Case 9:20-cv-00078-MJT Document 14 Filed 10/23/20 Page 1 of 31 PageID #: 184
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS,
`LUFKIN DIVISION
`
`CLARK CHANDLER,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`v.
`
`
`PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORPORATION,
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Civil Action No. 9:20-cv-78-RC-ZJH
`
`DEFENDANT PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORPORATION’S
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
`
`John B. Brown
`Texas Bar No. 00793412
`john.brown@ogletreedeakins.com
`Matthew P. Gizzo
`Texas Bar No. 24117188
`matthew.gizzo@ogletreedeakins.com
`OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH,
`SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
`8117 Preston Road, Suite 500
`Dallas, TX 75225
`Phone: 214-987-3800
`Facsimile: 214-987-3927
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

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`Case 9:20-cv-00078-MJT Document 14 Filed 10/23/20 Page 2 of 31 PageID #: 185
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`STATEMENT OF ISSUES ................................................................................................ 1
`
`SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE ............................................................................ 2
`
`III.
`
`STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS ....................................................................... 3
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Plaintiff’s Employment with Pilgrim’s ................................................................... 3
`
`Plaintiff’s Employment with Common Disposal .................................................... 4
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Plaintiff’s Hiring ......................................................................................... 4
`
`Pilgrim’s business interactions and communications with Plaintiff and the
`Louts during Plaintiff’s employment at Common Disposal ....................... 5
`
`C.
`
`Plaintiff’s Prospective Employment with Georgia Poultry .................................... 7
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Georgia Poultry’s offer of employment to Plaintiff and its rescission ....... 7
`
`Clint Hamilton’s communications with Georgia Poultry in his personal
`capacity as a Georgia Poultry customer ...................................................... 8
`
`D.
`
`Plaintiff’s Current Relationship with Pilgrim’s ...................................................... 9
`
`IV.
`
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................... 10
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`Summary Judgment Standard of Review .............................................................. 10
`
`Plaintiff’s “Blacklisting” Claim Must Be Dismissed Because No Such Private
`Cause of Action Exists .......................................................................................... 11
`
`There Is No Evidence to Support Plaintiff’s Claim that Pilgrim’s Tortiously
`Interfered with His Employment with Common Disposal ................................... 13
`
`There Is No Evidence to Support Plaintiff’s Claim that Pilgrim’s Tortiously
`Interfered with His Prospective Employment with Georgia Poultry .................... 17
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`There is no evidence that Pilgrim’s or Clint Hamilton committed an
`independently tortious or unlawful act. .................................................... 18
`
`To the extent Clint Hamilton committed an independently tortious or
`unlawful act (which he did not), he did so outside the scope and authority
`of his employment with Pilgrim’s............................................................. 21
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 25
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................................... 26
`
`-i-
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`

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`Case 9:20-cv-00078-MJT Document 14 Filed 10/23/20 Page 3 of 31 PageID #: 186
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Federal Cases
`
`Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
`477 U.S. 242 (1986) .................................................................................................................10
`
`Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co.,
`402 F.3d 536 (5th Cir.2005) ....................................................................................................10
`
`Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
`477 U.S. 317 (1986) .................................................................................................................10
`
`Coll v. Abaco Operating LLC,
`2011 WL 1831748, *5 (E.D. Tex. May 12, 2011) ...................................................................11
`
`Hernandez v. Dell, Inc.,
`2008 WL 11411513 (W.D. Tex. June 24, 2008) .....................................................................11
`
`Lewallen v. Conmed Corp.,
`261 Fed. App’x 704 (5th Cir. 2008) ........................................................................................17
`
`Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
`475 U.S. 574 (1986) .................................................................................................................10
`
`Niemietz v. City of Converse,
`2017 WL 6265089 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2017) .........................................................................12
`
`Peacock v. AARP, Inc.,
`181 F. Supp. 3d 430 (S.D. Tex. 2016) .....................................................................................11
`
`Resolution Trust Corp. v. Sharif-Munir-Davidson Dev. Corp.,
`992 F.2d 1398 (5th Cir. 1993) .................................................................................................11
`
`Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools,
`75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) .....................................................................................11
`
`Stults v. Conoco, Inc.,
`76 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996) .....................................................................................................11
`
`Other State Cases
`
`ACS Investors, Inc. v. McLaughlin,
`943 S.W. 2d 426 (Tex. 1997) ...................................................................................................13
`
`Aguilar v. Chastain,
`923 S.W. 2d 740 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, writ denied) .........................................................12
`
`-ii-
`
`

