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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`SHERMAN DIVISION
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`THE STATE OF TEXAS, et al.,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`GOOGLE LLC,
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`Defendant.
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`Civil Action No. 4:20-CV-957-SDJ
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`DEFENDANT GOOGLE LLC’S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE
`PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
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`The first case alleging that Google has monopolized online display advertising was filed in
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`May 2020 by an advertiser, seeking to represent a putative class of advertisers and publishers. An
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`identical case was filed a month later in June 2020, followed by a consolidated class action
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`complaint in September 2020.1 Three more similar cases were filed in December 2020, and, in
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`January 2021, a sixth. All of these private class actions were filed in the Northern District of
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`California, the venue where Google is headquartered and where more relevant witnesses and
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`documents are located than in any other district in the country.2
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`Like all these cases filed in the Northern District of California, this case alleges violations
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`of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, plus state antitrust and unfair competition law claims, and seeks
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`injunctive relief and damages. This case also alleges a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
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`based on Google’s alleged “unlawful agreement with Facebook … to manipulate advertising
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`auctions.” Compl. ¶ 2. Facebook, like Google, has its principal place of business in the Northern
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`District of California.
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`1 In re Google Digital Advertising Antitrust Litig., No. 20-cv-03556 (N.D. Cal.), Dkt. 1, 24, 25.
`2 Sweepstakes Today LLC v. Google LLC, No. 20-cv-08984 (N.D. Cal.); Genius Group Media,
`Inc. v. Google LLC, No. 20-cv-09092 (N.D. Cal.); Sterling Int’l Consulting Group v. Google
`LLC, No. 20-cv-9321 (N.D. Cal.); Astarita v. Google LLC, No. 21-cv-00022 (N.D. Cal.).
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`Case 4:20-cv-00957-SDJ Document 28 Filed 01/19/21 Page 2 of 16 PageID #: 321
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`Yet, Plaintiffs brought this case in the Sherman Division of the Eastern District of Texas—
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`a venue that has no special connection to the case. The Complaint contains no factual allegations
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`that connect Google’s alleged conduct to this division or District, or even this State. One might
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`expect that the State of Texas would want to sue in Texas court. But nine other states are plaintiffs
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`as well. Those states range from the far north (North Dakota) to the far west (Idaho) to the midwest
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`(Indiana) to the deep south (Mississippi), and plainly their claims—particularly, the parens patriae
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`claims on behalf of their individual citizens—have no particular connection to the Eastern District
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`of Texas. If Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota and South
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`Dakota would not be inconvenienced by trying this case in Texas—a venue with no connection to
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`their claims—then they would not be inconvenienced by trying it almost anywhere in the country,
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`and certainly not in the Northern District of California. As certain class action plaintiffs said in
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`opposition to a motion filed with the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to consolidate
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`various private antitrust litigation against Google (including various digital advertising class
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`actions) in the District of Columbia, “[t]he Northern District of California is the location of the
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`defendant and the most witnesses and evidence for purposes of these cases.” In re: Google
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`Antitrust Litigation, Dkt. 34 at 9 (MDL No. 2981). The private-interest factors that guide a
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`§ 1404(a) analysis therefore strongly favor transfer of this case to the Northern District of
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`California. And the public-interest factors tilt in favor of transfer as well. For those reasons, we
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`request that the Court grant Google’s motion and transfer the case.
`ARGUMENT
`The legal criteria for transferring a case pursuant to § 1404(a) are well-established. The
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`court must first determine whether the case “might have been brought” in the proposed transferee
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`forum and, if so, then consider eight factors—four “private interest” factors and four “public
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`interest” factors. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 312–15 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
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`-2-
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`Case 4:20-cv-00957-SDJ Document 28 Filed 01/19/21 Page 3 of 16 PageID #: 322
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`The private interest factors are: “(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the
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`availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance
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`for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious
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`and inexpensive.” Id. at 315 (internal citation omitted).
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`The public interest factors are: “(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court
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`congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity
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`of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems
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`of conflict of laws [or in] the application of foreign law.” Id.
