Case 5:22-cv-00069-RWS-JBB Document 148 Filed 12/27/23 Page 1 of 11 PageID #: 8073
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TEXARKANA DIVISION
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`PANTECH CORPORATION and PANTECH
`WIRELESS, LLC,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`ONEPLUS TECHNOLOGY (SHENZHEN)
`CO., LTD.,
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`Defendant.
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`C.A. No. 5:22-cv-00069-RWS-JBB
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`PUBLIC VERSION
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`DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO
`MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF INVALIDITY AND NONINFRINGEMENT
`OF U.S. PAT. NO. 9,063,654 (DKT. 119) (REQUEST FOR ORAL HEARING)
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`Case 5:22-cv-00069-RWS-JBB Document 148 Filed 12/27/23 Page 2 of 11 PageID #: 8074
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`II.
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`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 1
`A.
`The Asserted ’654 Patent Claims Are Patent Ineligible ......................................... 1
`1.
`Dependent Claims 6, 8, and 10 are Patent Ineligible ............................................. 1
`2.
`The Asserted Claims are Directed to an Abstract Idea .......................................... 2
`3.
`There is Nothing Transformative in the Claims of the ’654 Patent ....................... 4
`No Issues of Fact Remain as to Infringement of the ’654 Patent Claims ............... 5
`B.
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 6
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`Case 5:22-cv-00069-RWS-JBB Document 148 Filed 12/27/23 Page 3 of 11 PageID #: 8075
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Cases
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`Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
`880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ................................................................................................... 3
`Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC,
`906 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ..................................................................................................... 3
`Dropbox, Inc. v. Synchronoss Techs., Inc.,
`815 F. App’x 529 (Fed. Cir. 2020) .............................................................................................. 2
`Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
`822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ................................................................................................... 3
`GREE, Inc. v. Supercell Oy,
`855 F. App’x 740 (Fed. Cir. 2021) .................................................................................. 2, 3, 4, 5
`Mad Dogg Athletics, Inc. v. Peloton Interactive, Inc.,
`2021 WL 4206175 (E.D. Tex September 15, 2021) ................................................................... 1
`PC Connector Sols. LLC v. SmartDisk Corp.,
`406 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ................................................................................................... 6
`Sensormatic Electronics, LLC v. Wyze Labs, Inc.,
`2021 WL 2944838 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ........................................................................................ 1, 2
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`Case 5:22-cv-00069-RWS-JBB Document 148 Filed 12/27/23 Page 4 of 11 PageID #: 8076
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`OnePlus replies to Pantech’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement
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`of Invalidity and Non-Infringement of the ’654 patent (Dkt. 119, “Opp.”).
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`I.
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`ARGUMENT
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`A. The Asserted ’654 Patent Claims Are Patent Ineligible
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`1.
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`Dependent Claims 6, 8, and 10 are Patent Ineligible
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`Pantech argues that claim 1 is not representative of claims 6, 8 and 10. Opp. 5–6.
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`Pantech, however, offers no substantive reasons why OnePlus’s analysis of claim 1 as
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`representative is incorrect––except with a conclusory assertion regarding claim 10. Opp. 6. This
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`is legally insufficient. Sensormatic Elecs., LLC v. Wyze Labs, Inc., 2021 WL 2944838, at *4
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`(Fed. Cir. 2021) (a claim is properly considered as representative “if the patentee does not
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`present any meaningful argument for the distinctive significance of any claim limitations not
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`found in the representative claim” (citation omitted)); Mad Dogg Athletics, Inc. v. Peloton
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`Interactive, Inc., 2021 WL 4206175, at *3–4 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2021) (claim held
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`representative where dependent claims are “substantially similar and linked to the same abstract
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`idea”).
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`There is no “distinctive significance” in any additional claim limitation of dependent
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`claims 6, 8 or 10. In its Step One analysis, Pantech simply string-cites claims 1, 6, 8 and 10 as all
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`being directed to the same idea—provision of a “user interface” for electronic devices with
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`“limited screen sizes.” Opp. 7. Although Pantech identifies a minor distinction for claim 10 (id.