`

`Case 9:20-cv-00078-MJT Document 14 Filed 10/23/20 Page 4 of 31 PageID #: 187
`
`Brown v. De La Cruz,
`156 S.W. 3d 560 (Tex. 2004) ...................................................................................................11
`
`Chambers v. Garay,
`--- S.W. 3d ----, 2020 WL 4569030 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 7, 2020, no
`pet.) ..........................................................................................................................................12
`
`Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp.,
`417 S.W. 3d 909 (Tex. 2013) ...................................................................................................18
`
`CRSS Inc. v. Runion,
`992 S.W. 2d 1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no pet.) ..............................................12
`
`GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups,
`429 S.W. 3d 752 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. denied) ..................................................12
`
`Lee v. Levi Strauss & Co.,
`897 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1995, no writ.) ............................................................17
`
`Seifert v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
`567 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1978, no writ) .........................................................22
`
`Southwestern. Bell Tel. Co. v. John Carlo Tex., Inc.,
`843 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1992) ....................................................................................................13
`
`Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Hagenloh,
`247 S.W. 2d 236 (Tex. 1952) ...................................................................................................21
`
`Texas Beef Cattle Co. v. Green,
`921 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1996) ....................................................................................................13
`
`Wagner v. Caprock Beef Packers Co.,
`540 S.W. 2d 303 (Tex. 1976) .......................................................................................21, 22, 25
`
`Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges,
`52 S.W. 3d 711 (Tex. 2001) ...............................................................................................18, 20
`
`Federal Statutes
`
`28 U.S.C.
`§§ 1332(a), 1441, and 1446 .......................................................................................................2
`
`Other State Statutes
`
`Tex. Lab. Code
`§ 103.003(a) .............................................................................................................................19
`§ 103.004(a) .............................................................................................................................19
`§ 52.031......................................................................................................................1, 2, 11, 12
`
`-iii-
`
`

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`Case 9:20-cv-00078-MJT Document 14 Filed 10/23/20 Page 5 of 31 PageID #: 188
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ......................................................................................................................10
`
`Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A cmt. b ...................................................................................13
`
`Tex. Civ. Ann. art. 5196(1) ............................................................................................................12
`
`Tex. Civ. Ann. art. 5199 ................................................................................................................12
`
`
`
`
`-iv-
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`

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`Case 9:20-cv-00078-MJT Document 14 Filed 10/23/20 Page 6 of 31 PageID #: 189
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS,
`LUFKIN DIVISION
`
`
`
`
`
`Civil Action No. 9:20-cv-78-RC-ZJH
`
`CLARK CHANDLER,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`v.
`
`
`PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORPORATION,
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`
`
`
`
`DEFENDANT PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORPORATION’S
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
`
`Defendant Pilgrim’s Pride (“Pilgrim’s”) hereby moves this Court to enter summary
`
`judgment in favor of Pilgrim’s on all claims asserted by Plaintiff Clark Chandler (“Plaintiff”)
`
`because there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and Plaintiff’s claims for blacklisting,
`
`tortious interference with existing contract, and tortious interference with prospective employment
`
`fail as a matter of law. Pilgrim’s supports its motion with the summary judgment evidence
`
`included in the Appendix in Support of Summary Judgment filed herewith.
`
`I. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
`
`1.
`
`Whether Plaintiff can pursue a claim for blacklisting, pursuant to Texas Labor Code
`
`§ 52.031, where the statute does not expressly provide for a private cause of action and the Texas
`
`legislature has not demonstrated a legislative intent that the statute provide for a private cause of
`
`action?
`
`DEFENDANT PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORPORATION’S
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
`
`Page 1
`
`