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`Under the general venue statute, as the Fifth Circuit has recognized, “large corporations …
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`often have sufficient contacts to satisfy the requirement of § 1391(c) for most, if not all, federal
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`venues,” such that the statute “‘has the effect of nearly eliminating venue restrictions in suits
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`against corporations.’” Id. at 313 (quoting 14D Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice &
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`Procedure § 3802 (3d ed. 2007)). Section 1404(a) serves to “prevent plaintiffs from abusing their
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`privilege under § 1391 by subjecting defendants to venues that are inconvenient under the terms
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`of § 1404(a).” Id. at 315; Veba-Chemie A.G. v. M/V Getafix, 711 F.2d 1243, 1247 (5th Cir. 1983)
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`(§ 1404(a) “requires only that the transfer be ‘[f]or the convenience of the parties, in the interest
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`of justice.’”); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981) (noting the “relaxed standards
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`for transfer” under § 1404(a)).
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`It is indisputable that Plaintiffs could have brought this case in the Northern District of
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`California, as have the plaintiffs in the In re Google Digital Advertising Antitrust Litig., Genius
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`Media Group, Sweepstakes Today, Sterling Int’l Consulting Group, and Astarita cases.3 The issue
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`is whether the private- and public-interest factors favor transfer to the Northern District of
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`California as the more convenient and appropriate forum. They do.
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`3 In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 312 (“The preliminary question under § 1404(a) is whether a
`civil action ‘might have been brought’ in the destination venue.”).
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`-3-
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`Case 4:20-cv-00957-SDJ Document 28 Filed 01/19/21 Page 4 of 16 PageID #: 323
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`I.
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`The Private-Interest Factors Favor Transfer to the Northern District of California
`All four private-interest factors favor transfer.
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`Relative ease of access to sources of proof. In re Volkswagen arose from an automobile
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`accident on a Dallas freeway. It was undisputed that (i) the accident occurred in Dallas, (ii) the
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`vehicle was purchased there, (iii) Dallas residents witnessed the accident, (iv) Dallas police and
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`paramedics responded, (v) a Dallas doctor performed the autopsy, and (vi) the third-party
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`defendant (the driver of the car that struck the plaintiff) lived in Dallas. It was also undisputed that
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`none of the plaintiffs lived in the Marshall Division (where they filed the case), no witness lived
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`there, no source of proof was located there, and none of the facts giving rise to the case occurred
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`there.
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`The plaintiffs argued nevertheless that the relative ease of access to sources of proof was
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`the same for Dallas and Marshall because of “copying technology and information storage.” 545
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`F.3d at 316. The Fifth Circuit rejected plaintiffs’ argument out of hand, underscoring that “the
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`sources of proof requirement is a meaningful factor in the analysis” and that improved information-
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`sharing technology “does not render this factor superfluous.” Id.
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`Here, the challenged conduct occurred in the Northern District of California, where Google
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`has its headquarters and where its executives and most of its employees work, or in New York
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`City, where a number of employees concerned with display advertising work. None of the alleged
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`anticompetitive conduct is alleged to have occurred in this District, or even in Texas. Plaintiffs’
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`allegations acknowledge as much. The Complaint’s allegations of wrongdoing identify nine
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`Google employees by name,4 but none of them work in Texas. The Complaint’s allegations of
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`wrongdoing also quote or characterize a number of Google communications5—documents that
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`were authored by, sent to, or possessed by more than 150 Google employees in all. But, again,
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`4 E.g., Compl. ¶¶ 104, 160, 168.
`5 E.g., id. ¶¶ 5, 11, 13.
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`-4-
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`Case 4:20-cv-00957-SDJ Document 28 Filed 01/19/21 Page 5 of 16 PageID #: 324
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`none of these employees work in Texas. The vast majority work at Google’s Mountain View
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`headquarters or satellite offices in San Francisco or Sunnyvale (all in the Northern District of
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`California) or in New York City. While this District would be inconvenient for all of these
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`witnesses, the Northern District of California would be more convenient for dozens of them.6
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`The same is true of third-party witnesses and sources of documentary proof according to
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`the Complaint. It identifies various relevant third parties, a majority of which have their
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`headquarters or offices in Northern District of California (or elsewhere in California or
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`Washington State). None has its headquarters or offices in the Eastern District of Texas. The
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`Complaint names fourteen alleged rivals, Facebook, foremost among them. Facebook, like
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`Google, has its headquarters in the Northern District of California (in Facebook’s case, in Menlo
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`Park, California). The Complaint devotes 25 paragraphs to allegations that “the two giants reached
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`an illegal agreement” to prevent competitive bidding for display ads.7 There is no allegation they
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`did so in this District, however. To the contrary, the Complaint alleges that the “illegal agreement”
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`was the product of “formal negotiations” between executives of Facebook and Google. And where
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`are the other alleged rivals located?