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`at 7, 11), the limitation that Pantech relies on—restrict a selection of the displayed first object—
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`is nothing more than a general description of conventional touchscreen functionality. The’654
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`patent specification adds nothing to the generic language in claim 10, as the disclosure relevant
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`to claim 10 states “[t]he control unit 105 may control the interface 101 to restrict a selection of a
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`Case 5:22-cv-00069-RWS-JBB Document 148 Filed 12/27/23 Page 5 of 11 PageID #: 8077
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`first object while a second object is being displayed.” ’654 patent, 5:46–48. At best, this
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`provides a general description of a conventional function repeated in the claim. See GREE, Inc.
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`v. Supercell Oy, 855 F. App’x 740, 743 (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2021) (finding dependent claims
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`“recite only patent-ineligible subject matter. As is the case with the independent claims, neither
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`the dependent claims themselves nor the specification explains how the specifying operation
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`works except in generic terms”). The prosecution history is in accord. Ex 11 to OnePlus’s
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`Motion (Dkt. 84; “Mot.”) at 3–8. Like claim 1, the functional language in claim 10—specifying
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`a result and not explaining how to achieve that result—demonstrates of its abstract nature
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`because it fails to “describe how to solve the problem in a manner that encompasses something
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`more than the ‘principle in the abstract.’” Dropbox, Inc. v. Synchronoss Techs., Inc., 815 F.
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`App’x 529, 533 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 19, 2020). Claims 6 and 8 also fail to offer any meaningful
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`limitation beyond the abstract idea. They also recite functional limitations of a conventional
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`touchscreen without any specific explanation for how to achieve them. See id; Ex. 11.
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`Accordingly, Pantech has not provided “meaningful argument for the distinctive significance of
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`any claim limitations not found in the representative claim.” See Sensormatic, 2021 WL
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`2944838, at *4.
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`2.
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`The Asserted Claims are Directed to an Abstract Idea
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`Pantech argues that, under Step One, the asserted claims do not recite an abstract idea
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`because they are directed to following:
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`how to use a ‘touch region’ as a tool to identify a user’s intentions as
`to a first object (i.e. “identify an object that is overlapped by the touch
`input in the touch region as a first object”), discloses providing a
`second object in a new area based on the user’s input (i.e. “generate a
`second object based on the first object, and to display the second object
`in an untouched region”), and provides the option of executing an
`action if that second object is selected, or else removing the second
`object if no action is taken within a certain period of time (i.e. “execute
`an operation corresponding to the second object if the second object is
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`Case 5:22-cv-00069-RWS-JBB Document 148 Filed 12/27/23 Page 6 of 11 PageID #: 8078
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`selected [or] remove[] the display of the second object if the second
`object is not selected within a reference period of time”).
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`Opp. 6. Pantech, however, simply re-characterizes claim 1 of the ’654 patent in different.
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`Pantech does not show how the claims here at issue are anything more than the abstract idea of
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`manipulation of data on a touchscreen, as explained by OnePlus. See Dkt. 84 at 11.
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`Pantech argues that the “claims provide ‘an improvement in the functioning of a
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`computer.’” Opp. 7 (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir.
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`2016)). In doing so, Pantech likens the asserted claims to those at issue in Core Wireless and
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`Data Engine. Opp. 7. However, the claims in Core Wireless and Data Engine recited specific
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`structure, unlike the claims at issue here. See Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs.,
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`Inc., 880 F.3d 1356, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[L]imitations disclose a specific manner of
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`displaying a limited set of information to the user, rather than using conventional user interface
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`methods to display a generic index on a computer.”); Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC,
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`906 F.3d 999, 1008–09 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he claims require a specific interface and
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`implementation for navigating complex three-dimensional spreadsheets using techniques unique
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`to computers.”). Further, in GREE, Inc. v. Supercell Oy, the court distinguished the claims in
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`Core Wireless and Data Engine explaining that they were directed to “a specific manner of
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`displaying a limited set of information’” as contrasted with conventional user interfaces. GREE,
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`855 Fed.Appx. at 742–43 (upholding finding that claims were patent ineligible). Similar to
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`GREE, claim 1 of the ’654 patent does not provide a specific manner of displaying a limited set
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`of information, but rather recites generic steps of temporarily displaying a second object based
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`on a touch input on a first object, so long as the second object is displayed in an untouched
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`region—in other words, data manipulation on a touchscreen. See Mot. 10. Claim 1 of the ’654
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`patent does not limit the information displayed other than that it be based on an object on the
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`Case 5:22-cv-00069-RWS-JBB Document 148 Filed 12/27/23 Page 7 of 11 PageID #: 8079
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`display, nor does claim 1 provide a specific manner of displaying the information other than it be
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`temporarily displayed in an “untouched region.” These generic limitations of claim 1 do not
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`represent any improvement to technology, much less an improvement that rises above the
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`abstract idea of manipulating data on a touchscreen.