`

`Case 9:20-cv-00078-MJT Document 14 Filed 10/23/20 Page 7 of 31 PageID #: 190
`
`2.
`
`Whether Plaintiff can succeed on his claim for tortious interference with existing
`
`contract, stemming from his employment with Common Disposal, where he has no evidence that
`
`Pilgrim’s willfully and intentionally interfered with his employment?
`
`3.
`
`Whether Plaintiff can succeed on his claim for tortious interference with
`
`prospective employment, stemming from his prospective employment with Georgia Poultry / Hog
`
`Slat (“Georgia Poultry”), where he has no evidence that Pilgrim’s conduct was independently
`
`tortious?
`
`II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE
`
`PROCEDURAL HISTORY
`
`1.
`
`On March 17, 2020, Plaintiff Clark Chandler filed an Original Petition and Jury
`
`Demand the 145th Judicial District Court in Nacogdoches, Texas, captioned Clark Chandler v.
`
`Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation, bearing Case No. C2035608 (the “Original Petition,” cited as “Pet.”).
`
`The Original Petition alleges claims for “blacklisting,” pursuant to Texas Labor Code § 52.031,
`
`tortious interference with existing contract, and tortious interference with prospective employment
`
`(ECF No. 1-2).
`
`2.
`
`On April 10, 2020, Pilgrim’s timely interposed an Answer in response to Original
`
`Petition, which contained affirmative defenses (the “Answer”)(ECF No. 1-3).
`
`3.
`
`On April 20, 2020, Pilgrim’s timely removed the case to this Court, pursuant to 28
`
`U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441, and 1446 (ECF No. 1).
`
`4.
`
`On September 25, 2020, Pilgrim’s timely filed a First Amended Answer (the “First
`
`Amended Answer”)(ECF No. 13).
`
`DEFENDANT PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORPORATION’S
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
`
`Page 2
`
`

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`Case 9:20-cv-00078-MJT Document 14 Filed 10/23/20 Page 8 of 31 PageID #: 191
`
`III. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
`
`A.
`
`Plaintiff’s Employment with Pilgrim’s
`
`Pilgrim’s employed Plaintiff on two separate occasions; from May 1998 to May 2005 and
`
`then again from February 2014 to December 31, 2018. Pilgrim’s initially hired Plaintiff in May
`
`of 1998 as an Accounting Manager at Pilgrim’s Nacogdoches Complex. App. 2 (Deposition of
`
`Clark Chandler (“Chandler Tr.”) 32:7–12). In 2001 or 2002, Pilgrim’s promoted Plaintiff to
`
`Regional Accounting Manager, where he oversaw the live operations accounting for a number of
`
`Pilgrim’s complexes, including the Nacogdoches Complex. App. 3 (Chandler Tr. 36:15–19).
`
`Plaintiff remained in the Regional Accounting Manager position until he left Pilgrim’s in May
`
`2005. Id. at 36:20–37:1; App. 45–48 (Chandler Ex. 11).
`
`Plaintiff then returned to Pilgrim’s in March 2014 as a Production Manager for the
`
`Nacogdoches Complex. App. 4–5 (Chandler Tr. 45:6–46:6, 47:10–16).1 In or around mid-2016,
`
`Plaintiff interviewed for, and ultimately accepted, the position of Live Operations Manager at the
`
`Complex. App. 10–11 (Chandler Tr. 72:11–73:17, 74:11–18). Plaintiff’s first day as Live
`
`Operations Manager was September 3, 2016. App. 11 (Chandler Tr. 74:11–18, 75:12–15). As
`
`Live Operations Manager, Plaintiff oversaw the implementation of Pilgrim’s poultry growing
`
`programs at the poultry farms with which it contracted. See App. 5–6 (Chandler Tr. 48:24–49:1,
`
`52:12–16). He also was responsible for ensuring the live operations’ key performance indicators
`
`(“KPIs”) were meeting expectations. App. 5 (Chandler Tr. 48:24–49:1).
`
`During Plaintiff’s tenure as Live Operations Manager, the live operations’ KPIs were
`
`consistently below expectations. App. 12–13 (Chandler Tr. 97:16–98:23, 101:16–21); App. 42
`
`
`1 When Plaintiff returned to Pilgrim’s in 2014, he reviewed Pilgrim’s Employee Handbook, and executed the
`Handbook Acknowledgement, acknowledging his understanding of the Handbook’s contents as well as his receipt of
`the Handbook. App. 6-7 (Chandler Tr. 52:25–54:1); App. 41 (Chandler Ex. 3).
`
`DEFENDANT PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORPORATION’S
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
`
`Page 3
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`