` Apple (Compl. ¶¶ 142, 190): headquartered in Cupertino, California in N.D.
`Cal.
` Project Rubicon (id. ¶¶ 46, 76-77, 260): headquartered in Los Angeles,
`California; offices in N.D. Cal.
` OpenX (id. ¶¶ 203, 205, 254): headquartered in Pasadena, California; offices in
`N.D. Cal.
` The Trade Desk, Inc. (id. ¶¶ 54, 71, 230): headquartered in Ventura, California;
`offices in N.D. Cal.
` 24/7 Real Media (id. ¶¶ 64, 99, 104): headquartered in New York, New York;
`offices in N.D. Cal.
`Index Exchange (id. ¶¶ 76-77); headquartered in New York, New York; offices
`in N.D. Cal.
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`6 See Decl. of Andrew Rope ¶¶ 4-11, regarding the foregoing facts.
`7 Compl. ¶¶ 171-96. These paragraphs follow the heading, “Facebook helps Google kill Header
`bidding with an unlawful agreement.”
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`-5-
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`Case 4:20-cv-00957-SDJ Document 28 Filed 01/19/21 Page 6 of 16 PageID #: 325
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` Microsoft (id. ¶¶ 99, 142-43, 152): headquartered in Redmond, Washington;
`offices in N.D. Cal.
` Yahoo (id. ¶¶ 99, 152, 254): headquartered in New York, New York; offices in
`N.D. Cal.
` Amazon (id. ¶¶ 55, 142, 155, 162, 174, 176): headquartered in Seattle,
`Washington; offices in N.D. Cal.
` Criteo (id. ¶¶ 176): headquartered in Paris, France; offices in N.D. Cal.
`Only two alleged rivals have any connection to Texas (id. ¶¶ 76-77, 99, 109), but no connection
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`to this District, and each has strong connections to the Northern District of California.8
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`Just as in In re Volkswagen where there was easier access to the sources of proof in Dallas
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`because the accident occurred in Dallas, so here there is easier access to sources of proof in the
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`Northern District of California—because Google, Facebook, and most of the other alleged rival
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`companies identified in the Complaint are there. According to Plaintiffs’ own allegations, the
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`majority of the witnesses and documents will be found in the Northern District of California, while
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`there is no reason to believe that significant sources of proof will be found in this District. The first
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`private-interest factor therefore favors transfer to the Northern District of California.
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`Compulsory process. Rule 45, as extensively amended in 2013, permits a trial subpoena
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`to command the attendance of the witness “within 100 miles of where the person resides, is
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`employed, or regularly transacts business in person” or, if the witness is a party or party’s officer,
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`“within the state where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person.”
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`Thus, in its defense, Google would be unable to subpoena witnesses from Facebook or other
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`relevant third parties (including former Google employees), many of whom are located in
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`California. The Complaint does not identify a single company or person who might be a witness
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`at trial and lives or works within 100 miles of the Sherman Division courthouse. When applying
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`8 ValueClick (Compl. ¶¶ 99, 109) is now a subsidiary of Epsilon Data Management, which is
`headquartered in Irving, Texas. It does not appear to have offices in this District but does have
`offices in the Northern District of California. Similarly, AT&T (headquartered in Dallas)
`bought AppNexus (id. ¶¶ 76-77, 230, 254), which once operated an ad exchange, and made it
`a subsidiary of AT&T’s advertising division, Xandr. Xandr is headquartered in New York City
`and has offices in the Northern District of California.