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`3.
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`There is Nothing Transformative in the Claims of the ’654 Patent
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`Under Step Two, Pantech argues that OnePlus did not meet its burden to show the
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`remaining claimed features are routine and conventional. Opp. 10. This is untrue. As explained
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`in OnePlus’s Motion, limitations in the asserted claims beyond the abstract idea of manipulating
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`data on the touchscreen are directed to basic touch and display operations found in conventional
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`touchscreen devices. See Mot. 13.
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`Pantech also argues that patent eligibility is supported by the claims’ recitation of a
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`“touch region” that allows an imprecise initial touch to be clarified “or else the second object is
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`removed within a reference period of time.” Opp. 11. However, the claims are silent on touch
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`input clarification. The claims’ recitation of removing the second object after a reference period
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`of time is not premised upon any touch input clarification or the lack thereof, as is evidenced by
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`Pantech’s reading of the asserted claims to cover the accused “auto screen off” functionality in
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`the accused products. Pantech’s purported transformative features are not present in the asserted
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`claims and cannot, therefore, transform the claims into patent eligible subject matter. See GREE,
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`855 Fed.Appx. at 743 (“[T]he limitations separately and in their ordered combination were
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`routine and conventional . . . [because] none of the syntax of touches and swipes that GREE cites
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`as its inventive step are captured in any of the elements of the claims.”).
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`With respect to claim 10, Pantech further argues that the feature of “‘restrict[ing] a
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`selection of the first object while the second object is selected’” is transformative because it
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`“improve[es] the user’s ability to use the device.” Opp. 11. However, improving a user’s ability
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`Case 5:22-cv-00069-RWS-JBB Document 148 Filed 12/27/23 Page 8 of 11 PageID #: 8080
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`to use the device is a characterization that applies to virtually all features of the device.
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`Therefore, Pantech’s conclusory statement that a claim element improves a user’s ability does
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`not show that the feature is transformative. See GREE, 855 Fed. Appx. at 743.
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`Finally, Pantech cites to opinions of its expert that the claims of the ’654 patent solve
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`fundamental Graphical User Interface (GUI) problems “minimize errors in element selection,
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`data entry, and error correction based on the spacing of critical interaction elements on the GUI
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`design.” Opp. 11. However, none of these alleged improvements are tied to any particular claim
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`limitation. Thus, Pantech’s expert’s conclusory statements about problems allegedly solved by
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`the claims of the ’654 patent cannot transform the claims into patent eligible subject matter. See
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`GREE, 855 Fed. Appx. at 743.
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`B.
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`No Issues of Fact Remain as to Infringement of the ’654 Patent Claims
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`Pantech argues that the “reference period of time” in claim 1 is met by a time period set by
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`the “auto screen off” feature of the accused products, but not the feature itself. Opp. 12. This is a
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`distinction without a difference. Neither the “auto screen off” nor associated time period defines
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`a “reference period of time for displaying the second object,” as required by all asserted claims as
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`construed by the Court. See Ex. 3 to Mot. (Claim Construction Order) at 53.
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`Pantech claims that its infringement contentions do not violate the Court’s claim
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`construction because the “second objects” in the accused products are removed at the expiration
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`of the time period of the auto screen off feature. Opp. 13. Pantech ignores that the Court, in
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`arriving at its construction, specified that the “inclusion of ‘for displaying the second object’ . . .