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`Case 9:20-cv-00078-MJT Document 14 Filed 10/23/20 Page 9 of 31 PageID #: 192
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`(Chandler Ex. 5). On May 20, 2018, Plaintiff’s Supervisor, Brian Manley, placed Plaintiff on a
`
`30-day Performance Improvement Plan due to the ongoing underperformance of the Nacogdoches
`
`Complex’s KPIs. Pilgrim’s expected Plaintiff to demonstrate significant improvements in the
`
`Complex’s KPIs in the next 30 days. App. 14 (Chandler Tr. 102:25–103:22); App. 43–44
`
`(Chandler Ex. 7). At the conclusion of the 30-day improvement period, the Complex’s KPIs had
`
`not sufficiently improved. App. 15 (Chandler Tr. 106:14–107:2). As a result, Pilgrim’s relieved
`
`Plaintiff of his duties as the Live Operations Manager on July 5, 2018, and reassigned him to work
`
`as a Production Manager in Technical Services at the Complex. Id. at 106:14–18.
`
`Plaintiff remained in his role as a Production Manager in Technical Services until
`
`December 31, 2018, at which time his employment with Pilgrim’s ended because his position was
`
`eliminated for the 2019 calendar year. App. 16 (Chandler Tr. 111:15–112:15).
`
`B.
`
`Plaintiff’s Employment with Common Disposal
`
`1.
`
`Plaintiff’s Hiring
`
`On February 15, 2019, shortly after his employment with Pilgrim’s ended, Plaintiff went
`
`to work for Ricky and Dusty Lout as the Controller of Common Disposal, a saltwater disposal and
`
`trucking company they owned. App. 17 (Chandler Tr. 114:8–115:13). At the same time, the Louts
`
`also employed Plaintiff at an affiliated company owned by Dusty Lout called Dusty Lout Agri
`
`Services. Id. at 116:12–22. The Louts hired Plaintiff to work for them, in part, because of his
`
`experience working at Pilgrim’s. Id. at 114:14–115:3. Specifically, the Louts were hoping Plaintiff
`
`could help them control costs and maximize profits at their poultry farms, which were
`
`independently contracted “growers” for Pilgrim’s. App. 19 (Chandler Tr. 123:13–15).
`
`Before hiring Plaintiff, the Louts (on their own accord) contacted Pilgrim’s Executive Vice
`
`President of Technical Operations (Live Operations), Randy Stroud, to make sure that hiring
`
`Plaintiff would not create any issues or problems for them given their ongoing business relations
`
`DEFENDANT PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORPORATION’S
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
`
`Page 4
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`