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`-6-
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`Case 4:20-cv-00957-SDJ Document 28 Filed 01/19/21 Page 7 of 16 PageID #: 326
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`§ 1404(a), the courts have a decided preference for trials where witnesses appear live, not by
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`deposition. Rule 43(a) provides: “[a]t trial, the witnesses’ testimony must be taken in open court,”
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`absent “good cause in compelling circumstances and with appropriate safeguards.” The Advisory
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`Notes underscore why: “The importance of presenting live testimony in court cannot be forgotten.
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`The very ceremony of trial and the presence of the factfinder may exert a powerful force for
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`truthtelling. The opportunity to judge the demeanor of a witness face-to-face is accorded great
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`value in our tradition.”9 By filing in this District, Plaintiffs invite a trial where the only live
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`witnesses will be retained experts and those controlled by the parties. Accordingly, the second
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`private-interest factor also favors transfer to the Northern District of California.
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`Cost of attendance. It is an “obvious conclusion,” the Fifth Circuit said in In re
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`Volkswagen, that it is more convenient for witnesses to testify at home and that “[a]dditional
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`distance means additional travel time; additional travel time increases the probability for meal and
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`lodging expenses; and additional travel time with overnight stays increases the time which these
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`fact witnesses must be away from their regular employment.” 545 F.3d at 317; ESI/Employee
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`Solutions, L.P. v. City of Dallas, 2019 WL 5684668 at *4 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2019) (“Courts look
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`to the distance between witnesses and venue to determine the degree of inconvenience each district
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`poses.”). Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit established a 100-mile threshold—i.e., when the distance
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`between the existing and proposed venues is more than a hundred miles (as here), then “the factor
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`of inconvenience to witnesses increases in direct relationship to the additional distance to be
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`traveled.” In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 317. By that standard, it is significantly more inconvenient
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`for the witnesses in the San Francisco area to attend trial in the Sherman Division than in San Jose
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`or San Francisco, as the Sherman Division is 1,700 miles distant. In In re Volkswagen, the dispute
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`9 See Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Only through live cross-
`examination can the jury fully appreciate the strength or weakness of the witness’ testimony
`…. Videotaped deposition testimony, subject to all of the rigors of cross-examination, is as
`good a surrogate for live testimony as you will find, but it is still only a substitute.”).
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`-7-
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`Case 4:20-cv-00957-SDJ Document 28 Filed 01/19/21 Page 8 of 16 PageID #: 327
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`
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`was over venue in the Marshall Division versus in Dallas, a distance of only 155 miles. Yet the
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`Fifth Circuit held that the cost-of-attendance factor favored transfer, emphasizing both the
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`monetary costs suffered by the witnesses and “the personal costs associated with being away from
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`work, family, and community.” Id. The third factor therefore also favors transfer to the Northern
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`District of California.
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`Practical problems and judicial economy. The fourth private-interest factor follows from
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`the first three: if the greatest number of witnesses and other sources of proof are located a thousand
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`or more miles away, then trial in this District will be less easy, expeditious, and inexpensive than
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`it would be if it were held where the evidence is. Oddly enough, Plaintiffs’ chosen forum is not
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`convenient even for them. Nine of the ten Plaintiffs are states distant from Texas, the Attorneys
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`General for which have their offices hundreds of miles away: Arkansas (320 miles); Idaho (1,567
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`miles); Indiana (905 miles); Kentucky (872 miles); Mississippi (406 miles); Missouri (609 miles);
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`North Dakota (1,172 miles); South Dakota (953 miles); Utah (1,229 miles). A Texas forum may
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`be convenient for the Texas Attorney General, but even his office is 214 miles distant from the
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`Sherman Division. And Texas’s outside counsel are further away, in Houston (257 miles), Chicago
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`(907 miles), and Washington, D.C. (1,330 miles). While a plaintiff’s choice of forum often
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`conveniences only plaintiff’s counsel, Plaintiffs’ choice here does not spare any counsel lengthy
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`travel. Their choice would require all counsel to board a plane or spend hours behind the wheel.
