overcome the qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff must allege a violation of a
`
`constitutional right and show that the right was clearly established in the specific context of the case.
`
`See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 235-36 (2009). Since both prongs must be satisfied, the
`
`Supreme Court concluded that the sequence set forth in Saucier should no longer be regarded as
`
`mandatory. Id. at 236. If the court finds that an official’s conduct does not violate a clearly
`
`established constitutional right, then qualified immunity applies, and no further analysis is required.
`
`Id. at 232. If, however, the court finds that the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a clearly
`
`established constitutional right, the court must proceed in determining if the defendant’s action could
`
`reasonably have been thought consistent with that right. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 230 (1991).
`
`In determining whether the defendant acted reasonably, the court looks to whether the
`
`defendants’ actions were objectively reasonable in relation to the law as it existed at the time the
`
`conduct occurred and in light of the information the defendant possessed. Mouille v. City of Live
`
`Oak, 977 F.2d 924, 928 (5th Cir. 1993). Regardless of an official’s mistaken assumptions or
`
`subjective motivations, he is entitled to qualified immunity if his conduct is determined to have been
`
`objectively reasonable. The Fifth Circuit stated:
`
`[T]he court should ask whether the [defendants] acted reasonably under settled law
`in the circumstances, not whether another reasonable or more reasonable,
`interpretation of the events can be constructed . . . after the fact . . . . Even if law
`enforcement officials erred in [their conclusions], they would be entitled to qualified
`immunity if their decision was reasonable albeit mistaken. [Citations omitted.]
`
`Lampkin v. City of Nacogdoches, 7 F.3d 430, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom., Vanover
`
`v. Lampkin, 114 S. Ct. 1400 (1994). Similarly, in Valencia v. Wiggins, the Supreme Court held, “It
`
`is therefore irrelevant whether the defendants in this case acted with intent to injure as long as their
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 4:16-cv-00099-ALM-KPJ Document 28 Filed 03/08/17 Page 8 of 12 PageID #: 127
`
`conduct was objectively reasonable.” 981 F.2d 1440, 1448 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 509 U.S.
`
`905 (1993).
`
`A review of the record shows that Plaintiff’s claims do not rise to the level of deliberate
`
`indifference to a serious medical need. “Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to
`
`meet.” Domino v. Texas Dept. Of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). Deliberate
`
`indifference to the serious medical needs of an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment and states a
`
`cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). Deliberate
`
`indifference constitutes “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id., at 104. To establish
`
`deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show the defendant was both (1) aware of facts from which
`
`he could infer a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate’s health, and (2) actually inferred there
`
`was a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate’s health. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
`
`(1994). A “delay in medical care can only constitute an Eighth Amendment violation if there has
`
`been deliberate indifference [that] results in substantial harm.” Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 464
`
`(5th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original). “Actions and decisions by officials that are merely inept,
`
`erroneous, ineffective or negligent do not amount to deliberate indifference and thus do not divest
`
`the official of qualified immunity.” Doe v. Dallas Independent School District, 153 F.3d 211, 219
`
`(5th Cir. 1998). Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition is not sufficient. Estelle,
`
`429 U.S. at 105-06. Similarly, mere disagreement with medical treatment does not constitute
`
`deliberate indifference. Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 410 (5th Cir. 2013).
`
`“Medical records of sick calls, examinations, diagnoses, and medications may rebut an
`
`inmate’s allegations of deliberate indifference.” Banuelos v. McFarlane, 41 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir.
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 4:16-cv-00099-ALM-KPJ Document 28 Filed 03/08/17 Page 9 of 12 PageID #: 128
`
`1995). A plaintiff must show he was refused treatment, his complaints were ignored, he was treated
`
`incorrectly intentionally, or any other similar conduct clearly evincing a wanton disregard for any
`
`serious medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06.
`
`In the instant case, two of Plaintiff’s claims are mere disagreements with treatment choices -
`
`(1) Dr. Rajwani’s refusal to lower Plaintiff’s dosage of insulin, and (2) Dr. Rajwani’s refusal to
`
`change medications, from insulin to Metformin. Although Plaintiff’s appointment with Dr. Rajwani
`
`on October 7, 2015, escalated to the point that Dr. Rajwani asked Plaintiff to sign a refusal of
`
`treatment, Dr. Rajwani, the medical profession, gets to choose the medical treatment plan. Plaintiff’s
`
`disputes over his insulin dosage and insulin versus metformin are mere disagreements with Dr.
`
`Rajwani’s medical treatment plan. Thus, these claims do not constitute deliberate indifference.
`
`Rogers, 709 F.3d at 410. The claims must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state
`
`a claim.
`
`Plaintiff also complains about a week-long delay in diabetes treatment, between October 7
`
`and October 14, 2015. However, he fails to show substantial harm from any delay in medical
`
`treatment. Delay in medical care can only constitute an Eighth Amendment violation when deliberate
`
`indifference results in substantial harm. Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993).