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`Case 9:20-cv-00078-MJT Document 14 Filed 10/23/20 Page 10 of 31 PageID #: 193
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`with Pilgrim’s. App. 18 (Chandler Tr. 118:11–119:19). Stroud told the Louts Plaintiff had a “good
`
`record” at Pilgrim’s, and there should be no problem hiring him and that he could go to work for
`
`them in any capacity. Id. at 120:3–25. Plaintiff previously had worked with Stroud at Pilgrim’s
`
`and held Stroud in the highest regard. He also had the utmost respect for him, which he still does
`
`to this day. App. 8, 29 (Chandler Tr. 58:11–24, 176:6–177:1).
`
`2.
`
`Pilgrim’s business interactions and communications with Plaintiff and the Louts
`during Plaintiff’s employment at Common Disposal
`
`Part of Plaintiff’s job with Common Disposal and Dusty Lout Agri Services was to assist
`
`the Louts in overseeing their poultry farm operations and liaising with Pilgrim’s service
`
`technicians assigned to monitor the implementation of Pilgrim’s programs at the farms.2 App. 17,
`
`19 (Chandler Tr. 115:14–18, 124:17–25). Because Pilgrim’s service technicians were accustomed
`
`to interacting with the Louts’ farmhands, one Pilgrim’s service technician named Rylee Fountain
`
`was initially hesitant to speak with Plaintiff when she first saw him in the control room at one of
`
`the farms. App. 20 (Chandler Tr. 126:22–127:12). In response, Fountain contacted Pilgrim’s Live
`
`Operations Manager, Brad Cunningham, for guidance. App. 20 (Chandler Tr. 126:22–127:12).
`
`Cunningham, in turn, called Ricky Lout, who confirmed Plaintiff was assisting them on their farm
`
`operations. Id. at 127:17–25. To Plaintiff’s knowledge, at no time did Cunningham or anyone else
`
`at Pilgrim’s indicate there was an issue with Plaintiff assisting the Louts in that capacity or in any
`
`other capacity. App. 20, 36 (Chandler Tr. 128:4–7, 244:11–245:4, 245:11–23). Thereafter,
`
`Plaintiff continued overseeing the Louts’ poultry farms. App. 20 (Chandler Tr. 127:5–12, 128:8–
`
`11). Plaintiff also continued to communicate regularly with Pilgrim’s service technicians assigned
`
`to the Louts’ farms. App. 19–20 (Chandler Tr. 125:23–126:11). In fact, some of Pilgrim’s service
`
`
`2 The Louts’ poultry farms were not part of Common Disposal, nor were they part of Dusty Lout Agri Services.
`Rather, each farm was its own separate entity. App. 17 (Chandler Tr. 116:3–11).
`
`DEFENDANT PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORPORATION’S
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
`
`Page 5
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`

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`Case 9:20-cv-00078-MJT Document 14 Filed 10/23/20 Page 11 of 31 PageID #: 194
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`techs seemed to prefer corresponding with Plaintiff rather than the farmhands. App. 23–24
`
`(Chandler Tr. 141:20–142:4).
`
`On another occasion, one of the Louts’ farms assigned to Rylee Fountain that had been
`
`underperforming experienced an issue with its “controller”—i.e. the computer that operates the
`
`farm’s lighting program, monitors the farm’s temperature, and controls when the feed comes on,
`
`etc. App. 21, 23 (Chandler Tr. 130:21–131:8, 140:18–21). Fountain reported the issue to one of
`
`her managers at Pilgrim’s, as she was concerned Plaintiff may have changed the controller’s
`
`settings since he was in charge of overseeing the farms at that time. App. 21 (Chandler Tr. 130:21–
`
`131:8). Given the critical nature of the issue, someone from Pilgrim’s contacted Ricky Lout to
`
`advise him of the situation. Id. at 130:21–131:8. This did not surprise Plaintiff, however, as he
`
`himself would have done the same thing if a similar issue were to have occurred and been reported
`
`to him while he was the Live Operations Manager. App. 22 (Chandler Tr. 134:17–136:10).
`
`At the time, Ricky Lout suggested that Plaintiff focus on his work for Common Disposal
`
`and temporarily step away from the farm operations. App. 21 (Chandler Tr. 132:12–14). To
`
`Plaintiff’s knowledge, Ricky Lout made the decision himself and not because anyone at Pilgrim’s
`
`suggested Plaintiff should not be overseeing the farms. Id. at 132:15–20. Rather, Lout seemed to
`
`be generally concerned with how the controller issue may affect his relationship with Pilgrim’s at
`
`an already underperforming farm. Id. at 132:22–133:8. Ultimately, it was determined that an
`
`electrical glitch in the system caused the controller malfunction. Id. at 132:4–10.
`
`Despite the controller issue, Plaintiff continued to work for Common Disposal and Dusty
`
`Lout Agri Services until September 30, 2019. App. 24 (Chandler Tr. 142:23–143:11). On
`
`September 30, 2019, Jake Matthews, an employee at Common Disposal, informed Plaintiff the
`
`Louts were terminating his employment and that they would pay him four weeks’ severance. App.
`
`DEFENDANT PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORPORATION’S
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
`
`Page 6
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`