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`[ties] the limitation to not just any time, but the time the second object is displayed.’” Ex. 3 to
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`Mot. at 53. Here, the accused time period specified by the “auto screen off” feature is in no way
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`set “for displaying the second object.” To the contrary, it is undisputed that the time period for the
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`Case 5:22-cv-00069-RWS-JBB Document 148 Filed 12/27/23 Page 9 of 11 PageID #: 8081
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`“auto screen off” exists while the touchscreen is active in order to turn the touchscreen off after a
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`certain period of inactivity regardless of what is displayed on the touchscreen.
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` Pantech also argues that the time period of the auto screen off feature is “for the second
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`object” because certain objects it labels as second objects are removed, while other objects are not.
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`Opp. 13–14. Removal of some objects once the time period expires versus other objects not being
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`removed just shows that the time period of the auto screen off feature is untethered to the displayed
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`objects. See Mot. 18. For this reason, the time period cannot be a “reference period of time for
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`displaying the second object,” as required by the Court’s construction.
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`Pantech asserts that “[a]ll that matters is that ‘the control unit [of the accused products]
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`removes the display of the second object if the second object is not selected within a reference
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`period of time.” Opp. 15. Pantech ignores that showing infringement requires mapping features
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`of accused products to the properly construed limitations of the asserted claims. See PC Connector
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`Sols. LLC v. SmartDisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (summary judgement of non-
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`infringement is appropriate when “no reasonable jury could find that every limitation recited in a
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`properly construed claim [is] . . . found in the accused device.”). A “reference period of time for
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`displaying the second object” it is not satisfied by the accused time period for the auto screen off
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`feature when some objects are removed and others are not. Pantech simply has not shown that the
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`time period of the auto screen off feature is a referenced period of time for displaying any objects
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`on the touchscreen.
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`II.
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`CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons and those in OnePlus’s opening brief, the Court should allow
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`summary judgment of (1) patent ineligibility of asserted claims 1, 6, 8, and 10 of the ’654 Patent,
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`and (2) no infringement of asserted claims 1, 6, 8, and 10 of the ’654 Patent.
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`Case 5:22-cv-00069-RWS-JBB Document 148 Filed 12/27/23 Page 10 of 11 PageID #: 8082
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`Respectfully Submitted,
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`Date: December 20, 2023
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` /s/ G. Blake Thompson
`G. Blake Thompson
` State Bar No. 24042033
` Blake@TheMannFirm.com
`J. Mark Mann
` State Bar No. 12926150
` Mark@TheMannFirm.com
` MANN | TINDEL | THOMPSON
` 112 E. Line Street, Suite 304
` Tyler, Texas 75702
` Telephone (903) 657-8540
`Facsimile (903) 657-6003
`
`LEYDIG, VOIT & MAYER, LTD.
`David M. Airan (lead counsel)
`Wesley O. Mueller
`Robert T. Wittmann
`Paul J. Filbin
`Leonard Z. Hua
`Christopher J. Gass
`John K. Winn
`Nicole Kopinski
`Pei Chen
`Two Prudential Plaza
`180 N. Stetson Ave., Suite 4900
`Chicago, IL 60601
`(312) 616-5600
`dairan@leydig.com
`wmueller@leydig.com
`bwittmann@leydig.com
`pfilbin@leydig.com
`lhua@leydig.com
`cgass@leydig.com
`jwinn@leydig.com
`nkopinski@leydig.com
`rchen@leydig.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`OnePlus Technologies
`(Shenzhen) Co. Ltd.
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`Case 5:22-cv-00069-RWS-JBB Document 148 Filed 12/27/23 Page 11 of 11 PageID #: 8083
`Case 5:22-cv-00069-RWS-JBB Document 148 Filed 12/27/23 Page 11 of 11 PagelD #: 8083
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned certifies that
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`the foregoing document was filed electronically in
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`compliance with Local Rule CV-S(a). Plaintiffs’ counsel of record were served with a true and
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`correct copy of the foregoing document by electronic mail on December20, 2023.
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`/s/ G. Blake Thompson
`G. Blake Thompson
`
`