`
`Here, Plaintiff asserts the nurses did not give him insulin for a week until a doctor ordered the doses
`
`restored, at which point, he presumably began to feel better. Plaintiff’s first opportunity to claim any
`
`harm from the delay was when he went to medical and a nurse asked him what was wrong because
`
`he was pale. Once Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, he alleged numerous symptoms from the purported
`
`gap, “severe medical trauma, major headaches, muscle cramps, sharp pains in feet and legs, stomach
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 4:16-cv-00099-ALM-KPJ Document 28 Filed 03/08/17 Page 10 of 12 PageID #: 129
`
`aches, blurred vision and un-balanc [sic], loss of feeling.” Thus, Plaintiff’s claims allege only minor
`
`medical inconveniences except for his conclusory claim of “severe medical trauma.” Plaintiff’s
`
`conclusory statement concerning “severe medical trauma” is insufficient to state a claim. Rios, 44
`
`F.3d at 421. In sum, Plaintiff fails to allege substantial harm from the delay of treatment;
`
`accordingly, this claim must also be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim
`
`upon which relief can be granted.
`
`PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT
`
`To hold a defendant liable under a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show the defendant was
`
`personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation. Personal involvement is an essential
`
`element. Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983). A plaintiff must establish a causal
`
`connection between the alleged constitutional deprivation and the defendant whom he would hold
`
`responsible. See Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir. 1983). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege
`
`any personal involvement by Dr. Rajwani or supervisory-capacity liability for his claim that he went
`
`without medical treatment for a week. Specifically, he alleged:
`
`I kept getting lay in to go get insulin[,] but the nurses would not give me insulin. And
`they stopped] giving me lay ins to go[,] so I didn’t. It was from 10-7-15 to about 10-
`14-15 that I didn’t get [anything] for my body for sugar level to stay normal and not
`hurt me.
`
`As shown, Plaintiff did not allege that Dr. Rajwani failed to give him insulin, nor does he allege that
`
`Dr. Rajwani, as a supervisor, ordered the nurses not to give him insulin. Plaintiff fails to allege
`
`personal involvement or supervisory-capacity liability by Dr. Rajwani regarding the week he
`
`allegedly went without diabetes treatment. Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed pursuant to
`
`Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 4:16-cv-00099-ALM-KPJ Document 28 Filed 03/08/17 Page 11 of 12 PageID #: 130
`
`HIPAA CLAIM
`
`Plaintiff also claims his rights were violated because Dr. Rajwani refused to return to the
`
`privacy of his office to continue their discussion concerning the appropriate medical treatment.
`
`HIPAA generally provides for confidentiality of medical records. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1 to d-7.
`
`Private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress. Alexander v. Sandoval,
`
`532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). HIPAA has no express provision creating a private cause of action. Banks
`
`v. Dallas Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 2001). HIPAA limits enforcement of the statute
`
`to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1 to d-7. The Fifth Circuit has
`
`unequivocally held that HIPAA does not create a private right of action, and therefore, no federal
`
`subject matter jurisdiction exists. Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 2006). Even
`
`assuming arguendo that Plaintiff could bring this claim, the disclosure he alleges was incidental to
`
`Dr. Rajwani’s permitted disclosure to Plaintiff for his treatment. Plaintiff’s allegation of a HIPAA
`
`privacy rule violation must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
`
`which relief can be granted.
`
`TDCJ AND UTMB CLAIMS
`
`In Plaintiff’s original complaint, he named one defendant - “Imran Rajwani, Medical
`
`Director, UTMB, c/o Buster Cole State Jail.” He complains only of the medical care received by
`
`Dr. Rajwani, asking for an investigation and a hearing and “to be compensated for all damages.”
`
`Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint, styled as “Steven Walker v. TDCJ Medical Dept
`
`Imran Rajwani, M.D.” Although Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint states it seeks $250,000 in
`
`equitable relief from TDCJ, $250,000 in compensatory damages from UTMB (University of Texas
`
`Medical Branch), and $500,000 from Dr. Rajwani, Dr. Rajwani is the only proper Defendant.
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case 4:16-cv-00099-ALM-KPJ Document 28 Filed 03/08/17 Page 12 of 12 PageID #: 131
`
`Plaintiff makes no specific claims against TDJC or UTMB. Moreover, TDCJ and UTMB are state
`
`agencies, and immune from liability. Lewis v. UTMB at Galveston, 665 F.3d 625, 630 (5th Cir.
`
`2011); Sampson v. United States, 73 F. App’x 48 (5th Cir. 2003). Thus, any claims against TDCJ
`
`and UTMB are frivolous and must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1).
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`In conclusion, Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust all available administrative remedies before
`
`filing suit. Even if Plaintiff had properly exhausted his administrative remedies, his alleged facts do
`
`not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief
`
`may be granted; thus, Defendant’s motion to dismiss must be granted. It is therefore
`
`ORDERED that Defendant Dr. Imran Rajwani’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. #21) is
`
`GRANTED and the claims against him are DISMISSED with prejudice. Any construed claims
`
`against TDCJ and UTMB are DISMISSED as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). All
`
`motions by either party not previously ruled on are hereby DENIED.
`
`12
`
`