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`Case 9:20-cv-00078-MJT Document 14 Filed 10/23/20 Page 12 of 31 PageID #: 195
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`25 (Chandler Tr. 146:11–23). Plaintiff immediately went to speak with Ricky Lout, who
`
`confirmed Plaintiff’s termination and explained to Plaintiff that he did not feel their relationship
`
`was working out. Id. at 147:25–148:24. At no point during the conversation did Lout mention
`
`Pilgrim’s or anyone from Pilgrim’s. Id. at 149:3–7.
`
`At the time the Louts terminated Plaintiff, he was soliciting bids from local poultry
`
`equipment suppliers to assist the Louts in building additional poultry farms. App. 24 (Chandler Tr.
`
`143:3–144:4). As part of that process, Plaintiff contacted Pilgrim’s Broiler Manager, Wendell
`
`Goad, to confirm Pilgrim’s specifications for new builds. App. 24–26 (Chandler Tr. 143:20–144:4,
`
`145:15–146:1). To Plaintiff’s knowledge, no one at Pilgrim’s communicated with the Louts that
`
`Pilgrim’s had any issue with Plaintiff’s involvement in that process, App. 36 (Chandler Tr. 245:11–
`
`23), nor did anyone from Pilgrim’s communicate that to Plaintiff. App. 26 (Chandler Tr. 155:1–
`
`156:17).
`
`C.
`
`Plaintiff’s Prospective Employment with Georgia Poultry
`
`1.
`
`Georgia Poultry’s offer of employment to Plaintiff and its rescission
`
`A couple of weeks after Plaintiff’s employment ended with Common Disposal, Plaintiff
`
`became aware of an open sales position with Georgia Poultry, App. 27 (Chandler Tr. 158:6–18), a
`
`poultry equipment supplier and poultry house builder. Id. at 160:3–19. Plaintiff interviewed with
`
`Patrick Harrison (“Harrison”), an employee of Georgia Poultry, around Thanksgiving at a local
`
`restaurant in Madisonville, Texas. App. 27–28 (Chandler Tr. 161:24–162:9, 162:19–163:2).
`
`Plaintiff then received a telephone call and an email from Bea Rosales at Georgia Poultry
`
`explaining the hiring process and discussing Plaintiff’s tentative start date as January 1, 2020. App.
`
`30–31 (Chandler Tr. 189:6–14, 189:24–190:13). Rosales explained that Georgia Poultry’s offer
`
`of employment was contingent on Plaintiff: (1) signing the offer letter, (2) signing Georgia
`
`Poultry’s confidentiality and non-compete agreement; (3) submitting to, and passing, a background
`
`DEFENDANT PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORPORATION’S
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
`
`Page 7
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`