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`The nine Plaintiffs other than Texas have already demonstrated a willingness to travel great
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`distances to litigate this case. If they are not inconvenienced by travel to Texas, they will not be
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`inconvenienced by travel to the Northern District of California. Even Texas has demonstrated its
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`willingness to litigate its antitrust claims against Google halfway across the country, for Texas is
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`a plaintiff in the antitrust case filed in October 2020 by the United States in the District Court for
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`-8-
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`Case 4:20-cv-00957-SDJ Document 28 Filed 01/19/21 Page 9 of 16 PageID #: 328
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`the District of Columbia. So, too, are the other nine Plaintiffs.10 In other words, when the nine
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`Plaintiffs other than Texas elected to sue in this District, all nine selected this venue for reasons
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`other than convenience and judicial economy. The Complaint alleges no facts that demonstrate a
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`special connection between Plaintiffs’ claims and this District, and no considerations that would
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`make trial here, rather than in the Northern District of California, easier, more expeditious, or less
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`expensive.
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`Moreover, important considerations of judicial economy favor transfer. As courts in this
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`District have recognized repeatedly, the practical problems encompassed by the fourth private-
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`interest factor “include those that are rationally based on judicial economy, … [p]articularly, the
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`existence of duplicative suits involving the same or similar issues.” ATEN Int’l Co. v. Emine
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`Tech. Co., 261 F.R.D. 112, 125 (E.D. Tex. 2009).11 Where such suits exist, the fourth factor “will
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`weigh heavily in favor or against transfer.” Id.; Fujitsu Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 2d 761,
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`768 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (“While Fujitsu may be content trying two similar patent actions in courts
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`across the country, judicial economy will not bear that result.”); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Distinctive
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`Development Ltd., 964 F. Supp. 2d 638, 650-51 (E.D. Tex. 2013) (duplicative suits “counsel for
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`the cases to be handled by the same court”); Princeton Digital Image Corp. v. Facebook, Inc.,
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`2012 WL 3647182 at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2012) (“[I]t simply ‘does not make any sense for two
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`courts to plow the same ground’”; granting transfer motion).
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`It is not necessary that the case(s) pending in the transferee forum be identical. In re
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`Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 566 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (applying Fifth Circuit law) (“[T]he
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`existence of multiple lawsuits involving the same issues is a paramount consideration when
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`determining whether a transfer is in the interest of justice… Although these cases may not involve
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`10 Rope Decl. ¶¶ 12-13.
`11 All emphases are added, and all internal citations omitted, unless otherwise indicated.
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`-9-
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`Case 4:20-cv-00957-SDJ Document 28 Filed 01/19/21 Page 10 of 16 PageID #: 329
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`
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`precisely the same issues, there will be significant overlap and a familiarity with the patents could
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`preserve time and resources.”).12 What matters for purposes of judicial economy is whether the
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`issues sufficiently overlap that it would duplicate (and, therefore, waste) judicial resources to
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`litigate them in two forums and also risk inconsistent rulings.
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`The antitrust class actions against Google in the Northern District of California make
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`similar claims of monopolistic conduct relating to online display advertising. All, like this case,
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`bring Section 2 monopolization claims under the Sherman Act. All, like this case, seek damages
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`and unspecified injunctive relief. And, although the several complaints give greater or lesser
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`emphasis to certain alleged conduct, all allege the following conduct: (1) Google’s alleged
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`leveraging of its position in search and search advertising to acquire market power in display
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`advertising; (2) Google’s alleged manipulation of its position as (i) broker for both the buyers and
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`sellers of display advertising and (ii) operator of the exchange on which the buying and selling
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`takes place to self-deal; (3) Google’s alleged misinformation and lack of transparency; (4)
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`Google’s alleged suppression of head-to-head bidding with other advertising exchanges; and (5)
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`Google’s alleged tying and product integration arrangements.13
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`Though there may be differences in emphasis and the choice of factual detail, the core of
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`each complaint is the same, alleging Google’s dominance of the supposedly relevant markets in
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`almost identical language. Compare Plaintiffs’ central allegation, “Google uses its powerful
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`position on every side of the online display markets to unlawfully exclude competition,” Compl.
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`¶ 6, with what the plaintiffs in the Northern District of California allege:
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`12 See also Fujitsu, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 768; Uniloc, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 650 (“same or similar
`issues”); Princeton Digital Image, 2012 WL 3647182 at *5 (“similar (if not identical) issues”);
`ExpressJet Airlines, Inc. v. RBC Capital Markets Corp., 2009 WL 2244468 at *10 (S.D. Tex.