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`Case 9:20-cv-00078-MJT Document 14 Filed 10/23/20 Page 13 of 31 PageID #: 196
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`check; and (4) successfully completing a preemployment drug screen test. Id. at 189:6–13, 190:23–
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`192:24; App. 49–52 (Chandler Ex. 15). The offer of employment that Plaintiff signed also made it
`
`clear that his employment was contingent on completing a preemployment drug screen test. App.
`
`32 (Chandler Tr. 194:4–195:16, 197:2–5); App. 16–54 (Chandler Ex. 16). Rosales scheduled
`
`Plaintiff to take his preemployment drug screen on December 16, 2019. App. 31 (Chandler Tr.
`
`191:18–192:6, 192:21–24). Rosales subsequently informed Plaintiff that he did not need to take
`
`the drug screen because it was on hold—a directive that came from corporate. App. 31 (Chandler
`
`Tr. 192:21–193:22). Before Plaintiff ever completed the necessary drug screen, Georgia Poultry
`
`rescinded its offer to him. App. 35 (Chandler Tr. 231:4–21).
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`2.
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`Clint Hamilton’s communications with Georgia Poultry in his personal capacity
`as a Georgia Poultry customer
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`Georgia Poultry rescinded Plaintiff’s offer after Harrison spoke with a local poultry farm
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`owner and operator Don “Clint” Hamilton (“Hamilton”), who also happened to be an Assistant
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`Broiler Manager at Pilgrim’s. App. 57 (Declaration of Don “Clint” Hamilton (“Hamilton Decl.”)
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`¶ 10). Harrison contacted Hamilton at the suggestion of Georgia Poultry’s East Texas retail store
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`manager, Brandon Mince, who knew Hamilton because he frequently purchased poultry
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`equipment for his poultry farms from Georgia Poultry’s East Texas retail store. App. 56–57
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`(Hamilton Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4, 8); see App. 62 (Deposition of Patrick Harrison (“Harrison Tr.”) 63:23–
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`64:1). Harrison spoke with Hamilton briefly and asked him about Plaintiff. App. 63 (Harrison Tr.
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`66:1–21); App. 57 (Hamilton Decl. ¶ 8). Hamilton, speaking in his personal capacity as a poultry
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`farm owner and operator, and not as a representative of Pilgrim’s, told Harrison he did not have a
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`good relationship with Plaintiff from their time working together at Pilgrim’s and that he would
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`no longer purchase equipment for his farms from Georgia Poultry if they hired Plaintiff. Id. See
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`also App. 63 (Harrison Tr. 66:16–67:11).
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`DEFENDANT PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORPORATION’S
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
`
`Page 8
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`

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`Case 9:20-cv-00078-MJT Document 14 Filed 10/23/20 Page 14 of 31 PageID #: 197
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`Hamilton did not suggest that Pilgrim’s would not do business with Georgia Poultry if it
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`hired Plaintiff, as it would have been outside his authority to do so, as well as in violation of
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`Pilgrim’s policies. App. 57 (Hamilton Decl. ¶ 9); App. 34 (Chandler Tr. 222:10–223:16); see App.
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`67 (Harrison Tr. 89:25–90:14).
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`Georgia Poultry did not do significant business with Pilgrim’s anyway. See App. 61, 63,
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`65 (Harrison Tr. 54:6–8, 56:8–10, 68:2–4, 75:17–24). Georgia Poultry primarily sold equipment
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`to local poultry growers (like Hamilton) that contracted with Pilgrim’s and other poultry producers
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`to provide them with chickens, as it was already an approved supplier for Pilgrim’s. App. 61, 64,
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`66 (Harrison Tr. 55:4-5, 56:2–4, 70:17–71:5, 88:20–22); App. 57–58 (Hamilton Decl. ¶ 10).
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`Pilgrim’s did not dictate where the poultry farmers purchased their farm equipment. App. 57–58
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`(Hamilton Decl. ¶¶ 7, 10). Rather, the growers were free to purchase their farm equipment from
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`any supplier—Georgia Poultry, Borders Poultry, East Texas Poultry, etc.—so long as the
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`equipment met Pilgrim’s approved specifications. Id. See also App. 61 (Harrison Tr. 55:13–16).
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`D.
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`Plaintiff’s Current Relationship with Pilgrim’s
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`After his employment with Pilgrim’s ended, Plaintiff maintained a good relationship with
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`many of his former Pilgrim’s colleagues and had no reason to believe they would not want to do
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`business with him. App. 36, 38 (Chandler Tr. 242:4–9, 251:18–21). Plaintiff even visited them at
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`the Nacogdoches Complex on numerous occasions after his termination. App. 33, 37 (Chandler
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`Tr. 215:1–7, 247:16–248:7). Plaintiff even recently applied and interviewed for an open position
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`at the Nacogdoches Complex. App. 38 (Chandler Tr. 250:19–251:12). Plaintiff continues to
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`remain eligible for rehire at Pilgrim’s. Id. at 250:19–24.
`
`DEFENDANT PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORPORATION’S
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
`
`Page 9
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`

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`Case 9:20-cv-00078-MJT Document 14 Filed 10/23/20 Page 15 of 31 PageID #: 198
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`A.
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`Summary Judgment Standard of Review
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`IV. ARGUMENT
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c) (“Rule 56”) requires the Court to grant
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`summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
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`file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
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`and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact
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`is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v.
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`Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of
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`“informing the Court of the basis of its motion” and identifying those portions of the record “which
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`it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
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`477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the burden of proof at trial lies with the nonmoving party, the movant
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`may satisfy its initial burden by “‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there
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`is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325. The moving party
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`does not need to negate the elements of the nonmovant’s case. Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co.,
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`402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir.2005).
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`Once the moving party meets its burden, the non-moving party must “go beyond the
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`pleadings” and identify “specific facts” in the record “showing that there is a genuine issue for
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`trial.” See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
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`574, 587 (1986). “This burden will not be satisfied by some metaphysical doubt as to the material
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`facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.”
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`Boudreaux, 402 F.3d at 540 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Little v. Liquid Air Corp.,
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`37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)). To meet this burden, the nonmovant must “identify specific
`
`evidence in the record” and “articulate the precise manner” in which that evidence supports her
`
`DEFENDANT PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORPORATION’S
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
`
`Page 10
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`

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`Case 9:20-cv-00078-MJT Document 14 Filed 10/23/20 Page 16 of 31 PageID #: 199
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`claims. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 656 (5th Cir. 1996). Moreover, “[t]here must be a
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`conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question.” Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d
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`989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if no
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`“rational trier of fact” could find that the nonmoving party could prevail on his case based on the
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`record evidence. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Sharif-Munir-Davidson Dev. Corp., 992 F.2d 1398,
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`1401 (5th Cir. 1993).
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`B.
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`Plaintiff’s “Blacklisting” Claim Must Be Dismissed Because No Such Private Cause
`of Action Exists
`
`Plaintiff’s cause of action for “blacklisting” must be dismissed because Texas Labor Code
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`§ 52.031 does not provide for a private cause of action.
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`Texas law is clear: “causes of action may be implied only when a legislative intent to do
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`so appears in the statute as written.” Brown v. De La Cruz, 156 S.W. 3d 560, 567 (Tex. 2004)
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`(emphasis added); Peacock v. AARP, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 3d 430, 436 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (emphasis
`
`added); see also Coll v. Abaco Operating LLC, 2011 WL 1831748, *5 (E.D. Tex. May 12, 2011)
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`(finding “it [] apparent that the Texas Supreme Court applies a ‘strict rule of construction’ to
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`statutory enforcement schemes and implies a cause of action only when the Legislature’s intent to
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`create a private cause of action is clearly expressed from the language of the statute as written”
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`(citing Brown, 156 S.W. 3d at 567)).
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`Here, a plain reading of Texas Labor Code § 52.031 indicates it does not confer a private
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`cause of action as wri