`July 27, 2009) (“multiple cases, similar both legally and factually”); Westberry v. GusTech
`Commncn’s, LLC, 2018 WL 3548869 at *9 (N.D. Tex. July 24, 2018) (“substantially similar
`FLSA claims”).
`13 The class action complaints are attached as Exhibits B-F to the Declaration of Andrew Rope.
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`-10-
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` Digital Advertising: “[I]n display advertising, a single company, Google,
`simultaneously functions as the key intermediary through which buyers
`(advertisers) and suppliers (publishers) of display advertising trade, and as a
`leading publisher of advertisements in its own right.” Compl. ¶ 52; Ex. B.
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` Sweepstakes Today: “Google is now in the unusual position of representing
`both buyers (advertisers) and sellers (publishers), while also being in control
`of the exchange (which sets the auction and pricing rules) through which
`they interact, giving Google the incentive and ability to bias ad auction rules
`and prices in its own favor, which it has done for many years.” Compl. ¶ 8; Ex.
`C.
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` Genius Media: “The unlawful anticompetitive conduct at the heart of this case
`occurs in the display advertising marketplace, where publishers sell advertising
`space through real-time auctions. Through its campaign of anticompetitive
`conduct, Google has achieved and maintained a monopoly or near-monopoly
`in that marketplace by erecting a toll bridge between publishers and
`advertisers and charging an unlawfully high price for passage,” Compl. ¶ 2;
`“Google’s conduct has both the goal and effect of gaining control over the
`entire range of products, … locking publishers and advertisers into a Google-
`controlled network—all of which allows Google to extract more revenue from
`publishers and advertisers alike,” Compl. ¶ 63; Ex. D.
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` Sterling: “Google is able to [maximize its own revenues] because it occupies
`the dominant position as the representative for most sellers (Publishers) and
`most buyers (advertisers), and because of its role in designing and conducting
`the auctions for the sellers’ inventory ….” Compl. ¶ 82; Ex. E.
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` Astarita: “[I]n display advertising, a single company, Google, simultaneously
`functions as the key intermediary through which buyers (advertisers) and
`suppliers (publishers) of display advertising trade, and as a leading publisher
`of advertisements in its own right.” Compl. ¶ 39; Ex. F.
`Transfer of this case—which so clearly asserts similar claims—promises an extra measure
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`of judicial economy, because it offers the prospect that one judge can oversee discovery, gain
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`familiarity with the facts and legal issues, rule on dispositive motions, and, if necessary, preside
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`over a trial.
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`In sum, all four private-interest factors favor transfer to the Northern District of California.
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`-11-
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`Case 4:20-cv-00957-SDJ Document 28 Filed 01/19/21 Page 12 of 16 PageID #: 331
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`II.
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`The Public-Interest Factors Also Favor Transfer to the Northern District Of
`California
`Two public-interest factors are neutral. Whether the case proceeds in this District or the
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`Northern District of California, the court (i) will have equal familiarity with the federal law that
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`will govern the principal legal claim (violations of the Sherman Act) and (ii) will unavoidably have
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`to apply another state’s law (as each Plaintiff brings unfair competition or consumer-protection
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`claims under state statutes). The other two factors—relative court congestion and the local interest
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`in having localized interests decided locally—favor transfer.
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`Administrative difficulties. For all practical purposes, this factor is neutral. Although
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`judges in the Northern District of California nominally carry a heavier caseload, “weighted filings”
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`in that District and here are comparable—605 per judge here, 612 there. And the judges in both
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`districts manage and dispose of their cases efficiently: only 7.6 percent are more than three years
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`old here, 8.4 percent there.14 The courts of this District have repeatedly stated that this factor is
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`“the most speculative” and that “case-disposition statistics may not always tell the whole
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`story”15—indeed, may be “relatively meaningless”16—because “[c]omplex cases … need more
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`time for discovery and take longer to get to trial” no matter where they proceed. Virginia
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`Innovation Sci., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2019 WL 3082314 at *32 (E.D. Tex. July 15, 2019).
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`Here, transfer unquestionably achieves overall efficiency because it places this case in the same
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`district as numerous other antitrust cases against Google that concern the same claims.
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`
`14 U.S. Courts, Federal Court Management Statistics—Profiles as of Sept. 30, 2020, https://
`www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-court-management-statistics-september-2020
`(last visited Jan. 13, 2021).
`15 E.g., TDE Petrol. Data Solutions, Inc. v. Akm Enter., Inc., 2015 WL 11110603 at *3 (E.D.
`Tex. June 24, 2015); StoneAge, Inc. v. NLB Corp., 2011 WL 13224884 at *7-8 (E.D. Tex. Mar.
`30, 2011).
`16 Unomedical A/S v. Smiths Medical MD, Inc., 2010 WL 2680144 at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2010).
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`Case 4:20-cv-00957-SDJ Document 28 Filed 01/19/21 Page 13 of 16 PageID #: 332
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`Local interest. The ten Plaintiff States’ interest in having this case adjudicated in Texas
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`does not outweigh the greater interest that California courts have in adjudicating this matter that
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`involves numerous California residents and third parties. Under these circumstances, this factor
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`favors transfer to the Northern District of California (or, at worst, is neutral).
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`Plaintiffs may argue that online advertisers and publishers located in the Eastern District
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`of Texas have an interest in trying the case here, as do local consumers of the publishers’ content
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`and the advertisers’ products. But the Complaint does not identify any such advertisers, publishers,
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`or consumers. And the Complaint gives no reason to believe that there are more advertisers,
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`publishers and consumers here than in the Northern District of California or any other federal
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`judicial district. As the Fifth Circuit stated in In re Volkswagen, the argument that local residents
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`have an interest in the dispute “could apply virtually to any judicial district or division in the
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`United States …. That the residents of the Marshall Division ‘would be interested to know’
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`whether a defective product is available does not imply that they have an interest—that is, a
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`stake—in the resolution of this controversy.” 545 F.3d at 318.17
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`But while this District has no greater interest in the case than, for example, Mississippi’s
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`Eastern Division in Hattiesburg or the Northern Division of Arkansas’s Eastern District in
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`Jonesboro, the Northern District of California does have a greater interest than any other District.
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`First, California has a particular interest in adjudicating conduct that occurs in California as well
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`as conduct, wherever it occurs, of corporations that have their principal places of business in
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`California. In Optimum Power Solutions LLC v. Apple Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d 696, 702-03 (E.D.
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`17 See FTC v. Fortune Hi-Tech Mktg., Inc., 2013 WL 1858598 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2013) (“In this
`case, where the alleged injury was nationwide, the Northern District of Illinois has no
`particularly significant connection to the situs of material events. The alleged scheme impacted
`victims not only in Illinois but throughout the United States and Canada, and there is no reason
`to believe that any injury occurring in Illinois is more significant than injury that occurred
`in any other district.”).
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`Case 4:20-cv-00957-SDJ Document 28 Filed 01/19/21 Page 14 of 16 PageID #: 333
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`Tex. 2011), this Court stated that “[g]enerally, local interests that ‘could apply virtually to any
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`judicial district or division in the United States’ are disregarded in favor of particularized local
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`interests.”18 The Court granted the defendant’s motion to transfer the case to the Northern District
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`of California because:
`Two defendants and the plaintiff’s parent company are located in the Northern
`District. Products manufactured by companies in the Northern District of California
`are implicated in this case. Another party is located in the Southern District of
`California. Additionally, many non-party entities and individuals relevant to this
`case are located in California. California is a clearly more convenient venue for
`more witnesses and parties and has a much greater and localized interest in this
`litigation than this District.
`Id.19 As noted, Google and Facebook have their principal places of business in California, and at
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`least ten other alleged rivals named in the Complaint also have their headquarters or major offices
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`there. See pp. 4-6, supra. Second, where Plaintiffs seek equitable relief, a California forum has the
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`greater local interest. AllChem Performance Prods., Inc. v. Oreq Corp., 2013 WL 180460 at *6-7
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`(N.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2013) (“[T]he acts giving rise to suit occurred predominately in California,
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`where the trichlor products were manufactured and allegedly mislabeled. Any equitable relief this
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`court grants would therefore alter Oreq’s and PPI’s operations in California.”).
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`Under these circumstances, no deference is due Plaintiffs’ choice to sue in this D